

# The Yoga Aphorisms of Patañjali

*with the Commentary of Bhoja Rājā*



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*English Translation by  
Rājendralāla Mitra*

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THE

YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI

WITH THE

COMMENTARY OF BHOJA RÁJÁ

AND

AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

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XXXV

## P R E F A C E.

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The doctrine of Pessimism as evolved by Schopenhauer and developed by Hartmann created quite a sensation in Europe. The novelty, the bold generalizations, the closeness and vigour of ratiocination with which it was set forth, endowed it with qualities which could not but attract attention and claim consideration. But, carefully analysed, it does not appear to have any pretension to novelty or originality to which its admirers lay claim.

The doctrine of evil as inseparable from the world is nearly as old as humanity. It was the dread of evil that drove the primitive man to seek the shelter of superhuman power, and laid the foundation of religion. There would have been no religion if there had been no dread of evil, here or hereafter. Nor would philosophy have had its birth had not the necessity arisen to discriminate between good and evil. Morality, too, presupposes a differentiation between that which is proper and that which is improper—of a consciousness, however vague and undefined, of future reward and punishment. Doubtless the doctrine assumes constant and unalloyed evil, and not a mixture of good and evil; but in so doing it only places the evil in the present condition, and transfers the

good to a hereafter, in a hazy, cloudy, dubious, undefined way, but does not absolutely deny it.

The preëminence of the unconscious Will is the most important element of the doctrine; and it, too, under the names of Freewill, Mâyá, Buddhi, and the like, has occupied men's mind and played its part in philosophy from a pretty remote period of antiquity.

Then comes the repugnance to worldly attractions, love, affection and joy; and under the form of asceticism it is almost as old as civilized man.

The denial of the existence of God is an assumption of no modern date; it unquestionably preceded the formation of human ideas about Divine Providence; and the assumption about the objectification of Will forms the corner-stone of the doctrine of Patanjali.

It might be said that, if thus the leading tenets of the Pessimist doctrine be old, their association into a compact and complete system is not so, and that in this respect it may well claim the full meed of praise for its originality. This, however, cannot be conceded. Even as are its tenets, so is it in its entirety as a system. What Schopenhauer enunciated in his 'World as Will and Idea' (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*) in 1819, and Hartmann worked out in his 'Philosophy of the Unconscious' (*Philosophie der Unbewussten*) in 1869, is no other than the nihilist philosophy of Buddha put forth in a modern European garb, or, as an able writer puts it, a system "little more than Buddhism vul-

garised." It is the farthest from my wish to assert that the two German philosophers have surreptitiously, or deliberately, borrowed their system from the Indians: it is almost certain that Schopenhauer at the beginning of this century had no knowledge of any Buddhist Philosophy, and Hartmann, working on the model of his predecessor, had, probably, no occasion to consult the texts of the Sunyaváda system of the Buddhists as accessible to him in meagre abstracts in European languages. The similitude may be—nay, most probably is—purely accidental, the result of human mind set to thinking in a particular line of ideas arriving at the same conclusion; but it exists, and is as clear as possible, and that is all that is here intended to be emphasized.

The system of Sákya Buddha is a modification of a more ancient and more fully developed doctrine—that of Kapila, as known under the name of Sánkhya. Thoroughly logical in its scheme of ratiocination, the Sánkhya enunciates that there is no proof of the existence of a Supreme Divinity, and therefore leaves it entirely out of consideration in its scheme of primal causation. Its words, as summarised in the text book of the school, but which is obviously of a much later date than Kapila, are, *I's'varásiddheḥ*: "It is not proved that there is a God." (Sánkhya, Aph. I, 92.) The idea is more fully developed and argued in a subsequent part of the work (*Vide infra*, pp. 31f). Sákya Buddha, less logical but more bold, adopted this idea in a positive form, instead of keeping the question open by admitting only the want of

dialectic demonstration. Schopenhauer does **the same** without any reserve, describing theism as “a tradition **of the nursery.**”

The next subject is Soul or **the** vitalizing and conscious principle **of** life. Kapila’s theory recognises its existence, assuming a separate soul for each living being. Buddha did **the** same. These souls are uncreate and eternal, never coming to an end. Buddha acknowledged and, indeed, made them **the** basis **of** his system, but practically, though not in so many words, he denied them absolute eternity, for his theory **of** Nirváṇa assigned them an ultimate and final goal after many transmigrations in *sunyatá*, vacuity or nihility. It may be that his Nirváṇa did not extend to absolute nihility, for there is nothing authentic and unquestionable in his sayings ; but his immediate followers, who developed **the** Maháyána school, announce it in unmistakable terms, and for **the** purposes **of** the present comparison this is enough. The German philosopher goes a step further, and insists on **the** absolute negation **of** Soul. His words put in English are, “there is no psyche ;” but unable to dispense with it altogether, he supplies its place by an “unconscious will” which plays **the** part **of** Soul. Practically this amounts to admitting Soul, but divesting it **of** its consciousness and eternity.

In **the** Sánkhya system, **the** category next after Soul is *Pradhána*, or Nature, having inherent in it **the** threefold qualities **of** goodness, foulness, and darkness, or as **the** Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya defines it, “**the** equilibrium **of** the three qualities,”

(‘*triguna-sámyam*’). The terminology is archaic, but it implies the sum-total of the laws and forces of nature, which regulate the course of the phenomenal world. Buddha availed himself of this category to the full, and Schopenhauer does the same, using only modern terms in conformity with the physical science of the day.

The next is Intellect. It is common to all the three systems under notice, and alike unconscious in all. The Sáṅkhyas call it *Mahat*, the Buddhists *Buddhi*, and Schopenhauer Will, “the Reality, the absolute Existence, the Ultimate Fact, the universal and fundamental essence of all activities, both of the organic and the inorganic world, the primordial thing whence we and everything proceed.” In the Yoga system, the term used is *chittva*, which, in the following pages, has been rendered into ‘thinking principle ;’ but would have been as well—nay more pointedly—expressed by will.

Kapila assigned real substantiality to matter. What the primitive Yogís thought about it we know not. Patanjali is silent on the subject in his *Yoga aphorisms*; but in his *Mahábháshya* he admits an absolute reality of it. He raises the question by saying, *yadi távad gunasamudáyo dravyam*, “if you hold matter to be the aggregate of qualities,” (IV, 1.) and then refutes the theory, Buddha’s idea of Sunyatá necessitated the same theory in a more prominent manner. He could not admit absolute reality to any thing, and as the inevitable nihilistic consequence of his creed, matter had to assume the character of a phantasmal play of mental phenomenality—

“ — A fleeting show  
For man's illusion given.”

The Vedánta took it up after him, Berkeley worked it out in England in the early part of the last century, and Schopenhauer has done the same in our own days.

As already stated the theory of evil—constant, ever-present evil in everything mundane,—is common to all the three schools. Kapila designed his system with the express object of removing “the threefold pain” which is inherent in existence (Aph. I). Buddha's dread of the ever-recurring pain of birth, existence, decay, and death, drove him to the shelter of nihilism, and the Pessimists of our day look upon pain as constant and inherent in worldly existence. The Yogíś, who represent a section of the Sánkhyas, sum up the fruit of worldly existence by the significant remark, “to the discriminating all are verily painful.” (Yoga, II, 15.) According to Hartmann “the world is so bad that it had better not exist, and that it is steadily becoming worse.”

Nor are the means devised for the removal of this evil different. Perfect knowledge, attainable by hard, unremitting study amidst the most rigorous asceticism and self-mortification, and total renunciation of the pleasures of the world, is the only remedy accessible to man. Neither Kapila nor Buddha would have any other, and Schopenhauer, after dwelling on the miseries of existence, and showing that even suicide was not enough to put a stop to them, asks, “ Whence then is deliverance to come?” and the answer given is “ In knowing that the world is radically and essentially bad. Such knowledge leaves no ground for

that old affirmation **of the** Will to live; it leads to a negation **of** Will, to a renunciation **of** desire, which, completed by means **of** asceticism and mortification, must attain that perfect freedom **of** Will, that true *Nirvána* in which there is no more Will, therefore no longer an ideal presentation, or a real world."

In so far **the** correspondence is as close as possible in works set apart by an interval **of** considerably over four and twenty centuries—between Buddhism **of the** 6th century before Christ and **the** Pessimism **of** our own times. A learned writer describes Pessimism as **the** "goal **of** modern thought" in Europe. If so, that "goal" was reached in India over four and twenty centuries ago.

Nor should **the** limit be set there. It is impossible to believe that Sánkhyism, like Minerva, issued forth in all its perfection at once. It is but natural to suppose that many ontological and biological questions, such as God, soul, mind, primary causation, &c., must have formed **the** theme **of** speculation and enquiry from a long anterior period, to prepare **the** Indian mind for **the** conception and reception **of** so recondite a system as **the** Sánkhya. Kapila could not have conceived and brought it forth, had not his predecessors discussed and made themselves familiar with such philosophical ideas. There must have existed many doctrines, many dogmas, many theories to afford him **the** necessary materials to work out his scheme. Even as Bacon's *Novum Organum* was not **the** spontaneous generation **of** a novel thought, but **the** crystallization or solidification **of** ideas which

were extant at the time in a more or less undefined, nebulous way, so was Kapila's Sánkhya. Various phases of philosophic thought were well known and current in his time, and his was the master mind which put them together to create a complete system. The bricks existed, and Kapila was the architect who used them in constructing a novel edifice.

How long before the time of Kapila metaphysical dogmas had currency among the Hindus we know not for certain; but the remarkable hymn in the Rig Veda which discusses whether entity or non-entity existed before creation (X, 129) carries us to a remote period of antiquity beyond which we cannot speculate. The reference in the Sáma Veda to a Yati who condemned sacrifices, and whose wealth was transferred to Bhṛigu, is equally germane to the point. According to the Aitareya Bráhmaṇa some such Yatis were punished by being thrown before jackals. In the A'ranyakas period of Vedic history, these rationalistic speculations and metaphysical controversies were of frequent occurrence, and the Upanishads have preserved for us the substance of some of the orthodox speculations on the subject. They afford us traces also of the heterodox dogmas which they were intended to combat. Kautsa was the leader of one of the rationalistic schools, and he is named by Yáska. Jábála was an atheist, and his name occurs in the Upanishads. Páṇini alludes to atheists, sceptics, fatalists, and revilers of the Vedas. It may be taken for granted without any offence to reason that these heterodox people did entertain many dog-

mas in opposition to **the** received exposition of primal causation and other recondite doctrines **of** the Hindu faith. They could not have been heterodox if they had not adverse theories to propound ; and they must have been met by counter theories to keep up **the** antagonism. One may go further and assume that these, disputes led to **the** development **of** adverse schools **of** thought which have since been overthrown by later developments. The earliest Vedic cultus was purely ritualistic. It embraced prayers and peace-offerings—prayers in set forms, and peace-offerings in **the** form **of** sacrifices accompanied by libations **of** spirituous liquors. Those who reviled the Vedic religion opposed it principally on **the** ground **of** **the** futility, cruelty and unmeaning character **of** the offerings. The atheists, pure and simple, denounced **the** whole system as false. This, however, was a purely destructive course, and not calculated to win **the** multitude in its favour. Mere negation suggests **the** idea **of** **the** doctrine **of** Metrodorics, **the** Epicurean, which had for its main object **the** stomach. Society needed some check to vice by holding up a threat **of** future retribution, and absolute negation **of** divine providence and future life did not provide it. Besides, a future state being admitted, a preparation for it in **the** present state was felt a necessity, and a large majority **of** **the** opponents, therefore, appealed to self-torture and meditation for aid.

Meditation as a means **of** communion with **the** Divinity was known long before **the** date **of** the Sánkhya. Indeed, in all ancient forms **of** religion,

meditation occupies a prominent place as a religious exercise. In the Rig Veda the Gáyatrí enjoins the meditation of the divine light which vivifies the solar luminary as the most sacred act of devotion, and that meditation occurs in endless forms in the rituals of all subsequent sects and systems. This meditation is called *Dhyána*, the word used in the Gáyatrí being the verb *dhímahi* "may we meditate." Now, this *Dhyána* cannot be performed without fixing the mind on one particular object after abstracting it from worldly cares and enjoyments, and this fixation is called *Dháraná*, or steadfastness. The abstraction necessarily implies some amount of asceticism and austerity, and this is called in the Vedas *Tapas*. A man must foreswear all worldly enjoyments before he can fix his mind on one unworldly object, and the fixation must take place before he can begin a meditation. Austerity, therefore, forms the first step in the process; fixation or steadfastness the second; and meditation the third; and all these exercises have enjoyed a halo of sanctity from a remote period of antiquity. No Rishi could live without his hermitage; none without performing *Tapas*; none without steadfast devotion; none without his meditation. These are the essential attributes of a Rishi. It would be a contradiction in terms to suppose a Rishi could be so, without them. They suggest the idea of communion with something superhuman, and create a feeling of mysterious awe and veneration in the mind of the common herd. At first the object of meditation was of course the Divinity in some form

or other; but atheistic philosophers soon found it practicable to dispense with that object, and they converted **the** objective thought to a subjective one, and thus produced **the** highest meditation **of the** Sánkhyas, a meditation in which **the** mind meditates on itself, or, as **the** philosophers **of** this class express it, on nothing. **The** next step was to dispense with **the** eternity **of** matter, to reduce it to a phantasmal character. **The** mind was all in all, and there was no necessity for an eternal co-ordinate, and this is **the** dogma **of the** Buddhists and **the** Vedántists. None **of** these, however, dispensed with individual soul. That formed an integer in all **the** leading systems **of** early Indian philosophy. Nay, more, in order to provide for a future state **of** retribution, it was necessary to develop or retain **the** system **of** metempsychosis. It was seen that neither virtue nor vice always brought on its deserts in this life, and **the** necessity for a next life became unavoidable; and if **the** soul was to have a next corporeality **of** some kind to bear **the** deserts, there was nothing to hinder **the** transmigration many times. It may shock European ideas **of the** present day to be told **of** metempsychosis; but between worldly life, purgatory, and eternal hell-fire, or heaven on **the** one hand and metempsychosis on **the** other, dispassionate and unsophisticated logic will readily yield **the** palm to **the** latter. An English lady was once shocked at **the** sight **of** a Hindu lady with her nose bored for a nose-ring. She said, “ how barbarous is this custom **of** yours, dear sister, **of** boring **the** nose?” “ I fail,” replied **the** Hindu, “ to perceive **the** difference, Madam, between boring **the** two ears and

boring the nose." The Hindu controversialist may adopt this line of argument and ask, the matter not being susceptible of positive proof without the aid of revealed religion, "logically what is the difference between three corporealities and a dozen or more?" But, however that be, all the ancient leading schools of India accepted metempsychosis, and the grand object they had in view was to devise the means for putting a stop to the ever-lengthening and never-ending chain of transmigration. And so long that was kept prominently before the masses, most of whom keenly felt, as they do now, and will always do, what Schelling calls "that sadness which cleaves to all finite life," the system propounded, however otherwise discordant in doctrinal points, had a fair chance of success, as a proselytising system, particularly if it were favourable to peace and welfare in this present existence.

Buddhism was peculiarly well-adapted for this purpose. It was the most attractive in its moral and social phases. No system of human religion has propounded a more perfect course of morality, humanity, mercy, and sympathy. The universal benevolence it preached could not but exert a potent influence on the mind of the people. At a time when sacrifices of animals by hundreds were every-day practices, and those sacrifices were often effected by driving wooden spikes into the heart of writhing victims, the dogma of total abstinence from all sacrifices and uniform mercy to all creatures could not but produce a marked revulsion of feeling against the current religion, and to draw large numbers of

men to the standard of the new faith. The doctrines of equality of man and of non-recognition of caste also contributed very largely to recommend it to the favour of those who had been for a long time ground down by caste rules. The result was wholesale conversions of the lower and the middle classes of the people in all parts of India—so much so as to make Buddhism the leading religion of the country. The intellectual classes, the men of leading and light, also appreciated these moral and social advantages, and were willing to accept them. They perceived, however, the worm in the flower, and were shocked by the sight. The atheism which forms the basis of Buddhist philosophy never obtruded itself on the perception of the multitude. It was unknown to them, and they cared not at all to understand its true purport. But the intelligent few felt it, and wished to avoid it. Even professed Buddhists could not always tolerate it, and many were the attempts made to gloss over it, or to supplant it in an insidious way so as to divest the system of its atheism without injuring it in its constitution. The Ais'varika system of the Buddhists was the outcome of one of these attempts, and the Vedánta and the Yoga systems with their various Gitá, Tántric and Puráñic modifications represent the results of Hindu attempts at reconciling the higher philosophy of Kapila and Buddha with a theistic religion.

It is not my object here to enter into the vexed question of the chronology of these different systems. It would take more time and space than what are

at my disposal now. It is necessary, however, to state that in appealing to the Sánkhya, I appeal to the doctrine, and not to its text-books. There is abundant evidence, both in Hindu and Buddhist works of unquestionable antiquity and authenticity, of the Sánkhya and the Yoga systems having been current before the time of Buddha. The most prominent part of the exercise of those systems involved the most rigorous self-mortification, and that mortification was currently practised with the utmost rigour before the time of Buddha. Buddha himself notices this.

According to the Lalita-Vistara :—

“ While at Uruvilvá, Sákyá called to mind all the different forms of penances which people at his time were in the habit of submitting to, and which they thought raised the mind above all carnality. ‘Here,’ he thought, ‘am I born in the Jambudvípa, among people who have no prospect of intellectual redemption (*ádhímukti*), crowded by Tírthikas with diverse wishes, and at a time when their faculties are wriggling in the grasp of the crocodile of their carnal wants. Stupid men, who seek to purify their persons by divers modes of austerity and penance, and inculcate the same! Some of them cannot make out their *mantras*. Some lick their hands. Some are uncleanly. Some have no *mantras*. Some wander after different sources. Some abstain from fish and flesh-meat. Some mind not the annual duties. Some abstain from spirit and the water of chaff. Some beg alms from one, three, five, or seven tribes. Some indulge in tubers, fruits, mosses, kuśa grass, leaves, cow’s dejecta, frumenty, curds, clarified butter, molasses, and unbaked cakes. Some wash the body of charioteers, parrot-flyers, and news-purveyors. Some dwell in villages, or in woods for their livelihood. Some adore cows, deer, horses, hogs, monkeys, or elephants. Seated at one place in silence, with their legs bent under them, some attempt greatness. Some speak to only one person, others to seven. Some eat once in a day and night, some once on alternate days, and some

at intervals of four, five, or six days; some once in a fortnight, performing a *chándráyána*. Some put on themselves the feathers of vultures or owls. Some, seated on a board or a munjá mat, wear bark, kuśa grass, valvaja grass (*Eleusine Indica*), or blankets of camels' hair, or of goat's wool, or of hair, or hides. Some sleep more or less in wet clothes. Some sleep on ashes, gravel, stones, boards, thorny grass, or pestles, with the face downwards, in a hut or the bare ground. Some wear one, two, three, four, five, six, or seven pieces of cloth; others go naked, making no distinction between fit and unfit places. Some have long hair, nails, beard, and matted hair, and wear bark. Some live upon a single meal of a mixture of sesamum and rice. Some smear themselves with ashes, cinders from altars, dust, or clay. Some carry on their persons and in their hands down, munja grass, hair, nails, rags, mud, or a cocoanut-shell alms-bowl. Some drink hot water, or rice-water, or fountain water, or water preserved in earthen jars. Some carry on them cinders, metals, astringent things, three sticks, skulls, alms-bowls, bones or swords, and by these means they hope to attain to immortality, and pride themselves on their holiness. By inhaling smoke or fire, by gazing at the sun, by performing the five fires, resting on one foot, or with an arm perpetually uplifted, or moving about on the knees, some attempt to accomplish their penance. Some seek salvation by killing themselves by entering into a mass of lighted chaff or charcoal, or by suppressing their breath, or by roasting one's self on (hot) stones, or by entering any fire or water, or ascending in the air. The syllables "om," "vashaṭ," "svadhá," "sváhá," as also, blessings, hymns, lighting of the sacred fire, invocations, repetitions of mystic *mantras* teaching of the *Vedas* (lit. *mantras*), or fancying the image of a divinity in one's mind, afford means of purification to many. Some pride themselves on their saluting Brahmá, Indra, Rudra, Vishṇu, Deví, Kumára, Mátrí, Kátyáyaní, Chandra, Aditya, Vaiśravaṇa, Varuṇa, Vásava, Aśvina, Nága, Yaksha, Gandharva, Aśura, Garuda, Kinnara, Mahoraga, Rákshasa, Preta, Bhúta, Kushmáṇḍa, Párshada, Gaṇapati, Devarshi, Brahmarshi, or Rájarshi. Some select some of them, others resort to the earth, the water, heat, the air or the ether. Mountains, rivers, fountains, tanks, lakes, long narrow sheets of water (*tadágas*), oceans, vats, ponds, wells, trees, lotuses, herbs, creepers,

grasses, stumps, pastures, cremation grounds, courtyards, and bowers afford asylums to others. Houses, columns, stones, pestles, swords, bows, axes, arrows, spears, and tridents, are the objects of salutation to some. In curd, butter, mustard, barley, garlands, darbha grass, jewels, gold and silver, some seek their welfare. Thus do these Tírthikas, dreading the horrors of mundane life, seek their shelter. Some seek heaven and salvation in their offspring, and resolutely apply to them. They all follow the wrong road; they fancy that to be the true support which is untrue; they hold evil to be good, and the impure to be pure. I shall then commence that kind of vow and penance by which all hostile sects shall be overpowered. To persons deluded by works and sacrifices, I shall show the destruction of all works and sacrifices. To Devas, perceivable by meditation, as also to those who become manifest in divers forms, I shall exhibit a meditation by which they may be overpowered."—My *Buddha-Gayá*, pp. 24, *et seq.*

The meditations he practised were all in accord with the rules of the Yoga system, and even their technical names were the same. These facts demonstrate the antiquity of the Sánkhya and the Yoga doctrines; but this cannot be said of the text-books of those systems as we have them before us now. They are obviously of a later date than Buddha, and this may safely be predicated of all the six leading texts of Hindu Philosophy. The Sánkhya Sútra quotes the Vais'eshika by name in two places (A. I., 25 and VI, 35), and refutes the doctrine of the Vedánta Sútra. The Yoga Sútra takes for granted the twenty-five categories of the Sánkhya as the basis of its doctrine, and copies some of its aphorisms almost *verbatim*. The Vais'eshika Sútra recognises the Nyáya as well as the Sánkhya. The Nyáya Sútra refutes the doctrines of the Vedánta, and of the Sánkhya. The Mímañsá either directly or practically

by the mode of its refutation of adverse doctrines recognises the pre-existence of all the others, not excepting Buddhism. It also quotes Badari, a teacher, and Bádaráyaṇa, probably a grandson of Badari, and author of the Vedánta Sútras or later Mimáñsá, as also of a commentary on the Yoga Sútra. The Vedánta in its turn refutes adverse doctrines of all the five, and thereby admits their pre-existence. This state of facts can be reconciled only by the supposition that the different dogmas and the schools which cherished them existed for a long time before the dogmas were written down in the aphoristic form in which we have them now. Oral transmission must have been the principal means of their preservation for a long time. There might have been also text-books before, but they were set aside by the very complete systems which the new texts produced, and in the new systems the refutation of adverse opinions very naturally included all the theories which were prevalent at the time when the books were compiled, and not the theories only of the time when the original dogmas were first promulgated. This is also obvious in other ways. In the case of the Sánkhya Sútra, though it is usually attributed to Kapila, one of the mind-born sons of Brahmá, we find it refers to an “ancient teacher” (*A'chárya*, A. V, 31), and to “venerable preceptors” (A. VI, 69). Sanandana and Panchas'ikha are cited by name (V, 32, and VI, 69). Kapila is then said to have taught his doctrine to A'surí, who is described both as a brother and a pupil of the teacher. A'surí imparts it to Panchas'ikha, who is, according

to the Puráṇics, again a brother. This Panchasíkha, again, according to the Mahábhárata, lived in the time of Janaka, and taught the Sánkhya doctrine to that king of Mithilá. Had Kapila written the Sútra he would never have described in it his younger brother and pupil as an A'chárya.

In the Vedánta Sútra, Bádaráyaṇa, the author, is several times named in the third person (I, 3, 26; I, 3, 33; III, 2, 41; III, 4, 1, 8, 19; IV, 3, 15, IV, 4, 7, 12). This is usually explained by the statement that a pupil wrote down the teachings of the saint. Colebrooke, arguing on these facts, came to the conclusion that the text-books are much later than the saints whose names they bear. Referring to the Sánkhya he says “the text of the Sánkhya philosophy, from which the sect of Buddha seems to have borrowed its doctrines, is not the work of Kapila himself, though vulgarly ascribed to him; but it purports to be composed by I'svarakrishna,—and he is stated to have received the doctrine meditately from Kapila, through successive teachers, after its publication by Panchasíkha who had been himself instructed by A'surí, the pupil of Kapila.” (Essays, I, p. 93). Professor Cowell accepts this opinion in its entirety; he says “The Sútras, as we have them, cannot be the original form of the doctrines of the several schools. They are rather a recapitulation, at a certain period, of a series of preceding developments, which had gone on in the works of successive teachers. The Sútras mutually refer to each other; thus, those of the Sánkhya school, which in itself I should consider

one of the earliest, distinctly refer to Vedánta tenets. They expressly mention the Vais̄eshika in I. 25, V. 85; for the Nyaya cf. V, 27, 86, and for the Yoga I, 93." (Colebrooke's Essays, I, 354.) This is also the opinion at which I have arrived after a careful consideration of the bearings of the question; in short, my conviction is that the Sútras were written, like the Institutes of Manu and many other Hindu works, long after the date of their putative authors.

As regards the Yoga, the doctrine is described to be as old as Brahmá, and the text-book to be the work of Patanjali, who, says the commentator, "compiled the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them" (p. 4). That such is really the case, is obvious from the fact of the Yoga which Patanjali inculcates being identically the same which the Sánkhya accepted as the only means of salvation. It might be argued that the Sánkhya adopted the theory of the 25 principles, from the Yoga of Patanjali, and did not lend it to him. But the arguments against this theory are overwhelming. In the first place had Patanjali initiated the theory of the Tattvas he would have for certain defined them, and not left them to be inferred. He is very careful in his definitions, and he would never have left so vital an element of his system to be inferred. But following the Sánkhya no necessity was felt by him for any definition. It cannot be said that his Tattvas were different from those of the Sánkhyas, for that would make the necessity for a definition even more

imperative. Secondly, the author of the *Mahá-bháshya* cannot possibly be proved to have lived before Kapila, or his doctrine. The learned Professor M. M. Kunte, in his "Vicissitudes of Aryan Civilization," has combated, with great tact and ability, the arguments usually put forth to fix the date of *Patañjali*; and it may be admitted that individually each argument as put forth by Goldstücker and others admits of refutation, and I may add that a long chain of weak arguments is not stronger than any of its links. Still the coincidence of a number of names of a given period is one which in Indian history cannot be easily set aside as purely accidental. Confining, however, one's attention to the text-book only, no one who has read them carefully can fail to perceive that *Patañjali* has contented himself by tacking a theistic appendage of no direct utility to a positively atheistic model, without in any way blending the two ideas into any homogeneity or consistency. Hence it is that the Hindus call it *Sésvara Sánkhyā*, or *Sánkhyā cum deo*, as opposed to the former which is *Nirésvara Sánkhyā*, or *Sánkhyā sine deo*.

The cardinal difference between the two rests on their theistic and atheistic belief, but as already stated, it makes no difference in their systems. Isolation of soul from thinking principle is the end sought in either case, and meditation in *Samádhi* is the only means available. The believer in the existence of the God-head assumes that divine grace facilitates the end sought, but he does not dispense with *Samádhi*, and his belief, therefore, is of no material importance.

"In less momentous matters," as noticed by Colebrooke, "they differ, not upon points of doctrine, but in the degree in which the exterior exercises, or abstruse reasoning and study, are weighed upon, as requisite preparations of absorbed contemplation. *Patanjali's Yoga-s'āstra* is occupied with devotional exercise and mental abstraction, subduing body and mind: Kapila is more engaged with investigation of principles and reasoning upon them. One is more mystic and fanatical. The other makes a nearer approach to philosophical disquisition, however mistaken in its conclusions." (Essays I, p. 265.))

And we have enough in these facts and reasons to infer that the *Yoga* text-book is posterior to the *Sāṅkhya* text-book, and that both the text-books are later than Buddha; but that the doctrines of the two schools are very old. Any how these are the immediate ancient Hindu archetypes of the nihilist theory of Buddha, and indirectly of the Pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann.

The *Yoga*, moreover, is the archetype of another modern doctrine, that of spiritualism with its occult appendage. In this case the relation is direct and more intimate. The eternity of soul is recognised by both; both look to a course of gradual progress which has perfection for its goal; both admit the existence of soul in higher and higher stages; both recognise the possibility of man's commanding departed souls to come down, to become visible, and to hold converse with him; both pretend by regulation of breath and other exercises to attain occult powers of the most

transcendental kind. The details and the rationale of exercise may be different in minor points, and a few of the dogmas such as the “material reality” of soul according to the spiritualists, and its pure spirituality according to the Yogís, may be apparently contradictory; but substantially the two are as closely related as two systems separated by a gap of five and twenty centuries can well be. The cardinal theory, that “the body is the prison of the soul for ordinary mortals” but it is not so in the case of the adept, is evidently the same in both. “We can see only what comes before the windows of our body, we can take cognizance of what is brought within its bars. The adept has found the key of his prison, and can emerge from it at pleasure. In other words, the adept can project his soul out of his body to any place he pleases.” The whole system in either case is based on this doctrine, and even a cursory study of the 3rd chapter of the work now presented to the public in an English dress will, I believe, fully bear out this statement.

The name of the Yoga system as we now have it is *Yogánus'ásana*, or ‘the Institutes of the Yoga.’ This name, however, is rarely used, the work being better known as the *Yoga-s'ástra* or ‘the science of Yoga,’ or *Yoga-sútra*, the ‘Aphorisms of the Yoga.’ According to the commentary, commonly assigned to Vyása, one name of the work would appear to be *Sánkhya pravachana*, or ‘an exposition of the Sánkhya.’ The words of the colophon are *Pátanjala-yoga-s'a'stre sánkhya-pravachane*, which may be translated into, in Patanjali’s science of the Yoga, the *Sáṅkhyá pravachana*.

Vyāsa, however, if he be the author of the exegesis, which I do not believe to be the case, must have used the term simply to imply that it is a text-book on the Sánkhya system, and not to indicate the specific name of the work, for in his remarks on the first aphorism he distinctly says, "the name of the work is *Yogánus'ásana*," (*Yogánus'ásanam náma s'ástram*). Following this exegesis Colebrooke says : "the title of *Sánkhyapravachana* seems a borrowed one; at least it is common to several compositions. It appertains to Patanjali's *Yoga-s'ástra*." (Essays I, p. 244). In short, *Yogánus'ásana* is the specific, and *Sánkhyapravachana* the descriptive, name of the work. Anyhow it is obvious that the Yoga is recognised from an early period as a work on Sánkhya.

The Yoga text as we now have it comprises a total of 194 short, succinct aphorisms, divided into four chapters or quarters (*pa'das*). The first contains 51 aphorisms, devoted to an exposition of the nature and character of meditation, and is entitled *Samádhi-páda*. The second is called *Sádhana-páda*, or the quarter on the exercise of meditation and its requirements, and contains 55 aphorisms. The third is called *Vibhúti-páda*, and treats of the various occult powers which may be derived by the exercises enjoined in it. It is of the same extent as the second. The name of the fourth chapter is *Kaivalya-páda*, and it gives an exposition of the nature and character of the isolation or detachment of the soul from worldly ties, which is the object and aim of the exercises and meditations recommended. It is limited to 33 aphorisms.

The work opens with a definition of the term *Yoga*. It is derived from the root *yuj*, which means both "to join" and "to meditate." Some accept the first meaning, explaining it in the technical sense to imply the joining of the mind to the object of thought. Others prefer the second, but that makes no material difference in the purport. The technical meaning of the word as used in the text is a derivative one. Instead of giving prominence to the joining, it implies the detachment which that joining occasions. The definition is, "the suppression of the functions of the thinking principle." This suppression, however, need not be absolute in order to make the word applicable. It is used to imply all stages of abstraction of the thinking principle from worldly cares with a view to centre it in the peculiar meditation which serves to effect that abstraction. The word is of very ancient date. It occurs several times in the Rig Veda, but not in the technical sense. In the time of Buddha, six centuries before the era of Christ, it had acquired its technical meaning to perfection, and as Buddha, according to the view of the case set forth above, borrowed it from the followers of the Sánkhya school, it may safely be assumed that it dates from long before the age of Buddha. In fact, the *Tapas* of the Vedic Rishis got the more expressive name of *Yoga* at a later period, and Kapila and his followers gave it prominence in their system by making it the sole means of salvation. Many other works have since used it to indicate communion with the divinity in some way or other, and the Bhagavad-

gítá takes thirteen out of its eighteen chapters to be each a treatise on a separate kind of Yoga. The names are: 2, Sánkhyá Yoga; 3, Karma Yoga; 4, Jñána-karma Yoga; 5, Karma-sannyásá Yoga; 6, Dhyána Yoga; 8, Tárakabrahma Yoga; 9, Rájaguhya Yoga; 10, Vibhúti Yoga; 12, Bhakti Yoga; 13, Kshetra-kshetrajña Yoga; 14, Guṇatraya Yoga; 15, Purushottama Yoga; 18, Sannyásá Yoga. In fact, every phase of devotion is described as a form of Yoga. The Tantras have a great number of others, and many variations of those named above, but they need not be noticed here.

The definition of the text suggests immediately the question, what are the functions that have to be suppressed? These must first be known before they can be overcome. The author, therefore, proceeds to describe them. They are said to be fivefold, including right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory. These, directly or indirectly, comprise all the functions to which the thinking principle can possibly be directed. The means of suppressing these functions are next described. They include, (a) exercise, or "effort constantly made to keep the thinking principle in its functionless state," (xiii,) and (b), dispassion, or "the consciousness of being their subjugator on the part of one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects," (xv). The details of these are reserved for consideration in the next chapter.

The exercises and dispassion result in Yoga, of which there are two kinds, a conscious and an unconscious one. The former is that which is attended

by argumentation, deliberation, joy, and egoism or self-consciousness ; the latter is devoid of such attendants. As long as the thinking principle argues what is good and what is bad ; as long as there is deliberation as to the nature of the object of thought ; as long as a person engaged in meditation feels a sense of joy ; or as long as he retains a sense of his own individuality, (self-consciousness), he is said to be in a conscious state of meditation. This is, in the technical language of the school, *Savijasamádhi* or “seeded meditation,” because there is in it some nucleus on which the mind is centered. When, by arduous and long-continued exercise, this seed is lost, and the mind remains divested of all thought, a mere state of consciousness without an object, it becomes seedless, *nirvíja*, or perfect, and this is the *summum bonum* which the Yogi exerts to attain. When this is attained, the bondage of the world, of transmigration, is entirely severed, and the soul is declared to be *isolated* or free.

The expedients aforesaid are always and imperatively necessary—nothing can be attained without them ; but their action can be expedited by another means, and that is “Devotion to God.” This devotion is absolute resignation of one’s self to the Divinity. In the language of the commentator, “it is thorough worship of God. Without wishing for the fruition of worldly enjoyments, the making over all one’s actions to him, the preëminent guide.” This devotion is the means by which the theism of the current Hinduism is reconciled with the philosophy of

the school. Kapila did not care for this reconciliation, and his system, therefore, did not stand in need of a Divine Providence ; but his atheism being repulsive to the thinking portion of mankind, Patanjali avails himself of it to give a theistic character to his system. It will be noticed, however, that he makes his Divinity one of several means to an end, and not the end sought. The God he invokes is defined to be "a particular soul which is untouched by affliction, works, deserts, and desires," one who is existent, but not the avowed Creator and preserver of the universe. His name is I's'VARA or "the ruler," and that may imply providence, but nothing is said on this subject. In two successive aphorisms, He is described as one "in whom the seed of the omniscient attains infinity," (xxv,) and "who is the instructor of even all early ones, for, He is not defined by time (xxvi)." The indicator of this Divinity is the syllable OM, called Praṇava, and it is by repeating it and reflecting on its meaning that the different states of meditation can be easily attained. The author could have scarcely put God and his name to a more subordinate position.

Turning now to the obstacles which stand in the way of the Yogi in the satisfactory accomplishment of his meditation, the author enumerates what they are, and suggests the means of overcoming them. The obstacles, or causes of distraction, are disease, langour, doubt, carelessness, idleness, worldly-mindedness, mistaken notions, unattainment of any stage of abstraction, and instability in the stage obtained (A. xxx) ;

and these are attended by pain, distress, trembling, and oppressive inspiration and expiration (xxxI). These tend to make the thinking principle unsteady, or unfit for meditation, and have, therefore, to be sedulously overcome. The means for overcoming them are various. The habit of concentrating the mind on one particular principle is the most efficacious, (xxxII,) and it is to be supplemented by cheerfulness, benevolence, compassion, complacency, and indifference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue, and vice (xxxIII). It may be effected also by a system of regulation of breath, called *Prāṇāyāma*, which is supposed to exert a powerful influence in steadyng the thinking principle, and warding off disease and other obstacles (*cf.* p. 41). Although this regulation of breath is a necessary element in all the earlier or lower forms of the Yoga, one is specially called the Yoga of breathing, and technically called *Hat̄ha-yoga*, from the letters *ha* and *ṭha*, meaning the sun and the moon, which are the mystic names of inspiration and expiration. This form is particularly esteemed for its efficacy in procuring occult powers. When the habit of meditation has considerably advanced, and the Yogī is able to realize sensuous objects in his meditation, or when the mind is thereby so illumined, it is of itself sufficient to ward off tribulations. Meditation in the passionlessness of accomplished Yogīs might also effect this (xxxVII). Reliance on dreams, or on the object of one's fancy, is, likewise, an efficacious remedy.

The author then enters into a more elaborate classification of the Yoga. The twofold division first

pointed out does not suffice fully to indicate the various shades of difference which the seeded form assumes under different circumstances, and to each of these shades he assigns a different name, and defines its nature. In course of this, he points out the theory of the mind becoming the object it thinks upon (xli), in other words that intense thought creates objects, or becomes objective. This is the basis on which the occult powers described in a subsequent chapter are founded. The seedless form is one and simple, and it is the *ultimatum* sought by the Yoga.

The second chapter is devoted to the details of the exercises necessary for the performance of the Yoga, and is therefore called *Kriyá-yoga* or "practical Yoga." In its earliest and simplest state practical Yoga is accomplished by a strict observance of asceticism, by the muttering of a mantra a great number of times at stated periods every day, and by devotion to God. The object of these observances is to weaken afflictions and give firmness to meditation. Afflictions arise from attachment to worldly affairs, and asceticism is the best antidote for them, and the practice of repeating a mantra for a long time serves to steady the mind.

The reference to afflictions suggests the question, what are they ? They are ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life, or 'the Will to live' as Hartmann designates it. Some of these are subtle, others gross, (iii). The former are to be counteracted by acting against their natural bent, (x) and the latter by meditation, (xi).

The afflictions are described to be the root of all evil. They give rise to works, and works leave behind their stock of residua to be worked out in a subsequent birth, and in that subsequent birth other works are performed, and they leave their residua, and so on, the chain is never brought to an end. For instance, ignorance leads to the commission of a sin ; the retribution for that sin comes in the next existence ; while that desert is being borne in that existence another sin is committed through ignorance ; that necessitates another birth for its retribution, and the series never breaks. And what is true of ignorance is equally so of the other afflictions. Nor does the rule apply only to sins ; it applies equally to virtuous deeds. For instance, if instead of a sin a virtuous work be performed, its deserts have to be enjoyed in another existence, and the course proceeds exactly as in the case of sin. In fact, every work, whether right or wrong, has its apportioned desert, and it must be borne in a corporeal existence, and the succession of birth, decay, and death must, in the ordinary course of things, recur over and over again without a limit. The fruits may be joy or suffering according as the cause is virtue or vice, but to the discriminating they are invariably painful, (xv). They are, also inevitable, and must be borne. An act once performed must bear its fruit, and in so far there is no remedy. One may, however, avoid doing those works which bear fruit, and thereby break the spell, and the maxim is therefore laid down that only those pains are avoidable which are not yet come, (xvi).

The question then arises, what should one do to abstain from works, and avoid their consequences ? and the object of the Yoga is to devise the means through which the abstinence may be effected.

In order to explain the rationale of the course by which the evil is to be brought to an end, the author next enters into an explanation of the mutual relation of Intellect and Soul. Intellect is called a spectacle, and it is said "to be of the nature of illumination, action, and rule ; it is of the form of the elements and the organs ; it is for the purpose of experience and emancipation," (xviii). It exists solely for the purpose of Soul, (xxi). Soul is called the spectator ; "it is absolute sentience, and, though pure, still directly beholds intellected ideas," (xx). When these two are in conjunction through ignorance (and it is ignorance which brings them into conjunction) they produce life and its consequences, (xvii,) or as the text puts it "the apprehension of the nature of the contact, power, and the lordship of power," (xxii) *i. e.*, Soul thinks it is the experiencer and Intellect thinks it is the experiencer. Now, when the light of knowledge dispels the false impression the conjunction is dissolved. Intellect ceases to think that it is the experiencer, and Soul gives up the idea of its experience, and the ignorance is removed. In other words, the conjunction being removed Soul is isolated, and there is a period put to further birth and suffering. Now, ignorance being the sole cause of the conjunction, the great object is to remove that ignorance, and

this is to be effected by discriminative knowledge, or that which will rightly appreciate the true character of the relation which exists between Soul and Intellect. This knowledge then is what is to be sought, and the means are now provided by which it may be attained.

The knowledge in question passes through seven stages before it becomes perfect (xxvii). The first stage is that in which a person feels that "the knowable has been known by me." (2) He next feels that "there is nothing remaining to be known." (3) The conviction then arises that "my afflictions are overcome, and there is nothing for me to overcome." (4) This is followed by the belief that "discriminative knowledge has been attained by me." These four suffice to effect what is technically called "liberation from work," (*Kárya-vimukti*), for when these have been acquired there is no more impulse or wish left to perform works. These are followed, in course of progress, by three more successive convictions. These are,—1st "my intellect has accomplished its purpose;" 2nd, "the three qualities have finished their dominion over me, and can no longer affect me;" 3rd, "my meditation has been identified with my soul," that is the Intellect has merged into the Soul. These three are called "intellectual liberation" (*Chitta-vimukti*). The last is called isolation (*Kai-valya*), on the attainment of which the Soul is believed to be perfectly liberated.

In order to bring on this consummation the Yogi should apply himself to improve his understanding so



as to make it completely devoid of impurities. To effect this improvement eight means are recommended, and these are technically called 1, Restraint ; 2, Obligation ; 3, Posture ; 4, Regulation of ~~birth, breath~~ ; 5, Abstraction ; 6, Steadfastness ; 7, Contemplation ; and, 8, Meditation (xxix). Of these the first includes five negative acts, *viz.*, abstention from (1) slaughter, (2) falsehood, (3) theft, (4) incontinence, and (5) avarice ; and the second five positive acts, namely, (1) purification, (2) contentment, (3) penance, (4) study, and (5) devotion to the Lord. These two classes of acts are called *mahávratas*, or acts of primary asceticism. They are obligatory on all classes of the community, whether householders or ascetics, and none should neglect them. Slaughter is *in se* sinful, and none should commit it, whether he be a householder or a hermit. Falsehood and theft are sins of the same gravity, and should therefore be shunned by all. Incontinence &c., are likewise reprehensible, and none should be guilty of them. Nor can a virtuous and peaceful life be secured simply by these restraints ; it is necessary that one should keep himself free from filth, both material and moral ; that he should be contented with his lot and not rapine ; that he should submit to penance for his sins and for curbing his passions ; that he should study the Vedas, and be devoted to the service of God. No one can be a good citizen who does not practice these restraints and obligations, and therefore they are recommended to all classes of the community. And if they are good and necessary for ordinary

people, they must *ipso facto* be so for the Yogi, who aspires to rise above the common herd. Nay, to him they are most imperative, for none can prepare himself for the Yoga who does not especially attend to them, as the first step in his career. The advantages of observing these restraints and obligations are described at some length; but they call for no remark here.

Restraint and obligation being thus common to both householders and Yogis the third of the eight means becomes the first special act of exercise to which a Yogi has to apply himself; this is the assumption of particular postures, which are conducive to the fixation of the thinking principle to any object to which it may be directed. No one can settle himself down for meditation while walking, or running, or doing something unconnected with his main object, and some particular postures are, therefore, deemed essential. The text contents itself by saying that it should be firm and pleasant (XLVI), and entail the least effort (XLVII); but it does not describe any particular posture as the most beneficial. Commentators, however, have supplied the omission, and described a great number of them, some of them most painful and difficult of assumption, (*cf.* pp. 102*f.*).

When the Yogi has assumed one of the prescribed postures, he should begin the fourth exercise, the regulation of his breath. This consists in drawing the breath through one nostril; retaining the air for some time in the chest; and then throwing it out

through another nostril. The details of this process will be found on pp. 42f.

This process of breathing should be followed by the fifth exercise, the abstraction of the organs from their ordinary natural functions. As long as they are engaged in their own works, they do not allow the thinking principle to settle down for the act of meditation, and consequently prove obstructive. To overcome them, or to draw them away from works, is an essential preliminary. When they are abstracted, they merge into their primary cause, the thinking principle, and cease to disturb it.

All these five acts of Restraint, Obligation, Posture, Regulation of breath, and Abstraction are accessories or necessary adjuncts to Yoga, for without them no Yoga can be performed ; but they form no essential part of the Yoga itself. Even all the five existing together would not constitute Yoga, though without them as preliminaries no Yoga can be effectual. These are, therefore, called "practical Yoga," or "accessories to the Yoga," but not Yoga. The last three, on the other hand, are essential constituents of the Yoga, and are therefore called "intimates" or *anta-rangas*. These three include Steadfastness (*Dháraṇá*), Contemplation (*Dhyána*), and Meditation (*Samádhi*) ; and the third chapter opens with a description of these. "Steadfastness is the confinement of the thinking principle to one place," (L). As an exercise, it is of little moment to what object the thinking principle is applied : so long the thinking principle remains unswervingly attached to it, without for a

moment thinking of anything else, it is Steadfastness. When the understanding is brought to bear upon this fixation and the two act in unison the result is Contemplation (II), *i. e.*, when the thinking principle thinks intelligently and steadfastly on an object it is Contemplation. Again when this contemplation is so intense that it loses all idea of its own identity, and enlightens solely one object, it is Meditation or *Samādhi*. The definition given points to something much more intense than what the English word meditation ordinarily conveys; it implies a state of extacy or cataleptic trance when both the body and the mind are dead to all external impressions, and the thinking principle is completely drowned in the special object of its thought, or in itself, but as the degree of intensity is not fixed and is admitted to vary considerably under different circumstances, I have used the word meditation as the most convenient and conveying the nearest idea of the mental act indicated by the Sanskrit term. When these three follow successively or are united, they have the common name of *Sañyama*. How this union is to be effected, or how this *Sañyama* is to be performed, is nowhere described at length; but it may be directed to diverse objects, internal and external, and, when duly and thoroughly performed, results in the most extraordinary occult powers.

A subject is the correlative of the three qualities of tranquillity, enlivening and latency, and as each quality becomes ascendant the subject varies; and these variations may be produced by the power of

Sañyama, apart from ordinary mundane causes. Hence the efficacy of the Sañyama in producing occult powers. Sañyama, however, should not be applied indiscriminately to all purposes. The proper rule is to follow the stages of perfection successively attained by a Yogi, *i. e.*, it should not be applied to a subtile object, until it has been practised and perfected with regard to gross objects. In other words, it should be practised step by step according to the different stages into which the career of a Yogi is divided. Unless this is done no fruition follows (vi).

The occult powers, called Siddhis, derivable by the practice of the Sañyama are the most astounding possible. By it one may know the past and the future, the circumstances connected with his former existences, as well as the day and hour of his death. He may know what is in the mind of another person, or the meaning of the cries of animals. He may make himself or others invisible to bystanders, contract friendship with whomsoever he likes, or attain other superhuman powers. He may acquire a knowledge of things that are ordinarily too subtile, or too remote, for human observation, or so intercepted as not to be visible. He can observe the details of regions situated far away from the earth ; of the stars and planets, their dispositions and their motions. He can have ocular knowledge of spiritual phenomena. He may know what is going on inside his body ; subdue his hunger and thirst ; or make his body so firm as none can shake it. It is possible for him, too, to make departed spirits visible, and to converse with them.

He can attain superhuman intuition, audition, tactio, vision, gustation and olfaction. He may project his own soul into another's body, and then bring it back into his own. He can travel with the quickness of the mind through air or through water, and go wheresoever he lists.

When most of these powers have been attained and a Yogi is in a forward state for absolute perfection, the gods envy his success, and try to divert him from his onward course. They place temptations in his way in the forms of handsome women, great wealth, and other worldly objects of value, and thereby lead him astray (li). In this they play the part of Mára in the Buddhist legends, and of Satan in the Bible. Great care and determination are necessary to rise above such temptations. According to the Tantras when temptations fail, resort is had to frightful forms, tigers, lions, serpents, ogres and the like, which threaten instant destruction to the Yogi. But if they are met by firm resolve, they are always ultimately overcome.

Great as are these and such like powers, of which a great many are described in the text, they are not the objects which a Yogi should seek. They are the results of his meditations, and they indicate the success he is gradually attaining, and the progress he is making towards his goal ; but they are not that goal. The highest power is, even like the lowest, a part of the "seeded" or discriminative meditation. These powers are, nevertheless, of value, as they enhance the power of the understanding, and in their perfection result in the all-saving knowledge, *tárakjñána*,

which makes manifest the relation between the thinking principle and Soul, and brings on the “seedless meditation.” They are thus of use in consummating the isolation of Soul—the *summum bonum* which the Yoga promises to its votaries.

The fourth chapter is devoted to a consideration of such metaphysical topics as bear on the nature and character of Isolation. It opens by saying that special faculties may result from five different causes, (1). Some of them are described to be due to birth; such as the power of flying, or living in water, or with suspended animation for protracted periods. These are specific peculiarities of particular genera of animals which may be acquired by being born in such genera, and are not common to all living beings. Others are due to herbs, such as the effect of drugs in arresting sleep, hunger, or the like, or making the flesh proof against heat, or poison, or cold. Others, again, are due to certain incantations or mantras which are universally believed by the Hindus to have very extraordinary powers. Austerity or asceticism in the same way is credited with the power of enabling people to acquire special faculties. Of course, the tangible faculties in this case are not faculties strictly so called, but the effect of habit. And lastly, Samádhi is believed to produce the same results, and these are what have been described in the preceding chapter. The first four causes do not concern the author, and, therefore, no further notice is taken of them. The last is intimately connected with the question at issue, and great pains are taken to meet such objec-

tions as might be started against the theory of Samádhi being the cause of special faculties. The objections are assumed to proceed from opponents, and the Sútras supply the replies. In the second and the third aphorisms, an opponent is made to deny causality to Samádhi, inasmuch as it has no influence on the body, and bodily changes are known to have been produced in this life. The explanation given is that the materials of the body undergo change of their own accord, and merit resulting from Samádhi subserves only to remove all obstructions from their way. This is illustrated by the example of the husbandman, who removes the inequalities on the surface of a field in order to lead water to where it is wanted, and the water then flows of its own accord, or in obedience to the laws of gravitation. This satisfies the opponent, who thereupon, shifts his ground, and, admitting the possibility of the materials changing by themselves, raises the question as to how thinking principles, which are immaterial, can be so produced. Yogís pretend that they can, each of them, animate a number of bodies at the same time, and it is necessary that, for such a purpose, each body should have a separate thinking principle, and the questions raised are how is it provided? and how is the unity of the creating one preserved? The theory of spontaneous change in materials cannot explain this, and the reply given is that such thinking principles are emanations of scintillations from the creating one, and are therefore subordinate to it, acting in accord with the will of the creator, even as the different organs of the

body act in accordance with the will of the mind, (III—v).

The possibility of Samádhi producing occult powers being thus settled, the question next comes as to the nature of those powers—are they of the same character as those produced by other causes? or are they different? The reply is that they are different, (vi). The faculties produced by the other causes are intimately connected with former births; the residua of former births are the active principles which *animate* them; whereas the faculties produced by Samádhi have no such background. They are spontaneous, and do not produce those after-consequences which the others do.

This leads to the classification of works leading to residua into four groups. Some are described to be white or meritorious; some are black or vicious; some are partly black and partly white; while others are neither black nor white. The first three groups belong to ordinary life, and leave behind residua; the last pertains to Yogís, and are not calculated to leave any remnant behind, (vii).

The after-consequences of ordinary works are two-fold, instinct, and kind, age and experience. The theory is that every work, every sensation, every form of experience leaves on the thinking principle an impress of its own, and such impressions, accumulating in course of a lifetime, become the stock of residua which, though for the time being latent, are susceptible of revival by proper stimulants in subsequent existences. (*cf.* p. 26—174). This

revival is Instinct, *i. e.*, instead of believing Instinct to be spontaneous, self-evolved, intuitive reason, as European philosophers describe it, (*cf.* p. 175,) Yogis take it to be the fruit of the remembrance of former experience, revived by particular circumstances. These residua are also the causes of rewards and punishments in subsequent lives, and the rewards and punishments are represented by kind, age and experience ; kind implying birth into higher or lower grades according to merit or demerit ; age the span of life in such existences, which is prolonged or reduced according to one's deserts ; and experience sensations of pleasure or pain. Confining his attention here to Instinct, the author describes that the residua producing Instinct do not revive invariably but according to circumstances, even after breaks caused by dissimilar births, (VIII). Nor do such breaks, produced by dissimilar births, localities, or times lead to any breach in the relation of cause and effect existing between residua and instinctive manifestations, (IX), inasmuch as the result manifests itself invariably at the first favourable moment.

The theory of residua as above propounded is open to the grave objection that it does not provide for the manifestation of instinctive action at the first birth when no residua can be predicated ; but the author obviates it by assuming eternity of desires and consequently of the universe. That which is eternal can have no beginning, and consequently there is no room left for a first birth, (X). This involves a *regressus in infinitum*, but, assuming matter and the universe to be eternal, it is not objectionable, or illogical. More-

over, the necessity of keeping God apart from creation, renders the theory of eternity of the universe unavoidable. Admit God to be the creator, the necessity arises of making Him engage in work and derive its fruit ; deny it, the universe must be accepted as self-evolved, and the theory of nothing comes from nothing not allowing of such an assumption, the author is driven to the only alternative left, that of eternity.

The opponent who raised the first objection now turns round and argues that if eternity be predicated of desires, how can they be removed ? and if they are not removed the chain of transmigration will ever lengthen and never come to an end, and no redemption is possible, so that the performance of the Yoga for the sake of liberation from the fetters of repeated existence would be futile. To this the author replies by saying that the cause of desire is ignorance of the true nature of things ; its effect is the body and its longings and their consequences ; its asylum is the thinking principle ; and its object is worldly enjoyment, and if these can be made inert or functionless, they would cease to produce their fruits ; and if they ceased there would be no root left *in re* the individual in which they are made functionless to produce new residua, and consequently he would be free, (xi).

But, says the opponent, the thinking principle is ever changing under diverse influences, it cannot be in one existence what it was before, and consequently there is no unity, and therefore the theory of oneness, of *omne ens est unum*, is lost. This argument is met

by the theory of archetypes. Every category is eternal, all things are eternal, nothing is really created, or absolutely destroyed, and what we call creation or destruction is simply change of attributes, and in the case of the thinking principle it is nothing more. When it changes its present condition, it reverts to its former condition, or assumes a new one, but its unity is never lost, (xii). This is the theory of the moderate nominalists or conceptionalists, with their *universalia ad rem*, *universalia in re*, and *universalia post rem*. Change having been admitted above, the author proceeds to account for it. It is produced by the three qualities acting either on the subject, or on the object, or on both, (xiii). The action, however, is not simultaneous, only one of the qualities is predominant at a time, and therefore there is no diversity in the two, (xiv). This leads to the question are sensibles the causes of sensation? or sensations the causes of sensibles? The first idea is in accord with every-day experience. Sensation usually takes place when there is a sensible present to produce it. The relation of the two as cause and effect is, however, not constant, and under different circumstances the same sensible produces simultaneously very different sensations, and the simultaneous production of different effects by one cause is illogical and impossible. The commentator illustrates this by appealing to the different effects produced by a single handsome woman on amorous males, her rivals, and ascetics. He might have gone further, and adverted to representative sensations as distinct from presentative

ones. In fact, as Professor Müller, in his 'Elements of Physiology' (Baly's *Translation*, p. 1059), has observed, "external agencies can give rise to no kind of sensation which cannot also be produced by internal causes, exciting changes in the condition of our nerves." Sensations, too, remain on the sensorium after the sensibles producing them have been removed. Nor can sensation be the cause of sensible, or, in the language of the commentator, "if a thing were an effect of the thinking principle, then there would be nothing besides, when that thinking principle would be occupied with one particular thing." It cannot be said that the ideal presentation of things would be created and maintained by other thinking principles while one thinking principle is occupied with a particular thing, for in that case many diverse causes would be made to produce one effect. Applied to the world the inference would be that one world is the effect of many diverse causes, and, that not being possible, the alternative would be that the world is causeless. The solution afforded is that there is no relation of cause and effect between the two; they are eternal and move in different paths (xv); and their action upon each other is regulated by the triad of qualities, one or other of which predominates for the time and produce its effects. Patanjali is exceedingly brief and enigmatical, but his object is the refutation of the theory of ideal presentation as opposed to real substantiality of matter, *i. e.*, of the *Vivartaváda* doctrine of the Vedánta.

The preception above produced is still incomplete.

The thinking principle may undergo modification and assume the shape of the object presented to it, but it cannot, being unconscious, intelligently perceive what it sees, (xvii). The intelligent principle has still to be infused into it, and this is done by Soul. The reflection of the Soul acting on it makes it perceive directly what is presented to it. It is accordingly said that a thing is known or unknown according as there is a reflection of the Soul, or the absence of it, in the thinking principle, (xvi).

An objection is now raised to the effect that under the circumstances above stated, there being no stability in the thinking principle, knowledge derived by perception could not be constant. The reply given is that since the real perceiver, the Soul, is immutable, knowledge which depends on it must necessarily be constant. Inasmuch, however, as the thinking principle can undergo only one modification at a time, and the Soul perceives only that modification, and not the outside world, there can be only one perception at a time: two diverse ideas cannot arise simultaneously, (xix).

The objector is still unsatisfied. To obviate the necessity of calling in the agency of Soul, he suggests a multiplicity of thinking principles, saying let one perception or thinking principle be perceived by another. This, however, says the author, cannot be, for the second perception would require a third, and so on, and that would lead to a *regressus in infinitum*. There would, moreover, be no certainty, for in calling one idea to mind a host would arise, and there would

be nothing to show which is the particular idea that has been invoked, or is necessary to the elucidation of the perception at hand.

There is yet another objection to urge. Accepting that perception cannot be helped by one cognition cognizing another, the opponent suggests that in life persons always express the opinion of their knowing things, and how can this take place unless the thinking principle possessed self-illuminative powers? This is met by saying that the thinking principle, assuming the form of the immutable soul, attains the light of intelligence, and is then able to understand its own cognitions, (xxi); and the conclusion arrived at is that when the thinking principle is modified on the one hand by soul and on the other by objects of cognition, it is sufficient for all purposes of understanding, (xxii). The commentator here anticipates a number of other objections, and disposes of them according to the theory of the Yoga. (*Cf.* p. 197).

These explanations, however, are not enough. There is yet a lingering suspicion that the thinking principle has a will of its own, and this suspicion is developed in the form of a question as to what motive the thinking principle can have in engaging itself in its various functions? Naturally inert, it can have no object of its own, and in performing its functions it must be acting without a motive, and as nothing is done without a motive, the inference would be that it has a will of its own, and it gratifies that will by acting as it does. This suspicion is set at rest by the remark that since it acts in conjunction with others,

its object must be to subserve another's purpose, and that another is soul, (xxiii). The commentator explains that such conjunct action for another's purpose without any consciousness on the part of the actors is possible, as we see it in the organs of sense, which act for the purposes of the mind without knowing that they are doing so. The Sánkhya-káriká adduces the example of milk, an unintelligent substance, secreting for the nourishment of the calf. (*Cf.* v.'s LVII to LX). The example of the cart carrying saffron for the use of man is also generally appealed to.

Soul is described as the witness, spectator and experiencer of the actions of nature. Conscious and always present in the body, it cannot but witness what takes place in it. This is the idea which Fichte assigns to mind, when he says, it is, "as it were an intelligent eye, placed in the central point of our inward consciousness, surveying all that takes place there," (Morell, II, p. 95). But since soul has no action or desire of any kind, and as it is, moreover, eternal and immutable, how can it be said to have a purpose of its own, which the thinking principle has to subserve? This is a crucial question, and the answer given is practically an evasion. The premises are admitted, but it is said that, inasmuch as it is a shadow of the soul that sensitizes the thinking principle, and that shadow feels and observes, by indiscriminate use of language we call the soul to be the experiencer and witness, (*cf.* p. 194). The service done is, in the same way, service done to the shadow

and not to the reality, and the benefit derived goes to nature or Prakriti, which is entertained and ultimately relieved of all sense of pain, and not to soul, which is painless and ever free.

Patanjali now turns to the effect of the theory and practice propounded. When a person has duly gone through the course of practice enjoined and acquired the knowledge promised, all false notions that he before had on the subject of life subside, (xxiv), and his thinking principle is bowed down by the weight of knowledge and commencing isolation, (xxv). Worldly thoughts, however, still break out occasionally, (xxvi), and these should be carefully repressed in the same way in which afflictions and obstructions were originally overcome, (*cf.* II, xxviii). When this repression is effected, perfect knowledge rises in the thinking principle, and entirely sweeps away all remnants of afflictions and residua of former works, (xxviii—xxx). All obscurations are removed ; the triad of qualities in regard to the individual concerned ceases from undergoing further change, (xxx) ; and the moment at last arrives when the qualities, having retired to rest, become defunct, and the soul abides solely in its own essence. This is isolation or salvation which is the aim and object of the Yoga doctrine, (xxxiii). This isolation is absolute and eternal, and the soul in regard to which it has been attained remains free for evermore.

Following the order of the text, the above summary does not afford a consecutive statement of the leading points of the Yoga system of theology and

metaphysics, and inasmuch as the dissertations on the Yoga now available in the English language are brief, obscure, and not unoften misleading and incorrect, it would not be amiss to attempt here a categorical resumè. The cardinal dogmas are, as already above stated, taken from the Sánkhya system, but there are differences, and the importance attached to some of them, in their mutual coöperation is markedly distinctive. The leading tenets of the Yogis are :

1st. That there is a Supreme Godhead who is purely spiritual, or all soul, perfectly free from afflictions, works, deserts, and desires. His symbol is Om, and He rewards those who are ardently devoted to Him by facilitating their attainment of liberation ; but He does not directly grant it. Nor is He the father, creator, or protector of the universe, with which He is absolutely unconnected.

2nd. That there are countless individual souls which animate living beings, and are eternal. They are pure and immutable ; but by their association with the universe they become indirectly the experiencers of joys and sorrows, and assume innumerable embodied forms in course of ever recurring metempsychoses.

3rd. That the universe is uncreate and eternal. It undergoes phenomenal changes, but, as a noumenon, it is always the same. In its noumenal state it is called *Prakrti* or nature ; it is always associated with the three qualities or active forces called goodness, foulness, and darkness. Matter as an integral part of

the universe is, likewise, eternal, though subject to modifications like the world. Strictly speaking the modifications of matter produce the phenomenal world which is composed of it.

4th. That next to soul there is a noumenon called *Chitta*, or the thinking principle, or mind in its most comprehensive sense. It is subject to the three qualities aforesaid, and undergoes various modifications according to the prevalence of one or other of those qualities. It is essentially unconscious or unintelligent, but it becomes conscious or intelligent by the reflection of, or association with, soul, which abides close by it. It also receives through the organs of sense shadows of external objects, and thereupon modifies itself into the shapes of those objects. The consciousness reflected on it makes it think that it is the experiencer of all worldly joys and sorrows. In reality, however, it is merely the spectacle of which soul is by proxy (its shadow) the spectator. It is closely allied to *Buddhi* or *intellect* of the Sánkhya system, but it plays a much more important part in the system, than what Buddhi does, partaking as it does the parts of both *Prakṛiti* and *Buddhi* in a prominent degree, and also of self-consciousness. It occupies the position of Will of the modern Pessimist system.

5th. That the functions of the thinking principle are five-fold, including right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory, and that these functions are produced by the prevalence of one or other of the three qualities.

6th. That, like the universe, all sensible objects

have their eternal archetypes or noumena, which undergo phenomenal changes, but are never absolutely destroyed. When one object changes into another, it is merely a modification of its form, and the form assumed, when destroyed, passes on to some other form, but it ultimately reverts to its noumenal or primary state.

7th. That phenomena, as results of modifications of noumena, are real and not phantasmal.

8th. That sensibles are not the direct causes of sensations, nor sensations the causes of sensibles ; but that the thinking principle receives impressions of sensibles under the influence of one or other of the three qualities, and the result is regulated by that influence. The influence extends both to sensations and to sensibles.

9th. That the thinking principle being changeable, constancy of knowledge is due to the immutability of the soul, and that no perception can take place until the thinking principle is made conscious by the soul.

10th. That impressions produced on the thinking principle leave on it certain residua (*αναμνήσις* of Aristotle) which are causes of intuitions, desires, new births, and further experiences.

11th. That desires are the origin of pain in this world.

12th. That the universe being eternal, desires are likewise eternal, and it is needless therefore to enquire when residua first arose to create desires.

13th. That mundane existence is thus associated with pain, and it is the duty of every one to rise above that pain.

14th. That the pain may be finally overcome or removed only by withdrawing the thinking principle from its natural functions.

15th. That the withdrawal in question can be effected by constant and sedulous observance of certain prescribed restraints, obligations and steadfast meditation.

16th. That in the course of the exercises above referred to, the adept attains extraordinary occult powers.

17th. That when that withdrawal is complete and absolute, the soul is completely isolated from the world, and that when that isolation is attained, it is liberated from all liability to future transmigration. And this is the isolation, liberation, emancipation, or final beatitude which should be the great object and aim of human existence.

The general impression regarding the nature of the Yoga doctrine, has been hitherto exceedingly unfavourable among Anglo-oriental scholars. It is mystical, it is fanatical, it is dreadfully absurd, are among the mildest charges brought against it. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall is so disgusted with its tenets that in a fit of virtuous indignation he says, "As few of the twenty-eight Yoga works which have fallen under my inspection are at present read, so, one may hope, few will ever again be read, either in this country or by curious enquirers in Europe. If we exclude the im-  
mundities of the *Tantras* and of the *Káma-sástra*, Hindu thought was never more unworthily engaged than in digesting into an economy the fanatical vagaries

of theocracy. Not less, it is observable, have the Yogins of India transcended than they have anticipated the quietistic delirations of Bonaventura, de Sales, Saint Theresa, and Molinos," (*Contributions*, p. xi). Other writers, if not equally denunciative, are still very severe in the tone of their criticisms. I believe this is due principally to the subject not having been carefully studied. The subject is dry—exceedingly so—and the enigmatical form in which it is presented in the text-books is not conducive to any interest being created in its favour. Generally speaking Indian scholars do not study it, and the few ascetics and hermits who do seldom associate with the world. Pandits, when called upon to explain, frequently, if not invariably, mix up the tenets of Patanjali's Yoga with those of the Tantras, the Puráñas, the Tantric Sañhitás, the Pancharátras, and the Bhagavadgítá—works which have very dissimilar and discordant tenets to inculcate. Some of the later avowedly Yoga works are, moreover, exceedingly allegorical and mystical in their descriptions, and in them the purport of the instruction is buried in a mass of absurdity. Practices, too, have been inculcated in them which are certainly repulsive. (*Cf.* pp. 103, 117). In judging, however, of the nature of Patanjali's doctrine it is unfair to associate it with the vagaries of fanatical, deluded mendicants, or with the modifications and adaptations which it has undergone in the hands of the Tantrics and the Puránics.

The tenets of Patanjali are all that concern the

critic, and the summary of them given above will show to the unbiassed enquirer that they are closely similar to those enunciated by some of the greatest metaphysicians of ancient Greece. The similitude is in some cases so close that I would not be surprised to see some enterprising dialectician, intent upon proving everything good in India to be of European origin, demonstrate that the whole system has been nefariously copied from Greek philosophers. The tenets may not be the best of their kind—some of them are unquestionably futile,—but they are certainly, not such philosophic desperadoes as to commit outrages on the chastity of our thoughts, or so vile as to make us join in the hope so fervently expressed by Mr. Hall that the works which treat of them may not again be read by the curious enquirer. If the history of the human mind be a fit subject for study, if it be desirable to compare the progress of metaphysical knowledge among different nationalities at different times in different places, if the civilization of the Hindus be an object of enquiry, we should rather earnestly desire that the works should be thoroughly examined, and not neglected, and that without in any way pledging ourselves as their defenders. There is no reason to doubt that such enquiry will not only be useful to history, but reflect credit on the grasp of the intellect of the ancient Indian sages who matured the doctrine.

It would take more space than what I have at my disposal to go through all the tenets seriatim, and show their relation to European theories, but it may

be generally observed that even the most faulty dogmas do not, on sufficient examination, appear to be so bad as they are represented to be by hasty and adverse critics. The theory of isolation is certainly very startling, but it was the logical outcome of the conception of the absolute perfection of the Godhead reacting on the Upanishad doctrine of resolution into the Divine essence.\* The Bhagavadgítá thus sums up the Upanishad idea :

- ‘He who all paths stops up, and in the heart
- ‘Confines the mind, shuts up the breath within
- ‘The head, adopts a firm devotion, utters
- ‘The single syllable “Om”—the Soul Supreme,
- ‘And thinks of me, and goes, abandoning
- ‘The body thus, reaches the goal supreme.’

(*Telang's Translation*, p. 52.)

This idea, however, involves the necessity of additions to, and abstractions from, Divine perfection. The theory is that the human soul is specifically distinct from, though generically the same with, the Divine one, and as the two dissimilars cannot melt into one, they must always remain separate, and as joy, felicity, bliss and the like imply activity and enjoyment,—a concrete heaven inconsistent with the theory of final rest,—the Yogís obviate all philosophic and logical difficulties by contenting themselves with isolation, without predicating it with joy or bliss.

The threefold division of the intellectual man into *puruṣa*, *chitta* and *ahankára* is the counterpart of *νοῦς*, *ψυχὴ* and *σοῦα* of Plato and other ancient

\* Dr. Weber probably refers to this Upanishad theory, and not to the Puráṇas as stated on page 208.

European authors. (Plato, *Timaeus*, Aristotle, *Politics.*)

The theory of Prakṛiti, a noumenal absolute of the phenomenal world, or nature in the abstract, has been a stumbling-block to many Europeans, and the allegorical way in which it is frequently described, is certainly often misleading. Even among Hindus it has given rise to many frivolous and absurd stories. In the main, however, it seems to accord very closely with some of the latest European speculations on the subject. It is no other than the *φυσις* or plastic nature of Cudworth, which has been designed to avoid fortuitousness on the one hand and God's constant interposition on the other. Morell, in his 'History of modern Philosophy' (I, p. 208) commenting on one of the latest German systems, that of Herbarts, says :

'The process by which the necessity of philosophy comes to be felt is the following :—When we look round us upon the world in which we live, our knowledge commences by a perception of the various objects that present themselves on every hand to our view. What we *immediately* perceive, however, is not actual essence, but phenomena ; and after a short time, we discover that many of those phenomena are unreal ; that they do not pourtray to us the actual truth of things as they are ; and that if we followed them implicitly, we should soon be landed in the midst of error and contradiction. For example, what we are immediately conscious of in coming into contact with the external world, are such appearances as green, blue, bitter, sour, extension, resistance, &c. These phenomena, upon reflection, we discover not to be so many real independent existences, but properties inhering in certain substances, which we term things. Again, when we examine further into these *substances*, we discover that they are not real ultimate essences, but that they consist of certain elements, by the combination of which they are produced. What we term the *reality*, therefore, is not the *thing as*

*a whole*, but the elements of which it is composed. Thus, the further we analyze, the further does the idea of *reality* recede backwards; but still it must always be somewhere, otherwise we should be perceiving a nonentity. The last result of the analysis is the conception of an absolutely simple element, which lies at the basis of all phenomena in the material world, and which we view as the essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation.'

Dr. Kay, in his remarks on this passage, observes—

'This "essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation"—this which the European analyst arrives at as "the last result of the analysis"—is what the Sañkhya expositor, proceeding, "more Indico," synthetically, lays down as his first position. This is Kapila's *múlaprakṛiti*—the "root of all"—"the radical producer"—that which, variously modified, constitutes all that the 'soul' takes cognizance of. This primordial essence—among the synonymes for which, given in our text-book, are the 'undiscrete' *avyakta*, the 'indestructible' *akshara*, that 'in which all generated effect is comprehended' *pradhánaka*, &c., is the 'absolute' of German speculation. The development of this principle, according to one of Shelling's views (noticed by Mr. Morell at p. 147, Vol. II) is 'not the free and designed operation of intelligence, but rather a blind impulse working, first unconsciously in the mind.' So, according to Kapila, "From Nature issues Mind, and thence self-consciousness."'  
(*Benares Magazine*, Vol. III, pp. 284f.)

This *Prakṛiti* is believed to be unintelligent, and yet it is described to be acting for another's purpose, and this has often been stigmatized as a specimen of Indian absurdity. This theory, however, is exactly what Cudworth entertains in regard to his plastic nature, which, he says 'doth never consult nor deliberate;' 'it goes on in one constant unrepeating tenor from generation to generation; it acts artificially and for sake of ends, but itself understands

not the ends which it acts for.' 'It acts neither by knowledge nor by animal fancy, neither electively nor blindly, but must be concluded to act **FATALLY**, magically, and sympathetically.' ('True Intellectual System of the Universe,' B. I., Cap. III, 37.)

Again, *Prakṛiti* and necessarily matter are eternal, says the Yogi, and in the sense in which he predicates eternity, *i. e.*, to noumena as distinct from phenomena, we have nothing more preposterous than the "eternal verities" of the European philosophers of even our own times—verities which even the Godhead cannot undo, such as the conception of a triangle invariably including two right angles. To such archetypical eternities few can object from a pure philosophic standpoint, apart from revealed systems of religion.

The two most repellent dogmas of the system are its faith in metempsychosis and its theory about occult powers, and even these have found defenders in quarters where they were least expected; and, carefully considered, they do not seem to be so absurd as one would at first glance suppose.

Extravagant as are the ideas regarding the occult powers, and purely imaginary as, at least, some of them doubtless are, it is worthy of note that belief in such powers was almost universal in the ancient world, and well-authenticated reports are not wanting to show that some of them were attainable. Mental prescience has manifested itself on many occasions. Mesmeric and other electric conditions of the body are now objects of scientific research; and they are well-known

to produce extraordinary phenomena. Many facts have been brought to light which show that physical causes may be, particularly in unsophisticated states of society, easily mistaken for occult powers. Sir David Brewster's theory of the objective projection upon visual organs of a subjectively conceived image may account for a good many occurrences which strike the mind of the masses with wonder, and appear as the result of superhuman agency. Many psychological conditions, which are known to arise and produce startling results, but the true nature of which has not yet been fully and scientifically examined and ascertained, would account for some so-called occult occurrences. But in the present state of our knowledge it is impossible to separate the wheat from the tares—to discriminate between what powers were really attained or attainable by Yogis and what they fancied they would attain by persevering in their practices. Doubtless the pretensions of the European psychics of the day are to a considerable extent false and fraudulent; still there are among them some good men and true, and their researches carried on on catholic, honest and scientific principles will hereafter bear some good fruit, and the time will then come to enquire how far the Yogis had anticipated them. In the meanwhile all that need be said is that the extravagance of some of their pretensions should not make us spurn the Yogis as all knaves and charlatans, and their psychical system wholly false and fatuous. Such a principle of action, however necessary and prudent in shifting the merits of a lawsuit, and even then under certain

restrictions, would be intolerable in history. If some obviously false, or improbable, or unprovable, statements in any author would justify our rejecting the whole of his testimony there would be no ancient author left whose testimony could be accepted, and I know not how few of our modern authors would escape the condemnation. No Yogi myself, nor any-wise interested in the doctrine, all I feel in the cause of truth is, that there should, for the present, be a suspension of judgment, and the materials afforded by the Yogis should be subjected to examination and analysis.

As regards metempsychosis something has already been said, (*ante*, p. xiii.) It is a doctrine which even Plato thought fit to adopt, and much might be said in favour of it which cannot be readily disproved ; but I shall content myself here with a quotation.

Perhaps the ablest metaphysician who ever came to India from England was the late Rev. Dr. Kay, principal of the late Bishop's College. His strong Christian convictions did not by any means make him an indulgent critic of adverse faiths, but in commenting on the doctrine of metempsychosis as affording a solution of the question of the origin of evil, he says :

‘ The doctrine of the Metempsychosis is, in fact, the Hindu theory on the great question of the “ origin of evil.” The theory may be thus stated. Evil exists, and it is not to be supposed that evil befalls any one undeservedly. When, therefore, for example, a new-born child, who has had no opportunity of acting either rightly or wrongly, is found suffer-

ing evil, it is inferred that the evil is the fruit of evil deeds done in a former state of existence. If you ask how the person became disposed to do evil in that former state of existence, the answer is ready—it was the consequence of evil deeds done in a state of existence still anterior, and so on. You have only now to apply the Newtonian principle—that what is true at every assignable point short of the limit, must be true at the limit—and then there is no assignable point in the existence of evil in past time at which point its existence cannot be accounted for by the hypothesis of antecedent evil-doing; it follows (argue the Hindus) that the existence of evil is accounted for on this hypothesis; and further, they contend, it is accountable on no other.

‘ If one will take the pains thoroughly to grasp the conception, and to view the matter, as a German would say, from the same *stand-punkt* as the Hindu, who, holding the past eternity of soul, denies that the *regressus in infinitum* here involves any absurdity, he will probably acknowledge that the doctrine of the metempsychosis, however false, is not to be treated as a fiction of the poets, when we are arguing with a Hindu. We try to make the Hindu give up the tenet—and we do well:—but we shall also do well to bear in mind that we are calling upon him to give up, without an equivalent, what he has been accustomed to regard as a complete solution of the greatest mystery in the universe—short of the primal mystery of “Being” itself. The Hindu’s explanation we regard as a delusion, and we must tell him so—

but we must beware how we allow it to appear as if we were provided with a substitute. The "origin of evil" has not been revealed. The requirement that we shall maintain our entire reliance on the goodness of God, in the absence of such revelation, is one of the trials—rather it furnishes the substance of all the trials—of our faith. This we have to teach—but we have no equivalent solution of the mystery to offer. On this point the words of Whately should be treasured by every Missionary among the Hindus. We quote from the Preface (p. 12) of his 'Essays on some of the peculiarities of the Christian religion.'

'The origin of evil, again, not a few are apt to speak of, as explained and accounted for, at least in great part, by the Scripture-accounts of 'sin entering the world, and death by sin'; whereas the Scriptures leave us, with respect to the difficulty in question, just where they find us, and are manifestly not designed to remove it. He who professes to *account* for the existence of evil, by merely tracing it up to the *first* evil recorded as occurring, would have no reason to deride the absurdity of an atheist, who should profess to account for the origin of the human race, without having recourse to a creator, by tracing them up to the *first pair.*'" (*Bonares Magazine*, III, pp. 286f.)

Elsewhere the same writer, speaking generally, observes, 'it may somewhat tend to check the mischievous consequences attendant on bluntly regarding any current and influential Hindu doctrine, that happens not to accord with our accustomed notions, as being self-evidently frivolous and effete, if it can be shown that the conceptions involved in the doctrine are still influential in directing the current of speculation in Europe, in quarters where that current runs (or is supposed to run) deepest.' (*Opus cit.*, pp. 283f.)

To turn now to the life of Patanjali. The brief notices to be met with of him in Sanskrit works are so legendary and contradictory that little can be made of them to subserve the cause of history. He was a great scholar and unrivalled philologist of his time, and the life of every great man was, in ancient times, so encrusted with the supernatural that it is difficult to remove the covering, and come to the truthful core. Rev. J. Ward, citing the Rudrāyamala Tantra, the Vrihannandikes'vara Purāṇa, and the Padma Purāṇa, describes him to 'have been born in the Ilávrata Varsha, where his father Angirá and his mother Satí resided, and that, immediately on his birth, he made known things past, present, and future. He married Lolupá, whom he found on the north of Sumeru, in the hollow of a "Vaṭa" tree, and is said to have lived as a mendicant to a great age. Being insulted by the inhabitants of Bhota-bhandára, while engaged in religious austerities, he reduced them to ashes by fire from his mouth.' (*Hindus*, II.)

There occurs in the *Sankshepa-s'ankara-jaya* of Mádhava A'chárya a story, according to which the Devas, on one occasion, repaired to Mahádeva, and besought his aid in saving the world from the baneful doctrines which Buddhas and other heretics had widely disseminated among men. The god vouchsafed to them a kind reply, and it was arranged that certain chief divinities would from time to time appear on earth as Jaimini, Vyása, Patanjali, and S'ankara, and, uprooting all heresies, preserve the true religion from pollution. It fell to the lot of Vishṇu and S'ankarshaṇa alias Ananta

to depute a portion of themselves to be born as Patanjali,\* and Mahádeva himself appeared as S'ankara.† The only value of this story for historical purposes is the admission that Patanjali appeared on the earth long after it had been overrun by the Buddhists. Mádhava A'chárya of the 14th century is no authority for what happened sixteen hundred years before him, but the tradition in his time was that Patanjali was born long after Buddha in order to inculcate theism, and this supports the opinion expressed on page xxiii to the effect that the Yoga doctrine as we have it in Patanjali's work is of post-Buddhist origin. It is in favour, too, of the deductions made by Goldstücker and others regarding the age of Patanjali from casual historical allusions in his great work, the Mahábháshya, entirely undermining, as it does, the arguments of Professor Kunte as given in his 'Vicissitudes of Aryan civilization.' It is true that the Yoga-sútra does not anywhere refer to Buddhism, and it is not easy to accept the theory of Professor Cowell that the relegation of benevolence (*maitri*), which occupies a prominent place in the Buddhist system, to an ancillary or subordinate position in the Yoga is a direct allusion to Buddhism, (*Sarvadarśana-sangraha*, p. 273,) for benevolence as an element of religious observance is

\* मध्यमं कांडसम्बर्तुमनुशास्त्रैः यथेव दैः ।

अवनीयोऽश्वदोऽभूतो सङ्करैषपतञ्जली ॥ १ ॥ ५१ ॥

मुनीभूता भुद्वापालि योगकाष्ठकतो ज्ञितो ॥

अधिनं ज्ञानकाष्ठकूर्दरित्यामीति देवताः । १ ॥ ५२ ॥

† यत्तीक्ष्णः सङ्करोगानामा भविष्यामि भद्रीतके ।

महात्म्यं भवताऽपि मानुषीं तनुमात्रिताः ॥ ५३

common to all systems of religion, and reference to it cannot be taken as an unmistakable test; but apart from them, I believe, I have produced sufficient evidence to show that Patanjali cannot reasonably be believed to have lived before Buddha. Ananta is represented in the form of a many-hooded serpent, and, as an emanation of that serpent, Patanjali is frequently indicated by the homonym *phani* or 'serpent,' (cf. p. 1).

The references given of Patanjali in his Mahá-bháshya entirely upsets the statements made in Mr. Ward's notice. The sage describes himself as the son of one *Goṇiká*, not *Satí*, and his place of birth was the eastern country, whereas *Ilávrata* is said in the Puráṇas to lie to the north of the Himálaya. These facts are thus given by Goldstücker in his essay on Páṇini:

'Of the lineage of Patanjali all the knowledge I possess is, that the name of his mother was *Goṇiká*. It occurs in the last words of Patanjali on a *Káriká* to Páṇini. Of more importance, however, is the information he gives us of having resided temporarily in *Káshmír*, for this circumstance throws some light on the interest which certain kings of this country took in the preservation of the great commentary.'

'His birthplace must have been situated in the east of India, for he calls himself *Gonardiya*; and this word is given by the *Kásiká* in order to exemplify names of places in the East. Patanjali's birthplace had therefore the name of *Gonarda*. But that he is one of the eastern grammarians is borne out also by other evidence. *Kaiyyaṭa* calls him on several occasions *A'cháryadeśiya*. If we interpreted this word according to Páṇini's rules V, 8, 67 and 68, it would mean "an unaccomplished teacher," but as there is not the slightest reason for assuming that *Kaiyyaṭa* intended any irony or blame when he applied this epithet to Patanjali, it is necessary to

render the word by the teacher “ who belongs to the country of the Achárya.” Now, since Kaiyyaṭa also distinctly contrasts áchárya as the author of the Vártikas, with Acháryadeśiya, the latter epithet can only imply that Patanjali was a countryman of Kátyáyana. Kátyáyana, however, as Professor Weber has shown by very good arguments, is one of the eastern school ; Kaiyyaṭa, therefore, must have looked upon Patanjali also as belonging to it.

‘ Another proof is afforded by a passage in the comment of Bhattojí Díkshita on the Phit-sútras which I have quoted above. For when this grammarian tells us that the *eastern* grammarians attribute the accent in question of *saha* to Pánini’s rule VI, 8, 78, we find that it is *Patanjali* himself who gives us this information, and without any intimation of his having obtained it from other authorities.’ (Goldstucker’s *Pánini*, p. 237.)

Meagre as these notes on the life of Patanjali are, they are of unquestionable authority, and we must rest content with them. In the ‘ Indian Antiquary’ (IX, p. 308), Professor Max Müller has a note on the travels of I-tsing, a Chinese pilgrim, who visited India at the close of the 7th century, and therein mention is made of a Sanskrit grammatical work under the name of *Juni* or *Chuni*. The learned professor shows on very good arguments that the work could be no other than the Mahábháshya, and then very pertinently asks, “ Is this (*Juni*) possibly a name connected with Goniká, the mother of Patanjali, who calls himself Gonikáputra, or with Gonarda, his supposed birthplace, from which he takes the name of Gonardíya ?” Few who have studied the subject would hesitate to respond in the affirmative to the first question.

In a note on a Páli inscription from Bhárhat, published in the Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal for March 1880, I have quoted a

great number of instances to show that in India metronymics were used to indicate illegitimacy, or the forsaking of a child by its father. If this theory of mine be tenable, the use of Goṇikáputra in the case of Patanjali would suggest a bar sinister in his scutcheon. Under that supposition it would be futile to enquire about his genealogy. If Napoleon said, 'my genealogy begins with the battle of Austerlitz,' Patanjali might well appeal to his Mahábháshya as the root of his family tree.\* Professor Weber, however, has been at some pains to find a genealogical tree for him. In his 'History of Indian Literature' he has several remarks with reference to Patanjali in connection with the Vedic Kápya Patamchala. He says, on page 137, 'Again, though only in the Yájnavalkiya-kánda, we have mention of a Kápya Patamchala of the country of the Madras as particularly distinguished by his exertions in the cause of Bráhmaṇical theology; and in his name we cannot but see a reference to Kapila and Patanjali, the traditional founders of the Sánkhya, and Yoga systems.' This is modified in a subsequent remark, (p. 223,) in which it is said, 'The name of Patanjali (we should expect Pát.†) is certainly somehow

\* Professor Weber refers to a tradition which, he says, 'identifies Pingala with Patanjali, the author of Mahábháshya and the Yoga-sútra,' but he justly adds, it 'should answer for itself; for us there exists no cogent reason for accepting it.' ('Hist. Indian Literature,' p. 231.)

† This grammatical correction has been suggested apparently with a view to make Patanjali a derivative of Patamchala to prop the theory of relationship.

connected with that of the Patamchala Kápya of the land of the Madras, who appears in the Yájnavalkiya-kánda of the Satap. Br. It occurs again (see below p. 737) as the name of the author of the Yoga-sútras.' On page 236, we are told that, 'Kapila, again, can hardly be unconnected with the Kápya Patamchala whom we find mentioned in the Yájnavalkya-kánda of the Vrihad A'ranyaka as a zealous representative of the Bráhmaṇical learning.' This is repeated on page 284,—'Kápya Patamchala, with whom Kapila ought probably to be connected.' It is difficult to make out from these extracts a consistent account of what the real or actual theory is. In the first extract a single individual, Kápya Patamchala, is split into two persons, Kapila and Patanjali, and that as certainly as the phrase 'we cannot but see' can imply. In the second extract the Vedic personage is said to be 'certainly' connected with Patanjali only, and in the third we are told that the same individual can 'hardly be unconnected' with Kapila. In the fourth the phrase 'can hardly be unconnected' is replaced by 'ought probably to be connected.' No reason is assigned for the first two conjectures, but for the 3rd and the 4th the reason assigned is that Kápya Patamchala was 'a zealous representative of the Bráhmaṇical learning.' It happens, however, that Kapila was an atheist, who repudiated the existence of the Godhead, saying 'there is no proof that such a being existed,' and it is difficult to conceive how the relationship should be established on the ground of Kápya having been 'a zealous representative of the Hindu learn-

ing,' unless we admit that Hindu learning consisted in atheism. It is obvious that the learned professor has been led away entirely by phonetic resemblance, unless he should urge, which is not at all likely, that it is an *ex cathedra* opinion, without any reason to back it. Kápya has the letters *k* and *p* and so has Kapila, and Patamchala sounds very like Patanjali, and therefore he evidently concludes they are the same. This is a line of argument, however, which I cannot help thinking, is, to use the language of the learned Professor, 'of a very curious kind.' It reminds me, I must frankly confess, the ratiocination of Fluellen by which that jovial Welsh Captain proved the identity of Macedon and Monmouth. Had that flighty logician been reminded in the present case of the absence in Kápya of the letter *l* of Kapila, and of *j* of Patanjali in Patamchala, I can easily conceive how he would have completely dumb-founded his antagonist with the pithy remark : ' Why, I pray you, is not pig great? the pig, or the great, or the mighty, or the huge, or the magnanimous, are all one reckonings, save the phrase is a little variations.' I have nothing to show that Patanjali was not connected with Kápya by the father's or the mother's or some other side, in family or race, but I firmly hold that we have at present no proof worth the name in support of the conjecture.

The son of a Bráhmaṇ priest, and devoted to literary studies and ascetic practices from early life, Patanjali had little to do which could afford incidents fit for historical record, and it is not remarkable, therefore, that we have no account left of his career. He was

doubtless married and probably the father of a family, but we know nothing about those points. The only memorials of his life are his literary works,—his great commentary on the grammar of Pāṇini and the *Yoga-sūtra*. It is impossible to speak in too high terms of the first. It is the noblest monument of profound erudition, of keen critical acumen, of unrivalled philosophical perception, which has been left to us by any ancient scholar in any part of the world, and well may the Hindus be proud of the heritage that has been bequeathed to them by their renowned ancestor. The second forms the theme of this essay. There is an *A'ryyā-panchásáti* on the Vaishṇava theory of the relation between soul and nature which is also ascribed to him. The work has been published in the Benares 'Pandit,' No. 50. He wrote also a work on medicine, but it is no longer extant. It would seem that he was, likewise, the author of a treatise on grammatical desiderata under the title of *Ishṭis*, and also certain supplementary notes on the rules of Sanskrit grammar (*Vártikas*), but these exist now only in the form of quotations in the *Mahábháshya*. The manner in which they are cited in the 'great commentary' suggests the idea that at one time they had separate existences, but they are not met with now as a separate work.

To turn now to the Bibliography of the *Yoga* doctrine. The leading text is, as already stated, the *Yogánuśásana*, but its different topics have been elaborated and expounded in a great number of subsequent treatises, and its literature is now represented

by a large mass of writings. In 1859, Mr. Hall, in his 'Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems,' collected the names of 28 separate works. But recent researches carried on under the auspices of the Government of India enable me now to put in the Appendix a list including no less than 150 names. It is probable that further researches will bring to light the texts of several other works. It must be admitted, however, that while Mr. Hall's list was compiled by a single individual after himself examining all the MSS. named, thereby obviating all risks of error, mine is a compilation from meagre reports, and it is likely, therefore, that there will be found in it mistakes of diverse kinds. Sanskrit works have many aliases, and it is possible that in some cases—probably very few—of works unknown to, and unseen by, me I have recorded the same work under two or three names. I have included, too, a few works which treat of varieties of the Yoga, the Tántric and Puránic forms of it, and not confined myself solely to the doctrine of Patanjali. The differences in some cases are so slight, that it was not possible for me, without carefully reading the works, to mark the distinctions. On the whole, however, I believe the new list will be found useful.

In preparing my list I have followed an alphabetical arrangement, a chronological one with anything like accuracy not being practicable in the present state of our information on the subject. If the *Yoga-sástra-sútra-páth*, attributed to Yájnavalkya, be really his, it

is the oldest treatise known on the Yoga doctrine. Yájnavalkya lived long before Patanjali, and the Bháshya especially cites his name to prove that the Yoga doctrine was current from a much anterior period than the *Yoga-sútra*, which was compiled for the benefit of novices ; but as I have not yet seen it, I can say nothing on the subject. Adverting to the work, Mr. Hall says, 'It is alleged that they (the aphorisms of Yájnavalkya) were noted down by Baudháyana, as they were orally delivered by S'ukra to Yájnavalkya. Hence they are ascribed to S'ukra, who here has the epithet of Mahákavi. This work possibly deserves a closer examination than I can at present give it : but, it is, I suspect, of comparatively recent origin, and of little worth in any point of view.' (*Contributions*, p. 18.)

Passing it over for the present I come to the work of Patanjali, the *Yoga-sútra* alias the *Yogánuśáśana* or the *Sáṅkhyá-pravachana*. It has the benefit of a host of commentaries, explaining its tenets from different standpoints. The most ancient of these commentaries is generally believed to be the one which is known under the different names of *Yoga-bháshya*, *Pátanjala-bháshya*, and *Sáṅkhyá-pravachana-bháshya*. It is held in high estimation by the Páṇdits of this country. It has the advantage, too, of two exegeses by eminent scholiasts, one by Váchaspati Mis'ra, and the other by Vijnána Bhikshu. It labours, however, under the disadvantage of being of doubtful authenticity as regards the name of its author. It has been twice printed, once

at Benares, edited by Bhairavadatta Dvivedi, and once at Calcutta, along with the gloss of Váchaspati Miśra, edited by Pandit Jívánanda Vidyáságara, in 1874 (Samvat 1929.) I have also seen upwards of a dozen MSS. of it of different dates; but in the colophon of none of these have I met with the author's name. This is a remarkable omission, inasmuch as it is rarely that the author's name, where known, is dropped out from the colophon of a Sanskrit MS. The tradition is pretty common and old that Vyása, the digester of the Vedas and the author of the *Mahábhárata*, is the author of it. This tradition has been generally accepted by European writers, and it has the support of the two well-known and respectable exegesists named above. Váchaspati Miśra in his gloss (*tíká*) on the commentary (*bháshya*) says, "Saluting the saint Patanjali, I attempt a short, clear exposition (*vyákhyá*), pregnant with meaning, on the commentary expounded by Veda-vyása."\* The authority, however, of this writer is not, in matters connected with historical facts of olden times, of much weight. There were two writers of this name. One of them was a lexicist, and, according to the colophon of his *S'udrácchára-chintámaṇi*, court Pandit of Mahárájá Harináráyaṇa, of Mithilá, and Harináráyaṇa lived in the middle of the 16th century. The other lived between the 10th and the 12th centuries, and commented both on the *Yoga* and the *S'ankhya* texts, as well as on the *Vedánta-sútras*. Adverting to him

\* व्यासा पतञ्जलिमित्रिं वेदव्यायेन भाषिते ।

सत्त्वचित्तस्त्वाद्यवक्ष्यते भाष्ये व्यासाः विवाक्षते ॥

Mr. Hall says, 'Váchaspati's exact age has not yet been discovered. But he is mentioned, as are Udayana and Prasastapáda, in the *Nyáyasára-vichára* of Bhaṭṭa Rághava, which was written in the *S'aka* year 1174 or A. D. 1252; and he quotes from Bhoja, who was reigning in A. D. 1042.\* (*Sánkhyá-sára*, p. 40.)

Vijnána Bhikshu dates from a much later time. According to Mr. Hall, 'in all probability, Vijnána lived in the sixteenth or seventeenth century. There is some slight ground, however, for carrying him back still further. His nationality is unknown; and so is his civil appellation even; for Vijnána Bhikshu is, without question, the style of a devotee.' (*Sánkhyá-sára*, pp. 37f.)

He continues, 'In the *Prayogaratna*, a work on the sixteen sacraments, by Náráyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, son of Rámes'vara Bhaṭṭa, its author says, that he was assisted,

\* This date is incorrect. It refers to the last Bhoja, whereas the Bhoja quoted must be the elder one, and elsewhere constructively admitted to be so by Mr. Hall himself. In the Preface to his 'Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems,' he observes, 'that two Bhojas have ruled over part of Central India, and that the earlier, whatever was the case with the later, was interested in literature, I have elsewhere shown conclusively. The Bhoja who reigned in the middle of the eleventh century very likely entertained learned men at his court; and the astrological compilation known as the *Rájamártanda*, and thus called in honour of him, may have been indebted, for its name, to the suggestion of the Yoga work, so entitled, written in the time of his homonymous antecessor. At any rate he came long after the date of the *Sarasvatíkanjhábharaṇa*; and we are nowhere told that the Bhoja to whom it is attributed bore the epithet of Ranaraṅgamalla.' (*Contributions*, p. viii.)

in preparing it, by Ananta Díkshita, son of Vis'vanátha Díkshita. The father of one of Vijnána's disciples, Bhává-gaṇes'a Díkshita, was Bhává-vis'vanátha Díkshita; and, if the latter was one with Vis'vanátha Díkshita, and if Bhává-gaṇes'a Díkshita was brother of Ananta Díkshita, we are enabled to form a pretty correct estimate as to the time of Vijnána Bhikshu. For Náráyaṇa Bhaṭṭa's youngest brother's second son, Raghunátha Bhaṭṭa, dates his *Kála-tattva-vivechana* in Samvat 1677 or A. D. 1620: Vijnána may be placed fifty or sixty years earlier.' But whatever the times of Vijnána Bhikshu and Váchaspati Mis'ra, it is futile to expect from such authors any precision as to the identity of a person who lived many centuries before them.

The name Vyása may be right enough, but there is nothing whatever to show that this Vyása was the same with the digester of the Vedas and the author of the *Mahábhárata*. In the *Mahábhárata* every epigraph gives the name of Vyása, and there is no reason why it should be omitted in the commentary. Then Vyása lived at a remote period of antiquity, in the beginning of the Kali Yuga according to Indian belief, and his classification and division of the Vedas existed long before the time of Patanjali, for we have unmistakable proofs of the existence of the classification in Páṇini, Yásk'a, the *Prátis'ákhya*s, and other works of a much earlier date than that of the Yoga aphorisms, and it is impossible to reconcile the idea that he should be the author of an exegesis which could not have had a *raison d'être* before the *Yoga-sútra* was

composed in the 2nd or 3rd century before the Christian era. That exegesis quotes, too, authorities which are of a more recent date than that of Vyāsa. The evidence of style is often a suspicious one, but no one who has any knowledge of the Sanskrit language will for a moment think it possible that he who wrote the Mahábhárata could be the author of the Bháshya under notice. Compared with the works of leading scholiasts, the Bháshya appears to be the production of a third class writer. It certainly cannot be compared with the 'great commentary' of Patanjali, or with the equally renowned exegesis of S'ankara on the Vedánta aphorisms, or with the commentary of Sabara Svámí on the Mímánsá ; and, whatever his age, Vyāsa was by the unanimous testimony of the Hindus a far superior author and scholar to Patanjali, or Sabara, or S'ankara. Fairly good though it be, there is a looseness, an indecision, a want of logical precision, in the Bháshya which are incompatible with the universal estimate of Vyāsa's learning and scholarship. Bhojadeva treats it with withering sarcasm. Without naming it, but obviously aiming at it, he says, 'all commentators are perverters of the meaning of their authors ; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious ; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain ; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number,' (p. 2). It may be that Bhoja had to justify his attempt at a new commentary by throwing discredit on his predecessors, but his remarks are not al-

together unauthorised. The invocation at the beginning of the Bháshya is also against its authenticity. No work of the leading Rishis which has come down to us contains any such invocation, and Vyása would be the last to pray to Mahádeva in the way in which that divinity has been invoked in the Bháshya. The tone of the Bháshya is that of a third class mediæval scholium, and I am clearly of opinion, therefore, that it is not the work of the digester of the Vedas. Its author may have borne the name of Vyása, a common family name even to this day, but he was not the digester of the Vedas nor older than the latest ancient times, or, more probably, the early middle ages.

The next commentary I have to notice is the *Rájamártanda*, of which a complete English translation is now offered to the public. It is not so ambitious as the last. It styles itself a *vritti* or gloss, whereas the other is a *Bháshya* or commentary. It is mainly explanatory, when the other is discursive. It is modest in tone, when the other is dictatorial. Its author sets forth his object in writing the work by saying, 'Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patanjali for the edification of intelligent persons,' (p. 2). And he has faithfully carried out his resolution. He has interpreted all the leading words of his text, and given a very fair explanation of the meaning of his author, and the purport and bearing of his doctrine. It is, perhaps, not always quite so full in philosophical matter as its predecessor, but it

certainly omits nothing of importance for a correct understanding of the text.

It is generally taken for granted by Indian writers that Bhoja, king of Dhárá, who flourished in the middle of the 11th century, was the author of the exegesis; but the opinion is not tenable. Doubtless the colophon of the exegesis names Maharájádhirája Bhojadeva as its author, but there have been many Bhojas in India, (*cf.* my 'Indo-Aryans,' II, pp. 385*f.*) and it does not show which is the sovereign meant: it certainly does not announce that this Bhoja was the hero of the *Bhojaprabandha* and a sovereign of Dhárá in the century named. The title assigned him in the introduction to the work is Ranarangamalla, and this, as far as we know, was not borne by the Bhoja of the 11th century. The former is, moreover, described in the introduction to have written three works, a grammatical treatise on the government of words, a medical memoir under the title of *Rájamrigán-ka*, and the gloss under notice, and none of these is attributed by the *Bhojaprabandha* to its hero. On the other hand, that hero is known to have written or published in his name a work on judicial astrology as bearing on Smṛiti rites, under the name of *Rájamártanda*, and it is impossible to imagine that he assigned the same name to his exegesis on the Yoga aphorisms. Two such dissimilar works could not have been published under one common name. And even if one believed such a nomenclature to be possible or probable, the question would arise, how is it that in the introduction to the Yoga, the astrological work is altogether

left out of record? The astrological work is several times the size of the *Yoga* exegesis, and otherwise of considerable importance; it has been very largely quoted by subsequent writers, and it is not at all probable that an author, or his encomiast, who was particular in noticing the meagre and poor medical treatise should overlook it. It might be said that it was composed after the composition of, and therefore could not be included in, the *Yoga* gloss, but that would be a simple assumption without any proof, a mere begging of the question. That the *Rájamártanda* is not a generic, but a specific, name is evident from the fact of an exegesis on the *S'áṅkhya* bearing the name of *Rájávártika*, which is believed to have been dedicated to *Ranarangamalla*. It is probable, therefore, that our author is the *Bhoja* of the 10th century, who was also a king of *Dhárá*. Advertising to him, Mr. Hall says, "That two *Bhojas* have ruled over part of Central India, and that the earlier, whatever were the case with the later, was interested in literature, I have elsewhere shown conclusively. The *Bhoja* who reigned in the middle of the eleventh century very likely entertained learned men at his court, and the astrological compilation known as the *Rájamártanda* and thus called in honour of him may have been indebted, for its name, to the suggestion of the *Yoga* work so entitled, written in the time of his homonymous antecessor. At any rate, he came long after the date of the *Sarasvatí-kaṇṭhábharana*; and we are nowhere told that the *Bhoja* to whom it is attributed bore the epithet, *Ranarangamalla*.' (*Contributions*, p. viii.)

Of the other commentaries on the *Yoga-Sútra*, the works of *Bhavadeva*, *Nágójí Bhaṭṭa*, *Bhává-ganés'a*, *Udayankara*, *Nages'a Bhaṭṭa*, *Náráyána Bhikshu*, *Sadá-síva*, *Rámánanda Tírtha*, *Mahádeva*, *Ananta*, *S'ankara*, *Umápati Tripáthí*, and *Kshemánanda*, may be cited as samples. They are all inferior in importance to the work of *Bhoja*, and call for no special remark here.

The same may be said of the other works named in my list. Some of them treat of the various practices which *Yogí*s resort to to acquire occult powers; while others describe modified forms of the doctrine of *Patañjali*, suited to *Vaishṇava*, *Sáiva*, and *Sákta* forms of worship, so as to lead the individual soul, in its longing for salvation, to subsidence in, or union with, the Divinity.

Among the works of the first group the most popular and noted is the *Háthha-pradípiká* or *Háthha-dípiká*. It comprises 395 stanzas, divided into 4 chapters or lessons, (*Upades'a*), the first treating of postures, the second of regulation of breath, the third of gesticulation or *mudrás*, and the fourth of *Samá-dhi*. Its author is one *Chintámaṇi*, son of *Sahajá-nanda*, but this name of his was what he got when living as a householder. On his becoming a hermit he took the name of *Svátmáráma*, and received the title of *Yogíndra*, and is now generally known by the name of *Svátmárama Yogíndra*. He makes a great mystery of the theme of his work. He says, "By *Yogí*s wishing for perfection, this science should be carefully kept in secret, for it is most efficient when

kept secret, and worthless when disclosed.”\* Like the alchemists of old, he indicates simple things by round-about metaphorical names, and enjoins that none but adepts should know anything of his subject. This book is named *Haṭha vidyā*, or the science of the letters *ha* and *ṭha*, *ha* meaning the sun and *ṭha* the moon. This sun again stands for the breath inspired, and the moon for the breath expired, and the ultimate meaning of *Haṭha vidyā* is thus the science of inspiration and expiration. Although by profession and habit a recluse who had thoroughly abandoned the world and its attractions, *Svātmārāma*, indulges at times in language of a grossly carnal type. Thus in one place he says, “let beef be eaten and the immortal arrack (*várupi*) be drunk every day. I reckon him who does so, to be a *kulīna* (a noble householder); the rest are destroyers of their nobility.”† Here beef *gomāñsa* stands for the tongue, which should be reverted and made to touch the palate, and *várupi* means the breath which passes over this reverted tongue. Again: “Let the youthful chaste widow be ravished on the land between the rivers Ganges and Yamunā; it is the highest glory of *Vishṇu*.”‡ Here the two rivers are the two nostrils, and the widow is the breath which is to be forcibly suppressed for a time. This style of

\* एवं विद्या परं नोप्या योगिना सिद्धिमिष्टता ।

भवेद्वृद्धीर्यवती वप्ता निर्वर्यो तु प्रकाशिता ॥

† बोक्षार्थं भवेद्वृद्धित्वं पिवेद्भरवावर्णो ।

कुरुषीगं तमर्थं मध्ये इतरे कुरुषातकाः ॥

‡ गङ्गायमवयोर्भेदे वालुरप्यातपस्तिभीं ।

द्वाषात्कारेष्व मृक्षिष्वातपद्मिष्वोः परमं परं ॥

allegory and mystery is adopted by a great many mediæval writers on the Yoga. At the beginning of the work, the author has given a list of thirty renowned Yogíś who had practised the science in question. At the head of these appear A'dinátha, who is generally identified with S'iva, who is believed to be the first and most renowned of Yogíś. The work has been made the subject of comment by several writers, among whom Brahmánanda, the author of the *Jyotsná*, is reckoned to be the ablest.

It would seem that the Yoga doctrine was, at a very early period, translated to Persia, and disseminated in some form or other among different sects. The Sápiyáns obtained it in its entirety. They believed on efficacy of discipline and austerity; they assiduously practised the regulation of breath enjoined in the Yoga; they divided the stages of their progress in meditation in the same way as the Yogíś did; they held the highest meditation to be a state of trance identically the same as the Samádhi; they claimed occult powers\* of the same nature and character as

\* 'Of these illustrious personages they have many miraculous and mysterious deeds: such as, in the upper world, hiding the sun's disk; causing him to appear at night; making the stars visible in the day-time: and in this lower world, walking on the surface of water; making trees productive out of season; restoring verdure to dried up wood; causing trees to bow down their heads; also showing themselves between heaven and earth in the form of lightning; and such like: and, in the animated world metamorphosing animals; rendering themselves invisible to men; appearing under various shapes and forms: some of which wonders have been recorded in the *Barmgah-i-durveshí-khushi*. They relate that these great per-

did the Yogis; they were familiar with the idea of the possibility of the soul at will passing from one body into another; they believed in metempsychosis; and, if they looked upon union with the Supreme Divinity as the *summum bonum* of their faith, they but accepted one of the several forms of the Yoga, different doubtless from the Isolation of Patanjali, but not independent of it. (*Cf. Dabistán I*, pp. 5f.) It is, however, not known whether the system of Sapásiyáns was founded upon any translation of a Sanskrit Yoga work, or on oral communication. Some of the Sapásiyáns admitted their obligation to Hindustán, but their text-books, the few and imperfect ones that are still accessible, have not yet been sufficiently examined to throw light on the question. The close relationship existing between the two systems, even in the use of technical terms, preclude the idea of spontaneous growth, and the avowed posteriority of the Persian doctrine leaves no doubt of its Indian origin; but as at present advised, we are not in a position to spot the exact text from which it was derived.

Of interpretations of the Yoga system in foreign languages the earliest appears to be an Arabic version of the text of Patanjali. The work is no longer

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sonages were to such a degree enabled to divest themselves of corporeal elements that they quitted the body at pleasure; also that they had acquired from the court of heaven the knowledge of all sciences, whether known or occult, and consequently had the power of exhibiting such wonderful works; having rendered, by the efficacy of their austerities, elementary matters subject to themselves." (*Troyer and Shea's Dabistán i Muzahib*, II, pp. 107f.)

extant, but the testimony in favour of its having once existed is unquestionable. Abu Réhán al Niráni, in his *Tárikh-ul Hind*, which formed a part of his famous *Kánún-i-Mas'údi* (A. D. 1025-36), says, 'I have translated into Arabic two Indian works, one discusses the origin and quality of things which exist and is entitled *S'áñkhya*, the other is known under the title of *Patanjali*, which treats of the deliverance of the soul from the trammels of the body. These two works contain the chief principles of the Indian creed.' (*Elliot's Historians*, I, p. 99; *Journal Asiatique*, IV serie, tom. IV, p. 121; *Reinaud's Fragments Arabs et Persans*.) It does not appear that any Persian version of *Patanjali* was ever taken in hand in the time of Akbar and his successor, when so many Sanskrit works were rendered into that language. There is, however, an abstract of the Yoga doctrine in the *Dabistán-i-Muzaháb* of *Mahsin-i Fáni*. That author flourished in the middle of the 17th century, and, during a long residence at Allahabad as the Chief Judge (*Sudder*), collected a great deal of information on the subject. Depending evidently on oral information, he could not avoid gross mistakes in his account of the philosophy, but in regard to the details of Yoga exercises and the occult powers he has compiled as reliable an exposition as could be expected from such a source. He notices *Gorakha-nátha* and several other celebrated saints, and states that he had seen some Yogís possessed of wonderful occult powers, but he does not name *Patanjali*. (*cf. Shea and Troyer's Translation*, II, pp. 123f.)

In English the first attempt to give an account of the Yoga doctrine was made by Ward in his account of the Hindus, but it did not produce any satisfactory result. Colebrooke's resumè in the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, is much more philosophic in spirit and faithful in details, but Colebrooke took it up only casually in connexion with his essay on the Sánkhya, and did not notice much more than the first chapter of the work. Taylor, in the Introduction to his translation of the Bhagavadgítá, supplies the Kriyá-yoga with considerable fulness, and Windischmann's account, though brief, is tolerably good. In 1853 Dr. Ballantyne published a translation of the first two chapters of the Yoga-sútra with extracts from the commentary of Bhojadeva, and from it abstracts of the Yoga system have been compiled by Dr. K. M. Banerjea, and Rev. Mr. Mullins. The translation of Ballantyne was completed, in a disjointed way, by Pañdit Govindaram Sástrí in the pages of a Benares magazine called the "Pandit." The two fragments have lately been printed together by the Theosophical Society of Bombay. The text with an original commentary together with an English translation is now being printed in the *Saddarsana-chintaníká* of Bombay, and an abstract of the text occurs in Cowell and Gough's *Sarvadarsana-sangraha*. An account of Yoga practices may also be seen in a pamphlet by Nabinchandra Pál, published at Benares.

Little need be said in praise of Dr. Ballantyne's work. The profound learning and thorough conservancy with Hindu philosophy which that learned

scholar brought to bear on his undertaking, enabled him to produce a very accurate reproduction of the original. In his anxiety, however, to be accurate he had occasion to resort too frequently to parenthetical clauses, and they resulted in confused sentences, involving much trouble in understanding them. His extracts from the commentary are particularly amenable to this objection. The extracts, moreover, are somewhat disjointed.

When the Asiatic Society of Bengal first proposed to publish an edition of the *Yoga-sútra* with the commentary of Bhojadeva, I undertook to reprint Dr. Ballantyne's translation with such additions as would complete the work. I soon found, however, that my work placed beside his produced a very patchy appearance, and his parenthetical style was not desirable for a proper and easy understanding of the text. I preferred, therefore, to translate the whole in my own way. The aphorisms will be found to be as closely literal as the idiom of the English language would admit of, and the commentary a fair reproduction of the spirit, sense and wording of the original, without being a verbatim reproduction.

Much difficulty has been felt in the treatment of the technical terms. Philosophical terms in the English language have not yet arrived at that fixity and firmness which would preclude possible variations. Different writers assign different values to even well-established terms, and their latitude is frequently varying; and such as they are, they are not exact equivalents of Sanskrit words, which in their turn vary

in meaning under different circumstances and in the hands of different writers. There are instances, too, of Sanskrit terms whose literal significations are very different from the philosophical ideas they are intended to convey, and in dealing with them, the translator has either to sacrifice precision of rendering for the sake of intelligibility, or intelligibility for the sake of precision. In the following pages I have borrowed the terms mostly from Colebrooke's translation of the *Sán-khya-kariká*, translating a few myself, and transliterating the Sanskrit terms in some cases. My reasons I have explained as far as I could in my notes.

When I undertook the task I had hopes of reading the work with the assistance of a professional Yogí; but I have been disappointed. I could find no *Paṇḍit* in Bengal who had made Yoga the special subject of his study, and the only person I met at Benares who could help me was most exorbitant in his demands. He cared not for the world and its wealth, and the only condition under which he would teach me was strict pupillage under Hindu rules—living in his hut and ever following his footsteps—to which I could not submit. I had, therefore, to depend on my own knowledge of the Sanskrit language to arrive at the meaning of *Patanjali*, availing myself frequently of the aid of my learned friend Professor *Mahes'a-chandra Nyáyaratna*, of the Calcutta Sanskrit College, for the solution of difficulties. I had the assistance, too, of Professor *Kámákhyánátha Tarkaratna*, of that College, both in revising the text and in translating it. Both the Professors are distinguished

Nyáya scholars, and Pañdit Mahes'achandra commands a deep knowledge of the Sánkhya, and with their aid, I believe, I have been able to avoid gross misinterpretations of the text, though I cannot flatter myself with the idea that I have been able always satisfactorily to expound the meaning of Patanjali.

Manuscripts of the Yoga-sútra are common enough in Bengal, but I have not met with any particularly old, or exceptionally correct text. In carrying the text and commentary through the press, I had the use of the following codices :

- A. From the Asiatic Society's Library, yellow paper  $13 \times 11$  inches, bound in a 4to. volume. Bengali character. Lines, 27 on a page. Incorrect.
- B. From the Sanskrit College of Calcutta, yellow paper,  $17 \times 4$  inches, puthi form. Folia, 35. Character, Bengali. Generally correct.
- C. From ditto, Káshmírí paper,  $10 \times 4\frac{1}{2}$  inches. Folia, 69. Character, well-written Nágari. Date, Samvat, 1850. Generally correct.
- D. From the Benares College, Káshmírí paper,  $11 \times 5$  inches. Folia, 30. Character, Nágari. Incorrect and incomplete.
- E. From Professor Mahes'achandra Nyáyaratna, Calcutta, yellow paper,  $15 \times 4$  inches. Folia, 55. Character, Bengali. Generally correct. First chapter revised.
- G. Ballantyne's reprint annexed to his translation.
- H. From Bombay, copied for me from a MS. belonging to the Government collection preserved in

the office of the Director of Public Instruction. Generally correct.

I. From my family Library, a quarto volume in Bengali. Corrupt and little used.

In the text of *Patanjali*, no variation of any note has been met with in the above codices. The work appears to have been preserved with every care, as may be presumed from the circumstance of its having enjoyed the benefit of a host of commentaries and glosses. The commentary of *Bhoja* has not been so correctly preserved. There are many differences of reading in the different codices. But on the whole the differences are not so material as would justify the assumption of different recensions, or produce any marked changes in the meaning of the author.

8 MANIKTOLLAH, }  
*January 28, 1883.* }

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## ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.



<i>Page</i>	vii	line 15	<i>for chittva</i>	<i>read chitta</i>
"	"	27	" some theory in a more	<i>read the theory</i> of unreality in a
xiv	"	8	" alternative	" resource
"	"	20	and its object is worldly enjoyment, <i>read its</i>	object is worldly injowment ;
xxxv	"	4	" birth	" breath
"	"	24	" rapine	" repine
xlvii	"	26	" produce	" produces
lxii	"	29	" Such a	" If it did, the
lxxx	"	6	<i>after Bháshya, add Vyása</i> himself is the author of a different system of Philosophy, and one cannot reasonably suppose that he would descend to expound the text-book of an adverse school.	
"	"	11	<i>after this day ; add, as a footnote, Brahmanya</i> Tírtha had a pupil named Vyása, who wrote the <i>Tátparya-chandriká</i> on the Vedánta Sútra.	
17	"	1	<i>for cive</i>	<i>read conducive</i>
19	"	18	" samáptti	" samápatti
43	"	25	" thum	" thumb
61	"	80	" word	" phrase
77	"	24	" drishṭá	" drashṭá.
78	"	15	" the purpose of for	" for the purpose of
83	"	9	" n	" in
91	"	28	" devotion	" steadfastness
96	"	80	" and naturally hostile individuals having acquired it live	<i>read</i> and even naturally hostile beings live beside those who have acquired it

- |     |         |       |                    |             |                    |
|-----|---------|-------|--------------------|-------------|--------------------|
| 114 | „ 20-21 | „     | steadiness         | „           | steadfastness      |
| 135 | „ 8     | „     | ( <i>anyatva</i> ) | „           | <i>anyatva</i>     |
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| 158 | „ 1     | after | attainment of      | <i>add</i>  | or unlimited reach |
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| „   | „ 22    | „     | boy                | „           | body               |
| 175 | „ 28    | „     | eteology           | „           | etiology           |
| 176 | „ 7     | „     | he                 | „           | the author         |

(Sanskrit.)

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८	६	विश्वा	विश्वा
१०	१४	सावना	सावना
११	१	चक्रानि	चक्रानि
१२	०	स्तंहीत	स्तंहीत
१३	१	जामच	जामच
१४	४	निराध	निराध
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२४	०	सात्त्विकः	सात्त्विकः
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५०	१	प्राचायामस्यैवं	प्राचायामस्यैवं
५०	१२	संश्वविपर्यासरूपं	संश्वविपर्यासरूपं
५१	१	‘ज्ञानपर्यं’	‘ज्ञानपर्यं’
५१	११	सरूपं	सरूपं
५०	०	प्राचायामानभिचाय	प्राचायामानभिचाय
५०	१८	प्राचायामात्	प्राचायामात्
५८	१	प्राचायामः	प्राचायामः

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१९	१	न्नं	न्नं
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१८	०	सनेनाभिप्रायेनेवेन	सनेनाभिप्रायेनेवेन
००	८	सविष्टातृष्टपः	सविष्टातृष्टपः
००	८	भोक्तृष्टपवात्	भोक्तृष्टपवात्
१०४	१९	विवेकाप्रवद्वाद्भोक्तृष्टपि	विवेकाप्रवद्वाद्भोक्तृष्टपि
१०४	१०	प्रतिसङ्कालिशब्दार्थः	प्रतिसङ्कालिशब्दार्थः
१०५	११	सात्त्विकपरिवासमृष्टे	सात्त्विकपरिवासमृष्टे
१०७	१	निर्वाद्यतीत्येवं	निर्वाद्यतीति । एवं
”	१५	चाहयेनमृथमासमादिना	चाहयेन सृथमासमादिना
१०८	१२	संस्कारवासमपि	संस्कारवासमपि

# THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI.

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## INTRODUCTION.

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Salutation to Ganesa. May that semi-corporeal union\* of S'iva and his spouse (S'ivá) by the recollection of which man enjoys isolation,† hard as it is to attain, shower on you all blessings!

2. We praise that eternal S'iva the thought of whom forthwith dissolves the threefold pain‡ which besets mankind.

3. That unprecedented work § of the sage Patanjali wherein he describes the severance of the soul (*Purusha*) from nature (*Prakriti*) to be Yoga|| (true union) reigns supreme.

4. May the sayings of the lord of snakes,¶ which are

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\* A fit of jealousy, according to the Káliká Purána, had caused a temporary separation between S'iva and his spouse Durgá. On their reconciliation, the lady besought her master to devise some means by which the possibility of all future separation could be obviated, and the expedient was hit of uniting their bodies so as to make of the two an androgynous figure, half male and half female. Other causes have been assigned for this union.

† Separation of the human soul from all association with nature. *Vide* p. 207.

‡ Viz., 1st, those proceeding from internal causes; 2nd, those from natural and extrinsic causes; 3rd, those that proceed from superhuman causes. *Vide* Wilson's Sáñkhya-káriká, p. 2.

§ Lit., saying.

|| A play upon the word Yoga. The purport is that a total abandonment of, lit. disunion from (*vijoga*), the world is a *conditio sine qua non* to the Yogi, which is the end sought by the Yoga system of Philosophy. In other words what is separation from sensuous objects is the union or dissolution of the thinking principle in its original source.

¶ Patanjali is believed to have been an incarnation of Ananta, and the title indicates that idea. *Vide* Introduction, p. lxvii.

even as the light of the moon to the mass of expanding darkness of the human mind, and the appreciation of which always fills the mind of good people with lasting happiness—may they prosper !

5. The glorious words of the king Rañarañgamalla,\* who, like the lord of snakes, has cast off all impurity from his speech, mind and body, who has (like unto him) compiled a work on the government of words, who has commented on *Patanjali*, and written on medicine a treatise called the *Rājamṛigāñka*†—may they prosper.

6. All commentators are perverters of the meaning of their authors ; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious ; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain ; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number.‡

7. Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage *Patanjali* for the edification of intelligent persons.

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\* A title of Bhoja.

† All these works of Bhoja are still extant.

‡ “Commentators each dark passage shun—

And hold a farthing *rnsh-light to the sun.*”

St. Jerome “not versions but inversions.”

Italian, *Traduttori traiori* or “Translators traitors.”

“Surrender rather than turn ;

Not turning, but overturning.”

## CHAPTER FIRST.

Now, an exposition of the Yoga (is to be made).

This aphorism explains the subject of the work, the object with which it is written, and the relation (it bears to the subject). (The word) "Now"\*(*atha*) suggests (that) a (distinct) topic (here commences), and it serves also as a benediction.

(The word) *Yoga* means 'union,' or the application of the mind to abstract contemplation, from the root *yug* "to meditate." An "exposition" (*anus'ásana*) is that whereby something is expounded or described through its characteristic marks, its real nature, its distinctive divisions, its causes and effects. (The two words *Yoga* and *anus'ásana* form the compound) *Yoganus'ásana*, (which means) "an exposition of the Yoga." This is to be understood to be the topic even to the end of this work (of Patanjali).

*Yoga*, with the means of performing it and its fruit, constitutes the subject, that being treated of in this Institute. The object of the work is the explanation of the subject, and the fruit thereof is the emancipation obtainable by the *Yoga*. The relation of the work is the connection which exists between that which treats, and the subject treated of, (or the Institute and its subjects). The connection between *Yoga*, the subject, and its effect, which is emancipation (*Kaivalya*), or the means and the end, is also its relation. The substance of this is—that in the work are described the instruments of performing the *Yoga* which is its subject—that *Yoga* the accomplishment of which leads to the consummation of emancipation called *Kaivalya*.

[Dr. Ballantyne has rendered the word *Yoga* into "concentration." That English word, however, in its ordinary signification, does

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\* Dr. Ballantyne's text has *atháta* "now then."

not convey anything like a fair idea of what Yoga means. The word meditation would have been more appropriate, but even that does not convey all the ideas which the Sanskrit term has been made to comprehend. A perfect English equivalent is not to be had, and I prefer, therefore, to use the original term to coining a new one. The commentator so explains the word *Anus'ásana* as to convey the idea that it is a verbal noun intended to explain the purport of the work. The commentary named *Pátanjala-bháshya* takes it along with the word *Yoga* to be the specific name of the work. (*Yogáns'ásanam náma s'ástram*). If this be accepted, and it appears to be the most appropriate, the aphorism should be rendered into, "Now, the (work called) Yogánuásana, (will be expounded)." Váchaspati Miśra, the annotator on the last named work, and Vijnána-bhikshu in his *Vártika*, take notice of this subject. They also raise the question about the origin of the doctrine. They hold that Patanjali was not the originator of the doctrine, for it has existed from creation, and Hiranya-garbha was the first performer of the *Yoga*; but that he was merely the compiler of the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them. *Nanu hiranyagarbao yogasya kartá náyah purátana iti yogiyájnavalkyasmrítéh, katham patanjaler yoga-sástritvamityás'áñkya sútrakáreṇa anus'ásanamityuktam, s'ishtashyánusásanam.)* ]

Now what is this *Yoga*? To this the author replies :—

## II.

**Yoga is the suppression of the functions of the thinking principle.**

"Thinking principle" (*chitta*) is of the form of goodness without a taint. "Functions" (*vrítti*) are modifications of the relation between each other of them. "Yoga" or meditation is described to be the "suppression" (*nirodha*), or dissolution in their primary causes, through the direction inward on the suppression of

the tendency outward, of the functions in question. This suppression is a cross-grained ascent of the "functions" of the thinking principle. Being common to all the conditions of the thinking principle, it is an attribute of all beings, and therefore it becomes at times evident in some one condition or other. The conditions, or the different states of the thinking principle, are—restless activity, mischievous ignorance, voluptuousness, concentration, and suppression. Thereof the condition of activity (*kshipta*) is induced by an access of the quality of foulness (*rajas*). Propelled by that quality it tends outwards, approaching or receding from imaginary or real pleasurable or painful objects. It is common to demons, sons of Diti, Titans, sons of Danu, &c. Addiction to evil actions without distinguishing between what should be done and what not (*mudha*) proceeds from an excess of darkness (*tamas*). It is common to demons (Rákshasas), ghosts (Pis'áchas), &c. Voluptuousness (*vikshipta*) is the feeling of avoiding the causes of pain, and engaging in (those sensuous objects of) sound and the like which promote enjoyment. It proceeds from an excess of the quality of goodness (*sattva*), and is observable in the Devas. It amounts to this, that the thinking principle by foulness becomes restlessly active; by darkness mischievous, or desirous of injuring others; and by goodness full of happiness. These three conditions of the thinking principle are not fit for the condition of devout contemplation. The two conditions of concentration and suppression, having an excess of the quality of goodness and following the others, are reckoned fit for that purpose.

The object of arranging the qualities of goodness &c. in a disorderly way is this: notwithstanding the two qualities of foulness and darkness being very detestable, the quality of foulness is first described, because unless activity is made intelligible, no suppression of it can possibly be grasped. Hence the reversed order. The object of placing the quality of goodness last is this: that by its excess, the two (subsequent) conditions become fit for Yoga. Of those two conditions, *viz.*, concentration and suppression, that in which

the thinking principle is in a state of (exclusive) application to one point is called *Yoga*. What is the result of this? (It is this): by *Yoga* or concentration to one point the external functions cease, and on that cessation there is a complete dissolution of all functions with their residua. In both these conditions, *Yoga* meditation is practicable.

[The most important word in the aphorism is *chitta* which has been rendered into "thinking principle" by Dr. Ballantyne. In ordinary Sanskrit it is a synonym of the word *manas* "mind," and Dr. Ballantyne has used that word as a synonym in different places, and in the sense in which that word is used in philosophy —i. e., "that which perceives, feels, thinks and wills," (Taylor, *Elements of Thought*), "or that which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned," (Harris, *Hermes*, p. 227)—he is right. In the Sáñkhya aphorisms of Kapila, its counterpart *manas* has been used in the same sense (*Mahadákhyamádyam káryam tanmanah*, I, 71). But inasmuch as the philosophical writers of this country make a marked distinction between mind as above described, and as an internal organ of knowledge, the sensorium, it is desirable that the distinction should be marked by the use of a different word. In the Sáñkhya aphorisms the word *chitta* does not occur, nor is it to be met with in the Nyáya. The Vedántists use it sparingly, taking it to be a modification or another name of *Buddhi* (*Vedánta-sára*). Its equivalent in the Sáñkhya is *Adhyavasáya*, which is synonymous with *Buddhi*. (*Adhyavasáyo buddhīḥ*, II, 13). It is called *Mahat* "the great one," because "it is the first and most important of the products of nature, presiding over and pervading the whole." (*Mahattvam svetara-sakala-kárya-vyúpakatvan-mahásvaryáchchha*) It is *mati* "understanding," because every thing is understood by it, (*manyati anayá*); *khyáti* "familiar knowledge;" *jñána*, and *prajná*. That Patanjali implies the object of these words by *chitta* is evident from the fact of his making it the first product of nature and anterior to egotism, as the Sáñkhya does, and by say-

ing that the suppression of its functions results in the completion of Yoga. (*Vṛitti-nirodhāt tatsiddhīh*, III, 31). Thus Váchas-pati Miśra—*chitta-s'abdenāntahkaranaṁ buddhimupalakshayati*. According to the order of creation *prakriti* comes first, thence *chitta*, thence egotism, thence mind, and thence the subtle organs &c., and this both according to the Sáñkhya and the Yoga systems. The thinking principle is thus the same with intellect, and mind in the highest sense.

The next word is *vṛitti*. I follow Colebrooke and Wilson by rendering it into "functions." The functions are produced by modifications of the original principle produced by unequal exertions of the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness. In so far they are allotropic conditions of the same principle, and so, as Vijnána Bhikshu expresses it, the world is merely a modification of form, of which *prakriti* is the materiality. (*Parinámarúpam jagadupádánakatvantu-prakrititvam*.) *Parináma* or change is the term usually employed as its equivalent, and Bhoja explains it by saying "they are modifications of the relation between each other of the functions." Vijnána Bhikshu calls it transformation of *Prakriti*, (*prakritivirúpam*). Under these circumstances Dr. Ballantyne's use of the term "modification" affords the closest rendering; but Dr. Wilson prefers functions as more idiomatic and expressive.

The last word is *nirodhā*, which means stoppage, or hindering, and suppression implies the same.

The definition of Yoga as given in the text and the commentary suggests the idea that the suppression of thought must be complete before Yoga can be accomplished, but such is not the object, for in the lower stages of meditation such is not the case, and yet it is Yoga. The *Pátanjala-bháshya* points this out by saying that since the word *sva* "all" has not been used before *vṛitti* "functions," the form of Yoga in which there is a distinct recognition is also Yoga. (*Sarvasabdágrahanāt samprajnátöpi Yogah*). It is remarkable that Bhoja should have overlooked so important a qualification.]

Now the author of the Sútras, wishing to describe the words *chitta-vṛitti-nirodhah*, describes first [in two aphorisms] the word *chitta*.

### III.

Then (*i. e.* at the time of meditation) there is abidance of the spectator in its own form.

"Then," at that time, the soul, as "the spectator," (*drashṭā*) "abides" remains in its own form, which is simple intelligence (and nothing more). The meaning is this: that on knowledge being fully developed, there being no shadow of any sensuous object cast on the thinking principle, and the egotism of one's self, which is the actor, being gone, and intellect being fit for liberation, the soul abides or obtains location in Buddhi which is its own form.

[The spectator is the soul which, abiding in the body, and influenced by the thinking principle, beholds what is done by the organs, but does not partake of the pleasures and pains resulting from their action, and in the state of Yoga the functions being-stopped there is the spectator without any spectacle to behold. This spectator is the soul.]

What then is the form (of the soul) when waking (or active, *i. e.* other than in a state of meditation)? To this he replies:

### IV.

At other times it is in the same form as its functions.

"At other times"—*i. e.*, at times other than that of meditation. Its "functions" are those the characteristics of which will hereafter be described (A. V.) "In the same form" means to consist of it. The purport is this. Even as the functions, involving pleasure, pain and bewilderment, manifest themselves, so does the soul *i. e.*, it appears so to itself. If so, it follows that that object, in which, in the state of modification produced by concentration, the power of understanding finds its own form, and which

being influenced by the functions of the senses resolves itself into worldly objects, and the soul appears manifest in the forms thereof, as the moon reflected in the moving ripples on the water, appears as if it were (itself) moving, is the thinking principle *chitta*.

[It is a dogma of the Hindu metaphysicians that the thinking principle or intellect assumes the form of the object perceived. And the aphorism explains that when that principle is immersed in complete Yoga it perceives itself and nothing more, but when it is active and influenced by external objects it assumes the forms of its excitants].

To explain the term function, (the third word in A. II,) the author says:—

#### V.

The functions are fivefold, (and they are either) painful or not painful.

The “functions” (*vritti*) are certain modifications of the thinking principle. The word *panchatayi* (five-fold) is formed by the addition of the affix *tayap* (Páni 5. ii. 42), and implies that the totality of the forms of the functions constitutes the form-bearer, and the functions severally are the forms thereof. The five functions are what are meant.

How are they? They are painful or not painful. “Those that are involved in sufferings of the kind about to be described are painful; those that are the reverse of these are not painful.”

[This aphorism is a verbatim copy of Kapíla’s aphorism 33, Book II. It only propounds what are to be explained in subsequent aphorisms].

The five functions are to be described after being named.

#### VI.

(The functions of the thinking principle are) right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep and memory.

Of these the author gives the definitions successively.

## VII.

Right notions are perception, inference, and testimony.

Here the author of the Institute has not given a separate definition of what right notion is, that being very well known, and it being made evident by the description of its different forms. In fact the real definition of right notion is that whereby is produced unquestionable knowledge.

“Perception” (*pratyaksha*) is that function of the thinking principle by which it acquires, through the medium of the senses brought in connexion with external objects having common and peculiar characteristics, a knowledge of the most important peculiar characteristic.

“Inference” (*anumána*) is the conviction produced by a previous knowledge of the necessary relation between a characteristic and that which bears it.

A trustworthy word is “testimony,” (*ágama*).

[*Pramána* means right notion, as also the means of acquiring that right notion, *i. e.*, evidence, and hence the two meanings are often confounded. As a function of the thinking principle it is right notion, and not evidence. The Yoga system follows the Sákhya in admitting only three means of right notion, and in the Sákhya-káriká they are said to comprise every mode of demonstration. The Naiyáyikas, however, reckon four kinds, *viz.*, preception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumána*), comparison (*upamána*), and testimony (*śabda*). The Vedántis follow this latter, and the Mímáñskas recognise six, *viz.*, perception (*pratyaksha*), presumption (*arthápatti*), proportion (*sambhara*), privation (*abháva*), comprehension (*pratibhá*), and oral communication (*aitihya*).

The word used for perception is *pratyaksha*, which means “that which is seen,” but it implies knowledge acquired through any one of the five organs of sense, or, as Reid defines perception,

“evidence which we have of external objects by our senses.” For testimony Patanjali gives *ágama*, which means the *Vedas*, but the commentator has generalised it by giving for its synonym *áptarachana* “reliable words”; it is the declaration of one who knows the truth of that which he affirms, and whose authority may be relied upon. The scriptures, as revealed knowledge, naturally come at the head of testimony].

Having thus described the function of right notion the author speaks of Misconception.

### VIII.

Misconception is incorrect notion, (or a notion) which abides in a form which is not that of its object.

“Misconception” (*viparyaya*) is a notion of something in respect of which it really is not; as the notion of silver in mother-o’pearl. “Which abides in a form which is not that of its object” is to say a notion which does not abide in that form which is its (real) form (in respect of which the notion is entertained). It amounts to this, that the notion does not reveal the real form of the thing. Doubt (*sañsaya*) founded on the notion whether a thing abides in its proper form or not, such as whether a particular object seen is a man or the stump of a tree, is also a Misconception.

To describe the function of Fancy, he says :

### IX.

Fancy is a notion founded on a knowledge conveyed by words, but of which (there is) no object (corresponding in reality).

Knowledge dependant on words is *śabda-jñána*. That which follows it, is *śabda-jñánánupáti* (the epithet used to define Fancy, which in the text has been translated by the word “notion founded on a knowledge conveyed by words”). Such a notion without reference to the real character of an object

is "Fancy." Thus the words, "the intelligence of the soul (*puruṣha*) is its own form." Here a notion is assumed by admitting a distinction as in the notion produced by the possessive case in the phrase "the blanket of Devadatta," though it does not really exist, for in fact the soul is intelligence itself (and there is no distinction between it and its intelligence, or of possessor and the possessed).

[“In the soul  
Are many lesser faculties, that serve  
Reason as chief; among these fancy next  
Her office holds; of all eternal things  
Which the five watchful senses represents  
She forms imagination’s airy shapes,”

Paradise Lost, B. V.]

In order to declare what Sleep is, he says :

## X.

Sleep is that function (of the thinking principle) which has for its object the conception of nothing.

Of that function which is based on the conception of nothing the name is as aforesaid (*abhāvapratyayā*.) Hence it follows that "Sleep" (*nidrā*) is that function (of the thinking principle) which takes place on the quitting of all objects, in consequence of the quality of darkness always preceding it. That this is a function (of the thinking principle and not a mere blank) is proved by our seeing that one recollects (on arising from a sound sleep) that "I slept pleasantly," which could not have happened without a consciousness of it, (and no memory can exist of that which is not). Hence it is a function.

In order to describe Memory, he says :

## XI.

Memory is the not letting go of an object that has been recognised.

“The not letting go” (*asampramosha*) or not allowing to escape from our intellect an object which has once been recognised through (proper) evidence is “Memory” (*smṛiti*).

Of the five functions Evidence, Misconception, and Fancy belong to the waking state. When any of these, from vividness of impression, becomes perceptible (in sleep), it is a Dream (*svapna*.) But Sleep of itself has no cognisable object. Memory again is dependent on Evidence, Misconception, Fancy or Sleep.

[Bishop Hall says, “Memory is the great keeper or Master of the Rolls of the soul, a power that can make amends for the speed of time, in causing him to leave behind him those things which else he would so carry away as if they had not been.” It is said to be dependant on Evidence, Misconception, &c., because the impressions it preserves are the productions of those causes.]

Having thus described the functions (of the thinking principle), in order to explain the suppression (the fourth word in A. II,) of these with the means thereof, he says :

## XII.

The suppression of these (functions is effected) by Exercise and Dispassion.

“Exercise” (*abhyāsa*) and Dispassion” (*vairāgya*) will be defined in the aphorisms about to be given. The repression by these (Exercise and Dispassion) of the functions of the thinking principle which have the form of revealing, energizing and regulating, is “suppression” (*nirodha*). What is meant is the placing of the functions, which from their turning inwards have ceased to dwell on external objects, in the thinking principle, which is their original cause, and of which they are but potential attributes.

Aversion from sensuous objects is produced by “Dispassion” resulting from a knowledge of the evil influence of those objects (on the thinking principle), and confirmed steadfastness is acquired by “Exercise,” which makes it a source of happiness and quiet ; and by the (conjoined effect of the) two the functions of the thinking principle are suppressed.

[The purport of this aphorism has been given by Kapila in six aphorisms, 31 to 36 of Book III.]

With a view to describe Exercise, he says :

### XIII.

Exercise is the (repeated) effort that it (the thinking principle) shall remain in its functionless state.

*Sthiti* or “functionless state” is that condition of the thinking principle in which it abides in its own (original) form, free from all functions; and the effort or endeavour (repeated) again and again to bring it to that condition is “Exercise” or *abhyāsa*.

He next mentions a special character of that (Exercise).

### XIV.

It is again a firm ground attained by proper devotion for a long time uninterruptedly.

It (Exercise) is a firm ground, *i. e.*, it becomes steadfast, or acquires firmness, by being assiduously attended to for a long time unremittingly with an excess of regard. The meaning is that it tends to firmness.

He now mentions the definition of Dispassion (A. XII.)

### XV.

The consciousness of being the subjugator on the part of one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects is Dispassion.

Objects are of two kinds, “Perceptible” (*drishṭa*) and “Scriptural” (*ānus'ravika*). The Perceptible is that which may be apprehended here (on earth), such as sound and other objects (perceptible through the organs of sense). The Scriptural is that which exists in the regions of the Devas or elsewhere (where it cannot be grasped by carnal organs).

That which is heard (*anus'rúyate*) from the mouth of a preceptor is *anus'rava* or the *Veda*. What comes to our knowledge therefrom (*i. e.*, from the *Veda*) is what is meant by "one heard of" *ánus'ravika*. Giving up all eagerness for these two classes of objects, on account of their becoming distasteful at the end, the reflection which ensues (in the thinking principle) to the effect that these are my subjects, but I am not their slave, is called Dispassion (*Vairágya*.)

[The word *Vairágya* (dispassion) is formed of the privative prefix *vi*, and *rágā*, 'affection,' 'prepossession,' 'love,' 'desire,' the meaning being, in the technical sense in which it is used here, absence of desire for enjoyable objects. The absence, however, should not be accidental, as in the case of a child or of a stolid person where, owing to want of development of certain organs, it results without effort, but the fruit of due deliberation, and a conviction that the objects are not worth having, and that the desire for them should be suppressed.

The word *vasíkára-sañjñá* literally means "consciousness of being able to subjugate," in this instance the passions; but the commentators take it to be a mere indifference or apathy, neither affection nor hatred. Thus the *Pátanjala Bháshya*: "devoid of hatred and desirability" (*heyopádeya-súnyá*); and Váchaspati Miśra explains the phrase by the words "a sense of indifference having neither attachment nor hatred" (*ásaṅgadvesharahitá upékshábuddhíh*).

The word rendered into 'perceptible' is *drishṭa* 'seen'; but, as illustrated by commentators, it means all worldly objects of sense; they may not be perceptible owing to excessive distance, extreme nearness, defect of the organs, inattention, minuteness, interposition of objects, &c., (*Sáñkhya-káriká*. V. VII.), still they are perceptible on this earth under some circumstance or other, and therefore included in the term. The *Pátanjala Bháshya* illustrates the term by naming women, food, drink, and power, (*striyonnapánamaisvaryamiti*). Dr. Ballantyne renders it into "seen," which is its lexicographical meaning, but which is quite

inadmissible here. Wilson, following Colebrooke, renders it into "temporal" which conveys the right technical meaning, but it becomes inappropriate under certain circumstances, as when we have to deal with *adrishta*, the antonym of *drishta*, in which case *non-temporal* would be unmeaning, for the word implies fate or what has not yet happened but may happen; *the unseen* is in that case the best.

The Sanskrit term for Scriptural is *ānuśravika*, which means "that which has been heard from another," but it has not been used in that sense here. As the commentators show, the secondary meaning of *ānuśrava* is the Veda, which is also called *śruti*, or "that which has been heard," and the object is to imply those rewards which the Veda promises to the performer of sacrifices &c. Colebrooke uses the synonym 'revealed.' The *Patanjala Bhāṣya* takes the rewards to mean heaven, rudimentary body, and dissolution into nature (*svargavaidehyapra-kritilayah*). Thus the dispassion implies not only indifference to worldly enjoyments and objects, but the same feeling also in regard to celestial and other forms of pleasure derivable by the performance of the rites enjoined in the Veda. The pleasures, both of this world and of the next, are equally temporary, and therefore should not be desired by one who longs for emancipation. Thus in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*: "The revealed mode is, like the temporal one, ineffectual, for it is impure; it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others." (Wilson's *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, p. 13). In fact it amounts to the moral imperturbability of Pyrrho.]

A peculiarity in it is to be described.

## XVI.

Carried to the extent of indifference to the qualities it is the highest, as it is (then) conducive to a knowledge of God.

"It" i. e., "Dispassion." "Highest" (*para*) the most estimable. The first degree of "Dispassion" (A. XV) has regard to (ordinary) objects; the second, has regard to the (three) qualities, and it is

cive to a knowledge of the distinction between the product qualities and the (nonproduced) soul, from its extreme conduciveness to the perfect suppressive meditation.

[The object of this aphorism is to divide Dispassion into two kinds; one referring to enjoyable objects and called *visaya-vairágya*, and the other to qualities, *i. e.*, to the knowledge of the relation between the discrete and the indiscrete, (*vyaktávyaktadharmakebhyoviraktah*). The latter is described to be the highest, or most estimable, because it is more valuable than the former, in the attainment of the final object. The word *para* is the leading term in the Aphorism, and stands by itself, being predicated by what follow. But Dr. Ballantyne has subordinated it, by reducing it into a predicate. He says "This carried to the utmost is indifference regarding the qualities." This is obviously not the right meaning.]

Having thus stated the nature of Yoga, the author (next) mentions the differences existing between the nature of that kind of it in which there is consciousness (*samprajñáta*) and that in which consciousness is lost (*asamprajñáta*).

## XVII.

Conscious, because it is attended with argumentation, deliberation, joy and egoism.

The word "meditation" (*samádhi*) is understood to be present after the word conscious to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism.

That which makes manifest without any doubt or error, *i. e.*, makes thoroughly manifest, the exact nature of the object pondered is "Conscious meditation," (*samprajñáta samádhi*). *Samádhi* or meditation is a kind of pondering (*bhávaná*.) The suppression or exclusion of every function (of the thinking principle) except that which relates to the subject pondered is Conscious or Discriminative meditation; it is the same with "Seeded meditation"—*savíja-samádhi*. And from there being distinctions of argumentation, &c., it is of four kinds, (namely) 1st, the "Argumentative" (*savitarka*); 2nd,

the “Deliberative” (*savichára*) ; 3rd, the “Joyous” (*sánanda*) ; and 4th, the “Egoistic” (*sásmita*). “Pondering” is the taking again and again into the thinking principle of any particular object to the exclusion of all other objects. The object to be pondered is of two kinds ; the Godhead (*is'vara*), and the categories or principles (*tattvas*). The last again are of two kinds according as they are “irrational” or “rational.” The irrational are the twenty-four ; the rational is the soul.

Among these (the four kinds of meditation), when accepting the gross elements and the organs as the objects, pondering is carried on with reference to which is antecedent and which is consequent, and the relation of the words to their meanings, it is called ‘Argumentative meditation’ (*savitarka-samádhi*). Should this pondering, however, be independent of the idea of their antecedence and their sequence and the relation between their names and meaning, it would be called “Non-argumentative” (*nirvitarka*). When pondering is engaged in with reference to something subtile, as the subtile elements and the internal organ, and to their qualities in relation to space, time, &c., it is “Deliberative” (*savichára*). But should this pondering be in regard to those subjects themselves, without reference to their relation to time and space, and simply as substrata of qualities, it is said to be “Non-deliberative” (*nirvichára*). What have been described up to this time are called Tangible Forms. (*Gráhya-samápatti*.)

When the quality of goodness of the Internal Organ tinctured with a little of the qualities of foulness and darkness is pondered, then consciousness being under the influence of qualities and the quality of goodness, which is full of the manifestation of happiness, becomes enlivened, the meditation becomes “Joyous” (*sánanda*). In this (kind of) meditation those of confined intellect who do not perceive the other (*i. e.*, last of the twenty-five principles, or the chief soul) are indicated by the word “bodiless” (*videha*), because they have risen above their body and egotism. This is the Acceptance Form. (*Gráhana-samápatti*.)

Next, the pondering which has the pure quality of goodness untainted by foulness and darkness for its object, is called Egoistic or ontric meditation, (*sasmita*), because in it, from the enlivening of the intellectual power, the quality of goodness, which is the object of the pondering, is disregarded and its existence alone is perceived. It should not be supposed that there is no difference between this Ontric meditation and egotism, because where the Internal Organ knows objects with the use of (the word) *I* (*i. e.*, with a knowledge of the distinction between itself and the object before it) it is egotism. But when mere existence is alone manifest in the thinking principle merged in nature from its reverse action resulting from its tendency inwards, it is egoism. In this (last kind of) meditation when contented (beings) do not perceive the Supreme Soul, and their mind is merged in its true cause, they are described to be *Prakṛitilaya* 'resolved into nature.'

Of the persons, who enter into pondering, knowing the Supreme Soul, the manifestation of intelligence is called the Form of the taker, *Grihitri-samápti*.

Even in the argumentative meditation all the four kinds exist potentially, and successively as each is abandoned the others remain, and all these four kinds are Conscious meditation, or that which has a distinct recognition, *samprajnáta-samádhi*.

[Meditation is described to be of two kinds, 1st, that which is carried on with a clear understanding of the object reflected ed upon as distinct from the meditator; and 2nd, that in which no such distinction obtains and the intellect is merged in the soul. In the former, the subject of the aphorism, there are argumentation, deliberation, joy, and egoism, when the objects meditated upon are irrational objects, such as the first twenty-four of the twenty-five categories of the Sáñkhya system which the Yoga school adopts; and they may not exist when the rational soul is the object. The first or Argumentative form applies to gross matter; and the second or the Deliberative applies to subtile matter. In both these the quality of goodness plays a subordinate part. When that quality attains ascendancy the meditation becomes "Joyous;" and it

ceases to have connection with the body, or technically becomes disembodied. When it prevails without any taint of the foul and the dark qualities, the thinking principle is then believed to have merged into primæval nature. This is, however, not the highest reward, for it does not put an end to transmigration : on the evolution of creation from nature, the merging ceases, and there is again a separation. It will be noticed that the first two forms, the Argumentative and the Deliberative, have their negatives the Non-argumentative and the Non-deliberative ; and these four form a class called the *tangible forms*.

The next is the "Joyous" kind in which the sense of the existence of the body is lost, and this is called the "acceptance form." In this there is no negative form, nor is there any such distinction in the next kind, the "Egoistic," in which every thing is identified with the self. This is called the "acceptor" form. In all these six kinds of pondering, there is, it will be perceived, a distinct recognition or consciousness of individuality, and hence they all come under the term Conscious. When this consciousness is lost, we come to the next class which forms the theme of the next aphorism.]

The author now describes that form of meditation in which consciousness is lost, *asamprajnāta*.

## XVIII.

The other is that in which the residua are ended, preceded by the exercise of thought as regards the cause of rejection.

By *viráma* is meant that whereby rejection takes place, *i. e.*, the abandonment of all anxiety about argumentation &c., (A. XVII). *Pratyaya*, "thought," added to *viráma*, "cause of rejection," produces the compound expression *viráma-pratyaya*. Exercise (*abhyásá*) is reiteration of the idea in the thinking principle. In this condition of exercise, constantly rejecting with a nega-

tive, "not this, not this," whatever ideas spring up, the result is the other or Unconscious meditation, or that in which there is no distinct consciousness, which has nothing left, and in which the residua are ended. It is the opposite of the former kind, and it is *asamprajnáta-samádhi*. In this condition there is nothing to be known, and therefore it is called Unconscious, undiscriminative, or seedless meditation (*nirvija*).

Now, there are four modifications of the thinking principle, waking, commencing meditation, concentration, and suppression of thought. Thereof (A. II) the waking state belongs to the two conditions of the thinking principle described as restlessness and mischievous ignorance. The quality of goodness being on the ascendant in the condition described as voluptuousness, it is that of commencing meditation. Concentration and absolute suppression are the final conditions. Each condition has its residua. Thereof, those residua which are present in the waking state are destroyed by those that are produced by the condition of commencing meditation, and those that are brought forth by the condition of commencing meditation, are destroyed by those due to the condition of concentration. The residua of the condition of concentration are destroyed by those of suppression. Even as lead melted with gold destroys the dross of gold as well as itself, so do the residua of the condition of suppression consume both themselves as well as the residua of the condition of concentration.

[The most important word in the aphorism is *Saṅskára*, and it is just the one which has unfortunately not been explained either in the commentary of Bhoja, or in the *Pátanjala Bháshya*. In ordinary Sanskrit it has many meanings. In the *Nyáya* it occurs frequently in three different senses, *viz.*, velocity (*vega*), thinking (*bhávaná*), and elasticity (*sthitisthápaka*). (*Tarka-saṅgraha*). Adverting to the second meaning the *Bhásá-parichchheda*, says: "Saṅskára, called thinking, (*bhávaná*), resides in sentient beings; and is imperceptible to the senses. Certainty

which has no inattention in its constituent, is its cause. It is also described to be the cause of memory and recognition.” (*Bhávanákhýástu sanskáro jívavrittiratíndryah.*)

*Upekshánátmakastasya nischayah káraṇam bhavet.  
Smarane pratyabhijnáyámapyasau heturuchyate.)*

Thus it is not memory as rendered by Dr. Roer in his translation of the *Bháshá-parichchheda*, for there it is described to be the cause of memory, and not memory itself. It is not sensation, nor impression, for it is not transient, but lasting. It is not perception, because that applies to the acceptance by the sensorium of something existing without, and does not serve as the cause of memory. It is not idea, for it is the result of former experience, and not spontaneous as an idea may be, nor eternal as the ancient Greek philosophers supposed ideas to be. Dr. Ballantyne renders it into “self-reproduction of thought;” but there is nothing like “self-reproduction” in it; for it is said to be revived by external stimuli, and not by its own effort. It is something then—a trace, a mark, a celule, a psychograph—which perception, whether conscious or unconscious, leaves behind in the intellect, to be revived afterwards under particular circumstances, and it is more or less connected with all intellectual acts as cause or effect. In the language of Dr. Morell (‘Mental Philosophy,’ p. 95) “When a given mental impression is produced upon us, it remains for a time before the consciousness, and then gives way to others. We know, however, that it is not absolutely lost; for, if proper conditions occur, the impression is renewed. The conclusion is, that there must be *something* deposited within us which subsists *permanently*, and which is equally there, whether it be at any moment the immediate object of our consciousness or not. This *something*, then, we term a *residuum*, using the expression, it will be observed, without implying any theory on the subject whatever.” The Sanskrit counterpart of this *residuum* is *Safískára*. Every sensation, every impression, every perception, every idea, nay, every dream, leaves its trace behind, and the traces or *residua* so obtained constitute the sum total of

our experience, and these are *Saṅskáras*. According to Indian philosophers these remain not only all life through, but even in subsequent states of existence, and they are, therefore, believed to be the cause of our instincts. The new-born infant takes to its mother's breast from the *sanskára* it has in its mind from its experience in a former existence.

The next word is *s'esha*, and it, too, has not been fully defined by the commentators. It means 'remainder' 'balance,' or 'end.' Compounded with *saṅskára* the meaning is that in which the remainders are the *saṅskáras*, or that in which the *saṅskáras* are ended, or brought to a close. Bhoja accepts the second meaning, and he illustrates it by saying that in the state of Unconscious meditation in its perfection all previous *saṅskáras* or residua of former conditions, as well as those of the perfect state, are destroyed, even as in the process of cupellation, lead melted with gold not only destroys the dross existing in impure gold, but also itself, leaving nothing behind. Thus the Unconscious meditation is seedless or has no object whatever for contemplation. The *Pátanjala Bháshya* takes a different view. According to it, in the Unconscious stage all functions are set at rest and the residua alone remain behind. (*Sarva-vr̥ittipratyastamaya-saṅskára-śeshah nirodhah*.) And Váchaspati Miśra emphasizes this by adding the word "alone"—*saṅskáras* alone remain—(*sanskára-mátra śeshah*.) This contradiction may be explained by supposing that the *Pátanjala-bháshya* has in view a meditation from which there is awaking, while Bhoja describes the final meditation from which there is no further waking; for he admits that in the earlier stages of the Unconscious meditation there are residua peculiar to it. Yogis admit that people do wake from the Unconscious meditation, and that that meditation is often practiced, and in such cases the *saṅskáras* must remain in a latent state to be revived by proper stimuli on waking. It is difficult satisfactorily to decide to what condition Patanjali himself referred to. The way in which he has used the word *śesha* would suggest the idea that he has been correctly interpreted in the *Pátanjala Bháshya*. See A. L. at the end of the chapter.

The state of Unconscious meditation above described is subject to the condition precedent, that there should be repeated acts of contemplation or exercise of thought amounting to a habit, as regards the necessity of rejecting all causes of disturbance. Without it the final stage cannot be acquired. This exercise of thought, however, forms a part of the Unconscious stage, and is totally unconnected with the Conscious form. Váchaspati Miśra says—"the first word in the aphorism (which I have rendered into 'preceded by the exercise of thought regarding the cause of rejection,' and for the sake of idiom put at the end of the sentence) describes the means, and the other two define the nature of the meditation in question" (*púrvapaderupáyakathanamuttarábhyam cha svarúpa-kathanam*). Dr. Ballantyne has mistaken the purport of the word, and made it the *conditio precedent*. His version is "The one [kind of meditation just described] is preceded by the exercise of thought in the shape of repose ;—the other [—independent of any fresh antecedent—] is in the shape of the self-reproduction [of thought, after the departure of all objects.]" After what has been stated above, it is obvious that this version is not tenable. It may be added that it is not at all usual with authors of Sútras to repeat in a subsequent sútra what has been already explained in a previous one.]

Having thus stated the distinctions and the nature of *Yoga*, and having briefly mentioned the method of performing it, the author proceeds to speak of those methods more fully.

## XIX.

Of (the meditative states attained to by the two classes of aspirants technically called) the Unembodied and the Resolved into nature, the world is the cause.

The "unembodied" (*videha*) and the "resolved into nature" (*prakritilaya*) have been described in the aphorism on the argumentative and other forms of meditations (A XVII, pp. 18 f.)

Of their meditation the world is the cause. The word *bhava-prataya* is formed of *bhava* 'world' and *prataya* 'cause.'

The meaning is this: that such persons, from their entrance into the world (on account of their deserts), become participants of similar (inadequate) meditation. Not being conscious of ultimate reality, for them this is a mere exercise of the Yoga. Hence, exertion should be made for the knowledge of the ultimate reality and in the contemplation thereof, with a view to the attainment of deliverance. This is the object for which this has been said.

[In the commentary on aphorism XVII, among the conditions of Conscious meditation disembodiedness and resolution into primæval nature have been pointed out as high. Here the object is to show that those results are secondary, and of the earth earthy. They do not secure the ultimate end of Yoga. They are accordingly meditations, of which the world or *Prakṛitī* is the cause. They are, nevertheless, desirable exercises as preparatory to the state in which the ultimate reality is revealed.]

Of others :—

## XX.

(In the case) of others this (meditation) is preceded by Inclination, Energy, Memory, Meditation, and Discernment.

“Of others” *i. e.*, of Yogīs, other than (those who have been described as) “the disembodied” and “the resolved in nature.” “Preceded by inclination” &c.; that meditation which has *śraddhā* &c. as the first means, is called *śraddhādipūrvaka*. These, inclination and the rest, act successively as the means and the end, *i. e.* they serve as the means or instruments for the Conscious meditation. Thereof “Inclination” (*śraddhā*) is approbation in favour of the Yoga. “Energy” (*virya*) is strenuous exertion. “Memory” (*smṛiti*) is not letting out what is once cognised. (A. XI, p. 12.) “Meditation” (*samādhi*) is intentness on a single point.

“Discernment” (*prajñá*) is thorough understanding of that which is to be known. Now, he who has “Inclination” gets “Energy,” or becomes persevering in favour of Yoga. In the condition of “Energy” comes “Memory” of former states, in which the thinking principle meditates; and the thinking principle which has meditated knows thoroughly what it has thought upon. All these are the expedients of the Conscious form of meditation. From the (frequent) exercise of that meditation and from extreme dispassion Unconscious meditation ensues.

[This aphorism explains the practices which should be adopted by the neophyte in the first stage of his career as a Yogi. He must have Inclination for the exercise he cannot then undertake. The Inclination then, must be followed by Energy, or active exertion. Then there should be Memory of what he has learnt. Next, there should be frequent exercise of Meditation of some being or other to bring on the habit for it. And, lastly, there should be clear Discernment of what should be done and what should be avoided.]

Of the Yogís possessing the above mentioned expedients he next describes the sub-divisions according to the different expedients they adopt (for the attainment of their object).

## XXI.

### Proximate for the ardently impetuous.

(To complete the aphorism the words :) “The attainment of the state of meditation” are required to be supplied. “Impetuous” (*sañvega*), energetic exertion for the execution of a work. “Ardent” (*tivra*), excessively, in a high degree. On the part of those who are thus ardently impetuous, the attainment of Meditation is “proximate” (*ásanna*). The fruition of Meditation is also proximate, *i. e.*, quickly accomplished.

[Having in the preceding aphorism pointed out the practices to be adopted by Yogís, the author in this lays special stress on the necessity for ardent application. A lukewarm feeling is not enough for immediate or early fruition. The application should be “ardently impetuous” to ensure quick reward.]

Who are then ardently impetuous? To this he replies.

## XXII.

There is a further distinction, from there being the mild, the moderate, and the excessive.

There are specific distinctions among those who adopt these expedients, from the mild and other expedients being different. The divisions of the expedients are "mild" (*mrīdu*), "moderate" (*madhya*), and "excessive" (*adhimátra*). These are severally threefold, from their being severally subdivided into "the mildly impetuous," "the moderately impetuous" and "the excessively impetuous." And in accordance with this division there are nine classes of Yogíś. The mild expedients are (severally) "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." The moderate expedients are (also) "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." The excessive expedients are (likewise), "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." And great endeavours should be made for the attainment of the "ardently impetuous" form of the excessive method. So much for the declaration of the distinctions of Yogíś.

[The object of this aphorism is to classify Yogíś into different orders according to their respective arduousness. Some are mildly, others moderately, and others ardently disposed, and so each group forms an order. Again in their mildness and the rest there may be degrees varying from mildness to moderateness and ardency, and so each of the three orders has three sub-divisions, making a total of nine groups. The injunction is that Yogíś should exert to pass through the several orders as quickly as possible, so that the attainment of the final stage may not be delayed.]

Now he mentions an easy expedient, distinct from the preceding expedients.

## XXIII.

Or by devotion to God.

“God” (*Isvara*) will be described presently (A. XXIV). “Devotion” (*pranidhána*) is a form of resignation to Him. It is thorough worship of Him, and the consignment of all one’s actions to Him. Without wishing for the fruition of worldly enjoyments, the making over all one’s actions to Him, the preëminent guide, is “devotion,” *pranidhána*. This is an important means of meditation and of its fruition.

[In this aphorism the author departs from the Sákhya system, by introducing devotion to God as a facile and ready means of attaining the end. God, however, is not made the end, but the means to an end of which He forms no integral portion. The theory of resignation or dedication of the fruits of all actions to Him, is evidently borrowed from the Bhakti system in which it plays the most important part. In entire reliance on the providence of the Godhead, the Bhakta wishes for no fruition whatever. Whatever he does is for the service of the Divinity, and He in His mercy is to grant whatever He thinks proper. In the Bhagavad Gítá this is made the cardinal point of faith, (IX, 27,) and there it appears quite consistent; but in the Yoga system Kapila found no necessity for it, and Patanjali adopts it as a sort of compromise to give a theistic character to his system; but it plays only a very subordinate part.]

It has been just stated that meditation may be achieved through devotion to God. With reference to this he now proceeds to declare, in order, the nature (XXIV), the proofs (XXV), the glory (XXVI), the name (XXVII), and the order of worship of God (XXIII), as also the fruit thereof (XXIX).

## XXIV.

God is a particular soul which is untouched by afflictions, works, deserts and desires.

Those things which afflict are "afflictions" (*kleśah*). They are ignorance and the rest about to be described. "Works" (*karma*), are what are enjoined or prohibited (in the S'ástras), as also what are mixed, *i. e.*, partly one and partly the other. What ripen out of those works are "deserts" (*vipáka*). They are kind, age and experience. What abide on the field of the thinking principle until fruition is affected are the residua called desires (*ásaya*). "Untouched," (*aparámriṣṭa*), free from the contact in all the three times (past, present and future). "Particular soul" (*Purusha-viśeṣha*), is that which is distinct from all other souls, and that is the distinction. "God" (*Iśvara*) Almighty, or one who is able to grant salvation to creation by the fiat of His will. It is true that the contact of afflictions does not obtain in regard to any soul, still the afflictions abide in the thinking principle of all souls, even as conquest and defeat effected by soldiers abide in their master. In the case of this Soul there is no such contact of the afflictions in any of the three tenses; hence He is especially the Almighty Lord. Such almighty ness of His is due to sempeternal excess of the quality of goodness. This excess is due for certain to the fulness of His wisdom. Being separately self-dependent, His wisdom and almighty ness are not mutually dependent, for they two are eternally abiding in the substance of the Almighty. His relation to that goodness is sempeternal, because the union and separation of *Prakṛiti* and *Purusha* cannot happen except by the will of that *Iśvara*. The thinking principle in ordinary beings, undergoing modifications into pleasure, pain and delusion, becomes, on being touched in the body of the *Yogī*, by the reflection of the soul, known; but such is not the case with *Iśvara*. His superexcellent modification of goodness abides eternally without a beginning as the sole object of enjoyment. Hence, being distinct from other souls, He verily is *Iśvara*. Again, in the case of the liberated soul, liability to pain and the like is removed by Sástic means (such as the *Yoga*, &c.). In His case, however, being always in that condition, there is no correspondence with liberated souls. Nor

is there a multiplicity of Gods, for if we admit their equality there must be diversity of object, and the object (of the enquiry into the cause of creation) is defeated ; and if we admit relative greatness, he who is the greatest, is God, because in Him almighty-ness attains its highest limit.

[The most important word in the aphorism is *I'svara*. Derived from the root *I's*, it means 'ruler' or 'governor,' but as that is not very definite, I have preferred the precise and unmistakable term God, which, though supposed to be derived from good, is generally accepted in the sense of a ruler.

The next word is *puruṣha*, which means a man, or the soul of a man—that which abides (*shete*) in the body (*pure*) ; but it also means a male simply. Dr. Ballantyne uses spirit as its equivalent ; but as the dualism indicated by European philosophers between soul or animal life (*Ψυχή*) and spirit, or rational life (*Πνεύμα*) is not recognised by Hindu writers, I have accepted soul to imply the two collectively. The use of the term shows that Patanjali did not much care for the Vedántic theory which denounces the idea of attaching sexuality to the Divinity, and, to avoid trouble, uses a neuter noun. To prevent misconception he thinks it quite enough to say that the soul was of a particular kind, quite distinct from all other kinds, and characterised by being devoid of all the accidents of humanity. For the sake of comparison with his definition it may not be amiss to quote here Udayana Achárya's summary of the different definitions of the Godhead given in leading Hindu works. It runs thus :

" Now although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the [four well-known] ends of man they may desire,—(thus the followers of the Upanishads as the very Knower,—the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,—those of Patanjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit, or deserts, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,—the Mahápásupatas as the Independent one, undefiled by Vaidic or secular violations,—the Saivas as S'iva,—the Vaishṇavas as Puru-

shottoma,—the followers of the Puráṇas as the great Father (Brahmá),—the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice,—the Saugatas as the Omniscient,—the Jainas as the Unobstructed,—the Mímáñsakas as Him who is pointed out as to be worshipped,—the Chárvákas as Him who is established by the convention of the world,—the followers of the Nyáya as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him,—why farther detail? whom even the artizans themselves worship as the great artizan, Viśvakarman,)—although, I say, with regard to that Being, the adorable Síva, whom all recognise throughout the world as universally acknowledged like castes, families, family invocations of Agni, schools, social customs, &c., how can there arise any doubt? and what then is there to be ascertained?"—(Cowell's *Kusumánjali*, p. 2.)

For a theist, intent on proving the existence of the Deity, this summary is good enough; but it is not absolutely correct. The Chárvákas do not admit the existence of the Godhead as the supreme ruler. They are atheists, and do not acknowledge any Divine supremacy. The Kápilas, though not so outspoken, still hold that the existence of the Godhead cannot be proved. Kapila, in the Sáñkhya aphorisms says, "It is not proved that there is a God." (*Is'varáriddheh* I. 92.) This idea he works out elaborately in his Fifth Book, and, for ready reference, I quote Dr. Ballantyne's translations of the aphorisms on the subject.

*Aph.* 2.—Not from its [—the world's—] being governed by the Lord, is there the effectuation of fruit, for it is by works [—i. e., by merit and demerit—] that this is accomplished,—[“by works alone, which are indispensable,”]—and if we *do* make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord, He cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works].

*Aph.* 3.—[If a Lord were governor, then] having intended his own benefit, His government [would be selfish], as is the case [with ordinary governors] in the world.

*Aph.* 4.—[He must then be] just like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise [than you desire that we should conceive of Him; for

“if we agree that the Lord also is benefited, He also must be something mundane,—just like a worldly lord ;—because, since his desires are (on that supposition) not (previously) satisfied, he must be liable to grief, &c.”].

*Aph. 5.*—Or [“if whilst there exists also a world, there be a Lord, then, let yours, like ours, be merely”] a technical term [“for that soul which emerged at the commencement of the creation,—since there cannot be an eternal Lordship, because of the contradiction between mundane-ness and the having an unobstructed will”].

*Aph. 6.*—This [that there is a Lord] cannot be established without [assuming that He is affected by] Passion, because that is the indispensable cause [of all energizing].

*Aph. 7.*—Moreover were that [Passion] conjoined with Him, he could not be eternally free, [“and thus the tenet (of His eternal freedom) must be surrendered.”]—“Pray (let us ask)—does Lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to be powers of Nature—(not properties of Soul—)or from an influence through proximity simply, —as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative”].

*Aph. 8.*—If it were from the conjunction of the properties of Nature, it would turn out that there is association, [which Scripture denies of Soul. “In regard to the latter alternative he says”].

*Aph. 9.*—If it were from the mere existence [of Nature, not in association, but simply in proximity], then Lordship would belong to every one ; [“that is to say,—if Thought obtains Lordship merely from proximity, as in the case of the magnet (which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron), then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that all men indifferently, experiencers in this or that (cycle of) creation, (may) have Lordship, because it is just by conjunction with all experiencers that Nature produces Mind, &c. ;—therefore your tenet, of there being only one Lord, is overthrown”].

*Aph.* 10.—It is not established [that there is an eternal Lord] because there is no real evidence of it, [—“in the first place, there is not *sense*-evidence, so that only the evidence of inference and of testimony can be offered ; and these are inapplicable ;” as he proceeds to show].

*Aph.* 11.—There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord], because there is here no case of [invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken ;—“and so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord ; because, in such arguments as ‘Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is a product,’ the fact of invariable concomitancy is not established, since there is no compulsion” that every product should have had an intelligent maker].

*Aph.* 12.—Moreover, there is scripture for this [world’s] being the product of Nature [—not of a Lord].” (*Sáñkhyá Aphorisms*, pp. 114f.)

I should add here that some Kápílas do not wish openly to admit their atheism, and appeal for support from the aphorism in which Kapila says “The existence of such a Lord is a settled point,” (III, 5 and 7), meaning by “such” an emergent Lord who has been absorbed into nature, and who is in no sense the governor of creation. The greater part of chapter III of the first book of the Vedánta Sútra treats of this subject ; but it is too long to be quoted here.

The *Pátanjala Bháshya* points out the distinction between the emancipated soul and the Godhead thus : “If isolation be it, then would there not be many isolated ones ? (Not so.) For the isolated ones attain their isolation by rending asunder the three bonds, whereas in regard to God there never was and never can be such bonds. The emancipated implies previous bondage, but this cannot be predicated of God. Again, in the case of the resolved into nature there is possibility of future bondage, but it is not the case with God—He is sempeternally emancipated and sempeternally the Lord.” *Kaivalyam práptáhstarhi santi cha bahu-vah kevalinah. Te hi triṇi bandhanám chhitrā kaivalyam*

*práptáḥ ; íśvarasya cha tat sambando na bhuto na bhári. Yathá muktasya púrvabandhakoṭíh prajnáyate naivamíśvarasya. Yathá vā prakritilinasyottarā bandhakoṭíh sambháryate naivamíśvarasya ; sa tu sadeva muktah sadeveśvarah.]*

Having described the identity of God, the author next produces a proof that such a being exists.

### XXV.

#### In Him the seed of the omniscient attains infinity.

In that God the seed of omniscience, as also of parvitude and magnitude and of knowledge of the knowers of the past, the future &c., attains its “infinity,” (*niratisaya*)\* or highest perfection. Being the source like a seed it is called seed (*víja*). It is well known that of the qualities of parvitude and magnitude, which have degrees, there is an absolute perfection. Thus, the perfection of parvitude is seen in atoms, and that of magnitude in the sky. In a similar manner knowledge and other manifest attributes of the thinking principle compared with each other must somewhere attain the highest perfection, and wherever they are in the highest perfection, that is God. Although from the general character of this inference no precise being is proved, yet in the Sástras His omniscience and other qualities may be precisely learnt.

But how does He, without any impulse of His own, cause the union and separation of Prakrti and Purusha? Such a doubt should not be entertained. Being merciful, He finds in His mercy to creation the impulse. His impulse is the wish “ I shall rescue all creation (from pain) at the periodical minor and great pralayas.” What ever is desirable to one, is his impulse.

[The logical force of this aphorism is not apparent. It is a mere assertion, and can scarcely be taken as a proof, as the Commentator puts it forward to be. He himself felt the difficulty, and escaped out of it by appealing to the authority of the Sástra.

\* *Niratisaya*, limitness, greatness, or infinity.

The Sástra here referred to is the Sáñkhya, and the P. Bháshya quotes a passage from the work of Panchaśikha which shows that “the first knower, lord, and great sage, with a view to creation, in his mercy taught this science to the enquirer Suri.” *Ādividvánnirmáṇachittamadhishtháya kárunyát bhagaván paramarshi rásuraye jijnásu mánáya tantraṁ pravácheti.* The first knower is Kapila, who, being an incarnation of Vishṇu, obtained the science from Sayambhu or Maheśvara.]

Having thus described the identity and proof of the existence of God, the author refers to His greatness.

## XXVI.

He is the instructor of even all early ones, for He is not defined by time.

Even of the primary creators such as Brahmá and others, he is the “instructor,” or preceptor, because “He is not defined by time,” for He has no beginning, while the others are so defined, having a beginning.

[The word *guru* has been translated “instructor” in accordance with the text, and after the commentator who supplies the equivalent *upadeshī*. It may be more appropriately rendered into “noblest” or “greatest,” as it would make the reason assigned, undefined by time, more consistent, for want of beginning, or being not circumscribed by time, does not imply tuition. The object of the explanation, however, is to refer to the first tutor Maheśvara to whom reference has been made in the last note. In the P. Bháshya no equivalent is given of the word, but the sense is explained by the word *yathásya sargasyádau prakarsha-gatyásiddhah, tathá-tikránta-sargádisvapi pratyetavyah.*

Váchaspati Miśra explains the term by *prakarsha* “superior :” *na vartate prakarshásya gatih práptih pratyetavya ágamát tadanena prabandhena bhagaváníśvaro darśitah.*

In giving the purport of the aphorism he uses the words : *Samprati bhávataḥ brahmádibhyah viśeshamáha.*]

Having thus described the greatness of God, the author now supplies His indicator, with a view to help people in their devotion.

### XXVII.

**His indicator is the Pranava.**

Of the *Ísvara* thus described, the “indicator,” name, expressive word, whereby one is thoroughly (*pra=prakarshena*) lauded (*nu*) or praised, glorified, or hymned is—*pranava*, which is the same with the syllable Om. (The sentence indirectly gives the derivation which is *pra* = “excessive” and *nu* = “to laud,” whence *Pranava*). Between the two (the name and the being denominated) the relation of the indicator and the indicated is eternal. This is conventionally expressed, but not produced by any one ; (it is the same) as in the case of a father and his son, when one points out the existing relation (by saying) “this is the father, and this is the son,” (though the relationship exists from before, and is not produced by the saying.)

[*Pranava* is the technical name of Om, and the injunction is that that syllable should be frequently muttered. Care is taken to show that the relation between the indicator Om and the indicated God is eternal and not produced by man, and the example of the father and son explains what is intended. The Vedas, the Upanishads and all Hindu works recommend the same process, accepting the term as the most sacred name of the Divinity. See *Chhándogya Upanishad*, Chapter I. In two short notes, published in the ‘Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal’ for 1865, pp. 46—208, I take the word to be the Indianized form of the Hebrew *A'man* and the English Amen.]

His adoration is next enjoined.

### XXVIII.

**Its repetition and the reflection on its meaning (should be made).**

“Its,” *i. e.*, of the Praṇava, consisting of three and a half instants, “Repetition” (*japa*), pronouncing it in due order, and the “Reflection” (*bhāvana*), the perception repeatedly of the God indicated by it, are the means of concentration of the thought in it. Hence, for the accomplishment of meditation (*samādhi*) the Pranava should be repeated, and its meaning reflected upon by a Yogi. This is declared.

[Om is ordinarily declared to be a compound of the letters (a) अ (u) and ए (m), which supply the three instants, and the conversion of the m into the nasal mark ं supplies the half instant. In prosody the word is a long syllable, but in modulated reading or recitation its prosodial quantity is a protracted circumflex sound.]

The fruit of such adoration is next described.

## XXIX.

Thence the right knowledge of the reverted perception, and the removal of obstacles.

From that repetition and that reflection the right knowledge of the “reverted perception” (*pratyakchetaṇā*) is effected in the case of Yogis. That “perception” (*chetaṇā*) or power of seeing, which turns towards its own internal organ, withdrawing itself from (or in opposition to worldly) objects, is called “reverted perception” (*pratyak* “turning back,” *chetaṇā* “perception”) and a “right knowledge” (*adhibama*) of it is thereby acquired. The “removal” (*abhaṭṭa*), *i. e.*, the counteraction of the power of the obstacles about to be described is also effected.

[The natural function of the senses is to extend outwards, in order to receive the impressions of external objects and carry them to the sensorium, but that being suppressed by the Yogi, the senses turn inwards and find their object within, and therefore the function is called reversed, or reflex. The object of this round-about way of description is to say that the senses hold communion exclusively with the soul.]

Now, a doubt arising as to what are the obstacles ? he says :—

### XXX.

Disease, Langour, Doubt, Carelessness, Idleness, Worldly-mindedness, Mistaken notions, Unattainment of any stage of abstraction, and Instability therein ; these, causing distractions, are the obstacles.

These nine, impelled by the force of foulness and darkness, become the causes of “distractions,” *i. e.*, by these enemies to concentration the thinking principle is disturbed. Of the nine :—

(1) “Sickness” (*vyádhi*) is fever and the like, resulting from disordered humours.

(2) “Langour” (*styána*) is an indisposition of the thinking principle to work.

(3) “Doubt” (*sañśaya*) is the disposition of the thinking principle which relies on both sides of a question, as whether Yoga is practicable or not.

(4) “Carelessness” (*pramáda*) is a disposition not to exert, or indifference in performing meditation.

(5) “Idleness” (*álasya*) is a heaviness of the body and of the thinking principle, which is the cause of want of interest in matters relating to Yoga.

(6) “Worldly-mindedness” (*avirati*) is the inclination of the thinking principle to enjoy the pleasures of the world.

(7) “Mistaken notion” (*bhrántidarsana*) is wrong perception, such as taking a bit of mother-o’pearl to be silver.

(8) “Unattainment of any stage” (*alabdha-bhúmikatva*) is not attaining, for some cause or other, a particular stage of abstraction.

(9) “Instability” (*anavasthitatva*) is the condition in which the thinking principle having attained a stage cannot abide in it.

These being opposed to the practice of concentration of meditation, are called “obstacles,” (*antá: áyáh*).

To shew that there are other causes which produce distraction of the mind, he says :—

## XXXI.

Pain, Distress, Trembling, Inspiration and Expiration are the companions of distractions.

Whenever from any cause distractions are produced then pain &c., come on. Thereof—

(1) “Pain” (*dukkha*) is a modification of the foulness of the thinking principle ; it is characterised by pain, which living beings exert to remove.

(2) “Distress” (*daurmansya*) is the agitation of the mind proceeding from external or internal causes.

(3) “Trembling” (*atigamejaytva*) is the shaking of the body which causes unsteadiness in the posture (of a Yogi).

(4) “Inspiration” (*svasa*) is a drawing in of the external air. The expulsion of the air from the lungs is “expiration” (*praśvāsa*).

These existing along with the (other) distractions, should be removed by the exercise and dispassion already described; (A. XII) and therefore they are noticed here.

[Pain here referred to is described in the *Pátanjala Bháshya* as of three kinds: mental, physical and supernatural. That which affects the mind without touching the body is mental, that which proceeds from disorders in the body is physical, and that which proceeds from evil spirits &c., is supernatural. The *Sáñkhya Karika* notices all the three. (Wilson’s *Sáñkhya Káriká*, p. 2.)

The *Pátanjala Rahasya* gives *píḍí* ‘disease’ as the equivalent of *Dukkha*.]

Another expedient for overcoming the obstacles with their accompaniments is now being pointed out.

## XXXII.

For their prevention let there be exercise on one principle.

For the "prevention" (*pratishedha*) or obstruction of those distractions, let there be "exercise" (*abhyásá*) or repeated application of the thinking principle to some one selected "principle," (*tattva*), from the force resulting from which arise the condition of concentration, and thereby the distractions subside.

[In former aphorisms meditation has been declared to be of two kinds: conscious and unconscious, or seeded and seedless. The object here is to inculcate the necessity of constant exercise of the first, or the seeded form, to steady the mind, and prepare it for the more arduous and difficult phase in which there should be no object upon which to meditate, or the state in which, in the language of Wordsworth, "thought is not." The highest form of conscious meditation is intelligent communion with the soul, but this too is not at once practicable, and the instruction is that any one of the twenty-five categories may be taken up for meditation, so that the mind may be trained to the habit of concentrating itself at any one point at pleasure, and of remaining in that state of concentration without fatigue.]

Now he describes another expedient with advertence to certain works which help to purify the thinking principle.

### XXXIII.

The cheerfulness of the thinking principle, through friendliness, compassion, complacency and indifference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue and vice.

"Friendliness" (*maitri*) disposition to be friendly. "Compassion," (*karuṇá*) mercy. "Complacency" (*muditá*) to be pleased. "Indifference" (*upekshá*) to feel neither pleasure nor pain. These feelings should be felt, in due order, for the happy, the grieved, the virtuous, and the sinful. Thus, to the happy one should be friendly, (saying) "blessed is their happiness;" and not be envious to them. For persons in grief he should show mercy, and desire how to relieve them from their grief, and not remain indifferent to their suffering. To the virtuous, with a view to encourage virtue, he should express satisfaction, and not be envious of them (say-

ing) "Forsooth, are these virtuous"? For the vicious a feeling of indifference should be practised, neither encouraging nor hating them. In the aphorism, the word "happiness" &c. are intended to stand for persons possessing those qualities. These feelings of friendliness &c., producing cheerfulness in the thinking principle, easily bring on the condition of Samádhi. These acts are external (and not intrinsic parts of the Samádhi). Even as in arithmetic, addition and the like are useful in the calculation of alligation, &c., (but are not in themselves integral parts of the main object), so the feelings of friendship, &c., antagonistic to envy, passion &c., producing cheerfulness, prepare the thinking principle for the conscious form of Samádhi. Passion and envy are the chief causes of distractions. When these are thoroughly eradicated, the cheerfulness induced, effects the concentration of the mind (to one object).

[The Aphorism suggests a second expedient that of cheerfulness. Unless the mind is cheerful it cannot be steady, and this cheerfulness is to be brought on by friendliness towards the happy, compassion for those who are in distress, complacency in regard to virtue, and indifference in respect to vice. Indifference in respect to vice might at first sight appear a very mild feeling, but hatred, detestation or other strong manifestation of feeling towards vice would mar cheerfulness, and itself be a cause of pain and unsteadiness; hence it is avoided.]

He points out another expedient.

#### XXXIV.

##### Or by expulsion and retention of the breath.

"Expulsion," (*prachchhardana*) means the throwing out of the air from the lungs in a fixed quantity through a special effort. "Retention" (*vidháraṇa*) is the restraint, or stoppage of the motion of breath for a certain limited time. That stoppage is effected by two acts—by filling the lungs with external air, and by retaining therein the inhaled air. Thus the threefold *práṇáyáma*, including the three acts of expiration, inspiration and retention of breath, fixes the thinking principle to one point of

concentration. All the functions of the organs being preceded by that of the breath—there being always a correlation of breath and mind in their respective functions,—the breath when overcome by stopping all the functions of the organs, effects the concentration of the thinking principle to one object. The *Agama* proclaims its power of destroying all defects thus: “All obstructive functions are caused by faults.” Hence, by its destroying faults, it becomes effectual in producing concentration of the mind.

[The definition of “retention” (*vidháraṇa*) by the terms “stoppage of motion” (*gativichchheda*) is obviously faulty, but as the aphorism refers to “retention” immediately after the “expulsion” (*prachchhardana*) and the attempt to retain the breath after it has been fully expired would be futile, it is necessary to inspire before the breath can be retained, and the commentator is obliged to include that act along with the retention. The Pátanjala Bháshya calls the retention to be *Práṇáyáma* (*vidháraṇa práṇáyamah*), and in the Sáñkhyá Sútra this meaning is accepted. It is, however, not the generally accepted meaning. All other Yogic and Tántric works regard the three acts of expiration, inspiration and retention performed in specific order, to constitute the *Práṇáyáma*. The order is not always the same. Some have expiration first, inspiration next, and retention last. Others place inspiration first, retention next, and expiration last. The word *mátrápramáṇa* in the commentary, which I have rendered into “fixed quantity,” has been rendered into *avalpa* or “little” or “slowly” in the Pátanjala Bháshya ; but it does not express the true technical meaning. The object of the *mátrá* is to imply a fixed period of time. According to the Skanda Puráṇa a *mátrá* is equal to the time required in one breathing, (*Eka śráṣṭā-mapi mátrá práṇáyáme nigadyate*), and to imply that this breathing must be natural, the *Yoga-chintámaṇi* adds that this breathing should be during sleep (when there is no violent effort). *Nidrásangatasya puñṣo yávatkálenaikaśváso gachchhatyágachchhati cha távatkálapráṇáyámasya mátretyuchyate.*) And this

period is equal to two and a half palas. (*Sárdha svása palad-vayátmakah kálah, práṇáyáma kála siddhah.*) The *pala* here means the period occupied by a twinkling of the eye. The *mátrá* is obviously taken as a unit, and of these from 1 to 24 are devoted to a *práṇáyáma* according as it is inferior, middling, or superior. The mode of reckoning the time to be devoted to each act is regulated in one of two ways ; 1st, by so many repetitions of the syllable Om, or the mystic mantra of the performer, or the specific mystic syllables (*víja*) of that mantra ; 2nd, by turning the thumb and the index finger of the left hand round the left knee a given number of times. The time devoted to inspiration is the shortest, and to retention the longest. A *Vaishṇava* in his ordinary daily prayer repeats the *Víja* mantra once while expiring, 7 times while inspiring, and 20 times while retaining. A *Sákta* repeats the mantra 16 times when inspiring, 64 times while retaining, and 32 times while expiring. These periods are frequently modified. The details vary according to each particular form of meditation, and the capacity of the performer. As a general rule it may be said that longer is the retention the more proficient becomes the *Yogí*. The usual mode of performing the *Práṇáyáma* is, after assuming the posture prescribed, to place the ring-finger of the right hand on the left nostril, pressing it so as to close it, and to expire with the right, then to press the right nostril with the thumb, and to inspire through the left nostril, and then to close the two nostrils with the ring-finger and the thumb, and to stop all breathing. The order is reversed in the next operation, and in the third act the first form is required. This constitutes the *Práṇáyáma*, and it may be repeated after short intervals according to choice for hours. The object avowed of this performance is the steadying of the mind. The *Hatha-dípiká* philosophises on this by saying, “ by the motion of the breath, the thinking principle moves ; when that motion is stopped, it becomes motionless, and the *Yogí* becomes firm as the trunk of a tree ; therefore the wind should be stopped. As long as the breath remains in the body so long it is called living. Death is the exit of that breath, therefore it should be stopped.”

(“*Chale vāte chalam chittam niśchale niśchalam bhavet, Yogi sthānūtvamāpnoti tato vāyumni rodhayet. Yāvad vāyuh sthito dehe tabajjīvanamuchyate, Marañam tasya nishkrāntistato vayum nirodhayet.*”)

Elsewhere the text asserts that this *Prāṇayāma* is conducive both to health and longevity, and all minor works on *Yoga* and the *Tantras* generally expatiate at great length on the sanitary and the therapeutic advantages of practising it regularly at stated times. The *Hatha-dīpikā*, in one place, says, “all diseases disappear in him who devotes himself to the *Prāṇayāma*; without it in the state of practising *Yoga* every kind of disease arises.” (*Prāṇayāmādiyuktena sarvaroga kshayo bhavet, ayuktābhyaśayogena sarvaroga samudbhavah.* The idea seems to have travelled to the far West, and the spiritualists in America have accepted it as a recognised maxim of their system. Many spiritualists practice this *Prāṇayāma* under the name of “deep breathing,” and A. J. Davis, one of their apostles, in his “*Harbinger of Health*” (pp. 52-53), gives the following directions for curing diseases through its means.

“First, if your weakness be general, and the blood is loaded with cold matter, lay flat down on your back, and, while breathing *deep, and slow, and uniformly*, WILL YOURSELF TO BECOME HEALTHY—in your feet and hands, in your knees and elbows, in your hips and shoulders, in your bowels and liver, in your lungs and brain! The heart will take care of itself. In cases where the weakness is generally distributed, all you are required to practice (while so prostrated and respiring) is the art of concentrating your Will and desires simultaneously on the extremities first; then work upward and *inward* progressively; and when, in the lapse of ten minutes of steady, deep breathing, you have reached the brain, repeat the process in the ascending scale, as indicated in the manner aforementioned.

“By this Pneumogastric treatment of yourself, you will receive spiritual strength from the air—nothing is more certain! When, by practice, you can *breathe* deeply and heroically, and at the

same time put your Will upon the restoration of the general system, the art of fixing your mind upon some particularly diseased part will become less and less difficult. *Consumptive persons*, by simply breathing profoundly, and willing systematically, *may enlarge their chests and lungs beyond the possibilities of disease*. Persons of cold temperature, with irregular habits and bad practices, may "right about face" and become harmonially healthy. Learn to depend upon yourself—use the infallible remedies of Nature—and, in spite of priest or doctor, you will 'pass from death unto life.'

"**TIME or EXERCISES.**—In acquiring this psychological power over the destinies of your bodily state, and in becoming a Self-healing Institution, whether home or abroad—it may be necessary to practice (either while on your back, or standing, or walking, or riding,) perhaps three times in each twenty-four hours. Never just before meals, nor soon subsequent to them; but the true time is when chilification is going on; about 90 or 120 minutes after eating. The spirit world will aid you, by forming a secret conjunction with the *pneumogastric* conductor. It is certain, gentle sufferer; do not permit yourself to doubt. Nothing is too good in Nature, in matter, in spirit, or in truth."]

In pointing out another expedient, he foreshadows the conscious form of meditation.

### XXXV.

Or cognition resulting from sensuous objects may be the cause of steadiness.

"Of the mind" (*manasah* is understood to) complete the sentence. "Sensuous objects" (*vishaya*) are odour, taste, colour, touch and sound, and that in which these reside as objects is *vishayavati*, the cognition whereof causes the steadiness of the mind. Thus, by directing the thinking principle to the tip of the nose, the cognition of spiritual odour is effected. In the same way the cognition of taste may be effected at the tip of the tongue, the cognition of colour at the forepart of the palate, the cognition of touch at the

middle of the tongue, and the cognition of sound at the root of the tongue. Thus the cognition of spiritual sense-objects resulting through one or other of those organs becomes the cause of the concentration of the mind. This is to encourage Yogis in the belief that the Yoga has a fruit.

[By this commentary the meaning of the text remains perfectly unintelligible to the uninitiated. The reason is, the commentator takes for granted that the rudimentary principles of Yoga are known to his readers. The purport is that in the act of Práṇayáma (as explained in A. XXXIV) when the Yogí directs his mind to the tip of his nose &c., he derives in the places mentioned a sense of those objects which is ordinarily acquired by their natural organs, and having done so, he feels no inclination to exercise those natural organs, and his mind settles down into undisturbed contemplation of the object to which he directs his mind. The commentator uses the word *divya* for which I use "spiritual" as the equivalent. The *P. Rahasya* uses *alaukika* or "supernatural" as the equivalent. The word *pravritti* in the text has been taken by the *P. Bhasya* to be equal to *sañvit* or cognition. In the commentary above and elsewhere the word *manas* mind has been sometimes used for *chitta*, thinking principle].

He describes another expedient of the same kind.

### XXXVI.

Or a sorrowless extremely luminous (disposition being produced causes the steadiness of the thinking principle).

(The sense of the aphorism must be completed) by the terms, "disposition being produced causes the steadiness of the thinking principle."

The word "lumen" (*jyotiś*) means the manifestation (of the quality) of goodness. When it exists in its fulness, in any disposition it is called "extremely luminous" disposition (*jyotismati*). "Sorrowless" (*visoka*) is that disposition in which the power resulting from the exercise of the delightfully pure element (goodness)

has removed the grief which is produced by the quality of foulness. It steadies the thinking principle. The purport of this is this:— when the thinking principle is in the quality of goodness located in the cup of the lotus heart as on the waveless milky ocean, and the sensuous functions are all destroyed by the light of knowledge, the steadiness of the thinking principle results as a matter of course.

[Briefly, the purport is that when the thinking principle is totally griefless, and manifest in the extreme refulgence of the quality of goodness, it is steady, and has no cause for vacillation.]

In course of pointing out another expedient, he describes the object of the conscious form of meditation—or discriminate meditation.

### XXXVII.

Or the thinking principle taking a passionless object (becomes the cause of the mind's steadiness).

The phrase “becomes the cause of the mind's steadiness” is understood to complete the sentence.

“The Passionless” (*vitarágá*) are those who have abandoned all longings for sensuous objects, and their thinking principle, which has destroyed all pain, by being made the object of thought, becomes the cause of steadiness.

[The next expedient is the making the thinking principle of those who have overcome all passions the object of contemplation. Váchaspati Miśra explains this by saying “the passionless are Kṛishṇa Dvaipáyana and others. To make their thinking principle the object of thought is to rely thereon. *Vitarágáḥ Kṛishṇadvaipáyana prabhṛitayah. Teshám chittam tadevávalambanam, tenoparaktamiti.*”]

He describes another expedient of this kind.

### XXXVIII.

Or reliance on knowledge resulting from dream or sleep.

“ Dream” (*svapna*) is the perception by the thinking principle alone of the soul’s agency when the functions of the external organs are dormant. “ Sleep” (*nidrā*) has been already defined (A. X.). The knowledge which results from “ reliance” thereon, *i. e.*, reliance on dream or reliance on sleep, produces steadiness of the thinking principle.

[Although sleep has been defined to be absence of consciousness, the Yogis believe absence of consciousness to be a kind of knowledge. (See. A. X.) Váchaspati Miśra gives an illustration to show how the beatific vision of an image of Maheśvara may, on waking, tend to steady the thinking principle in the contemplation of any particular object. Perfectly sound sleep of which on waking we know only that we have slept well and nothing more, is also favorable to steadiness in the same way, perfect calmness of the mind being thereby produced.]

Different men having different tastes, Yogis may affect each a different expedient according to choice, and by meditating thereon attain his object (*scil.* steadiness of mind). To establish this he says—

### XXXIX.

Or by meditating according to one’s fancy.

By thinking on anything according to choice, whether external, as the moon, or internal, as a plexus of arteries, the thinking principle becomes steadied.

[The object of this aphorism is to show that by constantly reflecting on any object of choice, the habit is acquired of keeping the thinking principle confined to one object. The choice of course does not extend to carnal objects, for they would tend to excite, instead of allaying, the passions. The moon, or the sun, or other similar object has no such tendency, and certain plexuses within the chest and the abdomen which are believed to be the seats of the thinking principle, are held particularly beneficial in producing steadiness.]

Having thus described the different methods, he proceeds to point out what the fruit thereof is.

## XL.

His mastery extends from the minutest atom to the limit of infinite magnitude.

Having by these means acquired steadiness of the thinking principle, the Yogí, by thinking on minute objects, acquires unfailing "mastery" (*vaśikára*) over the minutest atoms, *i. e.*, his thinking principle is not baffled even by the reflection of the most minute objects, such as the minutest atoms. In the same way, the reflection of big objects, like the sky &c., to infinite magnitude, never causes any disturbance of the thinking principle, *i. e.*, it becomes independent everywhere. Such is the meaning.

[The purport is obvious. When steadiness is once fully acquired, the thinking principle acquires mastery over every thing, and nothing can baffle it. The result of this perfect nature is transcendental power over all material and spiritual objects: of this full illustrations will follow in Chapter III. The P. Bháshya adds that when the thinking principle of the Yogí is perfect in this respect, it does not any longer care for the appliances of exercise elsewhere enjoined. *Tadvásikárát paripúrṇam yoginaśchittam na punarabhyásakritam parikarmápekshate iti.*]

What becomes of the condition of the thinking principle purified by these methods, he now proceeds to describe.

## XLI.

To him of overpowered faculties, there are a concentration and a consubstantiation in (matters relating to) the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceptible, as in a transparent gem.

He, whose faculties have been overpowered, is "of overpowered faculties" (*kshinavritti*). With reference to him there is, in regard to the objects of his faculties, no distinction about the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceptible, and there result a "concentration" and a "consubstantiation." *Tatsthatva* is concentration in it, (*ekágratá*). "Consubstantiation" (*tadanya-*

*natva*) is becoming of it, for when the thinking principle is lowered, (or reduced in its carnal functions in the way described,) the object of meditation attains superiority. The meaning is, that such a condition (*samápatti*), or modification to that form, results.

Of this an example is given. In the case of "a transparent gem" or clear rock-crystal jewel, whatever colour it dwells upon, the same it obtains. In the same way in the transparent, clear thinking principle the form of the object thought of is imposed.

Although the text gives the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceptible, but, according to the order of precedence, the terms should be understood to stand as if written "perceptible, means of perception, and perceiver," for first the meditation is directed to the perceptible; then it is devoted to the perception; and then it is confined to the perceiver, which is mere egoism; for in the case of the soul alone there can be no thinking. Even so, the thinking principle tinged by a substantial or a subtile object of perception assumes its character. In this sense the condition is implied also to the perceived.

[The word *kshína* in the text means weakened, but this weakness is not general; according to the P. *Rahasya* it is confined to those subjects which are not thought of, the power remaining in full force in connexion with the special object of thought: *kshína-vritteḥ álambanavishayátirikta - vishayani rúpita - vrittisunyasya*. *Tatsthata* is literally being in a thing, *tat* 'there,' and *sthá* "to be reposed;" but the commentator gives the equivalent concentration, *ekágratá*. *Tadanjanatva* is literally being tinged thereby, and the stock illustration of the crystal being coloured red by the shoe-flower placed in it is adduced; but the commentator prefers the equivalent *tanmayatva* "being of that substance." He is, however, not singular in these interpretations. The P. *Bháshya* amplifies the explanation by adding that when the soul, as agent or perceiver, is made the object of thought, the thinking principle becomes manifest in the special form of that soul, and when the emancipated soul is thought upon the think-

ing principle becomes of its special form. *Grihitripurushálambanoparaktam grihitripurushasamápannam grihitripurusha-svarúpákáreṇa nirbhásate. Tathá muktapurushálambanoparaktam muktapurushasamápannam muktapurushasvarúpákáreṇa nirbhásate.*]

Having explained the conditions, he now points out its four-fold differences (in three aphorisms.)

### XLII.

The argumentative is that which is influenced by the fancy of word, meaning, and understanding.

That which is perceptible by the organ of hearing, or is an explosion or bursting of sound (*sphoṭa*), is (technically sound or) “word” (*śabda*). “Meaning” (*arthā*) is (the sense conveyed by the word indicating) a genus (such as the cow or the horse). “Understanding” (*jñána*) is a function of the intellect in which the quality of truth prevails (in preference to the other two qualities). “Fancy” (*vikalpa*) has been already defined (A. IX) “Affected” (*sánkírṇa*) influenced by them, *i. e.*, by the three, words &c. That modification, in which the three (words &c.) are apparent in an undefined fanciful shape, (*i. e.*, their relations are doubtful in the mind), as the word *gau* “a cow,” meaning a cow, and conveying the notion of a cow, is called “argumentative,” (*savitarka*.)

[The conditions adverted to in the preceding aphorism are four-fold, and thereof the first is called argumentative, inasmuch as in that condition the thinking principle fancies or doubtfully accepts a thing without positive discrimination of the relations between a word or its meaning and the idea conveyed by it. The P. Bháshya explains it by saying, “*Gau* is the word, a cow is its meaning, and the idea is that of a cow, and accepting these distinct positions in an undivided form.” *Gauriti śabdo Gaurityartho Gauriti jñánamityavibhágena vibhaktánámapi grahanam drishṭam.* The P. Rahasya puts it more clearly by saying “when on hearing the word there is a doubt as to whether the *gau* is a word, or it is

a meaning, or it is an understanding. *Gauriti s'abde s'rute sati gauriti s'abdo vá gaurityartho vá gauriti jñánam vá evamvikalpah.* (See p. 18.) This is an inferior condition.

The word *sphoṭa*, which I have rendered into "bursting," is the technical name of the sound which is eternal, and of which spoken words are but manifestations. The theory of some grammarians is that words are eternal, and they become manifest when spoken. Dr. Ballantyne, in his essay on Hindu Philosophy, has given a full account of this dogma.]

The opposite of it or the non-argumentative is next described.

### XLIII.

That is non-argumentative in which, on the dissolution of memory, the meaning alone without any definite identity is apparent.

When the memory of words and of their meaning has subsided, and the shape rises manifest and distinctly graspable, excluding the sense of understanding, and appearing as if devoid of a definite identity, it is "non-argumentative."

[The P. Bhāṣya explains the purport thus: when the intellect, intent upon the form of the object of acceptance, forsakes the accepting understanding which is like itself, and becomes solely of the form of the object, *i. e.*, it becomes of the form of the object accepted, it is non-argumentative. *Gráhyasvarúpoparaktá prajñá svamiva prajñárúpam grahanátmakam tyaktá padártha-mátravarúpá gráhyasvarúpápanneva bhavati sú nirvitarká samápatti.]*

To indicate varieties of it, he says :

### XLIV.

By this the deliberative and the non-deliberative as pertaining to subtile objects are also described.

"By this," *i. e.*, by the explanation about the argumentative and the non-argumentative conditions, the deliberative (*avichárdá*)

and the non-deliberative (*nirvichárá*) conditions have been described. How are the latter? "Subtile objects," (*sukshmavisaya*)— "subtile" rudimentary matter and the organs are so called. By this the former two propositions are made to refer to gross objects. They are dependant on gross matter, whether connected with the ideas of words, meaning, and understanding (as in the case of the argumentative form,) or without them (as in the non-argumentative form.) "The deliberative" (*savichárá*) is that which is an abstract notion defined by place, time, quality, &c. "The non-deliberative" (*nirvichárá*) is that in which the abstract notion is manifest as a mere substratum of quality, perfectly independent of all ideas of place, time, quality, &c. These refer to subtile objects.

[The object aimed at is to assign the argumentative and the non-argumentative conditions to gross matter, and the deliberative and the non-deliberative to subtile objects. The distinction seems to be purely technical, implying only slight differences.]

To explain how far this subtile object extends, he says :

#### XLV.

This subtile objectivity terminates in the indissoluble.

What has been described about the object of the deliberative and the non-deliberative conditions being subtile objectivity extends to the indissoluble. That which does not merge into anything, nor indicates or implies anything is the "Indissoluble" (*aliṅga*) or First Principle (nature, *Prakṛiti*), and subtile objectivity extends to that limit. Now in the resolution of qualities, there are four stages, *viz.*, 1, defined character, (*viśishṭa liṅga*) ; 2, undefined character (*aviśishṭaliṅga*) ; 3, mere character (*liṅgamátra*) ; 4, devoid of character, or indissoluble, (*aliṅga*). The objects of defined character are the (gross) elements. Those of undefined character are the subtile elements and the organs. Mere character is indicative of the Intellect ; and devoid of character, the First Principle. Hereby it is said that there is nothing more subtile than the First Principle.

[The word *liṅga* has been defined to be that which indicates or characterises, a mark or sign which is inseparable from it, and, I believe, the word character is its nearest equivalent. The First Principle or Prakṛiti is called *aliṅga* or that which is without an indicator, because by itself it does not specifically indicate anything, and is the subtlest of the categories, and there is nothing more subtle. "It may be urged," argues the P. Bhāṣya, "that the soul is more subtle than the first principle, but, though it is true that the characterless (*aliṅga* or Prakṛiti) is more subtle than the characterised, still the same cannot be the case with the soul, since the soul is not the material but the instrumental cause of character, and therefore the utmost limit of subtlety must rest with the First Principle." *Nanvasti purushah sukṣhma iti. Satyam yathā liṅgāt param aliṅgasya sauκshmyam, nachāvam-purushasya, kintu liṅgasya anvayī-kāraṇam purusho na bhavati hetustu bhavatiti, atah pradhāne sauκshmyam nivatisayam vyākhyātām.*]

He now points out the necessity for these mental conditions.

#### XLVI.

These verily constitute meditation with a seed.

"These verily," *i. e.*, the conditions above described, exist with a seed or object. "With a seed," (*savīja*) means conscious meditation, (or Samādhi having a distinct recognition,) because such meditations have always something to rest upon.

[These four conditions have been already described in the commentary on Aphorism XVII, and call for no further remarks here.]

Now, these (conscious conditions) mature into the non-deliberative condition, and therefore he describes the fruit thereof.

#### XLVII.

In the purity of the non-deliberative (condition) there is intellectual contentment.

“Non deliberativeness” has been already defined. (Aph. XLIV). “Purity” (*vaisáradya*) means freedom from dirt. The non-argumentative condition is superior to the argumentative. To that the deliberative which has a subtile object in view, (is superior). Again, the non-deliberative, which has no object in view, is superior to the preceding. When by rigorous practice “purity,” as the condition of freedom from dirt, is attained “intellectual contentment” results, *i. e.*, the thinking principle, being free from pain and longing, becomes fit to flow in an even course. This is the purity of the thinking principle, abidance in which is steadfastness (Aph. XXXII).

[The four conditions are graded in due order, and the last is declared to be the best of them, because in the highest purity of that condition there is perfect intellectual contentment, in which one can behold all knowledge like one seated in the palace of wisdom can look, as from the top of a mountain, upon groaning mortals below on earth, without being in any way disturbed. *Prajnáprásádamáruhya as'ochyah s'ochatojanán, Bhúmishthániva śailasthah sarván prájñonupasyati.*]

He next explains what happens when this condition is attained.

### XLVIII.

In that condition knowledge becomes truth-supporting.

That “knowledge” (*prajná*) which supports the “truth” (*rita*) or reality, and never permits it to be covered by misconception (A. VIII) is “truth-supporting” (*ritambhará*), and in the condition (aforesaid) this is acquired. With the light of that knowledge the Yogi perceives everything in its true character, and acquires the highest Yoga.

[In the next aphorism it will be shown that this perfect knowledge is the same with the transcendental power of knowing things, independently of the ordinary means of ascertaining truth.]

Its distinction from other forms of knowledge is now to be explained.

## XLIX.

The knowledge which results from testimony and inference is general, (and differs from this) which has a specific object (in view).

“Testimony” (*s'ruta*) is knowledge founded on sacred texts. “Inference” (*anumána*) has been already defined (Aph. VII). The knowledge which results from these two has generals for its object, since neither words nor characteristic signs are able, like the organs of sense, to convey a knowledge of particularities. While this knowledge (the one under notice), resulting from the purity (fulness) of the non-deliberative condition, is distinct from them, inasmuch as it has a speciality for its object. When one is in the condition of this knowledge, the truth of all subtle, intercepted, and remote objects becomes manifest in a clear form. The advice is, that for this reason it is proper that every exertion should be made by Yogíś for the attainment of this knowledge.

[The transcendental powers referred to above are here described to be the power of observing things which are so subtle, or so intercepted, or so remote that they cannot be observed by the ordinary appliances of perception.]

He now describes the fruit of this knowledge.

## L.

The residuum of this is opposed to all other residua.

“The residuum” (*sañskára* Aph. XVIII) which is produced by that knowledge, obstructs all other residua, whether arising during worldly condition or during meditation, *i. e.*, it renders them incapable of achieving their respective works. Since the residua produced by knowledge being absolute, are more powerful, they are able to preclude all residua resulting from non-absolute knowledge. The purport is that for this reason that absolute knowledge should be exercised.

[The purport of this and of the next aphorism has already been explained in the comments on aphorisms XVII and XVIII.]

Having thus described conscious meditation, he now explains the un-conscious form of meditation, (Aph. XVIII).

## LI.

On the removal of this also, everything being removed, there is meditation without a seed.

"Of this," *i. e.*, of conscious meditation. "Removal" (*nirodha*) is dissolution. On its dissolution all functions of thought melting into their causes, and the mere residua which arise in this state being also rejected by the conviction "this is not, this is not," meditation without a seed becomes manifest. On this being accomplished the soul (*purusha*) becomes pure, and abides solely in its own nature.

[The *P. Bhāṣya* explains the aphorism thus: "That meditation is not only antagonistic to the impressions of the Samādhi state, but also to the residua left by those impressions. But how do the residua of the suppressed (*nirodha*) state remove the residua of the meditative state? By the influence of the duration of the suppressed state the existence alone of the impressions produced by the suppressed thinking principle is perceptible. As the thinking principle then merges into its own natural form along with all the impressions of the waking, the meditative, the suppressed and the isolated states, their residua can no longer be antagonistic to the natural state of the thinking principle, nor the causes of its (separate) existence. And since the thinking principle, divested of its functions, along with the residua of the isolated state, is suppressed, and in that suppression the soul resides in its own form, it is called pure and liberated."]

Now in this (chapter) have been described Yoga, the subject of the work (A. I), its definition by the words the cessation of the thinking principle (A. II), exercise (XIII), dispassion (XV), the

nature of the two means and their varieties (XVI, the conscious and the un-conscious forms of Yoga, the inferior and superior Yoga (XVII—XVIII), the various means of exercising Yoga, easy means of accomplishing it (XIX—XXIII), definition of God (XXIV), his proof (XXVIII), greatness (XXVI), indicator (XXVII), mode of worship (XXV), and its results (XXIX), the perturbations of the thinking principle (XXX), and the pains thereon consequent (XXXI), the means of obviating them by study and benevolence (XXXII-XXXIII), regulation of breath (XXXIV), condition preceding the conscious and un-conscious meditations (XXXV), meditation with a seed, mental afflictions (XLI), their definitions (XLII-XLIV—XLV), their fruits (XLVI—XLVIII), their object (XLIX), and meditation without a seed (LI). Thus is the Yoga chapter explained.

[The above summary has not been translated literally. The original is interrupted by a number of participles and explanatory words which have been omitted as they would have served only to make an uncommonly long sentence very much involved.]

This is the end of the first quarter or Yoga chapter of the commentary entitled *Rájamártanda* on Patanjali's Institutes of the Yoga by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadева.

## CHAPTER SECOND.

May the three-eyed Lord of the universe, by whom has been disclosed the several means of obtaining the occult powers of the difficultly-achievable Yoga, be favourable to the attainment of the desired object !

Having in the first chapter explained the Yoga for those whose thoughts are collected, together with the means thereof, the author now, anticipating the question what should be the practice of the means for the achievement of the Yoga for those whose thoughts are in a waking (worldly) state, describes the *Kriyá-yoga* (practical Yoga), with a view to establish the mode of accomplishing it.

[This chapter is designed for persons who have not obtained control over their passions, but who are nevertheless desirous of practising those works which are calculated to train them for the performance of the highest branches of the Yoga, and to enable them to acquire supernatural powers (*riddhis*). Inasmuch as this training can be attained only through active exercise of certain duties, and those duties form the topics of this chapter, the chapter is called *Kriyá-yoga* or “Practical Yoga.”]

## I.

Asceticism, muttering, and resignation to God constitute the Practical Yoga.

“Asceticism” (*tapas*) is the observance of the fasts called *Kṛiḍchhra*, *Chāndrāyana* and the like enjoined in another *Sāstra* (*Dharma-sāstra*). “Muttering” (*sádhyáya*) is the inaudible repetition of particular mantras preceded by the *Praṇava*, (*i. e.*, the syllable Om). “Resignation to God” (*Iśvara-praṇidhána*) is the dedication to the Supremely Venerable all one’s works, without

any concern for their fruits. These, it is said, are the Practical Yoga.

[This aphorism defines what Practical Yoga is. It includes the three acts of Asceticism, Muttering, and Resignation to God. The first includes all those acts of fasting and the like which the Smṛiti ordains for the mortification of the flesh. In this sense *tapas* would be best rendered by religious austerity or self-denial, but the examples given are included under the head of penance. The Yogīs do not exclude any of them, nor, except in the form of seats &c., add any new form of penance. The *Kṛīchchhra* named in the commentary is by some believed to be the same with the *Prājāpatya*, and by others with the *Sāntapana*. The first is effected by eating once a day for three days in the morning, then once in the night for three days, then subsisting for three days on food given, unasked, as alms, and lastly fasting for three days. The fast is absolute, and not even a mouthful of water is allowed to be drunk. The second is effected by living for six days on the five products of the cow and water in which *kuśa* grass has been steeped, and absolutely fasting on the 7th day. The *Chāndrāyana* has several varieties, but all of them are regulated by the moon's age, the food being daily reduced by one mouthful from the first day, till on the newmoon no food is taken, and then on the next day beginning with one mouthful the full allowance is got on the day of the fullmoon. These penances are ordained for particular heinous sins. In citing their names it is not the object of the commentator to enjoin that these particular penances should be regularly practised, but simply to cite examples. The *Hathadīpikā* enjoins some forms of asceticism suited to the *Rāja-yoga*. The object is, there should be constant mortifying of the flesh so as to subdue its longings.

Muttering, like the last, is a part of the Smṛiti ritual, largely dwelt upon in the Tantras. Every householder has a particular mantra which he is required to repeat for a certain number of times every day, the number varying from twelve to many thousands according to choice. The muttering is so done as not to be audible to a bystander, but in a manner so that each repe-

tition may be clear and distinct, and fit to be counted by the mutterer. The *P. Bháshya* and the *P. Rahasya* add that *sádhyáya* implies either the muttering of a mantra, or the study of that sástra which relates to emancipation. *Pranavádi-pavitrá-nám japo mokshas'ástrádhyayanam vá.*

Resignation to God (*prañidhána*) has been already explained on p. 28.

These are essentially necessary as preliminary practices, but they do not constitute the Yoga itself.]

(To the question) of what use are these, he replies :

## II.

It is for the purpose of the contemplation of Samádhi and for weakening afflictions.

“Afflictions” (*kleśáh*) will be presently described (II, III.) To “weaken them” is to make them unfit for their respective works. “Samádhi” (meditation) has been already explained (I, xx.) Its “contemplation” (*bhávaná*) is repeated cogitation of it in thought. That Yoga which has these contemplation and weakening for its purpose (*artha*), object, is so called (*kriyá-yoga*). What is said is this : These mortifications, &c. when practised, weakening the afflictions of the ignorance residing in the thought, become accessories to Samádhi. Therefore the advice is that the Yogi should first turn his attention to this Practical Yoga.

[The purport of this aphorism has been already anticipated in the remarks on the last preceding Aphorism.]

It has been said (above that the Practical Yoga is wanted) for the purpose of weakening the afflictions, and what those afflictions are he now describes.

## III.

Ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life are the five afflictions.

“Afflictions” (*kleśāḥ*) are the five, ignorance, &c., which will be (presently) described. These, being of an obstructive character, *i. e.*, producing distress, become the object of the term affliction. These, abiding in the thinking principle, strengthen the modifications of the (three) qualities which constitute mundane existence.

[Here the names of the afflictions are given, but their definitions are reserved for subsequent discussions. The reason why they are called “afflictions,” is explained to be that they tend to promote those modifications of the thinking principle which the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness tend to for worldly purposes. In other words, those functions which attach the mind to the world are afflictions, because they stand in the way of emancipation.]

Although all these are equally afflicting, nevertheless ignorance, being the source (of all of them), is the chief, and to establish this he says :

#### IV.

Ignorance is the field of those which follow, whether they be dormant, weak, intercepted or simple.

“Ignorance” (*avidyā*) is delusion ; it is in fact the assumption of that being the soul which is not soul. It is the “field” (*kshetra*), or ground of production, of those which follow, *i. e.*, egoism and the rest, and each of them may be in one of the four conditions of dormancy, &c. Wherever the reverse-idea-producing ignorance becomes weak, there egoism and the other afflictions are not seen to arise, for it is seen that where the mistaken notion exists there they arise, it follows, therefore, that ignorance is their source.

The “dormant, weak, intercepted or simple.” Of these afflictions those which, existing in the thinking principle, do not, owing to the absence of an exciting cause, produce their

effect, are called "dormant" (*prasupta*), asleep. Thus in childhood. Though residing in a child in the form of instincts those afflictions do not, from want of co-operation of an exciting cause, flare up.

Those afflictions are said to be "weak" (*ianu*) which, becoming overpowered in their effort to perform their respective functions by their mutually contradictory inclinations, reside in the thinking principle in the form of instincts, but are not able to carry on their work without the aid of numerous auxiliaries. This is the case in the practising Yogí (who being engaged in one particular contemplation does not allow the afflictions to disturb his thoughts. They are in him, but in a condition of weakness produced by their non-indulgence).

Those afflictions are said to be "intercepted" (*vichchhinna*) which remain with their powers overcome by a particularly potent passion, as desire when the prevailing passion is aversion, or aversion when the prevailing passion is desire: being mutually opposed to each other, they cannot dominate at the same time, (one must for the time intercept the other).

Afflictions are said to be "simple" (*udára*) when, having their auxiliaries beside them, they carry on their respective functions. This is the case of the waking condition of those who follow not the ways of the Yoga.

Each of these four (afflictions) has ignorance for its root, and is also attended by it, for nowhere are the afflictions found existing by themselves as opposed to, or independent of, the attendant. When that ignorance, a mere falsehood, is removed by thorough knowledge, these afflictions, like roasted seeds, never sprout again. It follows that these are both rooted in, and attended by, ignorance; hence they are all implied by ignorance. The conclusion is that as all these afflictions are calculated to produce distractions of the thinking principle, it is the foremost duty of the Yogí to exert for their removal.

[In A. III the afflictions have been described to be five in number. In this the author shows that four of them owe their

origin, and are subject, to ignorance. He also shows that they are always present, though not always active. The causes of their want of activity are described to be dormancy, weakness and interception ]

He now defines ignorance.

## V.

Ignorance is the assumption of that which is non-  
eternal, impure, painful and non-soul, to be eternal,  
pure, joyous and soul.

The assumption of a thing being what it is not, is "ignorance" (*avidyā*). That this is its general definition follows from its distinctions as pointed out (in the aphorism). Thus the assumption of eternity in the non-eternal water jar and the like is ignorance. In the same way, the assumption of purity in impure objects, like the body and so forth, that of joy in pain, and that of the soul in the body (which is not soul, are results of ignorance). By these is explained the mistake of confounding vice with virtue and the useless with the useful.

[The *P. Bhāṣya* argues that although the word *avidyā* is formed of the privative particle *a* with *vidyā* "knowledge," it does not mean simple absence of knowledge, but a conception distinct and the opposite of it, and illustrates it by the examples of *amitra* and *agoshpada*, the former of which, though formed of *a* (absence) and *mitra* "a friend," does not mean the absence of a friend, but an enemy, and the latter, formed of *a* and *goshpada* "the footprint of a cow," does not mean the absence of the footprint of a cow, but a country. *Tasyāchāmitrāgoshpada-vadavastu sa tattvam vijneyam, yathā námītro mitrābhávo na mitramátram, kintu tadvirudhah sapatnah, yathā vágoshpadam na goshpadábhávo na goshpadamátram, kintu des'a eva, tábhyámanyat vastvantaram, evamavidyá na pramáṇam na pramáṇábhávah, kintu vidyáviparítam jñánántaramavidyeti.*]

With a view to explain egoism, he says :

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VI.

Egoism is the identifying of the power that sees with the power of seeing.

“The power that sees” (*drik-śakti*), is the soul (*Purusha*). “The power of seeing” (*darsana-śakti*) is the internal organ produced by the quality of goodness unaffected by the qualities of foulness and darkness. What is said is, that the assumption of the two extremely different things,—the one being the enjoyer and the other the enjoyed—the active and the inert,—being the same is egoism (*asmitā*). Thus, when nature (*prakṛiti*), though really devoid of the power of enjoying and of intelligence, fancies “I am the enjoyer,” “I am the intelligent,” the blunder is the affliction called egoism.

[The internal organ is a modification of the quality of goodness, which marks the distinction between itself and the things around it. In this state it is egotism; but when that internal organ ceases to perform this function, and only a sense of mere existence is felt in the thinking principle without any distinction of the self and the things around it is egoism. This definition was anticipated by the commentator in his remarks on A. xvii chapter I, (p. 19) and the author gives it here.]

He defines desire.

VII.

Desire is dwelling on pleasure.

“Dwelling on pleasure” (*sukhānuśayī*) is lying on pleasure. The longing or thirst for pleasure on the part of him who had experienced it before, and is impelled by its remembrance, is the affliction called desire (*rāga*).

[The root *śi* is “to sleep” or “lie down,” and literally the translation of *anuśayī* should be the sleeper, or that which lies on something, but idiomatically I prefer dwelling, as it conveys more clearly the idea intended by the author. Obviously he means the

dwelling on, or keeping alive in the mind, the idea of some object or other. *Anusaya* means "to follow" or "to pursue," and that would afford a very appropriate rendering of the term here, but in the next aphorism it has been used with reference to pain, and as no one pursues pain knowing it to be pain, that rendering cannot be adopted. It is true the word also means "repentance," and it may be assumed that the author has used the word in two different senses in the two aphorisms, but such an assumption would be unjustifiable in dealing with definitions. The author, in his aphorisms, has nowhere evinced any leaning for rhetoric or verbal ornament, and it is very unlikely that he should use the same word in two consecutive aphorisms in two contradictory senses, when his object is to make things clear, and not to confound.]

He next defines aversion.

### VIII.

**Aversion is dwelling on pain.**

"Pain" (*dukkha*) has been already defined, (C. I, xxxi). That which one, having experienced it, and remembering it, is averse to its means as undesirable, is the affliction called "aversion" (*dvesha*).

[Three of my MSS. has *pratikula-lakshnam* for *ukta-lakshnam*. If that reading be adopted, the meaning would be "Pain is of an opposite nature," *i. e.*, in the case of pleasure there is a longing or thirst to get the object, while in that of pain, the feeling is the reverse, or avoiding to get it.]

He now defines tenacity of life.

### IX.

**Tenacity of life is an attachment to the body which relates to the residua of one's former life, even on the part of the wise.**

The fear arising from the memory of pain from death endured in a former life prompts the constant wish, "May I not be separated from the body and its objects," and the attachment to the body resulting therefrom, an attachment which exists without an inducing cause, in all beings from Brahmá to an earthworm, is the affliction called "Tenacity of life." (*Abhini-vesha*.) Thus, it is afflicting in the waking or mundane state. These afflictions should at the outset be destroyed by the Yogi by the exercise of concentration of the mind to one point.

[The only doubtful word in the aphorism is the first. It is formed of the three words, *sva* "one's own," *rasa* literally "wish," and *váhí*, "that which carries:"—"that which carries or keeps in current one's wish." The commentators have, however, not rendered it so. Without giving a synonym of *rasa*, the *P. Bhíshya* uses the word *vásaná* in its place (*marana-dukkhánubhavádiyam vásaneti*), and that word is the equivalent of *sañskára*, which I have rendered into residua. In this way the term *svarasaváhí* means 'that which carries the residua of one's former life.' It proceeds from the memory of former experience, and since no one has in this life experienced the pain of death, it must follow that the fear of death must be the result of the unconscious memory of the experience of a former state of life—and this fear is the cause of attachment to life.]

Since it is not practicable to remove these afflictions without first knowing what they are, the author, having described their names (II, III) fields, (I, IV) divisions, (II, IV) and characteristics, (II, V to IX,) now explains the division of the means of destroying them, according as they are gross or subtle.

## X.

These, the subtle ones, should be avoided by an adverse course.

Those are "subtile" (*súkshma*) afflictions which exist in the form of residua, but have not assumed a modification in the

form of active work. They are to be avoided (*heya*), eluded, by an adverse course (*pratiprasava*) or reflex modification. When the thinking principle, with its residua, has accomplished its course and entered into egoism, which is its source, how can these, (afflictions,) being rootless, exist?

[The five afflictions aforesaid are described under two heads, subtile and gross. They are subtile when they exist in the form of residua, *i. e.*, they exist potentially, but are latent. They become gross when they break out into active operation. Now, the latent ones are to be overcome by an adverse course. The natural course is to allow them to manifest themselves through the stimuli of external objects; but if the thinking principle be directed inwards towards egoism, the course of action is adverse to the natural tendency of the residua; and, in the absence of stimuli, they cannot manifest themselves. They cannot sprout, and are, therefore, compared in the *P. Bháshya* to roasted seeds.]

He next describes the means for the destruction of the gross (afflictions).

## XI.

Their functions should be avoided by meditation.

The functions of these afflictions in active operation, which manifest themselves in the form of pleasure, pain, and delusion, should be "avoided," destroyed, by meditation characterised by the concentration of the thinking principle on a single point. These, being gross, are suppressed by the mere exercise for the purification of the thinking principle, even as dense thick dirt on cloth and the like is removed by mere washing, while that which is subtile in it requires heating and other (arduous) means.

[The means of suppressing the gross afflictions, or those afflictions which are in active operation, is meditation, or confining the thinking principle to one action, and focussing it there to the exclusion of all other objects. The difference lies in this—that in the case of latent afflictions the thinking principle

is directed inward, and no opportunity is given to the latent ones to become active ; and in the case of gross ones or those which are in active action, the thinking principle is confined to one object, and thereby all others are excluded. In the one case a desire is repressed by turning away from it, and keeping the thinking principle occupied with another, and in the other no opportunity is given for external stimuli to excite the latent wishes.

The illustration given shows that the subtle ones are more difficult to repress than the gross ones.]

Having thus defined the true character of the afflictions he, with a view to explain the residua of works, says :

## XII.

The residua of works have affliction for their root, and are felt (either) in this manifest birth, (or) in the unmanifest one.

By the term "residua of works" (*karmás'aya*) the nature of the residua is explained, for all works are of the form of residua. By (the phrase) "Have affliction for their root" (*kles'amúlah*) their cause is indicated, for of good or evil works the afflictions are the cause. By (the phrase) "felt in this manifest birth, or in the unmanifest one," the fruition is described. What is felt in the present existence is called "felt in this manifest birth" (*drishṭajanma-vedaniyah*) ; that which is to be felt in another existence is called "felt in an unmanifest one," (*adrishtajanma-vedaniyah*). Thus, some virtuous actions, such as the worship of the gods and the like performed with excessive ardour, produce fruits even in this life in the form of kind, age, or experience. Thus, to Nandí'svara, through the influence of his worshipping the lord Maheśvara, change of kind was secured even in this life. Similarly to Viśvámitra and others kind and age accrued through the force of penance. In the case of some kind alone is changed. Thus in the case of Nahusa and others performing vicious acts with excessive ardour kind alone was changed. So Urvásí was

metamorphosed into a creeper in the garden of Kártikeya. Thus is the rule to be explained distributively or collectively.

[The leading word in this aphorism is *karmásaya*. Formed of *karma* “works” and *ásaya* “virtue and vice,” it implies the results which follow from the performances of works. The word *ásaya* has been accepted in aphorism 24, chapter I, to be the equivalent of *vásaná* and *sañskára*, and for the sake of concordance, and in accordance with the commentators, I render it here in that sense, inasmuch as the results do not manifest immediately, but remain latent to even a second or subsequent life in the form of residua.

The works are described to have afflictions for their root, because all works proceed from ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity for life, technically called the five afflictions, (II, III). No work can be performed unless impelled by one or other of these five, and so they are the roots of the residua that are left behind. The fruits of these residua are borne either collectively or singly, and at different times, either in this life or in a subsequent one, and the commentator cites instances to prove this. The story of Nandísvara becoming a demigod occurs in the Vrihannandikeśvara Puráṇa. The Rámáyána and some of the Puráṇas give the story of Vis'vámitra, a Kshatriya by birth, becoming a Bráhmaṇa. The Mahábhárata relates the story of Nahusa being changed into a snake by a curse. The story of Urvásí's becoming, like another Daphne, a creeper, occurs in the drama of Vikramorvaśi.]

Now he describes the varieties and distinctions of the residua of works with their fruits.

### XIII.

The root existing, the deserts are kind, age, and experience.

The “root” (*múlā*) is the afflictions aforesaid. As long as the afflictions are not removed, the deserts (*vipáka*), fruition of works,

good and evil, follow in the form of kind, age, and experience. "Kind" (*játi*) means being a man or some other being. "Age" (*áyus*) is always remaining in the same body. "Experience" (*bhoga*) means sense objects, the senses, and consciousness of pleasure and pain, according as it is accepted in the passive, instrumental, or abstract sense.

The purport of this is this: That as the residua of works reposed in the thinking principle from time without a beginning, attain maturity, so they, according to their measure, lead to fruition in the form of kind, age, and experience. The afflictions existing with their roots uncut, the residua of works become the originators of deserts. Even as unhusked S'áli paddy, like unroasted seeds, are able to germinate, but husked grains, like roasted seeds, cannot, so the residua of works, unparted from the afflictions, become the germinators of deserts; though such is not the case when the afflictions are removed, or the residua are reduced to the condition of roasted seeds.

[The first difficult word in the aphorism is *játi*. Its meaning is obvious enough, but I call it difficult because I can find no satisfactory equivalent for it in the English language. It is formed of the root *jan* 'to be born,' and means that which is born; but in philosophy it is used to imply species in a very comprehensive sense. It means caste, *i. e.*, distinction of family; or species, that is one distinct from another, as several species in a genus or order; or broader distinctions than what is implied by species; as also the broadest distinctions which naturalists indicate by the term kingdom. The examples given show that the word *játi* equally applies to the change of caste, as in a Kshatriya becoming a Bráhman; or to that of species, as in a man becoming a demigod; or to that of a kingdom as in a woman becoming a creeper: I know of no such comprehensive term in the English language. Dr. Ballantyne uses *rank*, but I doubt if the change of a woman into a creeper or a stone, the change could be idiomatically described as one of "rank." Colebrooke uses

“birth,” but the change may take place without a regular birth. For the sake of English idiom the best course would be to use different equivalents under different circumstances, but that would upset the line of argument of the author. Genesis appears to bear close approximation to *jāti*, and kind is its Anglo-Saxon counterpart. In using “kind” as the equivalent, I use what appears less liable to objection than others, but it is by no means a good one.

The second word *āyus* has been so explained by the commentator as to imply longevity, but the word means simply “age” or “duration of life,” which may be long or short according to circumstances:—a meritorious work leading to prolongation of existence in a particular body, whereas a vicious one tending to shorten the span of life.

The third word is *bhoga*, which Dr. Ballantyne renders into “enjoyment;” but inasmuch as here it means the endurance of pain as well as the delectation of pleasure, I prefer “experience,” which covers both.

The purport of the aphorism is that the fruition of works leads according to circumstances to change of body into a higher or lower grade, to the prolongation or reduction in the span of life, and to the experience of pleasure or pain.

The *P. Bhāṣya* thus explains the time of fruition: “The deserts are of three sorts, kind, age and experience. In regard to them the questions are discussed, 1st, Is one work the cause of one birth, or is it the cause of many births? 2nd, Are many works the causes of many births or of one birth?

One work is not the cause of one birth. Why so? Because there would be no regularity in the fruition of the remainder of innumerable works accumulated from time without a beginning along with a recent work. The objection would also be there would be no inducement for people (to perform many works). Therefore it is wrong.

Nor is one work the cause of many births. Why? Because if out of many works each work was to be the cause of many births,

there would be want of time for the fruition of all the remaining deserts. Therefore it, too, is wrong. Nor can many works be the cause of many births. Why? Because it is not possible for many births to happen simultaneously, and consequently it must be said to happen successively, and then the objection before urged (about want of time) would apply. It follows then that the diverse stock of residua of virtuous and vicious actions performed from birth to death remains in a dominant or a dominated form, and on a death taking place it becomes the cause of a birth, being itself liable to destruction on another stock becoming dominant."]

The above described kind, &c. being the fruits of works, the author, in order to show that they produce fruition according to the works which are their cause, says:

#### XIV.

They have joy or suffering for their fruit, according as their cause is virtue or vice.

"Joy" (*hláda*) is pleasure, and "suffering" (*paritápa*) is pain. Those which have joy and suffering for their fruits are so called, (*i. e.*, by the term *hláda-paritápa-pkalák*).

"Virtue" (*punya*) is fortunate action, and the reverse of it is "vice" (*apunya*). Those which have virtue or vice for their cause are so called (by the compound term *pnyápunya-ketulva*).

What is said is this:—those works which proceed from virtuous actions yield joyful fruition in kind, age, and experience. Those which result from vice have painful fruitions.

[The meaning is obvious, and calls for no remark.]

To all ordinary beings the fruition is thus of two kinds; but to the Yogi all are painful; to show this, he says:

#### XV.

To the discriminating all are verily painful, because of the adversity of the actions of (the three)

qualities, and of the pains of sequence, anxiety and residua.

The meaning is, that to the “discriminating” (*viveki*) who has had experience of the afflictions, &c., all manifest sense-objects are painful, like tasteful food infused with poison, and therefore should be known as adverse to him, since the thoroughly experienced Yogi feels oppressed by even the slightest pain. Even as the eyeball feels the acutest pain from the mere touch of a fibre of wool which the other organs do not, so the discriminating Yogi is distressed by even very slight pain.

To explain why it should be so, he says, “because of the pains of sequence, anxiety and residua.” Inasmuch as the longing for objects of enjoyment increases in the same ratio in which they are enjoyed, and the pain proceeding from their non-attainment is unavoidable, therefore pain always follows pleasure, and there is nothing but pain. This is the pain of sequence (*parináma-duhkhatva*).

Again, since even in the enjoyment of pleasing objects there is always a feeling of aversion against that which is antagonistic to them, anxiety cannot be eluded even while in the enjoyment of pleasures. This is the “pain of anxiety,” (*tápaduhkhatá*).

“Pain of residua” (*sanskáraduhkha*). The sensation of pleasure, or of pain, arises in the presence of a desirable or an undesirable object, and a corresponding residuum is left on the field (of the thinking principle), and since from such a residuum a corresponding sensation is produced, and since from a great number of such residua the mundane condition is never cut short, therefore all residua are painful.

“From adversity of the action of the qualities” (*gunavritti-virodhát*). The effects of the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness, manifesting in the forms of pleasure, pain, and delusion, being mutually overpowering or overpowered, are hostile to each other. They are everywhere connected with pain, hence they are painful.

What is said is this:—To the discriminating who is anxious to obviate pain to the utmost and absolutely, all the four causes above described, appear in the form of pain, and hence all deserts are said to be of the form of pain.

[The object of this aphorism is to establish that everything connected with worldly life is painful, and Yogis should, therefore, shun them all. To prove this, it is first shown that all joyous actions are followed by pain. (The word *parináma* in the text here is used for sequence or result, and not modification as in most other places.) There must be a change after the enjoyment of pleasure, and as there is an increase of desire from enjoyment there must be frequent disappointments, and they inflict pain. Even in the act of enjoyment there is always a dread of something that may disturb it, and so it is not unalloyed. Then all actions and all impressions leave behind residua in the field of the thinking principle, and they revive sensations of pleasure and pain. And lastly, the three qualities are adverse to each other, and therefore they create disturbances and cause pain. The conclusion is a state of pessimism, from which the only relief is to be had by totally cutting oneself off from all worldly affairs. This pessimism forms the basis of all the leading systems of Indian philosophy, and is not unknown in Europe. According to Hartmann, “if we balance our pleasures and pains, the latter greatly exceed the former.” Schopenhauer goes further, and assigns a negative nature to pleasure, which is very much the same as the doctrine of Leibnitz who assigns a privative character to pain. He holds that “all pleasure causes an exhaustion of the nervous processes, and are in themselves indirect, resulting from the cessation or intermission of pain, and seldom emerges into consciousness, whereas pain *eo ipso* generates consciousness.” He asks, “what, for instance, are all the pleasures of health, of youth, of freedom, of sufficient means? Are they anything but the absence of sickness, of old age, of slavery, of poverty? and is not work itself an evil? How great misery does it entail upon the toiling masses of

our fellow countrymen? Does any one work of his own free will?" He adds, "no amount of pleasure can compensate for any degree of pain." Again, "human life oscillates between pain and ennui, which states are indeed the ultimate elements of life." Hartmann holds pleasure and pain to be "qualitatively similar, and only different in quantity." (*Philosophie des Unbewussten*). Socrates aptly describes pleasure and pain to be "fastened together from one crown." (*Plato, Phædo.*) Poets generally revel in the pleasures of this world, but Byron, one of the greatest among them, says—

"Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen,  
Count o'er thy days from anguish free ;  
And know, whatever thou hast been,  
'Tis something better—not to be."

The question then arises whence is the deliverance to come? and an able writer thus summarises the answer of the pessimists. "In knowing that the world is radically and necessarily bad. Such knowledge leaves no ground for that old affirmation of the Will to live. It leads to a negation of Will, to a renunciation of desire, which, completed by means of asceticism and mortification, must attain that perfect freedom of the Will, that true nirvâna, in which there is no more Will, and therefore no longer an ideal presentation or a real world." (*Westminster Review, XLIX, 128.*) This is almost the very language of Kapila].

Since pain, residua, works, and the fund of deserts, as aforesaid, are produced by Ignorance, and since Ignorance is of the form of false knowledge, and should be destroyed by perfect knowledge, and since perfect knowledge is that which decides what should be rejected and the cause thereof, and what should be approved and its cause, he says this by way of explanation :

## XVI.

**Avoidable is the pain not yet come.**

Inasmuch as the past is gone (and cannot be recalled), and that which is being experienced cannot be avoided, that worldly pain which has not yet come (but may come) is what should be avoided. This is what is said here.

[The word *heyā* is derived from the root *hā* 'to quit,' and means both that which should be shunned and that which can be avoided. The English equivalent has not this double sense, but it affords the nearest approach to the Sanskrit term. The injunction is, since the past and the present are beyond control, exertion should be made to preclude the possibility of future pain. Dr. Ballantyne is quite right in rendering the aphorism into "what is to be shunned is pain not yet come," but when *heyā* is used as an adjective, this phrase "that which is to be shunned," is too lumbering to be used with convenience. Avoidance-worthy conveys the exact meaning, and is more easy of manipulation, but it too is lumbering. A single term is wanted, and, not knowing any English word of the kind, I use what appears to me to approach the nearest to the original, without being its exact equivalent.]

He now describes the cause of the avoidable.

## XVII.

The conjunction of the spectator and the spectacle  
is the cause of the avoidable.

The "spectator" (*drishṭā*) is the soul of the form of intelligence. The "spectacle" (*drīśya*) is the principle of understanding (intellect). The conjunction," *sañyoga*, *i. e.*, coming into the relation of the enjoyer and that which is to be enjoyed, of these two, without due discrimination, is the "cause," (*hetu*) producing agent, of the "avoidable," (*heyā*) which is pain resulting from the modifications of the qualities, and that is the world. The meaning is that on the cessation of that conjunction worldliness subsides.

[In this aphorism "the avoidable" is used to imply the affairs of the world. Those affairs result from the conjunction or

interaction of the soul and the intellect, and inasmuch as worldliness is invariably associated with pain, and that pain cannot be suppressed as long as that worldliness lasts, and for the sake of emancipation worldliness should be avoided, that which is to be avoided is here called the avoidable, or the avoidance-worthy. The word *sañyoga* means conjunction, but here a mere reflection of the soul is what is meant. The reflection results from propinquity. There is never an actual contact.]

Having described the conjunction of the spectator and the spectacle, he now explains the nature, the function, and the motive of the spectacle.

### XVIII.

The spectacle is of the nature of illumination, action, and rule; it is of the form of the elements and the organs; it is the purpose of for experience and emancipation.

“Illumination” (*prakásá*) is the nature of the quality of goodness. “Action” (*kriyá*) in the form of exertion, is that of foulness. “Rule” (*sthiti*), in the form of regulation, is that of darkness. That which has illumination, action and the rest for its essential nature is so called, (*i. e.*, by the term *prakásá-kárya-sthiti-śilam*). By this the nature of the spectacle is defined.

“It is of the form of the elements and the organs” (*bhūten-driyátmakam*). The “elements” (*bhūtas*) are, according as they are gross or subtile, the earth, &c. and the rudiments of odour, &c. The “organs” (*indriya*) are threefold, according as they are the organs of sense, the organs of action, and the internal organ. That of which these two (the elements and the organs), in the forms of the preceptor and the precept, are the natural modifications, not different from its own form, is called “of the form of the elements and the organs.” By this its action is also described.

“Experience” (*bhoga*) has been already defined, (II, xiii). “Emancipation” (*apavarga*) is the cessation of worldliness result-

ing from discriminative knowledge. That which has these two, (*bhoga* and *apavarga*) for its "object" (*artha*) or requirement, is the spectacle. This is the meaning.

[There would be no spectacle if there was not in it a power of manifestation, *i. e.*, of illumination, or light. Without some action, too, it could not be manifest ; and to be manifest it must have some rule or order. Hence the three are described to be the three essentials of its existence, or in other words its nature. The esoteric interpretation of this is that the spectacle is essentially the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness, which must be in action to produce spectacle. It is of the form of the elements and the organs. The organs could not alone produce spectacles, nor would the elements produce spectacles if there were no organs to perceive them and communicate them to the intellect. The independent existence of the two, unconnected with each other, would also fail to produce a spectacle. They must be brought together to do so, and therefore it is that the spectacle is described to be of the nature of illumination, and of the form of the elements and the organs. The purport of this round-about expression is that the intellect is the spectacle when it is acted upon by the elements and the organs, or the elements and the organs are modified in the form of the intellect. The word used in the text is *ātmā*, and it is explained to be a modification not different from its natural form or identity (*svarupābhinnah pariṇāmah*). What this natural form is is not apparent. Obviously the natural form of the intellect, or Buddhi, would be the meaning, but from what follows, Prakriti would seem to be what is meant. I shall notice this lower down, (A. xix, xxi).

The motive or object of the spectacle is twofold,—it ministers to our enjoyment, and it may be made to help us in our endeavours to attain emancipation from the bondage of the earth.

The word *sthiti* means fixity or abidance, but the *Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudi* explains it to mean rule, regulation, or order. Had there been no order or rule, illumination and action would be continuous, and there would be no cessation or break. It is the

intervention of darkness that causes the break or order of the manifestation of light and action ; this is implied by *sthiti*. It implies the quality of darkness.]

To describe the phases of this spectacle in its various conditions, in the forms of modifications which should be known as fit to be avoided, he says :

### XIX.

The specific, the unspecific, the solely mergent, and the immergeant are the divisions of the qualities.

“The divisions of the qualities,” *i. e.*, their specific conditions, should be known to be four—this is enjoined. Thereof the “specific” (*viśeṣha*) are the gross elements and the organs. The “unspecific” (*avīśeṣha*) are the subtle elements and the internal organ. The “solely mergent” (*līlāgamātra*) is intellect. The “immergeant” (*aliṅga*) is the unmanifest or undiscrete, *i. e.*, Prakṛiti. This is what is said. Since the relation everywhere of this undiscrete of the form of the three qualities is necessary to be known at the time of commencing knowledge, the four divisions are defined.

[The object of this aphorism is to explain that the spectacle assumes different forms under different circumstances. It is “specific” or well-defined when it refers to the elements and the organs. It is “unspecific” or undefined when related to the subtle elements and the internal organ or the mind. It is “solely mergent” or mere thought when it refers to the intellect or the thinking principle. And it is “immergeant” or unmanifest or undiscrete when referring to Prakṛiti. Here Prakṛiti is included as one of the forms or phases of the spectacle, though in the commentary on the seventeenth aphorism the spectacle has been defined to be the intellect or the principle of understanding (*buddhitattva*). This inconsistency is explained away by saying that the intellect is but a modification of Prakṛiti, and, inasmuch as its primary form is Prakṛiti, the spectacle must include

Prakṛiti. The words used in explaining the term *ālma* in the commentary on the last aphorism—"a modification not different from its primary form," (*svarúpábhinnah pariṇámaḥ*)—supports this inference. This is, apparently, different from the doctrine of Kapila who assigns 23 out of the 25 catégories to the spectacle, leaving out the soul and Prakṛiti; but in reality there is no difference, except in the phraseology, as will be shown in the twenty-first aphorism.

The four terms have been differently rendered by different translators. The terms used above have been taken from Colebrooke and Wilson's 'Sāṅkhya Kārikā.' Mr. Davies, in his 'Hindu Philosophy,' adopts the first two, but for "mergent" uses "attributive," and for "imergent" its negative. Dr. Ballantyne uses "diverse," "non-diverse," "merely resolvable" and "irresolvable." In translating aphorism 45 of Book I, I have rendered these words collectively with the subject, *liṅga*, into "defined character," "undefined character," "mere character" and "devoid of character."]

Since the detestableness of spectacle must be first known, and it having been described along with its conditions, to show what should be accepted, the spectator, the author now says :

## XX.

The spectator is absolute sentience, and, though pure, still directly beholds intellected ideas.

"The spectator" (*drashṭā*) is soul. He is "absolute sentience" (*drisimátra*), sensation only. The object of using the term "absolute" (*mátra*) is to preclude the idea of the quality and the qualified, (*i. e.* he is himself sensation and not possessed of sensation). Some explain sensation to be an attribute of soul.

He, the spectator, 'though pure,' (*suddhopi*), *i. e.* although existing by himself in his own essence, being above all liability to modification and the like, "directly beholds intellected ideas." "Intellected ideas" (*pratyayas*) are knowledge tintured by

worldly objects. "Directly" (*anu*), without any intervention, or without any medium, he beholds (*paśyati*).

What is said is this. Soul attains his spectatorship by his proximity to intellect, which alone is tinctured or influenced by passing objects.

[The soul is sentience only, *i. e.*, it consists of sentience and nothing more. In this condition it is absolutely pure, being unalloyed by any other object. It, nevertheless, directly beholds intellected ideas, or is the percipient, of all ideas without any intervention. This is effected by its proximity to the intellect, which receives the impressions of the outer world. The act of modification or change which perception implies is effected in the intellect, and does not extend to the soul. This distinction is necessary for the purpose of maintaining the immutability and perfect purity of the soul, for the admission of change would destroy its immutability and absolute purity.]

To show that soul alone is the experiencer, he says :

## XXI.

Only for his purpose is the soul of the spectacle.

"Spectacle" (*driśya*) has been defined above (II, xviii). 'Its soul' (*ātmā*) is its true nature. It, "the soul of the spectacle," is required for "his purpose," for the purpose of consummating the experiencership of soul to the exclusion of all selfish ends. Pradhāna in activity does not work with a view to attain any aim of its own, but to accomplish the experiencership of soul.

[The meaning is that the true nature of the spectacle acts solely to accomplish the purpose of soul, and not for any purpose of its own, for it has none such. It will be noticed that the text says it is the soul of the spectacle, and not the spectacle itself, that subserves the purpose of soul, and the question arises what is its soul? The word used in the text is *ātmā*, which means soul, *i. e.*, the soul of the spectacle subserves the purpose of the soul of a living being. The commentator explains *ātmā* by *svarūpa* "its own natural form,"

or true nature. In the commentary on A, xix, he uses the words *avarúpábhinnak* *parinámah*, or “a modification not different from its primary form,” neither of which carries us directly to what is meant. It is obvious, however, from the use of the word Pradhána—Prakṛiti in the commentary on the aphorism under notice, which in activity, is said, “not to work with a view to attain any aim of its own,” that the “soul of the spectacle” is but another form of expression for Prakṛiti. That Prakṛiti in activity is the spectacle is abundantly evident in the leading works of the Sāṅkhya system. Thus, in the Sāṅkhya-káriká : “For the sake of soul’s wish, that subtle person exhibits (before it) like a dramatic actor, through relation of means and consequence, with the aid of nature’s influence.” (Verse xlII). Again, “as a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul.” (Verse lIx). Again : “Generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of the ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities.” (Verse lx). Again “he desists because he has seen her; she does so, because she has been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation.” (Verse lxvi). Similarly the Sāṅkhya Sútra : “Nature’s creating is for the sake of another, though it be spontaneous,—for she is not the experiencer,—just like a cart carrying saffron (for the sake of its master).” (Ballantyne, III, lvIII). Again, “just like a dancer, does she, though she had been energising, desist, because of the end having been attained (in the shape of soul’s aim).” (Ibid. III, lIx). Nor is there any inconsistency in this, for intellect does not differ from Prakṛiti except in being in activity; and “soul,” “true nature,” “original shape of the intellect,” and other similar expressions must imply Prakṛiti or nature, and nothing else. This will explain the remarks made in the note on Aphorisms xvII and xix.

Commenting on the passages quoted from the Sāṅkhya-káriká, Mr. Davies observes, “Beautiful as poetry, but not very

philosophic, nor in direct harmony with other parts of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. Kapila, or Iśvara Krishṇa, forgets that nature (*Prakṛiti*) has no personality, no powers, no volition, and no consciousness," (p. 95.) This is not fair towards Iśvara Krishṇa, who provides for such criticism by saying, "as the production of milk, which is unintelligent (unknowing), causes the growth of the calf, so the developement of nature causes the liberation of soul;" (Verse LIX;) and Kapila cites the unintelligent cart carrying saffron for its owner.]

If the accomplishment of the experience of soul be thus the only aim, then, on the accomplishment of that object, Prakṛiti, having no other object in view, should cease to be active, and the cessation of all modification in it, itself being pure, (*i. e.*, having the three qualities in equipoise) all spectators should be free, and it would follow that the world would be cut short. Suspecting such a consequence, he says :

## XXII.

Destroyed in the case of him whose purpose has been attained, she is still active, for she is common to others besides him.

Although she (*Prakṛiti*—nature) becomes "destroyed" (*nashṭa*), devoid of action, in the case of some one soul which has attained its purpose, (*kṛitárhā*), by experiencing the world till the manifestation of discriminative knowledge, yet she, being common to all souls, remains active (*anashṭa*) in other cases. It follows that Prakṛiti, being common to all experiencers, can never be totally destroyed, nor can the emancipation of one imply the emancipation of all. This is what is meant.

[The conclusion arrived at in the next preceding aphorism, to the effect that on knowledge being attained, Prakṛiti ceases to act, and becomes functionless, is calculated to suggest the idea that her cessation from her action would apply to all souls, so that on one soul attaining emancipation all souls would be free, there being no active ministering Prakṛiti to keep them supplied with

external impressions. This, however, is not the case. The destruction, or cessation, of action, is confined to the particular soul concerned. When a soul has, through discriminative knowledge, attained his aim he ceases to be influenced by Prakṛiti, and *quod* that soul Prakṛiti is destroyed ; but as regards other souls which have not attained their aims she remains fully active ; and this is indicated by the paradox "though dead, still she is alive :" *nashṭopyanashṭam*. This is the natural consequence of nature being one, and souls many. The *P. Bhāṣya* explains the reason by saying that the contact of the quality to the qualified is without a beginning ; *dharmaṇām anādiśañyogat dharmamātrā-nāmapyanādiśañyogah.*]

Having described spectacle and spectator he proceeds to describe their conjunction.

### XXIII.

Conjunction is the cause of the apprehension of the natures of the inherent power and the lordship of power.

He defines it through its function. "Inherent power" (*svāśakti*) is the nature of the spectacle. "Lordship of power" (*svāmīśakti*) is the identity of the spectator. That "conjunction" (*sañyoga*) which is the cause of the apprehension of the natures of the two, existing correlated as the knowable and the knower, is the natural condition of the relation of the experience and the experiencer, and no other. Nor is their conjunction of a different character from their respective natures, which are eternal and all pervading. The character of the experience as the experience and of the experiencer as the experiencer is established from time without a beginning, and that is the conjunction.

[The purport of this is that there is an inherent relation between the experience as experienceable, and the experiencer as experiencer from time without a beginning ; that is, this relation is not casual or adventitious, produced at particular times by particular causes,

but natural and always existing. This relation of the two is indicated by the term *sañyoga* or conjunction, and this conjunction or the natural relation of the two is the cause of worldliness. As will be explained afterwards, the conjunction is not actual or material, but a mere reflection of the one on the other.]

He now describes its cause

#### XXIV.

Its cause is ignorance.

That which has been described before (II, iv) as "ignorance" (*avidyā*), having the nature of doubt and delusion, is the cause of the conjunction which has the form of indiscriminateness.

[The object of the text is to say that ignorance is the cause of the conjunction of soul with intellect, and that conjunction produces indiscriminateness, or the want of power on the part of soul to distinguish between itself and intellect, and the failure to do so leads to the feeling of the pleasures and afflictions of the world being borne by it. When the differences of the two are distinguished, the conjunction dissolves, and soul is free. Dr. Ballantyne has been misled by the presence of the word *heyā* in the preamble of the following aphorism into the supposition that that word is a part of the aphorism under notice, and having incorporated it he has interpreted it as such. The word, however, has been cited with reference to its use in a preceding aphorism.]

The avoidable (*heyā*) is the objective of the verb to avoid (*hā*), and to explain what that avoidance is, he says :

#### XXV.

From its absence there is absence of conjunction, and that is, avoidance. Thereupon results the isolation of the spectator.

"Its," *i. e.*, of ignorance. On its "absence" (*abkhāva*), *i. e.*, on its being irradiated by perfect knowledge which is its essential

opposite, the effect of the conjunction ceases, or is absent, and this absence is called "avoidance" (*hána*). The meaning is this: it is not, practicable to separate ignorance like an embodied object, but, on discriminative knowledge being produced, this conjunction, which has indiscriminitativeness for its cause, it of itself ceases, and this is its avoidance (*hána*). That which is an avoidance of the conjunction, is assumed to be an "isolation" (*kaivalya*) of the eternally isolated soul. In this way the nature, cause, and effect of the conjunction is explained.

[The meaning is that when ignorance is irradiated by a right apprehension of its relation to soul, its relation with soul ceases, and this surcease makes the solitary eternal soul isolated from ignorance and its consequences, and the soul remains isolated, as is its nature. All my MSS. give the reading "of eternally isolated" (*nityakaivalyasya*), but Dr. Ballantyne, has found a different version; his text has *nityam kevalasya*, which would give the meaning "there is eternal isolation of the solitary or isolated"—*kevalasya nityam kaivalyam*. The isolation is in either case assumed to be everlasting, and hence this isolation is believed to be final deliverance from bondage.

The word '*kaivalya*' is derived from *kevala*, "alone," and "isolation" appears to be its most appropriate rendering; but, inasmuch as this isolation takes place by withdrawing or detaching the soul from the phenomenal world, Colebrooke and Wilson use "abstraction." The *Sáñkyatattva-kaumudi* defines it to be "absolute suppression of the three kinds of pain, as a property of sacred writ, holy sages, and inspired teachers or prophets. It must, therefore, be something different from intellect and the rest which are the same thing as pain, and cannot effect a separation from their own essence." (*Sástránám maharshánám divyalochanánám cha kaivalyam chátyantikaduhkha-trayaprasamalakshayam na buddhyádinám sambhavati, te hi duhkhatmakákatham svabhávádibhik mochayitum sákyanti.*) Vijnána Bhikshu defines it in the same way, and calls it absolute extirpation of pain (*dukkhátyantikochchhedah*). Any way, it is the final reward

of the knowledge advocated and the practice of meditation enjoined in this system of philosophy.]

Now, by way of describing the means of avoidance he points out the cause of the acceptable.

## XXVI.

The means of avoidance is the manifestation of undisturbed discriminative knowledge.

“Discriminative knowledge” (*viveka*) is the name of the knowledge (which shows) that qualities are distinct from soul. Its “manifestation” (*khyāti*) is the means (*upāya*) or cause of the “avoidance” (*hána*) or rejection of the visible. How should this be? It should be “undisturbed,” (*aviplavá*). That which has no interruptions, or breaks or repeated intervals of waking from meditation, is called undisturbed.

The purport of it is this: on the dissolution of ignorance, from the contemplation of that which is adverse to it, the cessation of all ideas of relationship, agency, &c., the vanishing of the dirt of foulness and darkness, and the refluent modification of the intellect, the reflection of soul on intellect is called discriminative knowledge. And by the constant or uninterrupted prevalence of it the function of the spectacle ceases, and this is isolation.

[The object of the aphorism is twofold; 1st, to point out the means of avoiding the avoidable, 2nd, to indicate, by implication what should be accepted. The means of avoiding the avoidable, that is ignorance, is the cultivation of discriminative knowledge without any break or interruption. Light and darkness cannot exist conjointly, light must always destroy darkness, and as discriminative knowledge is light, and ignorance darkness, the one disappears on the other becoming manifest. Were, however, the light to be fitful, or interrupted, there would be certain periods of light and others of darkness, and to preclude this the injunction is added that the light “should be undisturbed” or uninterrupted.

The second object is implied, but not pointed out. If continuous light is necessary it follows as a matter of course that that is what should be accepted.]

Having described the enlightenment which takes place in the soul on the taking place of discriminative knowledge, he defines the nature of the discriminative knowledge.

### XXVII.

Of that there are, up to its utmost stage, seven kinds of enlightenment.

"Of that," *i. e.*, of the produced discriminative knowledge, the "enlightenment" (*prajñá*), with the understanding of what should be known is, to its "utmost stage," (*prántabhbúmi*) *i. e.*, to the stage of *Samádhi*, along with all its accessories, of seven kinds.

Thereof four are liberation from work, *viz.*, (1) The knowable has been known by me. (2) There is nothing remaining to be known. (3) My afflictions are overcome, and there is nothing for me to overcome. (4) Knowledge has been acquired by me, discriminative knowledge has been attained by me. Thus, in these states, by rejecting all other conceptions, these kinds of understanding are produced. This understanding, which is pure knowledge regarding work, is called liberation from work.

Intellectual liberation is of three kinds, *viz.*, (1) my intellect has accomplished its purpose. (2) The qualities have finished their domination over me; like stones fallen from the crest of a mountain they cannot go back to their place; for, tending to dissolution in their own cause, and there being a want of the original cause which is ignorance, and in the absence of a motive, how can there be springing up of the evil ones? (3) And my meditation has been identified with my soul. Such being the case I am existing in my real nature. These three kinds are intellectual liberation. Thus, on the springing up of this sevenfold knowledge to the utmost stage (of meditation) the soul is said to be isolated.

[The knowledge which is the aim and object of this system of philosophy is, according to its different states of perfection, classed under two heads ; one relating to works, and the other to intellect. The first of these two heads is then divided into four, and the second into three sub-heads, making altogether seven stages. The lowest stage is that in which the Yogi feels that he has known all that has to be known. The next is that in which he, in addition to the first, feels that he has nothing more to learn. In the third there is, in addition to the first two, the conviction, that all impediments to knowledge have been destroyed, and there is nothing more to destroy. These three lead to the conviction that the full amount of discriminative knowledge has been acquired, and this constitutes the fourth. All these refer to external nature, and since they are connected with the active creation or works, they are called liberation from work. The second group refers exclusively to the intellect or the thinking principle. The convictions, 1st, that the intellect has done its office by pointing out the distinction between soul and nature ; 2nd, that the qualities which govern the functions of the intellect have lost their influence ; and 3rd, that the intellect has merged in the soul, refer to the relation of the intellect to the soul, and as the conviction is that the intellect has lost its power on the soul, therefore, it is called intellectual liberation. All these, it will be perceived, are dependant upon judgment, or consciousness of the effects of certain actions, and therefore relate to conscious or seeded meditation. (Cf. B. I, A. 17.) The function of deliberation or judgment resulting from ratiocination is in every instance present, and the ideas of, I, me, and mine, govern the whole. But when the judgment is brought to this final stage there is nothing more to do, and then follows the unconscious condition which is absolute isolation.]

Having described that the cause of discriminative knowledge is the cessation of conjunction, he now explains what are the means of its origin.

## XXVIII.

On the decay of impurity through the practice of the accessories of the Yoga, there is an illumination of the understanding till discriminative knowledge (results).

“The accessories of the Yoga” (*Yogáṅga*) are what will be presently described, (xxix.) “The practice” (*anushṭhāna*) thereof is the intelligent exercise of the same till discriminative knowledge results. “On the decay of impurity,” (*aśuddhi-kshaya*), *i. e.*, on the decline of the impurity which is of the form of afflictions of the character of an envelope to the manifestation of the thinking principle, whatever “Illumination of the understanding” (*jñánadīpti*) takes place, greater or less, by the modification of the principle of goodness till the time of the manifestation of the discriminative knowledge, the same becomes the cause of that manifestation : this is the meaning.

[The commentary explains the aphorism in a roundabout way. The purport is that by the practice of certain exercises the impurities which surround the thinking principle are gradually destroyed, and as they are destroyed so there results a gradual enlightenment which culminates, on perfect maturity, in discriminative knowledge.]

The decay of impurity by the practice of the accessories of the Yoga having been thus described, the question arises what are those accessories ? (To this question) he replies.

## XXIX.

Restraint, obligation, posture, regulation of the breath, abstraction, devotion, contemplation, and meditation are the eight accessories.

Some of these being directly beneficial to profound meditation are intimate accessories, such as devotion, &c. Others subserve profound meditation by eradicating hesitation and adverse

feelings of slaughter, &c., such as restraint, obligation, &c. Among them posture and the rest are successively subservient (to *samādhi*). Thus on the acquisition of posture there is steadiness in the regulation of breath. The successive ones are to be explained in the same way.

[These eight are classed under two heads, 1st, general or extrinsic, and, 2nd, special or intrinsic. The first two are general, because they are obligatory at all times; the other six are intrinsic, because they subserve the purpose of the *Yoga*, but are not otherwise necessary. What these eight are will be explained in the following aphorisms.]

He now successively explains their nature.

### XXX.

Restraint includes abstinence from slaughter, falsehood, theft, incontinence, and avarice.

“Slaughter” (*hiñś'ā*) is work which requires the destruction of life; it is the root of all evils, and its absence is “non-slaughter,” (*ahiñśā*). As slaughter should be avoided at all times, its absence implied by non-slaughter is first mentioned.

“Veracity” (*satya*) is confirmity in mind and speech with fact.

“Theft” (*steya*) is forcibly taking another's property; and its absence is “non-theft” (*asteya*).

“Continence” (*brahmacharya*) is subjugation of carnality.

“Non-avarice” (*aparigraha*) is the non-acceptance of objects for the promotion of enjoyment.

These five, non-slaughter, &c., are indicated by the term *yama*, restraints, and reckoned as accessories to *Yoga*.

[These restraints figure prominently in all Hindu systems, and are by no means peculiar to the *Yoga*. They obtain equal prominence among the Jains and the Buddhists; the latter call them *Páramitás*. Using the term restraint, for *Yama*, I have found it necessary for the sake of English idiom and uniformity of expression to use the roundabout form of abstinence from false-

hood, &c., instead of the direct positive terms veracity (*satya*), &c., which the text employs. They form the ground-work without which no religious superstructure is possible.]

He points out a peculiarity of these.

### XXXI.

These are the great austerities of all stages, irrespective of kind, locality, time, and compact.

“Kind” (*játi*), such as Bráhmaṇhood (*conf. ante*, p. 71). “Locality” (*desa*), such as particular sacred pools, &c. “Time” (*kála*), such as the fourteenth lunation and the like. “Compact” (*samaya*), the requirement of a Bráhmaṇa, &c. These are called the great austerities (*mahávratas*). They are imperative in all conditions or stages of the thinking principle, “irrespective” (*anavachchhinna*) of these four conditions of kind, &c., *i. e.*, it does not mean that “I shall not kill a Bráhmaṇa,” “I shall not kill any one in a sacred pool,” “I shall commit no slaughter on the 14th lunation,” “I shall not kill except for gods, Bráhmaṇas, &c.,” implying four specific conditions, but that “I shall not for any purpose whatsoever, kill any one at any place, at any time.” The others should be explained in the same way. Thus, when these practices are universal, without any qualification, they are called “great austerities.” Their interrupted observance is not so.

[The purport is that these restraints should be observed with reference to all kinds of being, at every place, at all times, and under every circumstance, without any qualification whatsoever. The object of adverting to “compact” is to leave no room for religious sacrifices, such as the Vedas enjoin. They are, in the estimation of the Yogi, as objectionable as unauthorised slaughter.]

He next describes obligation.

### XXXII.

The obligations are purification, contentment, penance, study, and devotion to the Lord.

“Purification” (*śaucha*) is of two kinds, external and internal. External (*váhya*) means the washing of the body with earth, water, &c. The internal (*antara*) is the washing, by means of friendliness and the like, of all dirt from the thinking principle. “Contentment” (*santosha*) contentedness. The others have already been explained. These, purification and the rest, are indicated by the term *niyama*, “obligation.”

[These obligations are common to all persons, whether Yogis or otherwise. They must be attended to very carefully as much to prepare oneself for the performance of the Yoga, as for the well-being of ordinary worldly life.]

How these are accessories to the Yoga, he next explains.

### XXXIII.

By the exclusion of the questionable the thought of its opposite (is acquired).

(Those things which) cause doubts or questioning are “questionables” (*Vitarka*), and these, including slaughter and the like, are inimical to the follower of Yoga. When they are obstructed or excluded by the thought of their opposites, then Yoga becomes easily achievable, and the restraints and obligations consequently become accessories to Yoga.

[The restraints keep one from the performance of certain questionable acts, and the obligations train one habitually to avoid the questionables, and thereby the thinking principle is prepared for undisturbed concentration in the performance of the Yoga. The restraints and the obligations necessarily become accessories to the Yoga, and are therefore so called.]

Now he successively describes the natures, the distinctions, the varieties, the causes, and the fruits of the questionables.

### XXXIV.

The questionables are slaughter and the rest. (Whether) they are done, caused to be done, or abetted; (whether) preceded by longing, anger or delu-

sion; (whether) slight, moderate or excessive; they have pain and ignorance for their endless fruits. Hence (the necessity) of the thought of opposites.

The aforesaid slaughter and the rest are first divided into three kinds, *viz.*, done, caused to be done, and abetted. Thereof those which are accomplished by oneself are "done" (*krita*). Those which follow from orders to the effect "do them," "they should be done," are caused to be done (*k'rita*). Those which, on being accomplished by others, are encouraged by (the saying) "well done, well done," are "abetted" (*anumodita*). These three forms are described to prevent mistakes respecting them; otherwise a dull-witted person might fancy, "the slaughter has not been completed by me, so no fault rests on me."

To indicate their causes he says, "proceeded by longing, anger, or delusion." Although longing and anger are first noticed, yet since delusion, which is characterised by its accepting that to be soul which is not soul, the source of all pains, and since longing and anger arise from distinctions about differences of relation as to one's own or another, delusion should be known to be the root, *i. e.*, all faults proceed from antecedent delusion. "Longing" (*lobha*) is thirst. "Anger" (*krodha*) is an inflammatory function of the thinking principle, which sets aside all sense of discrimination about what is proper and what is improper. Each of these is threefold, according as it is distinguished by being done, caused to be done, &c., and slaughter and the rest are divisible into these according as they are caused by delusion, &c.

They are again divided into three kinds according as they are "mild, moderate, and excessive." "Mild," (*manda*) are slow, *i. e.*, neither excessive nor moderate. The "moderate" (*madhyama*) are neither mild nor excessive. The "excessive" (*adhimátra*) are ardent, neither mild nor moderate.

Thus there are nine kinds, and these being three-fold the total becomes twenty-seven. Again, of the mild &c., each being divisible according as it is mild, moderate and excessive, becomes

threefold. The combination to be made as it becomes appropriate; thus mildly mild (*mṛidu-mṛidu*) "mildly moderate" (*mṛidu-madhyā*), "mildly ardent," (*mṛidu-tivra*).

Their fruits he describes (by the words) "having pain and ignorance for endless fruits." Pain (*dukkha*) is a function of the quality of foulness, manifesting itself in the form of repugnance. "Ignorance" (*ajñāna*) is false knowledge in the form of doubt or error. Their fruits are indicated by (the compound term) *dukkhajñānánanta-phalāḥ*. From such pain and ignorance proceed "endless" (*ananta*) unintermitting fruit. What is enjoined is that these should be overcome by the Yogī, who has known their nature, cause, &c. by thinking on their opposites.

[The works condemned by the restraints and the obligations have been lumped together under the name of questionable (*Vitar-ka*) for easy treatment, and then their natures, distinctions, varieties and fruits are generally described. They call for no explanatory remark.]

In order to explain how perfections arise successively by ardent exercise of these (duties) he says :

### XXXV.

When non-slaughter is confirmed (there is) near him abandonment of enmity.

In the neighbourhood of him who is confirmed in non-slaughter there is "abandonment of enmity" (*vairatyāga*), or harmless abidance even on the part of the naturally cruel, such as of serpents and mungooses. The meaning is, those that are addicted to injury, give up their injurious nature.

[The purport is obvious. When the restraint from slaughter has been acquired there cannot exist any feeling of enmity, and, naturally hostile individuals, having acquired it, live in peace and harmony, like serpents and mungooses, which are naturally hostile to each other, and yet under the influence of the virtue may dwell together without injuring each other.]

He next describes what becomes of him who practices veracity.

### XXXVI.

In the confirmed in veracity (there is) asylum of the fruit of works.

“ Works” (*kriyāh*) are the sacrifices, which, when performed, yield the fruits heaven, &c. The Yogí who practices veracity rises to such greatness that he attains the fruits without performing those works, and at his bidding they may be attained by any one soever, without performing those works. Such is the meaning.

[Veracity or abstinence from falsehood is here described to be as meritorious as the sacrificial rites enjoined in the Vedas; *i. e.*, by practising veracity with unswerving faith one acquires the same merit which the sacrifices yield, and that without its being tainted by the cruelty which attends sacrifices. The *P. Bhāshya* explains that he becomes virtuous, and as a virtuous person attains heaven (which is the reward of virtuous works), and his speech becomes fruitful. (*Dhārmika bhūyā iti bhavati. Dhārmikah svargam prapnuhīti svargam prāpnoti, amoghāya vāg-bhavati.*)]

He now describes the reward of him who abstains from theft.

### XXXVII.

Jewels from all sides approach him who is confirmed in abstinence from theft.

When a Yogí practices abstinence from theft, and that abstinence rises to a high pitch, jewels from all sides come to him without his wishing them.

[The object here is to show that what may be acquired with great trouble by theft, may be had unsought by scrupulous abstinence from theft.]

The fruit of continence he next describes.

## XXXVIII.

## Attainment of vigour in confirmed continence.

Whoever steadfastly practices continence obtains, on its attaining its highest pitch, " vigour" (*virya*), or manly power comes in him. Conservation of manly vigour is continence, and on its attaining a high degree, vigour comes in plenty in the body, the organs and the mind.

[The meaning is that there is always a loss of vigour by incontinence, and therefore the Yogi should abstain from it in order to conserve his vigour.]

He next points out the fruit of non-covetousness.

## XXXIX.

## On non-covetousness being confirmed there is conscience of all about births.

The word *kathantá* is the abstract form of *katham* 'what,' or 'what all about,' and *janma-kathantá* means all about births, and the full knowledge thereof is its "conscience" (*sambodha*). The meaning is that he knows all about the questions, " What was I in a former birth ? Who was I ? What did I do ?"

Covetousness is not confined to objects of enjoyment ; it extends to the soul's desire to have a body, for that too is covetousness, since the body is needed for enjoyment. And such being the case, the knowledge of principles cannot prevail, while the inclinations are disposed outwards from the excess of the quality of foulness. Now, when on giving up all desire for the body and the rest, an indifference is attained, then to the indifferent being, devoid of foulness, an acquaintance with all past and future existences becomes a cause of thorough knowledge.

[The reward here spoken of is transcendental ; it enables the observer of abstinence from all covetousness to see by his mental eye all that has happened to him in former births, and what will happen hereafter.]

Having thus described the perfections of the restraints, he now describes the obligations.

## XL.

From purity (proceed) loathing for one's own members, and non-intercourse with others.

For him who practises purity there is a "loathing" (*jugupsá*) or detestation produced for even the members of his own body from discrimination of their nature and cause. (The idea then is) "This body is impure, no fondness for it should be cherished." And for the same reason there results a "non-intercourse," (*asañsarga*) absence of relationship, or avoidance of mixing with "others," (*paraih*), *i. e.*, with other embodied persons. This is the meaning. How can he who loathes his own body from perceiving its this or that fault, wish to have intercourse with other bodies of the same description?

[The purity as defined in the commentary on A, xxxii. (p. 94) is obviously confined to contact with dirt and consciousness of the body being naturally impure. Here the latter phase is magnified to the extent of making the embodied loath his own body, and *à fortiori* all bodies.]

He describes other fruits of purity.

## XLI.

Moreover, purification of goodness, complacency, concentration, subjugation of the organs, and fitness for beholding soul.

(The words) "are produced" are required to complete the sentence. "Goodness" (*sattva*) consists of light, joy, &c. Its purification, is its not being oppressed (or overcome) by the qualities of foulness and darkness. "Complacency" (*saumanaṣaya*) is mental satisfaction from non-perception of distress. "Concentration" (*ekāgratá*) is fixedness of the thinking principle on any sensuous object to which it may be directed. "Subjugation of the organs" (*indriyajaya*) is the abidance in themselves of the organs diverted from their objects. "Fitness of behold-

ing soul" (*ātmadarśanayogyatva*) is the adaptation of the thinking principle to do so on the manifestation of knowledge. To one who is practised in purity these, purification of goodness and the rest, successively manifest themselves. Thus, from purity comes purification of goodness; from purification of goodness, complacency; from complacency, concentration; from concentration, subjugation of the organs; from subjugation of the organs, fitness to behold soul.

[This aphorism is the sequel of the preceding one; it enumerates advantages in addition to those previously described. The advantages noted are of obvious import.]

The fruit of exercising contentment.

## XLII.

From contentment, (proceeds) superlative felicity.

From contentment becoming excessive such internal felicity arises for the Yogi, as cannot be equalled by the pleasures of external objects, even to the extent of a hundredth part of it.

[The meaning is obvious.]

The fruit of austerity.

## XLIII.

Through austerity results the perfection of the body and the organs, from decay of impurity.

Through the decay of impurity of the form of distress and the like by the exercise of austerity there arises in the mind a "perfection" (*siddhi*) or superiority of the body and the organs. The meaning is this, the afflictions of the thinking principle decay by the performance of Chāndrāyaṇa and other fasts. From that decay the organs acquire the power of perceiving the minute, the hidden, and the remote, and the body (the power of assuming) at pleasure the form of a molecular, or great magnitude.

[Briefly the purport of the aphorism is that by attaining perfection in austerity, a Yogí acquires transcendental powers; his organs are then able to grasp all kinds of objects, whether they be so minute as not to be ordinarily perceptible by the senses, or so hidden as not to be accessible to the senses, or so remote as to be beyond their range.

The reference to the Chándráyana is a mere illustration, the object is to imply austerity generally, and not to such only as are enjoined as penances. The object is not penance or expiation for sins committed, but the general mortification of the flesh.]

The fruit of muttering.

#### XLIV.

Through muttering results the cognition of the desiderated deity.

On the perfection of "muttering" (*sádhyáya*) characterised by the repetition or the like of a selected mantra, there results a cognition on the part of the Yogí of the deity desiderated: the meaning is that that deity becomes visible to him.

[The word *svádhyáya* means the study of the Vedas, but here it is used in the technical sense of muttering or inaudibly repeating a great many times any selected mantra. This is closely analogous to the counting of the rosary.]

The fruit of contemplating on the Lord.

#### XLV.

Meditation is completed through the contemplation of the Lord.

Whoever is thus devoted to the Lord, in him "meditation" (*saṁádhi*) of the kind described (C I A L.) becomes manifest, because that Divine Lord, being pleased, excites meditation by removing all obstructive afflictions (from the way).

[The theistical character of Patanjali's doctrine is here established by the admission that the divinity may, when contem-

plated, help to promote the object of the Yoga. Kapila repudiates the idea.]

Having described the restrictions and the obligations, he now proceeds to describe posture.

## XLVI.

Posture (is that which is) firm and pleasant.

“ Posture” (*ásana*) is that whereby one sits, such as Padmásana, Dandásana, Svastikásana, &c. When that seat becomes “ firm” (*sthira*) or devoid of agitation, and “ pleasant” (*sukha*) or not uncomfortable, then it is reckoned as an accessory of the Yoga.

[The word *ásana* ordinarily implies the material adapted for sitting upon, such as a rug, a mat, a board, a chair, or the like, but here it has been used for particular modes or attitudes of sitting, and therefore I have translated it into posture and not seat. The aphorism recommends such postures as ensure steadiness and comfort; but the postures as described in other works do not convey to a worldly understanding any such idea. Brahmánanda, in his commentary on the *Haṭhapradipiká*, says that Váśishtha, Yájñavalkya and other ancient sages had described 84 postures as appropriate for Yogíś, and that Síva, the greatest of Yogíś, was their author. He adds that Gorakshanátha, a Yogí of a later date, but of great renown, reckoned the total number of appropriate postures at 84,00,000. (*Chaturasi-tilakeháni cha taduktam Gorakshanáthena.*) Of the 84 some are common, some are more important. Svátmáráma, in the *Haṭhapradipiká*, describes ten as “ more important” for the performance of the Hathayoga. These are called, 1, *Svastika*; 2, *Gomukka*; 3, *Víra*; 4, *Kúrma*; 5, *Kukkuṭa*; 6, *Uttána-kúrmaka*; 7, *Dhanuh*; 8, *Mat-syánátha*; 9, *Mayúra*; 10, *Sava*. The most important ones are: 1, *Siddha* alias *Mukta* alias *Gupta*; 2, *Padma*; 3, *Siñha*; 4, *Bhadra* alias *Goraksha*. The *P. Bháshya* does not enter into any detail, but names the following as examples, *viz.*, 1, *Padma* or lotus; 2, *Víra* or heroic; 3, *Bhadra* or decent; 4, *Svastika* or the mystic diagram so called; 5, *Dandá* or staff-like; 6, *Sopáśraya* or self-reliant; 7, *Pary-áñka* or bedstead-like; 8, *Krauñcha-nisidana* or like the posture of the seated heron; 9, *Hasti-nishidana* or seated elephant; 10, *Ushtra-*

*nishidana* or seated camel ; 11, *Samasansthána* or evenly poised. The following are brief accounts of the ways in which the postures are assumed.

1. *Padmásana*. The right foot should be placed on the left thigh, and the left foot on the right thigh ; the hands should be crossed, and the two great toes should be firmly held thereby ; the chin should be bent down on the chest ; and in this posture the eyes should be directed to the tip of the nose. It is called *Padmásana*, and is highly beneficial in overcoming all diseases.\*

2. *Vírásana*. Place each foot under the thigh of its side, and it will produce the heroic posture *Vírásana*.†

3. *Bhadrásana*. Place the hands in the form of a tortoise in front of the scrotum, and under the feet and this is *Bhadrásana*.‡

4. *Svastikásana*. Sitting straight with the feet placed under the (opposite) thighs is called *Svastikásana*.§

5. *Dandásana*. Seated with the fingers grasping the ankles brought together and with feet placed extended on the legs.||

6. *Sinhásana*. Let the ankles be placed under the testes, the left ankle on the right side of the suture (the mesian line) and the right on the left side of the suture ; let the hands placed on the knees, and the fingers extended ; let the mouth be wide open, and the sight be directed to the tip of the nose while one is in deep contem-

\* बामोकपरि दक्षिण चरणं संस्थाप्य बामं तथा  
दक्षोकपरि पश्चिमेन विधिना छाला कराभ्यां हठं ।

अबुष्टे हृदये निधाय चिवुकं नाशायमासोकये-  
देतद्वायिविनाशकारि यमिनां पद्मासनं प्रोक्षते ॥

† एकपादं तथैकस्त्रिलं विष्वेदुष्विति स्तितं ।  
इतरिण्यस्था चोर्दं वीरासनमितीरितं ॥

‡ गुरुष्टो च हृष्टस्याधः स्त्रीवन्याः पार्चव्याः चिपेत् ।  
सव्यवस्थं तथा एवे दक्षगुरुष्टां दक्षे

पार्चवादौ च पार्चिभ्यां हठं वद्धा तु निष्पत्तं ।  
भडासनं भवेदेतत् चर्ष्वायिविनाशनं ॥

§ आमूर्वारनारे सम्यक् छाला पादतत्त्वे उमे ।  
भृक्तुवायाः समाशीलः स्त्रिकं तत् प्रचच्छते ॥

|| उपविष्ट चिदाहुकिं चिद्रुष्टौ भूमिच्छिद्वज्ञुग्रपादौ प्रसायं  
हृष्टासनमध्यवेत् ।

plation; and it will produce the lion posture *Sinhhásana*, the adored of all Yogíš.\*

7. Put the right ankle on the left side of the chest, and similarly the left ankle on the right side, and the posture will be *Gomukha*, or of the shape of a cow's mouth.†

8. Closing the anus with the two ankles crossed while the mind is under control, produces, say the knowers of Yoga, the tortoise posture, *Kúrmásana*.‡

9. Having established the lotus posture, if the hands be passed between the thigh and the knees and placed on the earth so as to lift the body aloft, it will produce the Fowl seat, *Kukkuṭásana*.§

10. Having assumed the fowl posture, should the two hands be placed on the sides of the neck it would make the posture like that of the tortoise upset; it is called upset tortoise posture, *Uttánakúrmakásana*.||

11. Hold the great toes with the hands, and draw them to the ears as in drawing a bowstring, and this is called the bow posture, *Dhanurásana*.¶

12. Place the right foot on the roof of the left thigh, surround the right knee with the left, foot, and sit with the body twisted, and it will result in the *Matsyanáthásana* or posture *Matsyanátha*.\*\*

\* गुरुकौ च हृष्णस्त्वाधः सीवन्ध्यः पार्श्वेणोः विप्रेत् ।

दक्षिणे सव्यगुरुफल्नु दक्षगुरुफल्नु सव्यके ॥

चक्षु तु कान्वोः संखाय्य स्वाकुलीः संप्रसार्य च ।

आकाशवल्लो निरीक्षेत जासापं तु समाहितः ।

सिंचासनं भवेदेतत् पूजितं योगिपुङ्कवैः ॥

† सव्ये दक्षिणगुरुफल्नु शुष्ठपार्श्वे नियोजयेत् ।

दक्षिणेऽपि तथा सव्यं गोमुकं ब्राम्भाकृतिः ॥

‡ गुरु निरथ मरुफार्भां व्यतकमेति समाहितः ।

कूर्मासनं भवेदेतदिति योगिदिवा विदुः ॥

§ पश्चासनकं संखाय्य जान्मूर्धारन्तरे करो ।

गिरेम भूमै संखाय्य योगस्य कुकुटासनं ॥

|| कुकुटासनव्यस्थो द्वार्यां सम्बन्ध कम्भरां ।

यस्मिन् कूर्मवदुचानोभवेदुत्तानकूर्मकं ॥

¶ पादकुष्ठो तु पालिभ्यां स्त्रहीला व्यवसाधि ।

धनुराकर्षणं कुर्यादनरात्रिनमध्यने ॥

\*\* वासोदमुक्तापर्तिदद्यादं जानोर्विहिवेहितवामपादं ।

प्रस्तुत्वा तिष्ठेत् परिवर्त्तिमाङ्गः श्रीमत्यनाथो दितमासनं तत् ॥

13. *Mayúrásana*. Hold the earth with both hands placing the elbows on the sides of the navel, and keep the body erect like a staff : this is called the *Mayúrásana* or peacock posture.\*

14. *Siddhásana*. Place the left ankle on the *membrum virile*, and thereupon put the right ankle, and it completes the *Siddhásana*.†

Besides these *A'sanas*, Yogíś have a great many postures or gestures which they reckon under the name of *Mudrá*, to which, however, no mention is made here in the text. In Tántric rituals the technical difference between an *A'sana* and a *Mudrá* depends upon the organs employed. An *A'sana* or seat is by its very nature connected with the disposition of the lower limbs, whereas the *Mudrá* depends upon the motion of the upper limbs ; and in the Tantras all symbols produced by twining the fingers or placing the hands in particular positions are recognised as *Mudrás*. The Yogíś have also some *Mudrás* of the same kind ; but in their more important *Mudrás* the distinction is entirely lost sight of, and hands and feet alike come into play to produce the *A'sanas* as well as the *Mudrás*. The great and most remarkable distinctive character of the *Mudrá* appears, however, to be its connection with the regulation of breath. The *Gheraṇḍa Sañhitá* describes in all twenty-five *Mudrás*, and the *Haṭhadípiká* recognises ten of these as the most important "in warding off decay and death," (*jarámaranandásanam*.) These are — 1 Mahámuḍrá ; 2, Mahábandha ; 3, Mahávedha ; 4, Khecharí ; 5, Uḍḍiyána ; 6, Múlabandha ; 7, Jalandhara ; 8, Viparita-karaní ; 9, Vajroṇí ; 10, S'akti-chálana.‡ The following are brief descriptions of these gesticulations and of the advantages to be derived from them :

1. *Mahámuḍrá*. Pressing the perinæum by the heel of the left foot, the right foot should be extended, and then held fast by the two

\* भरामयद्युम्बुद्धये न तस्मुर्परस्यापितगाभिपार्श्वः ।  
उच्चासनोऽप्यचकुत्वितः स्थात् भयरमेतत् प्रददन्ति पीडं ॥

† फेन्ड्रादुपरि विष्वस्य सर्वं नुहकं तथौपरि ।  
अुषषाकारक गिरिष्य चिदाचलनिर्द भवेत् ॥

‡ भवामुड्रा भवाम्बोभवाम्बेध्य चेचरी ।  
उच्चीयार्थं मूलबन्धोऽन्वेत्ताकालभराभिपः ॥  
करकी विष्वरीताक्षाः वक्षोही अतिकालमं ।  
ददं च मुड्रादश्वं जरामरस्याम्बनं ॥

hands. Then closing the throat the wind should be held above. Even as a snake struck by a staff stretches like a staff, so the coiled S'akti (breath) suddenly becomes straight, for then she is in a state of dying in the two nostrils. Then the wind should be discharged steadily, but not forcibly. The wisest of the wise call this *Mahámudrā*.\*

2. *Mahábandha*. Let the heel of the left foot be put under the perineum, and the right foot on the left thigh, and, having drawn in breath, let the chin be pressed hard on the chest, and the wind be held fast in the heart. After holding the wind as long as one is able, let it be slowly expired. When the expiration is complete, let the operation be repeated on the right side. (This shows that the breath in the first instance should be drawn by the left nostril.)†

3. *Mahávedha*. While performing the *Mahábandha* should the Yogí effect the suppression of the breath in the *Khecharí* style by closing the passage of the wind by the throat *Mudrā*, and then, putting the hands evenly on the ground, drive the wind slowly towards the buttocks, it is *Mahávedha*.‡

\* महामुद्रा । पादमूलेन वासेन वीणिं संपीड्य इच्छिष्ठ ।

प्रशारितं पर्द छला कराम्यां धारवेदृढः ॥

कष्टे वर्णं समारोप्य धारवेदायुमूद्रतः ।

यथा इष्टहस्तः सर्पेऽद्वाकारः प्रकाशये ॥

प्रभ्यीभूता तथा इति: छुप्तांसी सचसा भवेत् ।

तदा सा मरणावस्था आयदे द्विपुडाचया ॥

तदः इवैः भवेत् देवयेष्व वेजतः ।

महामुद्रात् देवेव वदति विदुवोत्तमाः ॥

† महावन्धः । पाणिं वामस्य पादस्य वीणिकामी विवेकयेत् ।

वामोऽप्यरि संसाध्य इच्छिष्ठं चरणं तथा ॥

पूरयिका तमोकावृं छद्ये चित्रुकं दण्डं ।

विच्छीष्य वायुसाकुभ्यु भवेत्तमये विवेकयेत् ॥

चारयिका यथाशक्ति रेत्वेद्विलङ्घनैः ।

सवाङ्गे तु समभ्यय इच्छाते पुनरभवेत् ॥

‡ महावेदः । महावन्धितोवोग्नी छला पूरकमेकवीः ।

वायूना भवित्वादत्य विभृतं कष्टहस्तया ॥

समहस्तयुग्मा धूमै लिङ्घौ सकाङ्कुच्छनैः ।

पुनर्द्वयविभृत्वा वायुः छुरति मध्यमः ॥

4. *Khecharī*. When the tongue is reversed and pressed into the hollow of the head and the sight is fixed at a spot in the middle of the two eyebrows, the posture is called *Khecharī*.\*

5. *Uddiyánabandha* is that posture in which the wind flies upwards by the susumna vessel from the right side of the belly above the navel.†

6. *Múlabandha*. When the heel is pressed against the perineum, the anus is contracted, and the Apána wind is by force directed upwards, it is *Múlabandha*.‡

7. *Jálandharabandha*. When the throat is contracted and the chin is pressed hard on the chest it is *Jálandhara* posture, the destroyer of decay and death.§

योमस्त्रयाग्निसम्बोजायते चावसाय है ।  
स्वतावस्था समुत्पदा ततोवाय विरेचयेत् ।  
महावेष्टायमभ्यासाक्षात्तिदिप्रदायकः ॥

\* खेचरी । कपास्त्राकुररे जिङ्गा प्रविशा विषरीतम् ।  
भुवोरन्मतादिर्भिन्दा भवति खेचरी ॥  
ऐद्वाचालानादोऽहे: कलां क्रमेषावर्दयेतावत् ।  
सा यावत् भूमयं स्फुर्णति तदा खेचरीदिदिः ॥  
श्वसीपचनिर्भवत्त्वं दुतीस्त्रणस्त्रिम्बन्निर्भवत्त्वं ।

† उम्मीयानवनः । वभोयेन सुप्रभायाः प्राशास्तुम्मीयते यतः ।  
तच्चादुम्मीयनाम्मीयं वोगिभिः समुदाहतः ॥  
उम्मीन्मुखते यस्ताद्विवार्त्ते महावनः ।  
उम्मीयान्तं तदेव स्यानुच वभोइन्मीयते ॥  
उदरे पस्तिमं तानं वामेष्वर्जेच वारयेत् ।  
उम्मीयानोद्धृतौ वभोस्त्रयमात्रकेशरी ॥

‡ पार्विमानेन स्थीय योगिमाकुरवेद्वर्द्दं ।  
पापानमूर्द्दमालय सूक्ष्मव्योमिभीयते ॥  
पाषोऽविमपानं वै ऊर्द्दन्मुखते वस्त्रात् ।  
पाकुरुनेन तं प्राङ्मूर्द्दवर्द्दं च योगिमः ॥

§ आक्षन्वरवनः । कष्माकुरवा इद्ये व्यापयेषिवुकं उठं ।  
वन्मोक्षालभराक्षोऽयं व्यापस्त्रयविवामकः ॥

8. *Viparitakarāṇi*. Place the sun (expiratory air) above, just below the hard palate, and the moon (inspiratory air) below, just above the navel, and the *Viparitakarāṇi* is completed. It promotes hunger, &c., &c.\*

9. *Vajrōṇī*. The exercise by which the several secretions are drawn upwards is so called.†

10. *Saktichálana*. Seated in the *Vajrásana* posture, let the feet be held firm by the hands and the anus be pressed by the heels, then putting the air in motion by the bellows of the chest, let it be suddenly stopped, and, contracting the forehead, let the wind be

\* ऊर्ध्वं नाभेरध्वसाक्षोऽर्द्धं भानुरथः इष्टी ।  
कर्षी विपरीतास्ता मृद्वाक्षेन सम्भवे ॥  
गित्यमध्यासमत्तस्य अट्टराग्निविवर्दिणी ।  
आष्टारोद्दित्तस्य सम्पादः साधकस्य च ॥  
अत्याहादेयदि भवेद्विद्विति तत्त्वात् ।  
अधःग्निराष्ट्राद्वयाः ऊर्ध्वं स्नात् प्रथमे दिग्मे ॥  
चपाच किविद्विषिकमध्यविष दिग्मे दिग्मे ।  
वल्लितं पञ्जितस्त्रैव पञ्चांगे दद्धाते ।  
मासमाचक्षु योगित्वमध्यवेत् च तु काष्ठजित् ।

† वज्रोषी । स्तेष्या वर्तमानाऽपि योगोऽपि नियमैर्विना ।  
वज्रोषीं यो विवानाति स योगी चिदित्ताक्षयः ॥  
तत्र वक्तुद्वयं वज्रो दुर्जर्म वस्त्र कस्यचित् ।  
चौरस्त्रिकं द्वितीयला यारी च वज्रविनिंगी ॥  
मेष्वनेन इनैः सम्बूद्धाकुञ्जवमध्यवेत् ।  
पुष्टोऽप्यथवा यारी वज्रोषीशिदिग्मान्त्यात् ॥  
पलतः शस्त्राण्येव पुष्टार्द्वं वज्रवक्षरे ।  
अनैः इनैः प्रकुर्वीत वायुमध्यारकारकात् ॥  
नारीभाने पतंहित्तुमध्यादेनोद्द्वाष्टाहरेत् ।  
चलित्वा विज्ञं विष्टमर्जमालास्त्र रक्षयेत् ॥  
सहजेऽलित्त्वा मरीचिवज्ञाता भेद इकतः ।  
ज्ञेय भय निष्पित दम्भगोमयसयावं ॥  
वज्रोषीमैयुगा दूर्धं योपुष्टोः स्नात्त्वोपर्वते ।  
आसीनयोः सुखेनैव सुख्यापारदोः चरात् ॥

directed that way for two muhūrtas and when it comes to the susumna vessel, stop it and this is *S'aktichálana*. (Loosely translated.)\*

According to some the *Bandhas*, on distinct form the *Mudrás*. (Cf. N. C. Pál's treatise on the *Yoga*.)

Treating of a system of philosophy Patanjali has not thought proper to enter into details, regarding age, sex, caste, food, dwelling, &c. as bearing upon Yoga, but other works supply information about them to a considerable extent. A few notes derived therefrom may not be unfitly added here. The first question that would arise would be—who are fit to perform the Yoga? On this subject the *Hatha-pradipikā* fixes no limit. It says, “by the practice of Yoga, every one may attain perfection, whether he be youthful, or old, or very old, or diseased, or decrepit.”† The next point is the selection of a proper place. “A small monastery, a dwelling not larger than a cube of six feet, situated in an out-of-the-way place where there is no danger within a circuit of a bow, of hail, fire and water, in a country abounding in food and free from danger of wars and the like, where religion prevails, in a thriving kingdom,” is the most appropriate. The cell or *mathikā* should have a small door and no window; it should be free from holes, cavities, inequalities, high steps and low descents; it should be smeared with cow-dung, devoid of dirt, not infested by vermin, with a terrace in front, a good well, and the whole surrounded by a wall. Dwelling in such a place, avoiding all anxieties, the Yogi should follow the path pointed out by his teachers in the exercise of

\* सति वचासने पादौ करायान् धारेहृदं ।  
 मुस्फदेशसमीपे च कर्वं तच प्रपीडयेत् ॥  
 वचासनेकितोयोगी चालयिता च कुष्ठस्त्री ।  
 कुर्यादनकारं भक्षान् कुष्ठस्त्रीमाय वेषयेत् ॥  
 भानोराकुष्ठनं कुर्यात् कुष्ठस्त्री चालयेतः ।  
 स्वत्युपक्रमतसापि तस्य स्वत्यभयं कुरतः ॥  
 मुहूर्तं दृश्यपर्यन्तं निर्मेयं चालनाददौ ।  
 अर्द्धमालायदे किञ्चित् कुष्ठस्त्रायां समझता ॥  
 तेन कुष्ठलिङ्गी तस्या तुष्ट्वामाया मुखं भ्रुवं ।  
 कालाति तस्यात् प्राकार्यं कुष्ठस्त्री वक्षति स्त्रतः ॥  
 † युवा युक्तोतियुक्तोवा व्याखितोदुर्बलोऽपि वा ।  
 अभ्याशात् उदिदिक्षाप्रोति सर्वयोगेष तन्त्रितः ॥

the Yoga.\* He should avoid all excess of food, violent exertions, and vain disputations. His food should consist of wheat, sáli rice, barley, shashṭi rice (or that which matures in six days), the syáma and the nívara grains, milk, clarified butter, coarse or candied sugar, butter, honey, ginger, palval, fruits, five kinds of greens, mung pulse, and water," and all soothing sweet things in a moderate quantity, avoiding flesh-meat and too much salt, acids, and all stale, putrid, decomposed or acrid substances. The quantity of food taken should be such as to leave one-fourth of his appetite unappeased.†

He describes the means of making the seat firm and pleasant.

#### XLVII.

Through slightness of effort and attainment of the infinite.

The construction of the sentence is that through slightness of effort and through attainment of the infinite the seat becomes firm and pleasant. When the wish is formed, 'I shall adopt this posture,' and that posture is accomplished even with "slightness of effort," i. e., without difficulty, and when the thinking principle is reposed in the infinity of space or the like, and by understanding it becomes of it, then from absence of the body and of egotism the posture does not become painful. When this controul over posture is accomplished agitations of the body and such other obstructives to meditation do not arise.

\* सुराव्ये धार्चिके देशे तुभिष्ये निरूपद्वे ।  
चमुःप्रमाणपर्यन्ते शिलाग्निजावर्जिते ॥  
एकान्ते मठिकामध्ये ज्ञातव्यं छटयोगिना ।  
चल्पदारमर्तंप्रवर्त्तविवरं नात्युचनीव च यत्  
स्त्वये गोमयसांक्रियप्रसादाणां निःश्रेष्ठयद्वं भिसे ।  
वास्त्वे भंडपवेदित्तपद्विर्जिरं प्राकारर्तवेदित्तं  
प्रोक्तं योगमठस्य लक्ष्यमिदं सिद्धैर्हठाभ्याविभिः ।

† गोदूमग्नाहित्यवषाद्विकग्नोभनानं चौरात्पर्वदग्नवनीतिभितामधुग्निः ।  
शूँडिपठेतालकफङ्गादिकपद्वशाकं भुङ्गदिदित्यमुदर्वं च यमीत्पर्य ॥  
तुष्णिग्रथमधराहारथतुर्थांश्विवर्जितः ।  
भुच्यदे शिवंभीत्ये मिताच्चारः स उच्यते ॥  
कदद्वतीक्षणलव्योव्याहरीतश्चाकं सौवीरतेजतिलासर्वप्रसमसमस्तान् ।  
आज्ञादि मांस दधितत्र कुक्षात्वं कोऽपि पित्ताकदिग्नुल्लग्नाद्यमध्यमाऽऽः ॥

[The object here is to point out that when by practice one becomes able to assume any position at will, without any difficulty, and, adverting to the dogma that the thinking principle assumes the form of the object it thinks of, when by thinking on any infinite object, such as the sky, it becomes itself infinite, it feels no pain or uneasiness in assuming any posture, however painful it may otherwise be. The means of attaining firmness of seat thus are practice and the contemplation of boundless objects.]

A fruit thereof when accomplished.

### XLVIII.

Thereupon non-embarrassment by the pairs.

The meaning is that on the controul of posture being accomplished, the Yogi is no longer oppressed or embarrassed by the pairs, *i. e.*, cold and heat, hunger and thirst, and the like.

[This is the ultimate fruit of attaining perfection in assuming the different postures above adverted to.]

Having thus described how to controul the postures he describes regulation of breath.

### XLIX.

On its being accomplished the regulation of breath (which is) interruption in the flow of inspiration and expiration.

On posture becoming firm that auxiliary of the Yoga which is regulation of breath and of which firmness of posture is the cause, should be practised.

How is it characterised by the interruption in the flow of inspiration and expiration? Inspiration and expiration have been already defined (B. I. A. xxxiv.) The "interruption" (*vichchheda*) or stoppage of the twofold "flow" (*gati*) or current in places outside and inside produced by means of expelling or filling of the breath is called *Prāṇāyāma* or regulation of breath.

[Here the true Práyñáyáma is accepted to be the interruption or break in the flow of the breath. The inspiration and the expiration are the functions of which the stoppage is the most effectual act for the attainment of perfect meditation. It is called *kumbhaka*, or quiescence, and the longer it is sustained the more proficient becomes the Yogi. When perfect control has been attained in this respect, the Yogi can live buried under earth for months and years without performing any organic function whatever.]

For its better understanding, he describes its nature after showing its distinctions.

### L.

That, again, is an external, an internal, and, a stationary function; it is divided by place, time, and number; it is protracted or subtle.

The "external function" of breath is expiration, or expulsion of the breath outward (*rechaka*). The "internal function" is inspiration or filling in (*púraka*). The function of stoppage inside is *kumbhaka*. Because the vital air at that time remains quiescent or motionless, as water in a jar, (*kumbha*) therefore that condition is called *kumbhaka*.

This regulation of breath is of three kinds, according as it is specialised by space (*des'a*), "time" (*kála*), and "number" (*sañkhyá*). It is also "protracted" (*dírgha*), or "subtile" (*sukh-ma*). It is especialised by place, as (when we say) "twelve distant from the nose," meaning as far as twelve fingers from the nose. It is specialised by time, as (when we say) "of the duration of thirty-six instants." It is specialised by "number," when (we say) "many times done."

By these inspirations and expirations the first *udgháta* is produced, and to know this a numeral figure has to be used. *Udgháta* is the striking of the head by the wind propelled upward from the navel.

[The object of this aphorism is to describe the Práṇáyáma. It is an operation which includes the three functions of inspiration, quiescence, and expiration. The breath must be drawn in first before it can be retained within; the retention cannot last long, and so after a time there must be an expiration. The first and the third, however, are regulated by the capacity of the lungs, and by the time necessary for the expulsion of a given quantity of air, and cannot be much modified, and the second alone, therefore, concerns the Yogi most, for he can controul it to a considerable extent, and hence it is held to be the most important element of the Práṇáyáma; not unoften, as in the last preceding aphorism, it alone is described as *the* Práṇáyáma. The threefold operation is specialized by the time devoted to each operation, by the extent of space from which the breath is drawn, by the number of times it is repeated, by the period for which it has been practised, and by the subtility or grossness of the operation.

The operation of *udgháta* is mysterious. I cannot find out from any work or person how the internal air is made to strike particular internal organs.]

Having described the three members of the regulation of breath, he, with a view to enunciate a fourth, says :—

## LI.

The fourth is dependant on the recognition of the outer and the inner spheres.

“The outer sphere” (*váhya-vishaya*) of the breath extends far as twelve (fingers) from the nose. The “inner sphere” (*ábhyantara-vishaya*) is represented by the heart, the navel and the like. That quiescence or stoppage of motion, (which ensues) on recognising or taking into consideration these two is the “fourth” regulation of breath (*práṇáyáma*). Its difference from the third form, called *kumbhaka*, is this : The latter without taking any note of the outer and the inner spheres suddenly assumes quiescence,

like a lotus falling on a hot stone, while this is a stoppage which results from a recognition of the two spheres. This, like the preceding, should be known to be divisible according to place, time and number.

[This is purely intellectual, and involves no change in the order of the operation. It is the same operation, but performed intelligently.]

He now describes the fruit of the fourth kind.

### LII.

Thereby is removed the covering of light.

“Thereby,” *i. e.*, by that fourth form of regulation of breath, the “covering” (*ávaraṇa*) of the form of afflictions which envelope the “light” (*prakás'a*) which is the thinking principle abiding in the quality of goodness, is destroyed. This is the meaning.

[The purport is that this fourth form of *Pránayáma* is specially useful in removing all those ideas of pain and suffering which are ordinarily associated with the thinking principle.]

Another fruit.

### LIII.

The mind's fitness for steadiness.

“Steadiness” (*dháraṇá*) will be defined presently (B. III, A. 1.) The mind (*manas*), divested of its defects through the instrumentality of these forms of regulation of breath, remains fixed to whatever it is applied, and does not suffer from distractions.

(Here the word *manas* has been used as a synonym of *chitta*, thinking principle).

He gives the definition of abstraction.

### LIV.

Abstraction is the assumption by the senses of the original nature of the thinking principle, from want of application to their respective objects.

That by which the senses are abstracted, or from a feeling of opposition, withdrawn from their respective objects, is Abstraction (*pratyáhára*). How that may be effected is thus explained. Of vision and the other senses the respective objects are form and the rest. "Application" (*samprayoga*) to them is advancing towards them. The want of such advance is the forsaking of them and abiding in their original nature. When that forsaking is effected the senses become the imitators of the original nature of the thinking principle. Since the senses follow the thinking principle as do bees their king, they all become of its nature. Thus when the thinking principle is subdued these become abstracted.

[The natural tendency of the senses is outwards, towards the objects which are designed for their entertainment, and the great object of the Yoga is to divert them from those objects, in order to bring them to a focus in the thinking principle. When this is effected they cease to act, and are restored to the natural state of the thinking principle of which they are emanations. That natural state, again, is quiescence, and consequently the senses become quiescent, and this is their abstracted state.]

Having described abstraction, which is the imitation of the nature of the thinking principle by the senses, he now describes the fruit of the act.

## LV.

### Thence the complete subjugation of the senses.

The meaning is—that by the practice of abstraction the senses come so completely under controul that do not proceed, according to their natures, outwards to their respective objects even when excited thereto.

[The chapter opened by enquiring, what the exercise of the Yoga was, and having described in detail that exercise with all its concomitants, it now closes by describing the fruit of that exercise. The fruit is complete subjugation of the senses.]

Thus then has been described the practical exercise of the Yoga which forms the theme of the first chapter. The practical Yoga is first defined (i), then follow its use (ii), in the weakening of the afflictions (iii), its origin from ignorance (iv), the definition of ignorance (v), do. of afflictions (vi to ix), means of obviating them (x and xi), works, their sources and fruit (xii to xiv), afflictions, their character and why and how they are to be got rid of (xv to xxvii), discriminative knowledge (xxviii to xlvi), postures, &c., (xlvii to lii), and the advantages thereof (liii to lv). [Not literally translated, but only the substance of the commentary is given here for reasons elsewhere assigned, p. 58.]

Now this Yoga, through restraints and obligations, assumes the form of a seed, which sprouts through postures and regulation of breath, flowers through abstraction, and bears fruit through contemplation, retention and meditation, and these are explained in this chapter on exercise.

This is the end of the second quarter, or the quarter on practice, of the commentary entitled *Rájamártanda* on Patanjali's institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.

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## ADDENDUM.

The note on Aphorism **xxxii** on page 94 is calculated to mislead unwary readers. The remark that purification and other obligations are common to all persons, whether Yogis or otherwise, is quite correct with reference to the text. The obligations are as imperative on Yogis as they are on householders, and none should neglect them; but purification is here taken in its ordinary acceptation, and does not refer to certain peculiar acts of washing or *Saucha* which some Yogis, particularly the followers of the *Hathayoga*, recommend. They hold that ordinary washings &c., are not enough. They have accordingly devised complicated, and in some respects very repulsive, forms of purification, which they regard as absolutely necessary as preparatory steps towards the attainment of fixity of seats. These they describe under the collective name of *Shaṅkarma* or "sixfold work," as they are reckoned under six different names. These names are—I, *Dhauti*; II, *Vasti*; III, *Neti*; IV, *Laukikī*; V, *Trāṭaka*, and VI, *Kapālabhāti*.\* These are variously subdivided by the *Gheranda Saṅhitā*, the *Niruttara Tantra*, the *A'diyámala* the *Brahmayámala*, the *Grahayámala*, the *Rudrayámala*, the *Sivasaṅhitā*, and other Tantras. I shall follow the first in the following notes :

I. *Dhauti* means washing, and it is known under four different names according to the parts of the body to which it is applied. These are, 1st, *Antardhauti* or washing of the intestines; 2nd, *Dantadhauti* or washing of the teeth; 3rd, *Hriddhauti* or washing of the stomach; and 4th, *Mūlasodhana* or washing of the rectum.†

The first is effected in four different ways, *viz.*, (a) by contracting the mouth in the form of a crow's bill, and drawing in a full draft of air into the intestines, where it is retained for a time and

\* धौतिर्विकल्पा मेति: धौकिकी चाठकं तथा ।

कपालभातिस्तानि चट्कर्षाद्वि समाचरेत् ॥

† अन्तर्धौतिर्देवाचौतिर्द्वौतिर्मूलयोधनम् ।

धौतिं चतुर्विकी चला च चक्षेनु निषेषं ॥

then thrown out.\* As wind is the means of washing in this case it is called *Vátasára*. (b) By drinking a large quantity of water up to the throat, and then forcing it down so as to expel it by the lower orifice.† This is called *Várisára*. I know not how this can be effected, but to the occultist everything is possible. (c) By stopping the breath and then striking the navel a hundred times against the vertebral column.‡ This is called *Agnisára*. (d) By taking in air through the mouth contracted into the form of a crow's bill, retaining it in the intestines for an hour and a half, and then expelling it through the lower orifice.§ (*Vahiskarana*.)

2nd. The Dental washing includes the purification of the teeth, the tongue, the two ears, and the foramen on the crown of the head.|| For the teeth a dentrifice of catechu or clean earth is recommended as appropriate.¶ For the tongue scraping with the index, the middle and the ring fingers is held sufficient.\*\* For the ears, rubbing the orifices with the index and the ring fingers,†† and for the foramen

- \* काकचुवदासेन पिवेद्वायुं इनैः इनैः ।  
चालयेदुदर्दृं पशाह्वर्णा रेचयेक्षनैः ॥
- † आकर्ष्य पूर्येद्वारि वस्त्रेन च पिवेच्छनैः ।  
चालयेदुदरेव चोदराङ्गेचयेद्वचः ॥
- ‡ नाभिपर्वि भेदश्च इत्वारच कारयेत् ।  
चग्निशरनेवा धौतियैविनां शब्दिदिवा ।  
उदरामयक्त्वा चक्षुं चक्षुराग्निं प्रवर्दयेत् ॥
- § काकीमुद्रां शोधयित्वा पूर्येदुदर्दृं मरत् ।  
भारयेदद्वयामनु चालयेद्वोवर्णना ।  
इषा धौतिः परा गोप्या न प्रकाश्च कदाचन ॥
- || इक्षुसूङ्खं चिक्षामूलं रम्प्रवक्त्वयुग्मयोः ।  
कपासुरन्ध्रं पच्छेता इक्षुधौतिर्विचीयते ॥
- ¶ कादिरेव रसेनाथ दत्तिकया च शुद्धया ।  
मार्ज्येइक्षुमूलच धावत् किञ्चित्प्रमाहरेत् ॥
- \*\* तर्ज्जनीमधमानामा चक्षुलिपययेनतः ।  
वेशयेद्वासमधे तु मार्ज्जयक्षम्बिकामूलम् ।  
इनैः इनैर्मार्ज्जयित्वा कफदोषं निवारयेत् ॥
- †† तर्ज्जन्वन्मिकायोगामार्ज्जयेत् कर्षरन्ध्रयोः ।  
नित्यमध्यासयोगेन नादाम्बरं प्रकाशयेत् ॥

on the crown of the head rubbing with the thumb are enough.\*

3rd. The purification of the stomach is effected in three ways : 1st, by passing the tender leaf-shoot of a plaintain, or a turmeric plant, or a cane, through the mouth into the stomach, and, after shaking it drawing it out (*Dandādhauti*) ; 2nd, by drinking a large quantity of water and then vomitting it out (*Vamandhauti*) ; 3rd, by swallowing a strip of cloth three inches wide and fifteen cubits long and then drawing it out (*Vāsadhauti*).†

4th. The purification of the rectum (*mūlas'odhana*) is effected by washing the part with water aided by a finger or the stalk of a turmeric plant.‡

II. The purification of the fundament (*Vāstis'odhana*) is effected by repeatedly contracting the fundament while seated firmly in water up to the navel (*jalavasti*) or on dry land (*sthalavasti*).§

III. *Neti* is the technical name of thread, a span length of which is passed through the nostrils and drawn out from the mouth with a view to purify the nostrils.||

IV. *Laukiki Yoga* is the practice of shaking or swinging the

- \* इदाङुषेन द्वेष मार्जयेद्वास्तुरभक्तम् ।
- † रभादस्तु चरिद्रादस्तु वेचदस्तु तचैव च ।  
इत्याच्ये चालयिला तु पुनः प्रत्याहरेत्वनैः ॥  
भाजनान्ते पिवेद्वारि चाकच्छूर्ष्वितं सुधीः ।  
जर्द्दहस्ति च्च चाला तच्चल्लं वसयेत् पुनः ।  
गित्यमध्यासयोगेऽयं कपपित्तं लिवारयेत् ॥  
चतुरङ्गुलविकारं द्वचावलं अनैर्घयेत् ।  
पुनः प्रत्याहरेदेतत् ग्राचते धौतिकर्मकम् ॥
- ‡ पीतमूलस्य दधेन सभ्माङुलिनार्प वा ।  
यत्नेन चालयेद्वगुद्धं वारिला च पुनः पुनः ॥
- § नाभिमध्यजलेपायुः न्यसावान्त्कटावगम् ।  
आकुचनं प्रसारस्त लालवल्लं समाचरेत् ॥  
चलिं पश्चिमोत्तेन चालयिला इत्तैर्घः ।  
पश्चिमीमुद्दिश्या पायुमाकुचयेत् प्रसारयेत् ॥
- || वित्तिलानं द्वचाद्वरं नासान्ते प्रवेशयेत् ।  
सुखाग्निर्वामयेत् पश्चात् ग्राचते गेतिकर्मकम् ॥

intestines repeatedly from one side to the other.\*

V. For the purification of the eyes, the recommendation is that the eyes should be fixed on one point, the tip of the nose for instance, without permitting any twinkling, until tears flow in abundance. This is called *Trāṭaka*.†

VI. Under the last head of *Kapálabháti*, three practices are recommended: 1st, drawing the air through the left nostril and expelling it by the right, and then reversing the operation, and performing it alternately several times, (*Váṭakrama*); 2nd, drawing in water by the nostrils and throwing it out by the mouth, (*Vyutkrama*); 3rd, by sucking up water by the mouth and throwing it out by the nostrils, (*S'ítkrama*).‡

The Tantras describe several other modes of purification, and suggest many variations in the rules above quoted; but it is not worth while to quote them, particularly as first class Yogís denounce all such purifications as quite unnecessary, if not actually futile.

\* असद्वेगे तुम्ह भासयेदुभयार्चदेः ।  
सर्वरात्राम्बिहनीह देहानलविवर्णनम् ॥

† लिमेवामेषकं त्यङ्गा खूच्चाल्लयं निरीचयेत् ।  
यावदशूष्मि पतन्ति चाटकं प्रोक्षते वुच्छेः ॥

‡ इच्छा पूरवेदाय् रेचयेत् पिङ्गला पुनः ।  
पिङ्गलाय पूरयित्वा पनस्त्वं रेचयेत् ॥  
पूरकं रेचकं छला वेगेन न तु चालयेत् ।  
एवमभ्यासयोगेन कषद्वार्चं निवारयेत् ।  
नासाभ्यां जल्लमालयं पुनर्वस्त्वं रेचयेत् ।  
पायं पायं व्युक्तमेषकं स्नेहदेवं निवारयेत् ॥  
शीत्कात्य पीला वस्त्रेन नासानाशैचिरेचयेत् ।  
एवमभ्यासयोगेन चासदेवससो भवेत् ॥  
न चायते वार्द्धक्षयं चरा नैव प्रजायते ।  
भवेत् स्वस्त्रदेहसं कषद्वार्चं निवारयेत् ॥

## CHAPTER THIRD.

May Bhútanátha, (the lord of elements,) by the thought of whose lotus feet, the occult powers of Animá and the rest are attained by thinkers, be to our prosperity !

With a view to describe the three accessories of the Yoga, Dháraṇá, &c., already referred to, (C. II A. xxix) and to explain the external, the internal, and other Siddhis, Patanjali begins this chapter, adverting first to the explanation of the term Sañyama.

[The occult powers (*vibhútis*) are the following : 1, *anímá*, "molicularity," extreme minuteness, or parvitude, or invisibility ; 2, *Laghimá*, "extreme lightness," levity, tenuity, or incorporeality ; 3, *Prápti*, "accessibility," or touching anything at will, as touching the moon with the tip of one's finger ; 4, *Prákámya*, "wilfulness," or irresistibility of will, fulfilment of every wish ; 5, *Garimá*, "excessive pondrosity," magnitude, or illimitable bulk ; 6, *Iśitá* "sovereignty," or supreme dominion over animate and inanimate nature ; 7, *Vásitá*, "subjugation," the power of changing the course of nature ; 8, *Kámávasáyitá*, "self-control," or the power of suppressing all carnal longings. These are also indicated by the term *riddhi*, and also by *siddhi* or perfections. Inasmuch, however, as *siddhi* is applied to other perfections it is sometimes qualified by the term *mahá*. The powers are also indicated by the terms *bhúti* and *aiśvaryá*.]

Thereof, he describes the nature of steadfastness.

## I.

Steadfastness is the confinement of the thinking principle to one place.

"To one place" (*dese*), i. e., in the navel-wheel, the tip of the nose, or the like. "Confinement" (*bandha*) of the thinking

principle is making the thinking principle steady (on one object) by excluding (the thought of) all other objects. This (confinement to one place) is called *Dháraṇá* or the steadfastness of the thinking principle.

The meaning is this:—The Yogí, who has purified his internal organ by benevolence and other acts of refining the thinking principle, who has accomplished the restraints and the obligations, who has acquired mastery over his postures, who has subdued the vital airs, who has abstracted himself from the field of the senses, who has conquered the pairs (*cf.* C. II A. XLVIII), should, in a quiet place, and in an erect posture, by fixing it to one object, such as the tip of the nose, produce steadfastness of the thinking principle for the practice of discriminate meditation.

[The preliminary obligations and restraints having been accomplished, and the habit of assuming the various kinds of seats having been acquired, the Yogí should engage himself in training his thinking principle so as to be able to keep it unswervingly steady to any object to which he may wish to direct it; and this unswerving fixity is called *Dháraṇá*, or steadfastness. This steadfastness cannot be acquired without a substratum. There must be some object to which the thinking principle can be applied, whether it be the tip of the nose, or a plexus of nerves in the belly, or the crown of the head, or the ether, or the sky, for without it, in the preliminary stage, the thinking principle would be wandering. And inasmuch as there must be a substratum, the steadfastness of thinking produced by it comes under the head of discriminate meditation (*saṃprajñáta-samádhi*). (C. I A. xvii.) Practically it is a state of steady, immovable abstraction, but the word abstraction would be an indirect and not a direct definition of *Dháraṇá*, inasmuch as abstraction gives prominence to the act of withdrawing or separating, leaving the result of the act in the background, whereas *Dháraṇá* gives prominence to the fixation of the thinking principle to one point, leaving the separation or withdrawing from other things to be tacitly implied.

The *P. Bháshya* defines "Dháraṇá to be the fixation of the function of the thinking principle on the navel-wheel, or on the lotus of the heart, or on the light in the head, or on the tip of the nose, or on the point of the tongue, or on such other place, or on some external object." (*Nábhichakre hrídaya-puṇḍaríke mūrdhni jyotishi násikágre jíhvágra-ityádishu des'eshu váhye vā vishaye chittasya vṛittimátreṇa bandha iti bandho dháraṇá.) The "external object" of the commentator is explained by Vijnána Bhikshu to mean the image of a divinity.]*

Having defined steadfastness, with a view to define contemplation he says :

## II.

Contemplation is unison there of the understanding.

"There," in that place where the thinking principle is confined. "Of the understanding" (*pratyayasya*) of the knowledge. Whatever unison (or harmonious blending) is obtained through the instrumentality of avoiding untoward modifications, and what knowledge constantly arises through dependance on that on which steadfastness is reposed, is called "contemplation" (*dhyána*).

[The word *dhyána* is usually translated into meditation, for it implies that profound and abstract consideration which brings its object fully and undisturbedly before the mind. Inasmuch, however, as there is deliberation and consideration in this act, contemplation appears to me to be a more appropriate equivalent, the highest state of contemplation, which is Samádhi, being indicated by the term meditation.

The *P. Bháshya* defines Dhyána to be "an even current of thought undisturbed by other thoughts." (*Sadris'a praváka-pratyayántarenáparámrishṭo dhyánam.*)]

He now describes meditation, the last or highest member of the Yoga.

## III.

When that (contemplation), existing as if without its own identity, enlightens solely one object, it is meditation.

“When that,” *i. e.* contemplation as defined above (A. II). When “solely one object” is enlightened, *i. e.*, when the object produced by application to the form of an object, negating all other forms of consideration, and the thought appears as if devoid of its own identity, it is called “meditation” (*samádhi*). That which brings the mind together thoroughly, (*samyag-ádhíyate*), *i. e.*, brings it to one centre by avoiding all disturbing causes, is *Samádhi*.

[The *P. Bháskya* defines *Samádhi* to be “that in which contemplation so realizes the form of the object contemplated as to make its own identity, as it were, void from the prevalence of the nature of the contemplated object. (*Dhyánameva dhyeyákára-nirbhásam pratyayátmakena svarúpeṇa sunyamiva yadá bhavati dhyeya-svabháváves'át taddá samádhikirityuchyate*). As stated in the foregoing note, *Samádhi* is only a more advanced state of contemplation than *Dhyána*. In the latter the ideas of other objects besides the one contemplated are subdued and kept down, but not entirely suppressed; but in the former it is so complete that not only extraneous ideas are suppressed, but even the distinction between the thinking and the thought are lost, so that the former, as it were, merges into the latter, and nothing but thought remains. Such being the case, the body ceases to be influenced by external stimuli, and a state of catalepsy or trance is produced. Hence it is that *Samádhi* is not unfrequently translated into *trance* or *catalepsy*. Catalepsy, however, takes note of only the cessation of the organic functions, leaving unnoticed the state of the thinking principle, whereas *Samádhi* brings the intensity of the thinking to the fore, without caring for the organic functions, and the English equivalent used should therefore convey this idea. Medi-

tation it is true does not give the measure of the intensity, but since that intensity varies greatly under different circumstances, meditation is by itself enough for ordinary use.]

In order to supply for use in his work a technical term for the three constituents above described, he says:

#### IV.

The three together constitute *Saṇyama*.

In this Sástra the application of the three operations of contemplation, (*dhyána*) steadfastness (*dháraṇá*), and meditation (*Samádhi*), to one object is indicated by the use of the term *Saṇyama*.

[The word *Saṇyama* is formed of the intensitive particle *sam* prefixed to *yama* “ restraint,” and means vow, binding or confinement, and in this work indicates the absolute restriction of one’s self to the practice of the three means of accomplishing the Yoga. In connexion with the ceremonial of the *Smṛiti*, it is used to indicate the day preceding that of the rite itself, because on that day the performer has to place himself under certain restrictions about food, drink, and occupation, the nature of which varies according to the character of the rites. The word is defined with a view to prepare it for subsequent use as a technical term for the three most important acts of Yoga.]

The fruit thereof.

#### V.

From success thereof comes the light of understanding.

“Thereof,” *i. e.*, of *Saṇyama*. “From success” from its becoming similar (*i. e.*, freely blending with each other so as to be the same) by practice. “Understanding” (*prajñā*), *i. e.*, the nature of the object to be known. The “Light” (*áloka*), (understanding) expands. The meaning is—that which has to be known becomes thoroughly manifest.

[The purport is obvious. When a person is proficient in performing the threefold acts of Sañyama, he attains the light of understanding, or the power of knowing thoroughly the nature of the object to which he directs his attention.]

Its application.

## VI.

**It is to be applied according to its stages.**

According to "its," *i. e.*, of the Sañyama, "Stages" (*bhúmi*), it should be applied to the varying conditions of grossness and subtileness of the substratum of the function of the thinking principle. The Sañyama should be practised in a higher stage after subduing or attaining proficiency, or knowing thoroughly, the lower stages of the thinking principle, for the fruition is not effected by practicing the Sañyama in the highest stage without first bringing into control the lower ones.

[The subject matter of this aphorism is a mere detail: it is the rule that Sañyama should not be attempted for the higher stages of perfection until after it has been practised in the lower stages, *i. e.*, it is to be practised step by step according to the different stages into which the career of the Yogi is divided. See C. II A. xxvii.]

A doubt having arisen why in the chapter on the appliances (C. II) he should have described only five after naming the eight members of the Yoga, and omitted three, the author says:

## VII.

**The three are more intimate than the former.**

"Than the former," *i. e.*, of restrictions and other members of the Yoga, which are the appliances of meditation in a secondary degree. (C. II A. xxix.) The three members, steadfastness, &c., "are intimate" (*antaraṅga*, lit. akin,) to discriminate meditation, since they establish the true character of meditation.

[In C. II A. xxix. the accessories of the Yoga have been described to be restraint, obligations, postures, regulation of breath, devotion, steadfastness, contemplation, and meditation. Of these the first five are subsidiary or ancillary to, and the last three integral parts, lit. members of the body of, the Yoga, and this idea is developed in the aphorism under notice by the statement that the former are strangers and the latter intimates. The first five only prepare a person for the performance of the Yoga, but the last three constitute the Yoga, for without them there can be no discriminative Yoga having a specific object of thought.]

To point out that it is nevertheless a stranger compared to another, he says :

### VIII.

It is still a stranger to the seedless.

“To the seedless” (*nirvijasya*), i. e., to the meditation which depends on nothing, or carries on pondering with reference to vacuity. To it the threefold members of the Yoga are strangers, (*vahiranga*), because they are only secondarily subservient.

[Having in the next preceding aphorisms described the last three of the eight members of the Yoga, to be essential to the Yoga, the author makes a distinction, by saying that though they are essential in the case of discriminative meditation, or that in which there is a specific object of thought, they are not so when the Yogī, rising above all specific objects, makes vacuity (*s'ūnya*) the object of his pondering. This form of meditation is called “seedless” (cf. C. I. A. lx), and it needs no aid and can derive no help from steadfastness, contemplation and objective meditation.]

Having now clearly explained the subject of *Safjama*, wishing to disclose the nature of perfection of the different members of Yoga, he describes successively the three modifications.

### IX.

The suppressive modification is the moment of conjunction of the thinking principle with suppres-

sion on the overthrow and success of the twofold residua of waking and suppression.

“Waking” (*vyutthána*) includes the three conditions of agitation, bewilderment, and voluptuousness. “Suppression” (*nirodha*) is that modification of the thinking principle in which the quality of goodness becomes a part of it, or retires to it. When successively the “overthrow” (*avibhava*) and success “prevalence” (*prá-durbháva*) of the residua of the two, *i. e.*, of the waking and the suppressive conditions, are produced, then at the moment of “suppression,” the conjunction (*anvaya*) which takes place from the thinking principle having then both functions is called “suppressive modification” (*nirodhaparináma*). “Overthrow” is the condition of incapacity to perform work, there being a contempt for it. “Prevalence” is the condition of manifestation in the present condition. The meaning is this:—When the residua cognate to waking are pacified, and the residua of suppression are prevailing and the thinking principle appears connected with both from its being the substratum of quality, then that state is indicated by the word suppressive modification (*nirodhaparináma*).

Although there is no stillness of the thinking principle when affected by the functions of the qualities, nevertheless this modification is called *still* or *motionless*.

[Having explained the exact position of the threefold exercise of *Saúyama*, the author now proceeds to describe what follows that exercise, and in doing so first defines three terms, and the first of them is suppressive modification (*nirodhaparináma*). This is defined to be the time when all the residua of the waking state being overthrown, the thinking principle begins to be worked by the residua of the suppressive state; it is the moment of transition from the one condition to the other that the term indicates. The *P. Bháshya* thus defines the term: “the residua of the waking state are the attributes of the thinking principle, but they are not intelligent. The residua of suppression, produced by the intelligence of the suppressive state, are also the

attributes of the thinking principle. On the overthrow and the success of the two, the residua of the waking state are put down, those of the suppressive state rise up, and there is then a correlation of the thinking principle, and the changes, thus constantly occurring in a thinking principle is suppressive modification." (*Vyutthána-sañskáráschittadharma na te pratyayátmaká iti, pratyaya-nirodhena niruddhá nirodhasañskárá api chittadharma, tayorabhíbhava-prádurbhávau vyutthána-sañskárá kíyante nirodha-sañskárá ádhíyante, nirodhakshanañam chittamanveti tad ekasya chittasya pratiñshanañamidañ sañskárányathátvam nirodha-parinamah.*)

In explaining the text, Bhoja uses a term which, as playing an important part in subsequent explanations, requires a few words of comment. The word is *vartamánádhvan*, a compound of *vartamán* "present" and *adhvan* "a road," but here "time" (*adhvas'abda kálavachanah*), which I have rendered into "present condition." The theory is that every image, shape, or idea exists from eternity in a latent form; circumstances make it manifest, and when those circumstances are overcome it reverts to its former condition. The first is *anágatádhvan*, or the unmanifest or antecedent condition; the second or what we see is the *vartamánádhvan*, or the present condition; and the third is *atítiádhvan*, or the postcedent condition, which is reversion to the first condition. The image existed in the marble in a latent condition; the sculptor brings it to its present condition, and when it is broken it passes on to its postcedent condition. This theory is the same which prevailed in Greece in ancient times. Thus, says Sir William Hamilton: "Plato agreed with the rest of the ancient philosophers in this—that all things consist of matter and form; and that the matter of which all things were made, existed from eternity, without form; but he likewise believed that there are eternal forms of all possible things which exist, without matter; and to those eternal and immaterial forms he gave the name of ideas. In the Platonic sense, then, *ideas* were the patterns according to which the Deity fashioned the

phenomenal or ectypal world." So Tiberghien, (*Essai des Connoissance humaine*, p. 207,) "Seneca considered *ideas*, according to Plato, as the *eternal exemplars* of things, Cicero as their *form*, Diogenes Laertius as their *cause* and *principle*, Aristotle as *substances*."

The word *sañskára*, which, for the sake of uniformity, I have rendered into *residua*, would have been more pointed here if translated into *idea*.]

The fruit thereof.

## X.

Its tranquil flow from residual habit.

"Its," of the thinking principle, "tranquil flow" (*pras'ántaváhítá*) is produced by the *residua* of the suppression aforesaid. The meaning is, from voluptuousness being removed the thinking principle flows in its own modification.

[The advantage derived from the suppressive modification is that, when it is attained, the thinking principle becomes tranquil, and abides in its own nature, that is, it is no longer subject to agitation from the prevalence of the adverse qualities of foulness and bewilderment.]

Having described suppressive modification, he now defines meditative modification.

## XI.

The destruction of multifunctionality and enlivenment of concentration of the thinking principle is meditative modification.

"Multifunctionality" (*saṁvártthatá*) is the quality of voluptuousness of the thinking principle, which results from its accepting many objects from its versatility. When one object is depended upon there is a similar modification, and it is "concentration," and that too is a quality of the thinking principle. The "destruction" and "enlivenment" (*kshaya* and *udaya*) of the two are successive, *i. e.*, the destruction or extreme overthrow of the quality of multifunctionality and the enlivenment or full mani-

festation of the quality of concentration are successive. The condition in which there is a junction of the two in the thinking principle, when it has the quality of goodness in excess, is called "meditative modification" (*samádhi-parináma*). This is distinct from the former, (*i. e.*, suppressive meditation). In the former there are the overthrow and the prevalence of the two residua, *i. e.*, the contempt for the nature of the former waking residua and the prevalence in an unsubdued state of the latter or the residua of suppression. In this, however, there is destruction and full enlivenment. Destruction is entrance into the condition beyond that of reproduction, of the voluptuousness of multifunctionality, from extreme hatred. Enlivenment of the quality of concentration is its manifestation in the present condition.

[Suppressive modification as defined in A. IX, is confined to the point of time when the waking state passes on to the suppressive state; but in the meditative modification, there is a farther advance. The waking state has then been entirely overcome, and the meditative state is in full prevalence. The one is the commencement, and the other the consummation, of the condition of meditation. The *P. Bháshya* explains this by saying "multifunctionality is an attribute of the thinking principle, so is concentration; the meaning is there is destruction or disappearance of multifunctionality and the enlivenment or manifestation of concentration." (*Sarvárthatá chittadharmah ekágratá chittadharmah, sarváratáyáh kshayastirobháva ityarthah, ekágratáyá udaya ávirbháva ityarthah.*) Briefly this is a higher state of concentration.]

The third or the concentrative modification.

## XII.

The concentrative modification of the thinking principle is that in which both the tranquil and the enlivened conditions are equally recognized.

Unity of idea is a special function of the abstracted thinking principle. "Tranquil" (*sánta*) is that which has entered the postcedent condition. "Enlivened" (*udita*) is manifestation in the present condition. From the thinking principle being in a collected state, the two are equal, and from their object being one, are similar cognitions (*pratyayas*). When the collected thinking principle abides correlated with both it is called concentrative modification.

[In the suppressive modification the worldly state is just passing away, and the meditative state is just commencing, and the thinking principle is becoming tranquil; in the meditative state the first stage is passed, and concentration is in prevalence or fully enlivened; and when the tranquil and the enlivened conditions are in full play, the condition is called the concentrative modification. The *P. Bháshya* explains this by saying, "of the controlled thinking principle, the first cognition is tranquillity, and the next after it is a similar one that of enlivenment, and the thinking principle in meditation is correlated to both, in the same way" (*samáhita-chittasya púrva-pratyayah sánta uttarastat-sadriśa uditah samádhi-chittamubhayo-ranugatam punastathaiva*). As in the last case so here, we have in this an advance over the last preceding condition.]

Having described the forms of the modification of the thinking principle, he assigns them to other subjects.

### XIII.

By this the modifications of property, time, and relation in elements and organs have been described.

"By this," *i. e.*, by the threefold exposition of the modifications of the thinking principle (A. ix, xi, xii.). "In elements," (*bhúteshu*) both the gross and the subtle. "In the organs" existing severally as Intellect, organs of function, and internal organ. It is to be understood that the three modifications of property, time, and relation have been described (by the above aphorisms).

When, on the cessation of a former property, the subject undergoes the modification of another property, even as the subject clay, forsaking the form of an undefined mass, assumes another property, that of a jar, it is called the modification of property (*Dharmaparināma*). The “modification of time” (*Lakṣaṇa-parināma*) (is thus indicated)—when that jar, giving up its antecedent condition, assumes its present condition, or forsaking it, takes up its postcedent condition. The modification of relation (*Avasthāparināma*) is the correlation of the jars, in the first and the second conditions, for the train of the functions of qualities is always moving, and does not remain unchanging for even a moment.

[This aphorism applies the theory of eternity of ideas enunciated in the three preceding aphorisms to things in general. The object is to show that even as in ideas, latency, manifestation, and disappearance follow successively, so in the thinking principle ideas appear and disappear under particular circumstances without radically changing its original nature. Change in matter is not absolute, nor radical conversion of one thing into another, but a modification of property, or of time, or of relation. A mass of clay converted into a jar is a change of property, and not of the radical elements of clay. This change is next altered by time, as the breaking of a jar into potsherds ; and there is a further change going on in its condition, and the new jar of yesterday is not the same with the jar we see to day, for there has been some change in it since yesterday, for change is constant and cannot be retarded for a moment. The first change is called *Dharmaparināma*, the modification of property. The second is *Lakṣaṇaparināma*, the modification of time. The word *lakṣaṇa* ordinarily means a sign or character, but it has been explained by commentators to mean time (*kālabheda*). The third is *Avasthāparināma* or change of relation.]

Now, a doubt arising as to what the property is, he defines the nature of the propertied, *i. e.*, the subject.

## XIV.

The subject is the correlative of the qualities of tranquillity, enlivening, and latency.

“The tranquil” (*sāntāk*) (qualities) are those which, having performed their respective functions, have entered the postcedent condition. “The enlivened” (*uditāk*) qualities are those which, forsaking the antecedent condition, perform their functions in the present condition. “The latent,” (*avyapadesyāk*) qualities are those which, abiding potentially, do not produce action. Thus everything is comprised in everything, and so on. By the word property (*dharma*) is implied that simple potentiality which abides distinctly correlated as effect and cause. Whatever proceeds and admits of correlation with that threefold quality is called the “propertied” (*dharma*) which is the subject of tranquillity, enlivening and latency. Thus gold, giving up the quality of the form of a necklace and assuming that of the form of a svastika cross, still appears as a golden form, *i. e.*, when in these slightly different characters the subject appears as a common property, it is subject, but when it abides as a distinct mode it is a property, and therefore it is described as the correlative of qualities.

[Properties do not always exist in the same form in the same way. Sometimes they are tranquil, at others active, or enlivened, and sometimes latent, and these properties are called *dharma*, and the thing with which they are correlated is the “propertied,” or the substratum of qualities, or *Dharmi*—that which has the *Dharma*. A thing cannot be called a subject until it is correlated to a property, and a property ceases to be so when it qualifies nothing. On the other hand, by change of relation a subject may become a property and a property a subject—a subjective law or its objective outcome.]

To remove the doubt as to how a single (propertied) subject undergoes many modifications he says :

## XV.

The diversity of succession is the cause of the versatility of modifications.

*Krama* or “succession” of property as defined above and *anyatva*, “diversity,” which is every moment visible, make the compound *Kramānyatva*, (which has been rendered into “diversity of succession” in the text). And that is the “cause” (*hetu*), mark, or indicator of the (*anyatva*) or multiplicity or diversity of the modifications aforesaid. The meaning is this: Constant motion or succession, as from powdered earth into clay mass, thence flattened plates, thence a jar, shows the manifest form of the versatility of modifications. And whatever the motion in the subject of the modifications of time and condition, the same should be understood to be the argument in support of the versatility of modification. For certain all conditions appear constantly changing by constant motion, and the versatility of modification from constant mutability is thereby established. Of all mutable objects, like the thinking principle and the rest, some qualities are grasped by perception, such as pleasures, conditions and the like, and some are known by inference, such as fate, residuum, power, &c., and the propertied subject not being distinct from property is to be explained in the same way.

[Both the text and the commentary explain the subject in a very roundabout way. The purport is that the diversity of phenomena in the versatile world, is due to constant motion, or uninterrupted succession of changes. The three qualities are never at rest, they are flowing in a constant round of changes, and every change brings on some change of property, for were not properties to change, there would be no perceivable change. And the thinking principle, associated directly with the functions of the three qualities, must accordingly with these changes, be the agent of a multiplicity of functions, and that is its multi-functionality. The changes under notice are either perceivable

by the senses, organs, or felt by the mind, but in both cases they apply to the thinking principle.]

Now, with a view to describe Siddhi (perfection) by showing the object of the Sañyama already described, he says :

## XVI.

The knowledge of the past and the future is acquired by Sañyama over the threefold modification.

The threefold modification resulting from distinctions of attribute, time and relation has been already described. By the Sañyama, *i. e.*, by practising the controls aforesaid in connexion with this object, Yogis acquire a full knowledge of the past and the future. The purport is this : When a Yogi, knowing that in any given subject this is the attribute, this is the time, this is the relation, and it having performed its work in the present condition has entered the postcedent condition, performs the Sañyama by surmounting the obstructions, he knows everything, all that is passed, or that is to happen, because from the manifestation of the pure quality of goodness in the thinking principle, he then constantly rejects all obstacles caused by ignorance to the power of perceiving the purport of all and everything. When by these means all obstacles have been set aside, then, through concentration, the power of perceiving the property of all and everything becomes manifest as in a stainless mirror.

[Having explained the rationale of the action of the thinking principle on worldly objects, the author now proceeds to describe the effect of Sañyama on that action, and the occult powers which may be derived by that exercise. The first occult power or perfection noticed is the power of knowing the past and the future. This is acquired by directing the Sañyama to the threefold changes described in A. XIII, *i. e.*, by meditating about them till the light of truth rises in the thinking principle of the Yogi and makes everything manifest.]

He describes another kind of perfection.

## XVII.

A confused comprehension of word, meaning, and knowledge (arises) from indiscriminate understanding. By Sañyama with due discrimination, (is acquired an understanding) of the cry of all creatures.

A “word” (*śabda*) is a sound formed of letters joined in a fixed order, perceptible by the organ of hearing, and always conveying the same, single, distinct meaning ; or it is a mere explosive sound having in it no fixed order, but still intelligible to cultivated understanding. In either case it forms words and sentences, for both are adapted to convey a fixed meaning. “Meaning” (*arthā*) implies kind, quality, action, &c. “Understanding” (*pratyaya*) is knowledge, or the function of the intellect in which it assumes the form of the object (implied). By accepting in our intellect these naturally distinct word, meaning and understanding as one, there is confusion. Thus, in saying “bring a cow,” the meaning is a cow (*go*), belonging specifically to the species cow, and having dewlap, &c. ; the word is the indicator ; and the understanding is the appreciation of it ; and all these are grasped without any distinction. It is not used with a clear perception of the word cow being the indicator, the meaning being what is indicated by the word, and the understanding that which accepts the two ; and if one is asked what is the meaning ? what is the word ? what is the understanding produced by it ? he gives only one answer to all the questions by saying ‘a cow.’ Were he not to conceive all these to be identical, how could he give the same answer to all the questions ? In this state he who makes the “distinction,” (*pravibhāga*) that the essential nature of a word is that it is the indicator (*váchaka*), that of its meaning is the indicated, and that of the understanding is making it manifest, and, making this distinction, places himself in Sañyama about it, acquires the knowledge of the cry (*ruta*) or word of all creatures, including feral and domestic quadrupeds, birds, reptiles, &c., i. e.,

he knows with what particular motive a specific sound has been made by a particular animal.

[Words are correlated with meanings, and meanings with ideas. When sounds are reduced to speech there is a fixed relation between their constituents, and this relation is fixed by orthography and syntax; but when, in the cry of an animal for instance, this relation of sounds does not appear to be so fixed, it is not to be understood that there is no such relation, for without it the sounds could not convey meaning and idea. And the relation being admitted, it must follow that the cry of animals, which are intended to convey ideas, must have some such relation, and this relation can be learnt by directing the Sañyama to it. Ergo when the Sañyama is accomplished, the Yogi who performs it is able to understand the meaning of the cries of animals.]

He describes another form of perfection.

### XVIII.

A knowledge of former existence by making the residua apparent.

Twofold are the residual impressions of the thinking principle. Some are simply productive of memory; others are the causes of the deserts, kind, life, and enjoyment, called virtue and vice. When Sañyama is performed in regard to these residua, the performer, enquiring into his former actions to the effect—thus has that object been perceived by me, thus has that act been performed by me, remembers all the past by the mere reflection, the residua being by themselves excited without any separate stimulants, and gradually visibly sees in the self-excited residua the kind, &c., experienced in former existences.

[As explained in A. xviii, C. I., the residual impressions are of a twofold character. One class of them produce memory, that is when excited by a stimulus, the impressions which lie latent in the mind become vivid, even as an action done in childhood and afterwards entirely forgotten, is brought up in the mind many years after by the sight of the locality or other circumstance

connected with it. Involuntary impressions received in dreams and the like are also so produced. The second class of impressions are those which bring on the desert of works; they are perfectly involuntary, and are mostly residua of former existences. By applying Sañyama to these, they are excited and become visible to the Yogi, and thereby he is able to know the events of his former existences.]

Another form of perfection.

### XIX.

With reference to cognition, a knowledge of another's thinking principle.

"Cognition" (*pratyaya*) as indicated by some characteristic sign, such as the complexion and the like, of others. When a Yogi has performed the Sañyama with reference to it, he attains a knowledge of another's thinking principle. The meaning is, that one's own thinking principle, by entering the thinking principle of another, comes to know all its attributes, whether it is excited or otherwise.

[The principle explained above applies also to the thinking principles of other persons. The Sañyama applied to them brings them within the range of the understanding of the Yogi. The theory being that the thinking principle which thinks upon a thing assumes the form of that thing, it follows that the mind of the Yogi performing the Sañyama becomes the mind thought of, and thereby knows it.]

He now describes a peculiarity in the knowledge of other thinking principles.

### XX.

(But) not along with its object, that not being the object (of the thinker).

But he is not able to know another's thinking principle (in the text represented by the pronoun it) "along with its object" (*sálambana*), *i. e.*, along with the object to which it is directed,

because none of the characteristics of the object is made the subject (of the Sañyama). From the characteristic of the object not being reflected upon the thinking principle alone of another is known, but not that it is blue or yellow, because Sañyama cannot be directed to that which has not been made the object of it, and there can be no recognition where it is not made the object. Hence another thinking principle along with its object is not cognizable, the object not being taken into account. Now, the qualities of the thinking principle will be included. When contemplation is made as to what is the object, then from that Sañyama a knowledge of the whole subject is acquired.

[This aphorism qualifies the sense of the next preceding one. It says that by thinking on the thinking principle of another one can know it, but not its objects, unless those objects are also included. When they are included the knowledge is perfect.]

He describes another perfection.

## XXI.

From Sañyama with reference to the shape of the body, the power of vision being benumbed, and the correlation of light and sight being severed, there is disappearance.

The "body" (*káya*) is the human frame, and its shape (*rúpa*) is that quality of it which is perceptible by the eye. The meaning is—of such a body such is the shape. Through Sañyama the power of the eye to perceive things becoming 'benumbed' (*stambha*), *i. e.*, obstructed through contemplation with reference to that shape, and "the correlation of light and sight being severed," *i. e.*, the luminousness of the eye which proceeds from the quality of goodness being "severed," or rendered incapable of performing its function, there is a disappearance of a Yogi, *i. e.*, none can see him. By this it should be known that the disappearance of sounds &c. is also implied, *i. e.*, by this exposition of the means of the

disappearance of shape, &c., the disappearance of sounds, &c., the objects of the ears, &c., is described.

[Objects are perceptible by the light which the quality of goodness throws on them, but if this light be withdrawn by the quality of goodness being confined in the thinking principle, they cease to be so. Accordingly, when a Yogi performs Sañyama with reference to his body or any part of it he withdraws therefrom the quality of goodness, and the body or the part of it so acted upon ceases to have the quality of perceptibility, and the Yogi becomes invisible, inaudible, &c. When an object has no power of visibility in it, it necessarily becomes invisible. This is how the Yogi makes himself invisible.]

He describes another form of perfection.

## XXII.

Works are deliberate and non-deliberate, and by Sañyama about them a knowledge of the final end; or by portents.

Life is the consequence of former works. They are of two kinds, "deliberate" and "non-deliberate." Thereof the "deliberate" or anticipatory (*sopakrama*) is that in which there is an anticipation of consequences in the attempt to produce a result, as in the spreading of wet cloth in a hot place in order that it may dry quickly. The reverse of the former is the "non-deliberate" (*nirupakrama*), as the leaving the same cloth in a lump in a cool place where it may dry after a long time. Whoever performs Sañyama with reference to these two kinds of work, (enquiring) 'whether my work will mature quickly or slowly,' in him, through firm contemplation, a knowledge of the final end is produced. "Final end" (*aparánta*) is the separation of the body from the soul, *i. e.*, death. A "knowledge of it," *i. e.*, 'at such a time, at such a place my death shall happen,' he acquires with certainty.

“Or by portents” (*arishṭebhyvas*). Portents are of three kinds, spiritual (*ādhyātmika*), material, (*ādhibhautika*) and supernatural (*ādhidaivika*). The spiritual is that (which is conveyed in a spiritual way, as) when one with the ears closed does not hear the sound of the vital air in the stomach, or such like (the said sound being ordinarily audible). The material is the sudden sight of a frightful human form, or the like. The supernatural is the accidental sight of invisible things, such as paradise, &c. By them one knows the time of death. Although knowledge may be acquired through portents by other than Yogis, it is in their case general and doubtful. In the case of Yogis, on the other hand, the time and place being certain, the perception is as certain as actual sight.

[The efficacy of this Siddhi depends upon the precision with which the events of past existences are realised in the mind by reviving their residua through the power of Sañyama. When their memory is perfect, one can easily calculate which of his former acts will bring on death within a short time, and which are destined to retard it. It will be seen that in the Yoga system residua or deserts play the part of fate, and if the nature of the residua be known, one knows his fate.]

In order to explain the perfection acquired by the purifying processes (Chap. I, A. xxxiii, p. 40) he says :

### XXIII.

#### In friendliness, superhuman powers.

By performing Sañyama in regard to friendliness, mercy, complaisance, and indifference, super-human powers are acquired with reference to them, *i. e.*, in the performer friendliness, mercy, and complaisance attain such great excellence as to enable him to contract friendship with all (persons).

[The sense is obvious, and needs no comment.]

He describes another kind of perfection.

## XXIV.

**In powers, the powers of the elephant and the like.**

By performing Sañyama with reference to the powers of the elephant and the like, powers like those of the elephant, &c., become manifest in the Yogi. The meaning is this: He who performs Sañyama in regard to the power of the elephant, the force of the wind, or the vigour of the lion, wishing it to be in him, becomes possessed of those powers.

[As obvious as the purport of the last preceding aphorism.]

Another perfection.

## XXV.

**From contemplation of the light of the extremely luminous disposition, a knowledge (is acquired) of the subtile, the intercepted and the remote.**

The light of the extremely luminous disposition has already been described. (C. I, A. xxxvi). The "light" is that which expands the manifestation of the quality of goodness. From "contemplation" (*nyása*) of all things appertaining to it, *i. e.*, from thinking of the objects irradiated by it, a knowledge is produced, in one's own internal organ and the organs of sense endowed with special power, of the "subtile" (*súkshma*) such as atoms, &c., of the "intercepted" (*vyavahita*), as mines under the earth, and of the remote (*viprakrisha*), as the elixir of life existing on the other side of the Meru mountain.

[The clear light of the quality of goodness is what is meant by "the light of the extremely luminous disposition."]

Another perfection of a similar description.

## XXVI.

**From Sañyama in the sun, a knowledge of regions.**

He who performs Sañyama with reference to the manifest sun, obtains a definite knowledge of whatever regions and towns exist in the seven spheres, including the terrine, the aërial, and the celestial. In the preceding aphorism the subject is the

manifestation of the quality of goodness, here it is material, that is the distinction.

[The *P. Bhāshya* gives a long account of the seven principal regions and their subsidiaries, taken from the Purāṇas, but it is not worth quoting. In Wilson's *Vishṇu Purāṇa* the details are given at length.]

Another perfection by means of reliance on material manifestation.

### XXVII.

In the moon, a knowledge of the disposition of the stars.

By performing Sañyama with reference to the moon, a knowledge is derived of the disposition (*vyūha*), or the order of arrangement, of the starry luminaries. As the stars lose their light on the manifestation of the sun, Sañyama with reference to the sun cannot suffice to afford a knowledge of the stars, therefore a different means is (here) ordained.

[The reason given why the Sañyama with reference to the sun does not suffice to give an idea of the arrangement of the stars and planets appears ludicrous. Bhoja cannot have seen a star in day light. The *P. Bhāshya* does not refer to it.]

Another perfection.

### XXVIII.

In the Polar star, a knowledge of their motion.

A knowledge is produced of the "motion" (*gati*) of the particular time and position of each of the stars by performing Sañyama with reference to the Polar star (*Dhruva*), the chief, the fixed star. This is a star, that is a planet, this is the period within which it will reach a particular constellation,—all these are known. What is said is that this is the fruit of knowing their times.

[The *P. Bhāshya* adds that the Sañyama applied to the firmament above suffices the purpose. (*Uṛddha-vimāneśu kṛita-*

*sañyamastáni vijáñiyát). It is not obvious why Bhoja has omitted this.]*

After having described perfections regarding externals, he now attempts to describe internal perfections.

### XXIX.

In the navel-wheel, a knowledge of the disposition of the body.

A knowledge is acquired by the Yogi who has performed Safiyama with reference to the “wheel” (*chakra*) of sixteen radii which exists in the middle of the body, and is called “navel” (*nábhi*), of the “disposition” (*vyúha*) obtaining in the body of fluids, excrements, humours, tubes, &c. What is said is this—the navel-wheel, situated in the middle of the body, is the root of all the widespread tubes, therefore by knowing it, one fully understands how they are disposed in the body.

[Down to the last aphorism the effect of Safiyama applied to external objects formed the theme of comment; now the author turns to objects situated within the body. The first is the navel-wheel, which is said to have sixteen radii. How this idea got into currency I cannot make out. Ancient Hindus must have seen the human abdomen dissected, and having seen it, it is impossible to imagine, how they conjured up the idea of a wheel with sixteen radii. There must be some recondite metaphor involved in this, but I know not what it is.]

Another perfection.

### XXX.

In the throat-well, the subdual of hunger and thirst.

The well in the throat is “throat-well” (*kanthakúpa*). It is a pit or well-like place (and therefore called a well) behind and below the tongue and palate. By the contact of the vital airs with it (the sensations of) hunger and thirst are produced. The hunger

and thirst of the Yogi who has performed Sañyama with reference to that well, are subdued. The streams (of the vital airs) being satisfied below the uvula, this kind of perfection is accomplished.

[The throat-well is the pharynx where the air from the mouth and that from the cavity of the nostrils meet.]

Another perfection.

### XXXI.

#### Firmness in the tortoise tube.

Firmness of the mind is acquired by performing Sañyama with reference to the tube, called the "tortoise" (*kúrma*), which is situated below the throat-well. The meaning is—that on the mind entering that spot there happens no vacillation, in other words, such a firmness of the body is produced that no one can cause it to shake.

[The tortoise tube is the lower part of the larynx including the bronchí.]

Another perfection.

### XXXII.

#### In the coronal light, vision of perfected ones.

In the skull there is an aperture called *Brahma-randhra*. It is called "light" (*jyotiḥ*) because it is the site of light. Even as the spreading effulgence of a jewel in a closed room collects at the keyhole, so the light of the quality of goodness in the heart spreading collects at that aperture. And by the performance of Sañyama in it by Yogíś, those perfected ones, or celestial beings, who dwell in the space between the earth and the sky and are invisible to ordinary people, become visible, *i. e.*, Yogíś see them, and hold converse with them. This is the meaning.

[The point at the crest of the frontal bone remains open in childhood when the parietal bones are not sufficiently developed ; at maturity this opening is closed ; but, its existence having once been proved, it is believed to exist always, and is called *Brahma-*

randhra. Life is said to depart through this aperture in certain cases, and spiritually it is reckoned to be the most important part of the body. In the Tantras it is referred to with great reverence.

This is the only aphorism in the Yoga system which may be assumed as recognising the truth of the spiritual manifestations of modern European spiritualists; the *rationale*, however, is entirely different.]

He now describes the means of becoming all-knowing.

### XXXIII.

Or from *Prátibha*, everything.

*Prátibhá* is that knowledge which is independent of cause, produced solely in the mind, uncontradictory, and suddenly evolved. By performing Sañyama with reference to it this *Prátibha* knowledge, called *Táraka* or emancipator, which results before the manifestation of thorough knowledge, arises. Even as the light which becomes apparent before the rising sun, so this *Táraka*, or knowledge of everything before the manifestation of thorough knowledge, becomes apparent. When this is the case, the Yogi can know everything without resource to any particular Sañyama.

[The *P. Bháshya* explains the word *Prátibha* by the phrase *Prátibham náma tárakam*, which may mean the Morning Star, the one which is visible a little before sunrise, or that it is an emancipator. *Patanjali*, perhaps, referred to the star, as the light of that star prepares the way for the illumination of the universe by the sun; but *Bhoja*, having set a limit to external objects at the close of the 28th aphorism, is compelled to take the *Pratibhá* to be something different. According to his definition, it is a sort of instinct, or intuition, "the knowledge which is independant of cause, produced solely in the mind, uncontradictory, and suddenly evolved." He has, nevertheless, been obliged to preserve the relation of the star to the sun by referring to the illumination resulting from sunrise. The

morning star is not, like the Polar star, always the same, different planets serving its place at different times, and this uncertainty must have told against the material meaning being accepted as the right one. Whether the practising Yogi should think on the morning star, or intuition is a question which I cannot decide, but Bhoja has obviously the best of the argument.]

Another perfection.

#### XXXIV.

In the heart, a consciousness of the thinking principle.

“Heart” (*hridaya*) is a particular part of the body. The locale of the internal organ is within a small, inverted lotus placed in that part of the body. By performing Sañyama with reference to it, a knowledge of the thinking principle of one’s own and of another person is obtained, *i. e.*, the Yogi comes to know all the residua in his own thinking principle, as well as the passions, &c., in other thinking principles.

[The description of the heart is obviously rhetorical. As the seat of the thinking principle it is described as the most appropriate spot to which attention should be directed to know it thoroughly.]

Another perfection.

#### XXXV.

Experience is an undefined conception of the quality of goodness and the soul, which are totally unconnected. From Sañyama for its own object, and not for another’s object, proceeds a knowledge of the soul.

“The quality of goodness” (*sattva*) is a particular modification of nature (*pradhâna*); it is characterised by illumination and joy. ‘Soul’ (*puruṣha*) is the experiencer in the form of a ruler. From the distinction of the experiencer and the experience,—

of the rational and the irrational—there is total unconnection between the two, *i. e.*, they are separate. “A conception” of the two without any distinction, not knowing them distinctly, is experience. Hence whatever consciousness of pleasure and pain is felt by the quality of goodness assuming itself to be the master is experience. Goodness having no object of its own, its work is for “another’s object,” (*parártha*), *i. e.*, for the object of the soul. That which is distinct from it is its “own object,” (*svártha*) ; which is reliance on the true nature of the soul, or the connection of the shadow of the soul with the quality of goodness (*sattva*) devoid of egotism. By the performance of Sañyama in that connection, a knowledge of the object of the soul is derived, *i. e.*, the soul knows reliant perception to be in this way dependant on the quality of goodness. Nor does there arise any difficulty about the soul, the knower, becoming the object of knowledge, for the objection will be met by the argument of knowability (*i. e.*, that which is the knower cannot be the knowable) ; because the knower and the knowable are quite contrary.

[The soul is the experiencer of joys and sorrows ; it experiences them by its being reflected on the intellect, which is the immediate experiencer. The two are essentially different ; one is sentient, the other inert ; one the enjoyer, the other the enjoyed. An association of the two is brought about by the former being reflected on the latter, and then the former experiences what is produced in the latter. The latter, however, being irradiated by the former, acts the part of the agent or actor, and whatever it thereby feels is called enjoyment. This feeling, however, is for another’s purpose, *i. e.*, for the purpose of the soul, its own purpose being the merging in that soul. In the one case it works for another, and falsely imagines itself to be the actor, and in the other it acts with a view to attain its own end. When Sañyama is performed with this discrimination and with the object of knowing the soul, the knowledge is acquired.]

He now describes the fruits of this Sañyama.

## XXXVI.

Thence proceed intuition, audition, taction, vision, gustation and olfaction.

“Thence,” from performing Sañyama in the said quality of goodness, or practising it; even in the waking state these faculties are produced. Thereof “intuition” (*Práti<sup>bh</sup>ka*) is the knowledge already described (A. xxxiii) on the manifestation of which minute objects become visible.

“Audition” (*Srávāṇa*) is the knowledge produced in the organ of hearing. Therefrom the highest celestial sound, or that which is produced in the heaven, becomes audible.

“Taction” (*Vedanā*) is the knowledge produced by the organ of touch. That by which is known that a thing exists (*vidyati anayā*) is *Vedanā*; it is a Tantric term which has been used here. Therefrom proceeds the knowledge of such celestial things as are subjects of touch.

“Vision” (*Ádarśa*) is that knowledge which is produced by the organ of sight. Whereby is seen (*dris̄yati*) or perceived thoroughly what every form is, is *ádarśa*. When it is in its full development a knowledge of celestial forms is produced by it.

“Gustation” (*Ásváda*) is the knowledge produced by the organ of taste. That by which a thing is tasted (*ásvádati aneneti*) is *ásváda*, and on its full development a perception of celestial taste is produced.

“Olfaction” (*Vártá*) is the sensation of smell. In Tántric terminology the word *vritti* means the organ of smelling; that in which resides (*varittate*) the objects of smell (is *vritti*) and that which proceeds from that organ of smell is *Vártá*, i. e., the sensation of smell. When that becomes fully developed celestial smells become perceptible.

[This aphorism explains the collateral advantages of performing Sañyama with reference to the soul. These advantages are superior or transcendental powers in the organs of sense. Nor

are those powers confined to the meditative state; when once acquired, they are retained permanently, and even in his ordinary worldly waking state the Yogi can exercise them, so that in his ordinary faculties he becomes infinitely superior to common mortals.]

Of these different fruits he now describes the respective provinces.

### XXXVII.

These are obstacles in the meditative condition (but) perfections in the waking state.

“These,” the different fruits described above. In the state of meditation they are “obstacles,” (*upasargas*), hindrances, disturbers, because from joy, wonder, &c., resulting therefrom, meditation becomes relaxed. In the state of waking (*vyanudhána*), *i. e.*, in the ordinary state of life, they are, however, perfections (*siddhayah*), because then they yield desirable fruits.

[The perfections described are of the world worldly, required for worldly purposes, but useless for higher meditation, *i. e.*, for meditation having isolation for its aim. Nor are they simply useless, but positively obstructive, for they interfere with the even tenor of calm meditation. In the waking state they may be gratifying, and, indeed, they are useful only in that state, but apart from it they are not wanted.]

He describes another perfection.

### XXXVIII.

From slackness of the cause of bondage and from a knowledge of the process, the entrance of the thinking principle into another body.

The consciousness which results of the experiencer and the experience, acting from the constant relation existing between the soul and the intellect residing inside the body and from pervasion, is called corporeal bondage (*s'arirabandha*). When through medita-

tion the cause of bondage, which is work in the twofold form of virtue and vice, becomes slack, or attains attenuity, and when a Yogi knows the process, *i. e.*, the way in which the thinking principle issues from the heart through the organs towards worldly objects, knowing full well this is the tube called *chittavahá* through which the thinking principle circulates, and it differs thus from the tubes through which the vital airs and the rest circulate, and also knows the passages in his own body and that of others, he can enter, by the passage through which the thinking principle circulates, into the body of another, whether it be dead or alive. The thinking principle, after entering another body, follows the bent of the senses even as honey-bees follow the queen bee, (*lit.* king bee). And the Yogi who has entered another body uses it as his own body. Since work is the cause of circumscribing the fruition of the pervading soul and the thinking principle, if that circumscription be weakened or destroyed by meditation, fruition may result everywhere from the independence of the thinking principle. .

[The transfer of one's own soul into another body plays a prominent part in the legendary lore of India, and the idea was not unknown at one time in Europe. How this transfer is effected is explained in this aphorism. The bondage of the soul to the body is due to works and their deserts, works having been performed their deserts must be borne by the soul in association with the body ; but when through meditation the residua of works are obliterated and the bond is loosened, and the Yogi knows the way in which the soul goes out and comes into a body, he can, at will, make the soul travel by that way and enter another body, whether dead or alive, and again, at will, withdraw it from that body, and bring it back to its own. And wherever the soul rests there it works upon the organs, and enjoys their experiences, or in other words, the organs follow the soul as do working bees their queen.]

Another perfection.

## XXXIX.

From subdual of *Udána*, ascension and detachment from water, mud, thorns, &c.

The simultaneous waking, like the flaming up of burning chaff, of the functions (of the body) is indicated by the phrase vital air, (*Jívana*), and from differences of action, that vital air is indicated severally by the terms *Práṇa*, *Apána*, &c. Thereof one form of air is called *Práṇa*, because it passes (*praṇayanát*.) from the heart through the mouth and the nostrils. That air which descends (*apanayanát*) from the navel down to the great toe is called *Apána*. Another is called *Samána*, because, surrounding the navel, it permeates everywhere (*samantánnayanát*). Another is called *Udána*, because it ascends from the back of the neck to the head (*unnayanát*). Another air pervades the whole body, and is called *Vyána*, because it circulates over the whole body, (*vyápya nayanát*). From the subdual of the *Udána*, through *Saṇyama*, the other airs being suppressed and the tendency being upwards, the Yogí does not suffer from "water," *i. e.*, in large rivers, &c., nor from large collections of "mud," (*kardama*.) bogs, nor from sharp "thorns" (*kaṇṭaka*), *i. e.*, from his lightness he rises, like a floss of cotton, even when drowned in water or the like.

[The body is kept alive by five vital airs, and of these that which is called *Udána* is characterised by its tendency to rise upwards. Now, by making *Saṇyama* in reference to it the tendency of the other airs are overcome, and the whole body tends upwards, consequently there is no gravitation, and the Yogí is neither drowned in water, nor submerged in a bog. The attenuity of his body at the time is such that it cannot be pierced by a thorn.]

## XL.

From subdual of *Samána*, effulgence.

From the "subdual" (*jayát*) of the air called *Samána* which surrounds the fire (of the stomach), *i. e.*, by bringing it under

control through Sañyama, that unprotected fire ascends, and the Yogí appears effulgent as if flaming in glory.

[The stomach is the seat of the fire which keeps up the heat of the body and consumes food; and this fire is surrounded and kept in its place by the air called Samána. Such being the theory, it follows that when by Sañyama the air in question is overcome or rendered inapt in its special function, the fire, from its natural tendency upwards, should rise up and escape from the body in lambent flames of glory. The Buddhists, who developed the Yoga system to its utmost limit, declare that the crown of the head, the space between the eyebrows, the mouth and the shoulders are the places whence these flames usually issue. In the Sanskrit Buddhist literature of Nepal these flames are frequently described as issuing from the person of S'ákyá Buddha, whenever he immersed himself in a profound meditation, and in ancient sculptures images of Buddha are often represented with these flames occupying the place of halo, nimbus, aureola, or glory of European art. A physical cause for these flames may be found in the electric flames which have been noticed by Reichenbach on the persons of highly electric tendency under certain conditions. Of course it is an open question as to whether Yogíś had seen such electric flames and derived their descriptions therefrom, or drawn them from their fancy.]

Another perfection.

### XLI.

From Sañyama with reference to the relation between the organ of hearing and ether, a superperfect organ of hearing.

“Organ of hearing” (*Srotra*) is that organ which perceives sound, and is produced by egotism. “Ether” (*Ākáśa*) is sky, the result of the subtle rudiment of sound (*Sabdatanmátra*). The “relation” (*sambandha*) between the two is that of the site and the situated. The Yogí who has performed Sañyama with reference to it attains a superperfect organ of hearing (*Divyas'rotra*), and

becomes able to hear simultaneously subtile, intercepted, and distant sounds.

[The ether is the product of the rudiment of sound ; and the organ of hearing is dependant on it for the performance of its function ; and if the relation between the two be brought under control by performing Sañyama with reference to ether, the performer obtains the power of knowing it under all circumstances.]

Another perfection.

### XLII.

From Sañyama with reference to the relation between the body and ether, travelling in ether, from acquisition of levity, like that of cotton.

The “body” (*káya*), is the form made of the five elements. By performing Sañyama with reference to the relation which exists between the body and ether which yields space (for objects to abide in) a levity, like that of cotton and the like, is effected, *i. e.*, they become alike. Having effected this and attained the levity, the Yogí, walking at will over water, or on a spider’s web, or on the rays of the sun, at his choice travels on ether.

[The *rationale* of the operation in this case is very much the same as in the last ; the body is kept down by the ether, and if the ether be under control, the body acquires the power of rising over it.]

Another perfection.

### XLIII.

The function independent of external functions is the great incorporeal. Therefrom the destruction of the covering of light.

That mental function which is out of the body, *i. e.*, independent of it, is named the “great incorporeal” (*Mahávideha*), because it is exclusive of the stedfastness of the relation between the body and egotism. “Therefrom,” from Sañyama performed with reference to it, the destruction of the covering of light is

effected, *i. e.*, the covering consisting of afflictions, works, &c., which obstruct the light of the thinking principle centered in the quality of goodness alone, is removed. The meaning is this: The external functions of the thinking principle which result from the body and egotism are called factitious (*kalpita*). When, abandoning the feeling of body and egotism, there arises an independent (or self-reliant) mental function it is non-fictitious (*akalpita*). By performing Sañyama with reference to it, all taints in the thinking principle of the Yogi are removed.

[The covering produced by the qualities of foulness and darkness prevent the true light of the quality of goodness from being seen to perfection. If that covering be removed the vision is perfect. When retiring under this covering, which is no other than consciousness under the name of egotism, the mind entertains factitious ideas, and produces factitious works, which are consequently false. Divested of this covering it works differently, and whatever it produces is real. Sañyama performed with reference to the relation existing between the body and egotism removes the covering, and thereby cleanses the thinking principle.]

Having thus described the different forms of perfection, including anterior destruction of objects, posterior destruction of objects, and the middle condition; having also explained the knowledge of the externals, regions, &c., of the internals, the formation of the body, of the powers of friendliness, &c., which effect particular objects; having, further, described the conditions of internal and external organs and such like expedients for meditation, as also the conditions of the vital airs, Prâna, &c., and other perfections for producing stedfastness in the thinking principle and earnestness in meditation; he now, with a view to point out the various means for the perfection of the seeded and the seedless meditations for the visual inspection of the soul, says,

#### XLIV.

From Sañyama with reference to grossness, nature, subtlety, concomitance and fruition, conquest of the elements.

By performance of Sañyama with reference to the five specific conditions or qualities, such as grossness, &c., of the five elements, earth, &c., the conquest of the elements is effected, *i. e.*, the elements become subservient. Thereof "grossness" (*sthula*) implies the specific forms in which the elements are perceived. "Nature" (*svarípa*) implies respectively their effects, such as smell, viscosity, heat, impulsion, and impenetrability. "Subtlety" (*súkshma*) implies successively the subtile conditions which are the causes of the elements: these are the subtile or rudimentary forms of matter (*tanmátra*). "Concomitancy" (*anvaya*) includes the qualities of shape, disposition, and existence, which are everywhere seen to co-exist. "Fruition" (*arthavatva*) is that power in the qualities which lead to enjoyment and emancipation. Thus, by performing Sañyama in regard severally to the five elements, nature and conditions aforesaid, the Yogi conquers the elements. This is to be done in this way,—first in the gross form, next in the subtile form. To the performer of Sañyama in this order, nature and the elements become fulfillers of desires, even as cows follow calves.

[The object of this aphorism is to explain the advantages derivable from the performance of Sañyama with reference to the five elements. The elements brought under control subserve the wants and wishes of the controller, even as cows subserve the acquirments of calves by following them wherever they ramble.]

He now describes the fruit of this conquest over the elements.

#### XLV.

Therefrom proceed attenuation, &c., as also excellence of body and the indestructibility of its qualities.

(1) "Attenuation" (*animá*) the attainment of the form of atoms (molecularity).

(2) "Levity" (*laghimá*) attainment of lightness like that of a floss of cotton.

(3) "Ponderosity" (*garimá*) attainment of great weight.

(4) "Illimitability," (*mahimá*) attainment of greatness, or the power of touching the moon or the like with the tip of one's finger.

(5) "Irresistible will" (*prákúmya*) non-frustration of desires.

(6) "Supremacy" (*is'itva*) highest authority over the body and the internal organ.

(7) "Subjection" (*vas'itva*) prevailing everywhere, *i. e.*, the elements being subservient to him do not disobey his behests.

(8) "Fulfilment of desires," (*kámávasáyitva*) accomplishing one's desire everywhere, *i. e.*, in whatever object a desire is formed, the Yogi becomes accomplished in that, or brings it to fruition by attaining it.

These, attenuations, &c., as accessories to meditation, become prevalent in Yogis on their conquering the elements. Thus by attaining molecularity he can enter into (the substance of) a diamond. The other cases should be explained in the same way. These eight qualities, attenuation, &c., are called great perfections, (*mahásiddhis*). "Excellence of body" (*káyasampat*), which will be presently described, is also obtained. "The indestructibility of its qualities," means that the shape and the other qualities of that body are not liable to destruction by any means. Neither does fire burn its shape, nor wind dry it up, and so on.

[The exact nature of the advantages to be derived from Sañyama with reference to the elements, not having been described in the next preceding aphorism, the author supplies the omission in this aphorism. The advantages are the eight siddhis or perfections an account of which has already been given on page 121. They include many of the perfections described in separate aphorisms. I fail to perceive any marked distinction between the 5th and the 8th. The explanation of the 8th given on p. 121 is Tántric.]

He next explains what excellence of the body is—

#### XLVI.

Colour, loveliness, might, and adamantine hardness constitute the excellence of the body.

"Colour, loveliness, and might" are well-known. "Adamantine hardness" (*vajrasaṅhananatva*) means that hardness is produced in one's body like that of the diamond. These are the excellences that become manifest in the body.

[While yearning for the severance of all bondage to worldly objects, the Yogis cannot get over the natural love which ties the mind to the body. The body is one's own, and it is always desirable to have it in a perfect state of beauty, and the means are here provided to give it perfection. Of course it is introduced here as the effect of a particular kind of Sañyama, and not as a thing to be desiderated.]

Having thus explained the excellence of the body, he now describes the conquest of the organs by one who has attained his (proper) stage.

### XLVII.

From the performance of Sañyama with reference to perception, nature, egoism, concomitance, and fruition, (proceeds) the conquest of the organs.

"Perception" (*grahana*) is the function of the organs directed to their (respective) objects. "Nature" (*avarúpa*) is ordinary manifesting power. "Egoism" (*asmilá*) is consciousness. "Concomitance" (*anvayatva*) and "fruition" (*arthavatva*) as explained above (A. XLIV, p. 157). By performing Sañyama with reference to these five conditions of these organs the Yogi becomes the conqueror of his organs.

[The five conditions of these organs include 1st, their nature, *i. e.*, their power of making objects manifest; 2nd, their function when in active operation; 3rd, their consciousness of being active; 4th, their concomitance or relation to each other or mutual interdependance; and 5th, their fruition or the result they produce. If all these conditions be brought under control by performing Sañyama with reference to them, the organs necessarily come under complete control.]

The fruit thereof.

## XLVIII.

Therefrom proceed quickness as of mind, uninstrumental perception, and the conquest of nature.

“Quickness as of mind” (*manojavita*) is the attainment by the body of extreme quickness of motion like that of the mind. “Uninstrumental perception” (*vikarana bhāva*) is the accomplishment of the functions of the organs without the aid of the body. “Conquest of nature” (*pradhānajaya*) is bringing everything under subjection. These perfections are attained by those who have overcome their organs. In this science these are called honey-drops (*madhupratīka*). Even as every drop of honey has its taste, so each of these is tasteful, and therefore they are honey-drops.

[The advantage of having control over the organs as described in the last preceding aphorism is, that the Yogī is then able to perceive things without the aid of his material organs, and to do so with the quickness of the mind, *i. e.*, instantaneously. He also acquires mastery over nature in every way. The nature here referred to is the *Pradhāna* of the Sāṅkhya categories, the highest of the twenty-five, next only to soul.]

Having described the conquest of the (external) organs, he now points out the conquest of the internal organ.

## • XLIX.

Supremacy over all conditions and omniscience, the moment the distinctive knowledge of the quality of goodness and the soul (is attained).

The knowledge of the distinction between the quality of goodness and the soul which results from performing Sañyama with reference to the modification of pure goodness, is “distinctive knowledge” (*anyatākhyāti*). From the subsidence, through the influence of the Sañyama, of the conception about the qualities being agents the Yogīs, who are in that condition, attain in their meditation supremacy over all conditions and omniscience.

“Supremacy over all conditions” (*sarvabhávádhishthátritva*) is the attainment of power like a master over all modifications of qualities. “Omniscience” (*sarvajnatrítva*) is correct knowledge of those qualities as they exist in calm, (*sánta*,) enlivened, (*udita*,) and latent (*avyapadisya*) conditions. In this science this perfection is called “sorrowless perfection” *vis'okasiddhi*, while those that have been described before are indicated by the term *Vasi'kára* (controul).

[The object of this aphorism is to describe the effect of getting controul over the mind or the internal organ. That controul enables the Yogi to perceive the difference between the quality of goodness and the soul, and endows him with absolute mastery over all conditions of existence and thorough omniscience. The omniscience directly refers to the conditions of the three qualities, but indirectly to all and everything in the universe. Everything in the universe depends upon the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, and those qualities are either in a calm state, or in a state of excitement, or latent; and if one comes to know their conditions he necessarily knows all and everything that proceeds from them. This state of supreme knowledge is called *Vis'oka* or sorrowless perfection, for when it is attained there cannot possibly be any cause for pain or sorrow; whereas in the perfections previously described there is always some room for sorrow, or longing of some kind or other. The latter ensure controul over the things they refer to, and the controul is more or less perfect according to circumstances, and they are fitly called *Vasi'kára* or ‘controul.’ They do not, however, secure absolute immunity from pain, and this necessitates the marked distinction in the designations.]

Next he describes another stage.

L.

From indifference even to this (perfection) through destruction of the seed of evils, (results) isolation.

When the Yogi becomes indifferent even to that sorrowless perfection, then ignorance, the seed of the evils such as passion, &c., being destroyed by the root, "isolation," (*kaivalya*), absolute cessation of pain, results, *i. e.*, on the termination of the influence of the qualities the soul is restored, placed permanently, in its own state.

[Nor is the sorrowless perfection the ultimatum. When the Sañyama is exercised freely it produces an indifference in the mind in regard to it, and this indifference destroys ignorance, the root of all evil, and leads to isolation, or the detachment of soul from the bondage of worldly ties.]

He now points out the means of remaining in this meditation.

## LI.

Avoidance should be made of association with, and encouragement of, celestial temptations, from apprehension of evils recurring.

There are four classes of Yogis; *viz.*, 1st, those practisers of the Yoga on whom the light is just shedding; 2nd, Ritambharas, or those who possess the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3rd, those who have conquered the elements and the organs; 4th, those who have exceeded all objects of contemplation. Thereof, to those who have attained the fourth meditation, when the seven surrounding stages of knowledge have been attained, and the final stage of 'honeyed knowledge' has been interviewed, the celestial (*stháninah*) gods become tempters, *i. e.*, they offer presents of handsome women, elixir vitae, &c. With such temptations no association should be made, nor any encouragement be given to them. From association there is a fall into the enjoyment of worldly pleasures. With regard to them therefore both association and encouragement should be renounced.

[When the Yogi attains the last described sorrowless stage, he is exposed to a great danger. The gods envy his high excellence, but, unable to exercise open enmity, they try to divert him from

his purpose by insidious means. They place temptations in his way, offer him handsome women, inexhaustible wealth, long life, and so forth to bring him back to the ways of the world, and thereby frustrate his purpose of attaining isolation. They act the part of Satan in the Bible and of Māra in the Buddhist system. In Hindu legends Indra is the chief god who envies men who are about to rise superior to carnal weakness, and the means he employs are the courtesans of his court, who descend on earth and tempt all Yogis by their celestial charms. According to the Tantras when such temptations fail, resort is made to fear. Frightful forms of all kinds assail the Yogi when he is engaged in his meditations; venomous serpents hiss around him; tigers prowl about him; ogres come with wide open mouth to devour him. These are, in the technical language of the Yoga system, called *Vibhishikā*. The lukewarm yield to these, break their meditation, and are lost; the determined take no note of them, and attain their object. It is believed that these frightful forms never do any actual mischief; their object is to frighten, to put to test the determination and firmness of the Yogi, and not to do any positive harm. The advice given in the Tantras is not to give any encouragement to such temptations, nor to be depressed or frightened by the dangers which become manifest. Firmness suffices to overcome them. The text here does not refer to frightening.]

In connexion with the manifestation of this fruitful understanding, he describes a means besides the Sañiyamas above described.

## LII.

From Sañyama with reference to the course of moments (proceeds) an understanding born of discriminative knowledge.

“ Moment” (*khanya*) is the smallest division of time, which can no further be reduced in quantity. “ Course” (*krama*) the suc-

cessive modifications of such moments of time. By performing Sañyama with reference to the course of moments, the aforesaid understanding of discriminative knowledge results. The meaning is this: This is a moment of time, it is subsequent to another, therefore the first is antecedent to this. For him who has performed Sañyama with reference to this course, interview with the minutest is effected in the course of a moment, and so is the interview effected of the subtle nature. This is manifestation of discriminative knowledge.

[The next step of the Yogi is to perform Sañyama with reference to the progress of time, and when this is accomplished, discriminative knowledge becomes thoroughly manifest.]

He now applies this Sañyama to a special subject.

### LIII.

Therefrom results the knowledge of the difference between two similars when that difference is not marked out by kind, character and habitat.

“Kind, character, and habitat” (*játi, lakṣaṇi, des'a*) are the means of differentiation of things. Sometimes “kind” (*játi*) is the cause of distinction; as this is a cow, this is a buffalo. When the kind is the same, “character” (*lakṣaṇa*) may be the cause of distinction; as this is spotted, this is tawny. Where kind and character are alike, the cause of distinction may be “habitat,” (*des'a*); thus with two emblematic fruits of the same size and colour, one may be of one country and the other of another. There are again cases in which distinction cannot be determined, as particles of white earth of one country. When Sañyama is performed to ascertain distinctions in the last class of cases, a knowledge of distinction is produced, and by its exercise distinctions of even the exceedingly subtle categories may be perceived. What is said is this: When distinctions cannot be ascertained by any other means they, including a knowledge of such

distinctions in the subtile categories, may be known through this Sañyama.

[This aphorism explains what is meant by discriminative knowledge. Under ordinary circumstances discrimination is made by attention to kind, character and habitat. But this is not possible in the case of the subtile categories which are not amenable to such tests. For them Sañyama is the only means, and it should be brought to bear upon them. When the Sañyama is accomplished, the power of discriminating them is fully acquired, and this is discriminative knowledge.]

To explain the name, object, and nature of the aforesaid knowledge resulting from discrimination, he says.

#### LIV.

The knowledge resulting from discrimination is emancipating, omni-objective, semper-objective, instantaneous.

The knowledge which results from the power of the aforesaid Sañyama at the last stage is “emancipating” (*Táraka*). That whereby Yogíś are ferried over the unfathomable ocean of the world has the significant name of *Táraka*, (the emancipating). He describes its object ; it is a “omni-objective” (*sarva-vishaya*) ; all categories from the *Mahat* downward are its objects, and therefore it is omni-objective. Its characteristic is its *semper-objectivity* (*sarvahávishayatva*). That which has for its objects the categories in all conditions, whether gross or subtile, in all their modifications, and existing in all forms, is always *semper-objective*. Another characteristic of it is “instantaneous” (*akrama*). Being finally modified it has to make no progress in accepting two, three or one form, hence “instantaneous,” *i. e.*, (a Yogí in this stage) perceives everything at once, like an emblematic fruit in the palm of one’s hand.

[The discriminative knowledge aforesaid is here more fully explained. It grasps all the categories and therefore the whole

universe. It makes them its object at all times, and its knowledge is never absent. It acts instantaneously, because it has the whole thing before it, and needs no process of observation and retiociation to come to an understanding. And everything being known by it, it effects emancipation, for emancipation means true knowledge.]

He now says what results from this emancipating knowledge proceeding from discrimination.

#### LV.

On the purification of the quality of goodness and of soul becoming equal, (there results) isolation.

“The quality of goodness and soul” have already been defined. When their purification becomes equal there is isolation. The “purification” (*s'uddhi*) of the quality of goodness of the thinking principle is effected when, on the cessation of the assumption of agency, it merges into its first cause. The purification of soul is the absence of its factitious enjoyment. When the two are equally purified (in this way), isolation is effected with regard to the soul, *i. e.* it is emancipated.

[The thinking principle ordinarily fancies itself to be the agent of all work, *i. e.*, it is conscious of being the actor in all cases, and this is its natural function; but when this feeling is removed by discriminative knowledge, it reverts to its primary original condition, and ceases to cherish any idea of its being the actor, and this is its purification. Similarly soul, though itself devoid of action, is always engaged in an unnatural factitious enjoyment of the fruits of work by its association with the thinking principle, and when that association is removed it is purified. And this double purification, the cessation of the thinking principle from fancying itself the actor and consequent submersion into its original cause, and the removal of the association between the soul and the thinking principle, effects the isolation or separation of the soul from all attachments, and this is emancipation from the bondage of the world.]

Thus have been described in this chapter the three principal components of the Yoga, (i—iii) ; their collective name Sañyama, (iv) ; the merits of that Sañyama, (v—x) ; the three modifications of things, the antecedent, the middle, the post-cedent conditions, (xi—xvi) ; the Siddhis (xvii) ; the external perfections giving knowledge of regions (xviii—xxviii) ; the internal perfections, giving knowledge of the organization of the body (xxix—xli) ; the organs (xli) ; the stages of control of matter and organizations (xli—xlvi) ; the means of attaining discriminative knowledge, the emancipating knowledge, the highest Samadhi (xlvi—l) ; the subsidence of the thinking principle in its primary cause and isolation (l—lvi). These are the subjects described in this chapter on perfections. (Condensed as before.)

This is the end of the third quarter, or the quarter on perfections, of the commentary, entitled Rájamártanda, on Patanjali's Institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.

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## CHAPTER FOURTH.

I adore that solitary, unborn Isána who is made up solely of thinking principle and bliss, and by whose fiat isolation is produced without (the aid of) any special means.

Now the author commences the chapter on Isolation with a view to establish by inferential arguments and by refutation of errors resulting from mistaken convictions, the true nature of Isolation. And by showing that the perfections aforesaid result from birth and various other causes, he demonstrates that they appear with the help of the power resulting from the practice of Samádhi in former births and from causes in this life from the time of birth. Further, with a view to afford assurance that no harm is done to Samádhi which may be achieved in course of many births, and to prove the preeminence of the completion of Samádhi as also for the consummation of the isolating Yoga, he says :—

## I.

The Perfections are produced by birth, herb, incantations, austerity, or Samádhi.

Some perfections are caused by birth, as the power of flying in the air and the like in birds, or the perfected qualities of knowledge manifesting themselves immediately after birth, as in the great sage Kapila and others. *Perfections from herbs*—as firmness of the boy, &c. produced by the use of elixirs in Pátála and such like places. *Perfections from incantations*—as ascent in the air by the repetition of particular mantras. *Perfections from austerity*—as in the case of Vis'vámitra and others. *Perfections from Samádhi*—as already described in the preceding chapter.

These perfections result in those persons who have destroyed pain in previous births ; hence, as in the case of perfection by Samádhi, so in the case of others, the real cause is the practice of Samádhi in former births ; incantations, &c. are merely instruments.

[The word *Siddhi* comes from the root *sish* 'to accomplish,' and means something accomplished. Transcendental powers attainable by the performance of Sañyama, are perfections accomplished by special means and therefore called Siddhis or perfections ; and having used that English equivalent elsewhere I have thought fit, for the sake of uniformity, to use it in the above aphorism. It is, however, not fully expressive here. Special powers, or faculties would have been much more expressive and to the point, the purport of the aphorism being that some faculties are derived from birth, some from herbs, some from incantations, some from the practice of austerities, and some from Samádhi. This general principle is laid down with a view to prepare the way to what follows.]

It might be contended that since in Nandí'svara and others the change of kind, &c., were effected in this life, how can you then establish the causality of the practice of Samádhi in previous lives ? In reply to this, he says :

## II.

Change of kind (results) from transmutation of the material cause.

The "change of kind," &c., in Nandí'svara and others in this life (were produced) by "the transmutation of material causes" (*prakṛityápúrāt*). Future materials (or materials which are ordinarily produced in a subsequent life, come up and), produce in this life the transmutations, *i. e.*, they change themselves into other kinds.

[The general principle having been laid down in the first aphorism that special faculties are produced by five causes, the question arises, how does the body, which is produced by birth, change even in this life, the material cause remaining unaltered,

and the Samádhi performed in a previous life no thaving effected any change at birth? The reply is that Samádhi is not the material but an instrumental cause, and it prepares the way for the selfmutation of the material cause.

*Prakrti* is here used in the sense of material cause, or the materials of which the body is made up. *Apúraṇa* is to fill up. The two words together mean "the materials fill up," *i. e.*, they undergo the necessary transmutations to change one kind into another. The purport is that even in this life the materials of the body may so change as to convert a Bráhmaṇa's body into a divine one, as in the case of Nandis'vara, or a Kshatriya body into a Bráhmaṇa one, as in the case of Vis'vámitra, and consequently the exception taken to the argument put forth in the first aphorism to the effect that "birth, &c. are causes of perfection" is not tenable. By the use of the word *páśchátya*, 'future', the commentator means that the changes which in ordinary course would take place in a future life, take place in exceptional cases in this life.]

It may be argued that merits, demerits, &c., are in such cases seen to be resulting (in this life when their fruits would not under the theory be liable to manifestation), how can we then attribute to them causality in the transmutation of the material cause in this life? To this the author says :

### III.

In the mutation of the material cause merit is non-efficient: from it proceeds the piercing of the covering, as in the case of the husbandman.

"Merit" (*nimitta*), virtue, &c. In the transformation of the material cause merit is non-efficient, for a cause cannot be set in motion by an effect. Where then is there the operation of virtue, &c.? To this he says: "From it proceeds the piercing of the covering, as in the case of the husbandman." "From it," from the performance of virtuous acts, &c., proceeds "the piercing" (*bheda*) or destruction of whatever "covering" (*varana*) obstrue-

tion, such as vice, &c., exists, the two being mutually antagonistic, and the obstruction being destroyed, the material causes themselves become effective in their desiderated work. This he illustrates by an example. "As in the case of a husbandman." Even as a husbandman or farmer, wishing to carry water from one field to another, pierces only the obstacle to the flow of water, and that being pierced, water itself assumes the modification of expansion, without any exertion on the part of the husbandman to the expansion of water, so should be understood to be the case with regard to virtue, &c.

[Following the line of argument adopted in the preceding aphorism, the author shows that virtue, &c., are not the immediate causes of the change which takes place when a Bráhman becomes a god, as in the case of Nandí'svara, but that they serve the subsidiary purpose of removing the obstacles which stand in the way of the change, and the change takes place by itself. The illustration given puts this very clearly. The husbandman does not make the water flow, he only removes the obstacles, and then the water flows by itself from its own inherent tendency to follow the law of gravitation.]

When a Yogi, who has a mastery over the cardinal principles, with a view to enjoy at once the fruits of his actions, from the perception of his own superior transcendental powers, wishes to assume many bodies at the same time, whence does he derive many thinking principles (to vitalize those bodies)? In reply to this question the author, says:

#### IV.

The created thinking principles (proceed) solely from egoism.

The thinking principles which animate the bodies created by a Yogi, proceed through his will solely from their original cause, i. e., from egoism. They emanate at once as sparks from a fire.

[Among the perfections mentioned in chapter III the power of multiplying one's own body, so as to produce many where there is one, is not mentioned, but here it is taken for granted that

an accomplished Yogí possesses this power, and that he does produce them to effect quickly his emancipation by simultaneously performing in many bodies those works which promote his end, and the question is raised as to how does a Yogí, who creates many bodies and himself animates them all, provide a thinking principle for each of them? The answer given is that through his will he makes his egoism send forth the needful, even as a fire sends forth sparks from itself. This multiplication of bodies is called *Káyaryúba Yoga* or the *Yoga of many bodies.*]

Then, how do numerous thinking principles, having diversity of objects, produce one effect? To this, he replies :

#### V.

In the diverse tendency of the many the impelling thinking principle is one.

“In the diverse tendency” (*pravrittibheda*) or multifunctionality of the many thinking principles the one thinking principle of the Yogí is the impelling force or actuator, because it is the ruler, and therefore there is no difference of object. The meaning is—that as in its own body the mind directs the eyes, the hands, &c., according to its will, from its being the ruler, so does it in the other bodies.

[In the preceding aphorism the question having been solved as to how a single individual can provide thinking principles for many bodies, the question arises as to how can many thinking principles act in concert and preserve the unity of the creator? If this unity be not admitted, there would be so many independent individuals, each following the bent of his own mind, and the idea of one individual acting as many without any loss of individuality, would be lost. This doubt is removed by the explanation that the thinking principles provided to the many are in reality one, and entirely controlled by the primary thinking principle, of which they are mere scintillations.]

The thinking principle which belongs to the perfections resulting from birth, &c., are produced by the same five causes,

and yet the thinking principle produced by Samádhi is distinct from the others. To show this he says :

### VI.

Thereof the meditation-born one is without any residua.

“The meditation-born” (*dhyánaja*) thinking principle or that which is produced by Samádhi, is, among the five, the one which is “without any residua” (*anáśaya*), *i. e.*, without any residua of (former) work. This is the meaning.

[Thinking principles are said to be of five kinds, because they proceed severally from birth, herbs, incantation, penances, and meditation (A. 1). The word used (*ja*), means “born,” but the object is not to imply that the thinking principles are actually born of herbs, incantations, &c., but to indicate the training, habit of thought, disposition or impurities which it acquires under the five different circumstances. The first four are said to depend on the residua of former works, and the last to have nothing to rest upon, it being self-supporting, *i. e.*, not resulting from the residua of any former work.]

To show that the thinking principle of the Yogí is distinct in its work, even as it is distinct from other thinking principles in being devoid of pain, &c., he says :

### VII.

The work of a Yogí is neither white nor black : those of others are of three kinds.

That work which produces good fruit, such as sacrifices, &c., is “white” (*sukla*). That which produces a bad result, such as Bráhmañicide, is “black” (*krishna*). That which is mixed up of the two, is white-black (*sukla-krishna*). Thereof, the white work belongs to wise people, to those who are engaged in charity, asceticism, the study of the Vedas, &c.; the black belongs to the vicious; and the white-black (or mixed kind) to ordinary men. As regards Yogís, who have performed the Sañyama, work is of a

different character to these: their work produces no fruit, for they undertake it after renouncing all desire for fruition.

[In the first three kinds of work fruition is inseparable. The wise give alms, perform penances, read the Vedas, display their benevolence, &c. &c. and derive the fruits thereof; the vicious commit wicked actions and suffer for the same; ordinary mortals are sometimes engaged in good actions and sometimes in bad ones, and suffer or enjoy accordingly. The Yogis, who renounce the fruits of all actions, can neither suffer nor enjoy from what they do, and hence their work is declared to be distinct from the works of others. They are, in the language of the Bhagavadgita, like the lotus-leaf which, lying on water or having water on it, is never wetted.]

Now he describes the fruit of such works.

### VIII.

Thence proceeds the manifestation of the residua which are suitable to its fruition.

Now, the residua of works produce two sorts of fruits, one sort being memory only, and the other, kind, age, and experience. Thereof, those residua which have for their fruition kind, age, and experience which are derivable in one or many births, have already been described above (p. 69). Of those the only fruit of which is memory, the manifestation proceeds from the same works. Even as work produces a body, whether as a Deva, or a human being, or a lower animal, so does it by its maturity lead to a corresponding manifestation of residua (*vásaná*). The meaning is this. Should a celestial or other body once acquired by a certain work be acquired even after the interposition of a hundred other births the memorial residua of the former state will manifest themselves again. Their memory revives according to circumstances, even when residing in other regions. In the intermediate states, though existing, they remain in a latent condition. Nor do the residua produced in course of existence in hell and other places become evident then.

[For the sake of verbal fidelity I have used memory as the equivalent of the Sanskrit term *Smṛiti* of the commentary ; but the object aimed at is not memory in its ordinary signification, but the remembrance in one life of appetites, desires, and affections of a preceding one. These results manifest themselves in, what in European philosophy is called, instinct. They are remembrances, because they arise without any conscious purpose, though they are not without consciousness. European philosophers, who do not recognise transmigration, finding Instinct to be opposed to Reason, take it to be something distinct from it—a distinct faculty. In its widest signification it extends to living beings in general—to plants as well as to animals,—but for psychological purposes it is limited by Dugald Stewart to Appetites, Desires, and Affections. Butler changes Desires into Passions, but without any material change of purport. Dr. Bain says “Instinct is untaught ability,” (*Mental and Moral Science*, Bk. III, c. IV), and this is amplified by Hamilton into “an agent which performs blindly and ignorantly a work of intelligence and knowledge.” (Reid’s *Works*, p. 761a.) Paley has “a propensity prior to experience, and independent of instruction.” Milton calls it “Reason discursive or intuitive.” These definitions have been summed up into “untaught ability,” “untaught propensity,” “unconscious purpose.” It is opposed to Habit, which is the result of tuition and exercise, and distinct from Reason, which presupposes argumentation and deliberation. The memory of our text is Instinct as defined above ; but our author does not recognise spontaneity in anything, nor purpose independent of Reason. He attributes the etiology of Instinct to residua left in the thinking principle by rational action, and the said residua lie dormant till they are made vivid in a subsequent life. Habits leave their residua exactly in the same way as other actions, and they not only become manifest in the next life, but also in the progeny, as in the cases of pointers and other animals. In short, according to our author, Reason is one and the sole faculty of all knowing, the only principle of certain.

ty, and it manifests itself as Reason or Instinct differently under different circumstance. Anyhow, the meaning of our author will be best understood by replacing his Memory by Instinct.

The aphorism under notice explains the fruit of work as manifested by Instinct. Having already described that work leads to two kinds of fruit, Instinct and deserts, or in his language memory and kind, age and experience, he now says that Instinct does not manifest itself uniformly at every successive birth, but according to circumstances when it is needed in subsequent lives, even after many interruptions, the residua for it remaining dormant during such interruption. Thus, a man born in the next life as a dog having no occasion for his human instincts, acts as a dog, but twenty or more generations after, when he is again born as a man, his early instincts revive, and he acts according to them. This is the theory which the aphorism explains by saying that residua manifest themselves in conformity to the fruition of work. When a work entails existence as a serpent, those residua become manifest which are appropriate to such an existence, but not those which are appropriate for other forms of life. In other words, residua remain dormant or in a potential state until the necessary excitants are in operation. The *S. P. Bhāṣya*, explains this by saying, "when a celestial work is in fruition, it does not become the cause of manifestation of the residua of infernal, brutal or human states; it then enlivens only those residua which are conformable to a celestial existence." (*Na hi daivam karma vīpachyamānam nāraka-tiryāñ-manushya-vāsanābhīvyakti-nimittam bhavati kintu daivānugrañā evāya vāsanā vyajante*). The purport is that each kind of existence brings to light its own appropriate residua.]

Doubt having been produced of there existing any causal relation in these residua, he establishes it by saying :

#### IX.

From the uniformity of memory and residua there is uninterruptibility of relation, even after breaks by caste, locality and time.

Of worldly beings transmigrating in diverse forms, when one, after experiencing one form, attains that form again after an interruption of a thousand other births, the residua of impressions appropriate to that state, which had been formed at the first birth and had become latent from want of the necessary conditions, become manifest on the attainment of that suitable state. Thus, there is, notwithstanding breaks caused by caste, locality and time, an "uninterruptibility" (*ānantarya*) or continuity in producing their own necessary fruit of memory. How so? "From the uniformity of memory and residua." Thus, on the performance of a work there is produced a deposit of residuum on the quality of goodness of the thinking principle, and that is the germ of the fruits of heaven, hell, &c.; or it is the residua of works such as sacrifices &c. It exists as a latent power, or as a power of the actor in relation to experience and experiencer. From these residua proceeds memory, from memory the experiencing of pleasure and pain, and from that experience again come residua, memory, &c. It is true that where memory and residua are different there is, from want of uninterruptibility, a difficulty in producing a relation of cause and effect; but in our case here, where impressions become residua, and residua merge into memory, and they reside in concord in one thinking principle, the relation of cause and effect is not difficult or hard of effectuation.

[According to the preceding aphorism the residua of former births are the causes of manifestation of certain effects; but, since concomitancy is necessary between cause and effect while the intervention of many dissimilar births between two similars causes an interruption, it may be argued that residua are not the causes of memory, as alleged. This objection is met by saying that the memory remains, and therefore sequence is obviously not broken. The memory of sucking the teats on the part of an infant returns after many births, whenever that infant is again born as a human being, though it does not manifest itself when the same infant is born as a bird or a serpent, and it shows

that the memory is not lost. Hence the relation of cause and effect is not broken.]

Admitting the uninterruptibility of residua, and their relation as cause and effect, it may be asked when an impression first takes place is it caused by residua, or without a cause? To solve this doubt, he says:

### X.

There is no beginning about them, because of the eternity of desire.

“About them,” *i. e.*, about or in regard to residua. “No beginning” (*anáditva*), that which has no commencement. The meaning is, these have no beginning. How? “Because of the eternity of desire.” This “desire” (*ásisha*) or longing of an intensely delusive character—(manifesting itself in such wishes as) ‘may the means of effecting my pleasure be always mine; may there never be a separation between me and them’—is the cause of residua, and that being eternal there is no beginning. This is the meaning. What is meant is this: From the proximity of the cause the tendency of the functions of impressions and residua cannot be checked, and the thinking principle, from its expansible and contractile character, pierced by the impressions, residua and the like, modifies itself when it attains each appropriate existence.

[The theory of Instincts being the result of action in former lives is open to the grave objection that it does not account for Instinct in the first instance. A being born for the first time should have, according to the theory, no Instinct. The initial impression must therefore be causeless, and so there is no reason to admit that residua are the causes of effect, *i. e.*, of birth, age and experience. This objection is met in this aphorism by saying that Desire is eternal, and therefore there is no necessity for a beginning. Desire is essential to existence; there would be no existence if there was no Desire; and that Desire produces residua, and so there is no break in the course of eternity. The

opponent wished to expose the fallacy of the argument regarding residua being the cause of Intuition by showing that there could be no residua at the first start, and the author accepts a *regressus in infinitum* to surmount the difficulty. According to him the universe had no beginning and will never end, and therefore there is no occasion to seek a beginning.]

From their infinity it being doubtful that the residua can ever be destroyed, he points out the means of destroying them.

## XI.

Since they are agglomerated by cause, effect, substratum and support, their absence would produce the absence of the others.

Conception (*anubhava*) is the cause of residua ; desire, &c., are the causes of conceptions ; and of them the cause is ignorance. Thus is (ignorance) both the immediate and the mediate "cause" (*hetu*). "Effect" (*phala*) is body, memory, &c. "Substratum" (*ásraya*) is the intellectual principle. "Support" (*álabhana* or object of desire) is the same for both conceptions and residua. Now, since these infinite residua are collected by these cause, effect, substratum and support, when they are absent, *i. e.*, when they may be likened to roasted seeds, on their being burnt by knowledge and Yoga, there being no root left, the residua cannot sprout, nor lead to action, and thus they are destroyed.

[Now the question is raised, how can one undo that which is eternal? and the answer given is—since desires proceed from, or are the sum total of, cause, effect, substratum and support, one has to remove those conditions which produce desires, and that removal *ipso facto* removes desires. The removal is effected by the aid of Yoga. Yoga knowledge parches cause, effect, substratum, and support by exposing their real nature, and when so parched, they become, like roasted seeds, unfit for germination, and their destruction follows as a matter of course. Of course this is limited to the individual who effects the parching, and does not extend to the world at large.]

It may be questioned, that since the thinking principle is being constantly destroyed, and there is a difference in their relation as cause and effect from their want of simultaneity between residua and their effects, how can there be a unity? To prove the unity, he says :

## XII.

(The thinking principle) exists in its proper nature; the past and the future (result) from differences in the condition of qualities.

The (possibility of) production of things which are absolutely non-existent is unreasonable, from their want of relation to existence. Nowhere has there been any relation to existence in the horns of a hare.

In the case of a nonentity as an effect, with what design can causes proceed to act? None enters into action for a false object, and it being opposed to entity there is no relation of nonentity to it. When truth attains its own identity, how can it become baseless and untrue? The meaning is, it cannot accept an antagonistic form. Hence from there being no possibility of the destruction of existence, and from the impossibility of the origin of non-existence, the qualified, convertible by qualities, always remains in one form. The qualities, alone, change into their threefold conditions. Attaining each condition, the qualified forsakes its original form, and, remaining in the present condition, attains the state of objects of enjoyment. Hence in this science are established the distinctions of the past and future conditions of qualities, and of their relation to each other as cause and effect. Hence, too, the same thinking principle is made to exist as the qualified until isolation, and none can prevent it.

[The removal suggested in the preceding aphorism suggests the idea of destruction; but that is not possible. Nothing can proceed from non-existence, and no existence can be absolute non-existence, and the difficulty is solved by referring to the

doctrine explained in A. 14 C. III which recognizes a threefold condition of existence, the antecedent, the postcedent, and the present. Matter is eternal, and remains always an existence; but its conditions vary; accordingly when the present condition of a thing is destroyed, the thing reverts to one or other of its two other conditions, and the parching of the seeds implies their resolution into the antecedent condition. This is the theory of Moderate Nominalism or Conceptualism with its threefold condition of *Universalia ante rem*, as thoughts in the mind of God; *Universalia in re*, as the essence (quiddity) of things; and *Universalia post rem*, as concepts. The text looks to thoughts or ideas or plastic types without reference to God.]

He now describes of what forms these qualified and the qualities are.

### XIII.

They are individualised or subtile, and consist of qualities.

The qualities and the qualified described above are divided into the individualised and the subtile. The “qualities” (*gunāḥ*) are of the forms of goodness, foulness, and darkness. “To consist of” (*tadātmānah*) is to be of that nature, or to be modified to that form: this is the meaning. Since there is seen a concomitance in all persons, both externally and internally, through goodness, foulness, and darkness in the forms of pleasure, pain and delusion, of individuals and conceptions, and since it is found that which is concomitant is also its modified form, as in the case of jars which are concomitants of earth are also modified forms of earth, therefore the modification of qualities is evident.

[The simple proposition in this aphorism is that all attributes are mere modifications of the three primary qualities. Circumstances may make them subtile or gross, but, whether one or the other, they consist of nothing but the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness modified in some one form or another. They are mere modes of being, but not radically different beings.]

Apprehending the doubt that if all these three qualities be the chief causes everywhere, how can we talk of one qualified (or one substratum of quality) ? he says :

#### XIV.

From unity of modification (results) unity of a thing.

Although there are three qualities, yet their modification into the member and the membered, (in some cases goodness becoming the membered, in some cases foulness, and in others darkness,) being one, "unity" (*tattva*) or oneness is admitted. Thus, in the examples this is the earth, this is the air, &c., (in which unity is observed, for earth is a modification of darkness, and air of foulness.)

[The purport is that as only one modification can take place of the thinking principle at a time, the unity of a thing is never disturbed. The thinking principle under similar circumstances changes exactly in the same way, and no difference can possibly result. In other words, as the three qualities can be only separately ascendant, one at a time, the simultaneous perception of the effects of all the three cannot be effected ; and this meets the objection raised in the preamble.]

Had objects existed distinct from cognition it would be proper to talk of the unity or multiplicity of objects, but when cognition itself from the influence of residua existing in the relation of cause and effect, appears in different shapes, how can you say so ? In reply to this question, he says :

#### XV.

Even in the sameness of object, the course of the two are distinct, from diversity of the thinking principle.

the "of the two," of the cognition and the cognizable, the course proceed, distinct, follow different or separate roads. How so ? From non-equality of thinking principles even in the sameness of object.

Even in similar things, as the attainment of women and the like, differences of thinking are noticeable in different observers from the resulting sensations of pleasure, pain and delusion. Thus, on beholding a beautiful and attractive woman, pleasure is felt by an amorous person, enmity by her rival, and disgust by an ascetic. And since these different kinds of feeling arise from one object there can be no agency in the thing itself. If it be said that object is the effect of our thinking principle only, the object would appear in one form only. Also, if a thing were an effect of the thinking principle then there would be no other thing extant when that thinking principle would be occupied with one thing. (If it be said) be it so, we deny it. For how could that thing then be beheld by many others? And since it is so beheld, it cannot be an effect of the thinking principle. If it be said that it is created by many at the same time, the reply would be that there would be a difference between a work produced by many, and a work produced by one. And if the difference be not admitted, then there being difference of cause without a difference of effect, the universe would be either causeless, or uniform. What is said is this: should there be no difference of effect when the causes are different, then the whole universe resulting from many causes would either be of one form, or not following the different causes, be causeless from its independence (of the causes). And if it is so (it may be asked) why does it not, being made of the three qualities, produce in the same percipient the sensations (simultaneously) of pleasure, pain and delusion? The case is not so. Even as the object consists of three qualities, so is the thinking principle made up of three qualities, and in its perception of objects, merits and demerits are accessory causes, and from their prevalence or depression results the manifestation of the thinking principle in such and such (varying) forms. Thus in the presence of a woman near an amorous person, his thinking principle, disposed towards merit through the influence of the quality of goodness, becomes full of pleasure. From the co-operation of the quality of foulness, which is auxiliary to vice,

for all rival wives, it becomes painful. Similarly from the co-operation of the quality of darkness, which is attended by ardent vice, it becomes to angry rival wives the cause of delusion. Hence the cognizable object is independent of cognition, and consequently cognizable and cognition, being contradictory in their natures, cannot bear the relation of cause and effect. Thus it being possible without any difference in the cause for the existence of a difference in effect from their relation, the independence of cognition from the object is established.

[The question discussed in the preceding aphorism raises a doubt as to whether perception is due to objects or to the cognitive power. It cannot be said that objects produce perception, for in that case a given object would always and everywhere produce the same sensation, as a given cause cannot produce dissimilar effects. A handsome woman should be a handsome woman to all beholders, without a distinction. In the world this is, however, not the case. A woman produces very dissimilar feelings in different beholders, and she, as the object, cannot therefore be said to be the cause of perception. On the other hand, the thinking principle cannot be the cause, for if you accept it to be one in all persons, it, as a cause, cannot produce different effects; and if you accept it to be different in different individuals, dissimilar causes would lead to one uniform result, which is impossible. The solution offered is that thinking principle and object are different, but inasmuch as both are governed by the three qualities, the prevalence of a particular quality at a particular time in the thinking principle produces a difference in the perception of an object. The "diversity of the thinking principle" in the text implies a diversity in its condition as regards the state of the qualities working within it. The argument here is the same which European philosophers discuss with reference to sensations and sensibles; and the optional use of *jñána* and *vijnána* by our author shows that he means cognition or sensation and perception, and not the higher knowledge elsewhere indicated by the

word *jñána*. I have used for it cognition after Mr. Jardine, who defines it as "a general name which we may apply to all those mental states in which there is made known in consciousness either some affection or activity of the mind itself, or some external quality or object." ('The Elements of the Psychology of Cognition,' p. 1). The object to which this *jñána* or cognition is applied is *jneya* or cognizable, which is just the same with *idea* as used by Locke, who says, "it is the term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by *phenomena, notion, species*, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." Idea, however, has been used in so many varying senses by European metaphysicians that I have thought it safe to confine myself to *cognizable* or *object*, as least likely to cause misconceptions. The theory of eternity of matter is here made the basis of the argument.]

Since a cognition, being an illuminator, is by nature perceptive, and the object, being susceptible of illumination, is by nature perceptible, why should cognition not perceive and recollect all things simultaneously? With a view to remove such doubt, he says :

### XVI.

A thing is known or unknown from its dependence on its change of form in the thinking principle.

"Its" of the object. "From its change of form" (*uparágát*). From its producing forms in the thinking principle, an external object becomes known or unknown. The meaning is this: in the attainment of their production all things depend on the conjunction of their causes. The production of the cognition of a blue or other colour depends on the accessory cause of the form being brought forward as an object through the passage of the organs of sensation; perception being impossible without the object, since there is no correlation. Hence, by whatever object is the form of cognition modified, that object is brought

into cognition, *i. e.*, that object becomes known. That which does not give its shape (to the thinking principle) is held to be unknown. Similarly, recollection is produced of that object which, having been known before, has left residua in the mind, and which residua, excited by a similar object, acting as the accessory cause, brings it to our knowledge. Hence, neither cognition, nor memory is constant everywhere, nor is there any inconsistency.

[The argument mooted in the last aphorism is further developed by saying that the effect of the qualities is transmitted to the thinking principle through the object seen, and the thinking principle is thereby modified differently under different circumstances. The qualities act from two different directions, first in the thinking principle apart from the object, and next in the object, and through it in the thinking principle. A man in a passion has the quality of foulness prevalent in him, and then that foulness affects everything he sees, though it is not foul; and when all the qualities are calm in him, he sees a foul action, and the foulness of that action enters within him and tinges his thinking principle from without.]

To remove the doubt that since the perceiving soul does not perceive a yellow colour when it perceives a blue, there is liability of its assuming, like the thinking principle, different shapes, or being modified from its being at times the perceiver, he says :

### XVII.

The functions of the thinking principle are always known, for its presiding soul is unmodifiable.

All the functions of the thinking principle—characterised as they are by proofs, misconceptions, &c.,—are “always,” *i. e.*, at all times, known to its percipient soul, since it is unmodifiable, or wanting in liability to change from its being of the form of the intellect (*chidrūpa*). Were it mutable, the constant perceptibility of those functions would not follow, the mutability

being (necessarily) occasional. The meaning is this. The soul of the form of intellect always remaining as the presiding principle, and its intimate associate, the pure element, the thinking principle, being also always present, by whatever object it (the latter) is modified in shape there is the probability of that object being always brought into contact with the shadow of the former (soul, *chit*); and such being the case it is established that there is constant perceptibility, and never can there be any apprehension of change.

[Having explained the relation of cognition to cognizables, and the *rationale* of the process by which things become known or unknown, the author proceeds to explain how it is that the thinking principle, which, under the circumstances alleged, is always changing and assuming new forms, should still be able to know different objects, or have the power of understanding. The thinking principle is admitted to be *in se* unconscious, and is itself undergoing constant modifications, and cannot therefore exercise intelligence, and be itself the cause of knowledge. But, says the author, its presiding soul is constant and immutable, and associated with that soul it derives reflected intelligence, and by its aid it is always able to know whatever external object casts its shadow on it. In other words, though the thinking principle is itself unconscious, it derives intelligence from the soul which is pure intelligence and absolutely immutable. The *P. Bhāṣya* explains the aphorism by saying, "had the presiding soul been liable, like the thinking principle, to constant mutation, then objects or the functions of the thinking principle would have become, like sounds and other objects, sometimes known and sometimes unknown to it; but constant consciousness (*lit.* perceptibility) of the mind is indicated by the immutability of its presiding soul." (*Yaddi chittavat prabhurapi purushah pariṇameta tatastadvishayā chitta-vrittayah śabdādvishayavat jnātājñātāh syuh, sadājñātātvanu-mānasastatprabhoh purushasyāpariṇāmitvam anumāpayati.*) This idea is further developed in other commentaries.]

Now it may be said that since the thinking principle itself,

from excess of the quality of goodness, is the illuminant, it can from its self-illumination, illuminate both itself and the object, and the act of perception can thereby be completed, what is the use of the assumption of a separate percipient? To allay this doubt, he says :

### XVIII.

It is not self-illuminative, since it is perceptible.

“It,” the thinking principle, is not “self-illuminative” (*svábháva*), expositor of itself, but it is perceptible by the soul. How so? Because it is “perceptible.” A perceptible is known by a percepient, as in the case of a water-jar or the like. The thinking principle is an object of perception, and therefore it is not self-illuminative.

[The argument in the next preceding aphorism would suggest the idea that the thinking principle, whether directly or indirectly, was itself the perceiver, and that being the case there is no necessity for assuming a separate perceiver. Where one assumption is sufficient, two are not needed. This objection of the opponent is refuted in the aphorism under notice, by saying that the thinking principle cannot be the percipient, or self-illuminative, because it is itself an object of perception. That which is an object of perception cannot itself be percipient; and the commentator illustrates this by citing the example of a water-jar, which, as an object of perception, cannot know itself. The *P. Bháshya* elaborates the argument by saying, “Even as the other organs and their objects, such as audition, &c., cannot be self-illuminative from the circumstance of their being perceptibles, the mind should be so known. Nor can fire be an example in this instance; for even fire cannot make its own hidden identity visible. Manifestation is seen to result from the conjunction of a manifestator with a manifestable, and such conjunction cannot take place with one's own identity. Besides if the theory of self-illuminativeness of the thinking principle be admitted, it would not be perceptible to any body else.” (*Yathetaránindriyá-*

ni śabdādayaścha dṛśyatvánna svábhásáni tathá manopi pratye-tavyam. Na chágñiratra dṛishṭántam. Nahyagnirátmavarúpama-prakásam prakásayati. Prakásácháyam prakásya-prakásaka sañyoge dṛishṭah, na cha svarúpamátreṣti sañyoyah kinchā svá-bhásam chittamityagráhyameva kasyachiditi.) The illustration of fire becomes appropriate on the assumption that it owes its luminosity to itself. But the luminosity contemplated by the term *svábhása* is knowledge, and not light. In fact, the *light* of the text can be understood only by substituting for it the word *knowledge*, throughout the discussion.]

It may be said that the argument here has accepted the proposition, (*i. e.*, it involves a *petitio principii*), for the perceptibility of the thinking principle has not yet been established. Besides, in men the functions of accepting that which is good and rejecting that which is injurious are made manifest through the consciousness of one's own intellect; and such feelings as "I am angry," "I am afraid," "I have no desire," cannot be produced without the consciousness of the intellect (and since they are, the agency of the soul is not needed.) To meet this argument, he says :

### XIX.

Attention cannot be directed to both at the same time.

The understanding of an object is the establishment of its usefulness by (knowing it to be) this—this is the object which is the cause of pleasure or pain. The understanding of the intellect is the establishment of the use of that object through pleasure or pain in the form of I (or the ego). In the perception of an object two such kinds of understanding cannot be effected at the same time, for there is a contradiction. There is no possibility of effecting two contradictory actions simultaneously, and therefore it is not possible to perceive "both," *i. e.*, cognition and cognizable at the same time. Hence, it is laid down that the thinking principle is not self-illuminative. Further, even if

two such actions could be accomplished, their fruits could not result, for there cannot be an apprehension of the two fruits, because the thinking principle being directed outwards to grasp an object cannot know itself. The result is confined only to the object, and not to itself. This is the meaning.

[The opponent again comes to the charge, and says that the intellect or understanding may supply the place of the soul, for the thinking principle may see, and the intellect may decide about the nature of the sight. The author demurs to this by saying two such functions cannot take place simultaneously, or the thinking principle cannot see and argue at the same time. The sensation of hunger is first felt, and then its nature discussed. The thinking principle must undergo two modifications, once to feel, and then to consider, and these it cannot undergo at once; so these two acts can never take place simultaneously, and consequently it cannot be said that the thinking principle is alone sufficient to account for consciousness and knowledge: a separate cause must be assigned for these two feelings, and that cause is the soul. The *P. Bhāṣya* pithily disposes of the question by saying, "It is not possible to behold one's own self and another at the same time, for it leads to the theory of the momentarists who hold action, effect and cause to be the same." (*Na chaikasmin kṣhāṇe svapararūpāvadhāraṇam yuktam, kṣhāṇikavādino yad bhāvanam saiva kriyātadeva cha kārakam ityabhyupagamah.*) The meaning of the aphorism is simply that the thinking principle cannot perform the two acts of perception and self-knowing at the same time, and therefore it is obvious that it cannot by itself be the cause of intelligence.]

Let it be admitted that a cognition cannot be self-perceptive, still may it not be perceived by another cognition? Assuming such a question, he says:

## XX.

If one cognition be the perceptible of another, there would be an excessiveness of cognitions to

cognitions, and also a confusion of memory.

If one cognition could cognize another, then that cognition being itself unintelligent and unable to illuminate another, we must assume a third cognition and for it another, and so on and a thing could not be perceived in the whole lifetime of a man. Nor can an object be known when the cognition remains unknown.

It leads also to "confusion of memory." On a particular colour or a taste being produced in a cognition there would arise an endless series of cognitions to perceive it, and when the residua left by a former cognition would attempt to recall it to memory there would arise, from there being no break in the ideas of cognitions and objects, cognitions and memories simultaneously, and hence, it being impossible to make out with reference to what object the recollection has arisen, there would be a confusion of memory, *i. e.*, it would not be known that this is the memory of colour and this is the memory of taste.

[The explanation above given leaves the door open to the assumption that one cognition may perceive another, and thus obviate the necessity of assuming the agency of the soul, *i. e.*, each individual may have many cognitions which co-operate with each other in producing knowledge of a particular object. To preclude this theory, the author brings forward the argument of *regressus in infinitum*. If one cognition could perceive another, we would require a third to perceive the second, and so on, and there would be no end to the chain. It would, he urges, also lead to a confusion of memory, for on one idea being called to memory all its attendant ideas would arise to infinity, and it would be impossible to determine which is the particular idea that has been revived.]

The question may then be asked, if, in the absence of self-perceptive power in cognitions (*buddhi*), one cognition cannot be known by another, how do we use the idea this is the perception of an object? To remove this doubt, he expounds his conclusion.

## XXI.

The intellection of its own cognition takes place when it takes its form through the non-transitional soul.

“Soul” (*purusha*), being of the form of intelligence, is called *chiti* (intellect). It is “non-transitional” (*apratisañkramá*), that which has no transition or passing into another place is so called : by this is meant that it does not mix with anything. In the modification of the member and the membered, the (three) qualities, (as members) in passing into the qualified or membered, assume their forms, and in the world atoms, moving on, produce the forms of objects ; but the power of intellection (*i. e.*, soul) does not do so, because it always retains its own form, inasmuch as it exists in itself. Hence when the thinking principle, being near it, assumes its shape, intellection takes place ; and when the soul, by its contact with the function of the thinking principle being endowed with understanding, cognizes, then the knowing of the thinking principle of its own self takes place.

[The soul never undergoes any modification, but by its reflection on the thinking principle that principle derives its intelligence, and that intelligent state is therefore said to be attained through the non-transitional soul. It is then *chiti* or intelligence, because for the time being it has intelligence in it, and this is explained by the commentator. When the thinking principle in its intelligent state assumes the form of an object, it is able to know its own notions. The *P. Bháshya* explains the text by saying, “unmodifiable is the power of experiencing ; it is also non-transitional. On its reflection falling on the excessively modifiable (the thinking principle) the functions of the latter reflect on it. Thereupon people call it the function of understanding from its imitating the function of the thinking principle enlivened by intelligence, though it is devoid of the function of understanding.” (The force of the argument here depends upon the distinction made between intelligence and the function of understanding, for the soul, though intelligence itself, does not exercise any

function.) (*Aparinámini hi bhoktrisaktirapratisañkramá cha parináminyatgarthe pratisañkránteva tadvrittimanupatali, tasyáscha práptachaitanyopagraharupáyá baddhivrittaranukárimátratayá buddhivrittayavisishṭá hi jnánavrittirákhyaáyate*).

Pandit Govindadeva Sástrí, following some later commentators, explains the text so as to mean that the soul itself undergoes the modification. The earlier and more reliable commentators, however, do not accept that meaning, and as the sequel shows them to be right I have accepted their interpretation.]

To show that thus the self-perceptive thinking principle, being able to perceive all objects, becomes fit for all purposes, he says :

## XXII.

The thinking principle, modified by the knower and the knowable, is (able to perceive) all objects.

“The knower” (*drashṭá*) is soul. To be modified by it is to seem to be of its form from its propinquity. To be modified by the knowable, is to undergo the modification of assuming the form of the (object) perceived. When this (double modification) takes place, then it becomes able to perceive all objects. Even as a transparent crystal, or a mirror, or the like is fit to receive the reflection of all images, so the quality of goodness, unstained by foulness and darkness, is able, from its purity, to receive the reflection of the soul (*chit*). Not so foulness and darkness, owing to their want of purity. The quality of goodness, divested of all association with foulness and darkness, from its being liable to only one modification, and being able to receive the reflection of the intelligent soul, remains like a steady lamp-flame till the attainment of emancipation (*moksha*). Even as in the vicinity of a loadstone motion is produced in iron, so in the vicinity of the intelligent soul manifestible intelligence is reflected on the quality of goodness. Accordingly, in this system of philosophy two powers of intelligence are recognized, the eternally present (*nityoditá*) and the manifestible (*abhivyañgá*). The eternally

present power of intelligence is soul. The manifestible power of intelligence is the quality of goodness, which derives its power by its contiguity to the former. From extreme propinquity, it, as an intimate friend, effectuates the experiencership of the soul. And as that quality is the resting place of *Purusha*, the supreme soul, the Sāṅkhyas, who recognise an actionless Brahma, attribute to it the experience of pleasure, pain and delusion. (The epithets "supreme" and "Brahma" are meaningless here, for the human soul is all that is meant: God as Brahma is not indicated).

Now, though from the extreme abeyance of some one quality and of its prevalence at certain times and in some cases, all the three qualities are constantly modifying in the forms of pleasure, pain, and delusion, and the thinking principle is not pure, yet when that principle modifies its form into that pure quality of goodness, which is the essence of work, it attains its perceptibility. The pure primary quality of goodness of the thinking principle, on the one side reflected upon by intelligence or the soul, and on the other covered by the thinking principle modified into the forms of external objects, and becoming conscious from the effect of the reflection of the soul, becomes able to feel pleasure, pain and delusion, though it is devoid of intelligence. Thus the experience, from its extreme propinquity to soul and from want of due discrimination, is said to be of soul, though it is unexperiencing. To this effect has Vindhya-vāsī said: "the sufferingness of the quality of goodness is the sufferingness of soul." Elsewhere it is said. "Even as an image produced by the reflection of a reflected image on a mirror is called a reflection, so the manifestation of the shadow of intelligence, like the intelligence of soul, is implied by the word *pratisaṅkrānti* or contact."

It might be argued that, though the reflection of the ever-modifying may be seen in a transparent body, as a human face in a looking-glass, how can there arise the reflection of the absolutely transparent, all-pervading, unmodifying soul in the comparatively untransparent quality of goodness? To this the reply is—Not knowing the true nature of reflection you

have said this. The display of the manifestible power of intelligence in the quality of goodness, by the propinquity of the soul, is called reflection. Even as is that sentient power, abiding in the soul, so does its reflection appear in the quality of goodness.

Again, since it has been said that soul is absolutely pure, how can it be in contact with the (comparatively) untransparent quality of goodness? This argument is not correct, for the contact of the sun and the like (which are highly transparent) is seen in water and the like which are less transparent. If it be said that there can be no contact of that which is undefined, that too would be inconsistent, because we see the all-pervading sky (*ákáśa*) reflected in a looking-glass, or the like. And such being the case, there can be no objection to the effectuation of the reflection (under notice).

It may be argued that what has been said about there being an apparent or external contact by propinquity of the sentient power with the quality of goodness of the thinking principle, there should be the experience of pain and pleasure on the part of soul, is inconsistent, for how can the quality of goodness of the thinking principle be produced without a modification of *Prakṛiti*? and for what object should there be a modification of *Prakṛiti*? To this it is replied, that *Prakṛiti* has to effectuate soul's experience of the objects of mundane existence, and, its duty being to effectuate the object of soul, the modification is proper.

It may be urged that this is not proved, for the effectuation of the soul's object is impossible. The duty of effectuating soul's object implies the consciousness on the part of *Prakṛiti* that "it is my duty to effectuate soul's object;" but how can there be such a consciousness on the part of the unsentient *Prakṛiti*? If you admit the consciousness, how will you maintain its unsentience or inertness? The reply to this is that in the two forms of progressive and regressive modification there are the two natural powers (of progression and regression), and they are called the duty of effectuating soul's purpose. Those powers are natural to the unsentient *Prakṛiti*. Its progressive modification (*anu-*

*loma-parináma*) is the outward one, extending from the intellect to gross matter; while entering through its cause and ending with the annihilation of egoism is its regressive modification, (*pratiloma parináma*). Hence on the completion of soul's experience, the two natural powers being destroyed, Prakṛiti, having achieved its object, ceases to modify. In performing such duty for soul on the part of the unsentient Prakṛiti, there is no inconsistency.

Again, it may be argued, if there be two such powers naturally possessed by Prakṛiti, then why is exertion made for salvation (*moksha*) by those who long for it? and if salvation be no object the science of those who advise it is worthless. The answer is, the relation of soul and Prakṛiti as experiencer and experience is from time without a beginning, and that being the case, when pain is felt on the part of Prakṛiti in action, from the assumption of its being the agent or actor, there arises the desire—“how can there be absolute stoppage of my suffering?” and hence there is a necessity on the part of Prakṛiti for the advice of the science which points out the means of stopping the pain. The substance of the advice of the science is the quality of goodness of the thinking principle as governed by work. In other works on philosophy this has been accepted to be the nature of ignorance (*avidyá*). That nature, exerting for salvation, relying on the help of the advice of such sciences, obtain the reward called salvation. All works influenced by the (necessary) conjunction of causes attain their own selves, and it is established by proof that of the work called *moksha*, which is acquired by regressive modification, this is the conjunction of causes, because it cannot be attained by any other method. Hence without that cause how can it be effected? It follows, therefore, that the quality of goodness of the thinking principle modified by worldly objects in contact and enlightened by the shadow of soul, conducts, through the conviction of (the reality of) those objects, all worldly affairs. Deluded people, looking at such thinking principle, imagine it and all such thinking principles to be the world. They should be enlightened.

[Having met all the principal objections to the theory of the thinking principle being sensitized into intelligence by a reflection of soul which is intelligence, the author enunciates that the thinking principle, modified on the one hand by the soul and on the other by external objects, is brought into play in every case of sensation. The word used in the text for the double transformation is *uparakta*, which is a compound of *upa* 'excess' and *ranja* 'to colour' or 'tinge,' meaning that the thinking principle is doubly tinged or influenced; and this conveys the true meaning of the text. The *P. Bhāṣya* accordingly cites the example of the crystal vase tinged by the coloured object put in it. Inasmuch as the theory, however, is that the thinking principle assumes the shape of the object in every instance of cognition, and the same epithet is used for the double tinging, it is necessary, for the sake of consistency, to adopt the same phraseology everywhere; I have accordingly used the word modified.

Bhoja, after explaining the text, enters into a long dissertation on the various objections that may be started to the doctrine, and refutes them *seriatim*. The first and most obvious objection is—how can a shadow of soul produce in an object on which it falls the quality of the original? Soul may be intelligence, but its shadow cannot reasonably be said to convey that intelligence on the object on which it falls. The commentator sees no harm in this, for, says he, such action is manifest in the motion produced in iron by the propinquity of a loadstone. He describes soul's intelligence to be two-fold; one is *Nityoditā* or always and eternally present, and the other *Abhivyāṅgā* or manifestible, and it is the latter that sensitizes the thinking principle.

The next argument is, if it be the thinking principle that is sensitized, how can soul be said to be the experiencer? The reply is—that soul is really not the experiencer, but since experience is felt by the agency of its shadow it is in an indiscriminate way called experiencer. *—, yet the*

Then the question arises how can reflection *of* darkness, *is. The organs*

a perfectly transparent object like soul, on a comparatively untransparent object like the thinking principle with the quality of goodness prevalent in it? This is met by saying that the word reflection here simply is the technical name of the influence of soul on the thinking principle.

An argument like the last is raised with reference to the contact of the absolutely pure soul with a comparatively impure thinking principle. This, however, is held possible, as we see the sun reflected in foul water. The contact of that which is illimitable with a finite object is also possible, as in the case of the sky reflected in a mirror.

The objection next urged is that why should Prakriti or nature change to produce effects? The answer is, it subserves the purposes of soul. This answer is, however, not enough, for Prakriti or nature being unintelligent, cannot have such a consciousness of duty, and act up to it. The reply is that Prakriti has two inherent powers in it, that of progression and of regression, and acting under their impulses it subserves the purposes of soul, and therefore there is no inconsistency.

The admission of the two powers aforesaid suggests the objection that, if they be natural they will run their course of their own accord, and there is no use in controlling them. The effect of the regressive action is salvation, and that must come of itself; none needs try for it, and, if so, what is the use of Yoga as a means of salvation? This is met by saying that it is Prakriti when in action that feels pain and, wishing to put a stop to that pain, wants to know how to do so, and hence arises the desire for salvation, and the Yoga points out the means of doing so. Without such advice Prakriti would go on working for ever.

The *P. Bhāṣya* has not noticed these discussions.]

Suspecting that it may be argued that if all purposes are accomplished by a thinking principle of this kind, why should we acknowledge an experiencer of which there is no proof, he gives the proofs (in support of the existence) of the spectator.

## XXIII.

It exists for another's purpose, though coloured by uncountable residua, because it operates by association.

"It," the thinking principle, "coloured," *i. e.*, assuming many forms, through the influence of an uncountable number of "residua" (*vásaná*) (existing in it), effectuates for "another's," *i. e.*, a master's, "purpose" (*artha*) the work of experience and final reward. How so? "Because it operates by association." "Association" (*sañhatya*), *i. e.*, by fully joining together, operates to accomplish a purpose. We see that works performed jointly are for another, as in the case of a bed or a chair. The co-operators (in this case) are the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, which, modifying in the form of the thinking principle, jointly work for another, and that "another" is soul.

It may be urged that through the force of the example by which the subservience of another's purpose by an embodied stranger, as a bed or a chair or the like, is established, a similar (embodied) stranger may be proved, but you contemplate an unembodied "another," and, the opposite being proved, your argument becomes destructive of the object. The reply is thus given: Although in the example pervasion of the premiss has been accepted as general in regard to effectuating another's purpose, yet on consideration of the specific distinctions of goodness in the qualified, the distinction will be evident, and the position that the experiencer is another is established. Thus, as in inferring the existence of fire in a mountain covered with fuel of a particular kind from the smoke seen there, the inference that fire is produced by fuel and is distinct from other fires is taken for granted, so here in inferring that the specific experience called goodness is for another's purpose. In the same way the experiencing superior is proved to be another of the form of intelligence and isolated. Although he appears as the other and the noblest of all, yet the body is superior to objects resulting from the quality of darkness, because it is manifest, and the asylum of the organs. The organs

are superior to the body; to them the illuminating quality of goodness is superior; and he who is the illuminator is distinct from illumination and of the form of intelligence. How can then there arise this conjunction? (*i. e.*, there is no actual conjunction but a mere shadow).

[The explanations given in previous aphorisms still leave the door-open to the argument that the agency of the soul is redundant and not wanted. If the thinking principle doubly modified as above stated is sufficient for conception, why make the soul the experiencer of worldly joys and sorrows? To this question the reply given is that, though the thinking principle is actuated by innumerable desires resulting from the residua of former works, it nevertheless acts for another's purpose, and not for itself, since it acts by the co-operation of many causes, and not of its own motion. Though there are innumerable residua in it, they cannot work until external agencies are brought to bear upon them, and that shows that the thinking principle has no power of action *suo motu*. It is unconscious too, so that it can have no will of its own. It acts only when it is worked upon, and this is indicated by the phrase "operates by association." Inasmuch, however, as its action may tend to bring on liberation which is for the good of the soul, it is to be inferred that in its other actions it subserves the gratification of that soul. No line can be drawn between what actions are for the soul and what are not, and logically what is true for a part, *i. e.*, for liberation, must be true for the whole. This idea is expressed in the *Sāñkhya-kārikā* by the verse "generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities," (lx). It should be noticed, however, that the functions which are usually attributed to nature or *Prakṛiti* in the *Sāñkhya* are invariably assigned to the thinking principle (*chitta*) in the *Yoga* of Patanjali. In fact, in the *Yoga* system, *chitta* plays a more important part than the *Buddhi* of Kapila, and appertains to itself the character both of *Buddhi* and *Prakṛiti*, but the commentator does not mark this distinction. In

his works Kapila frequently refers to Prakṛiti where Patañjali confines himself to Chitta. The action of the unconscious thinking principle for another's purpose is usually explained by the illustration of the saffron cart, which, unconscious as it is, suberves the purpose of man by bringing him a desirable condiment.]

He now proceeds to show by ten aphorisms that the fruit of this philosophy is isolation.

#### XXIV.

For the knower of the difference there is a cessation of the idea of self in the thinking principle.

Thus the quality of goodness and soul being proved to be distinct, whatever idea exists of his self being the thinking principle, in him who knows them to be distinct, that is the one is different from the other, the same surceases, *i. e.*, the idea ceases of the thinking principle being the actor, knower, and experiencer.

[Having disposed of all metaphysical questions bearing on the subject-matter of his work, the author now reverts to the thesis, how isolation is effected. The metaphysical questions above set forth, when thoroughly understood, enable a person to divest himself of the idea that his self or ego is his thinking principle, and to believe that his soul is the real self. He knows that the thinking principle is unconscious and not his self. The idea, in fact, is altogether set at rest, and his soul is so far freed from the natural wrong belief that the thinking principle is the ego.]

(To the question) what happens when this takes place, he says :

#### XXV.

Then the thinking principle is turned towards discriminative knowledge, and bowed down by the weight of commencing isolation.

The thinking principle, which was turned outwards by igno-

rance, to derive the fruit of experiencing worldly objects, deflects now towards "discriminative knowledge," (*viveka*) *i. e.*, turns inward towards the path of discriminative knowledge, and is "bowed down by the weight of coming isolation," (*kaivalya-pragbhara*) *i. e.*, the fruit of isolation, or the commencement of isolation.

[When the belief aforesaid is effected, the thinking principle drops the cosmos, and turns inward to the cultivation of discriminative knowledge, and is overpowered by the sense of isolation which begins to sprout in him.]

Now, by describing the causes of the impediments which occur in the thinking principle flowing towards discrimination, he points out the means of overcoming them.

#### XXVI.

In the intervals thereof other impressions arise from residua.

"Thereof," *i. e.*, of the thinking principle engaged in meditation. In the "intervals" (*ckhidreshu*), in the void spaces of the thinking principle, whatever "impressions" (*jnánáni*) or ideas of the waking (or worldly) state arise, the same proceed from the now-fading residua of the former waking state, in the forms of "I," "mine," and the like. What is said is that by means of extirpating the internal organ their avoidance should be effected.

[While isolation is progressing there are opportunities when a person is not actually engaged in meditation, *i. e.*, during the breaks in his meditation, for worldly ideas to sprout from the residua of former existences still clinging to the mind. These are calculated to disturb the process of isolation, and are so far impediments, which should be destroyed.]

He now says that the means of avoidance has already been explained.

#### XXVII.

The avoidance of these should be (the same) as already described in the case of afflictions.

The avoidance of these should be effected in the same way in which the avoidance of afflictions, ignorance, &c., has been already pointed out (C. II. x—xi). Even as they, scorched by the fire of knowledge, do not, like roasted seeds, sprout in the field of the thinking principle, so are the residua, (rendered infructuose).

[The ideas should be destroyed in the same way as afflictions, for which provision has been made in a previous part of the work, (C. II. x—xi).]

He now describes the means by which a Yogi, on his meditation becoming steady by the non-production of other thoughts in the way aforesaid, may attain excellence.

### XXVIII.

On the completion of the series there is produced the meditation (called) the Cloud of Virtue, even in the case of the non-aspirant, from the appearance of constant discrimination.

“On the completion of the series” (*prasaṅkhyāne*), i. e., after careful contemplation of the nature and respective peculiarities of all the categories arranged in due order. On that being accomplished even in the case of the “non-aspirant” (*akusida*), or one who does not wish for any fruition, there is produced from the appearance of constant discrimination, on the cessation of all foreign thoughts in his thinking principle, the meditation called the Cloud of Virtue. That which showers (*mehati*) or irrigates profusely the virtue (*dharma*) which is neither black nor white, (cf. IV, VII,) and which is subservient to the attainment of the *summum bonum* is the “Cloud of Virtue” (*Dharmamegha*). By this is shown that the highest virtue is the cause of knowledge.

[When the series of works enjoined above for the perfection of Yoga meditation have been completed, then there arises in the mind of the performer a meditation called Cloud of Virtue, which means that all virtues are showered on it, even when

it does not wish for them. The sense is that though the Yogi may not wish for any reward, still the reward comes. The word in the text is *akusida*, from *a* meaning negation and *kusida* interest, that is disinterestedly. The theory is that the perfection of virtue results spontaneously in a person who completes his Yoga duties as described in the text.]

He explains next what results from that Cloud of Virtue.

### XXIX.

Thence follows the cessation of afflictions and works.

The meaning is, that on the manifestation of knowledge, their antecedent causes being removed, there is a cessation of the afflictions resulting from ignorance, and of all the works which are, according as they are white, &c., of three kinds. (vii).

[The object of the cloud is now described. On its appearance there results a complete cessation of all afflictions and all works; there is no longer any sense of affliction left in the mind of the Yogi, and he has neither any desire for work, nor any residua of former works left in his mind.]

He next explains what happens on this cessation.

### XXX.

Then the knowable becomes small from the infiniteness of the knowledge free from all coverings and impurities.

“Coverings” (*ávaran̄i*), are those whereby the thinking principle is covered; they are the afflictions; they are also impurities. Free from them, means devoid of them. From the knowledge (*jñána*) becoming free, like the sky bereft of cloud, and “from its infiniteness” (*ányatyát*), i. e., from its being without a break, or all-pervading, “the knowable” (*jneya*) becomes “small” (*alpa*), or fit to be counted or grasped. The meaning is, that the Yogi can easily know everything.

[The next advantage is that the objects of sense are reduced to a minimum. Knowledge then becomes limitless and free from all impurities and coverings or interruptions ; and placed against such knowledge, knowables or cognizables become insignificant, *i. e.*, that knowledge which can grasp everything, finds no difficulty in understanding small matters. Not that there is a reduction in the number or quantity of cognizables, but, placed besides limitless knowledge, they, by comparison, become insignificant.]

He then states what takes place after this :

### XXXI.

Thereupon takes place the termination of the succession of the modifications of the qualities which have accomplished their end.

Those which have "accomplished" (*krita*), completed, soul's purpose or object in the form of experience and emancipation are called *kritárháh*, or those which have accomplished their end. The "qualities" (*gunáh*) are goodness, foulness, and darkness. "Their modifications" (*parináma*) are their conditions of existence in relation to each other as members and membered, in a progressive or a regressive state to the time of the completion of the purpose of soul. Their "succession" (*krama*) is to be presently described. Its "termination" (*parisamápti*) is its finality, *i. e.*, it does not arise or happen again.

[Proceeding onwards, the next effect of the Yoga is a cessation of the tendency on the part of the qualities to undergo change. The qualities are the most active agents in worldly life, and it is their modifications that produce the various impressions of life, and when they cease to change, there is *ipso facto* a cessation of worldly impressions. It is the duty of Prakṛiti to minister to the purposes of soul, and as the qualities are inherent in Prakṛiti, the qualities may be taken as synonymous with Prakṛiti, and those qualities, having done their work, cease

from labour. The work of the qualities is said to be two-fold ; they have to minister to soul's experience of the world, and then to bring on its emancipation ; and when the state above described is attained, the qualities have already accomplished both these works, and, having nothing else left to do, stop work *in re* the soul concerned.]

He now describes the succession above referred to.

### XXXII.

The succession is the counterpart of the moment perceptible at the end of the modification.

“ Moment” (*kshana*) is a short amount of time. Its “ counterpart” (*pratiyogi*) is another distinct moment. “ Perceptible at the end of the modification” means that which is accepted as the totality after perceiving a number of moments, and this is called the “ succession” of moments, for no succession can be perceived in unperceived succession of moments.

[The word “ succession” (*krama*) used in A. xxxi, is explained in this aphorism to mean the following of one moment after another. The object is to say that the lapse of time is reckoned by the succession of one moment after another, though there is no break between them ; one totality is divided into many parts only for facility of reckoning.]

He now defines the specific nature of isolation, which is the result.

### XXXIII.

Isolation is the regression of the qualities devoid of the purpose of soul, or it is the abidance of the thinking power in its own nature.

“ The regression” (*prati,rasava*) or the non-production of change on the completion of the regressive (or reflux) modification of the (three) qualities, on the accomplishment of soul's (two-fold) purpose of experience and emancipation is called “ isolation” (*kaivalya*) ; or, it is the abidance of the thinking

power (soul) solely in its own proper nature, on the cessation of its identification with intellectual functions (or objects).

[Having described the Yoga in all its details, the author concludes the work by announcing the ultimatum to which it leads. This ultimatum is *kaivalya*, and it is defined to result on the reabsorption of the triad of qualities in their original cause, on their having done their duty to soul, or on the abidance of the soul in its own nature without any association with the qualities; that is to say, when it has no longer the thinking principle near it to cause its shadow to fall thereon.

The commentator does not explain the word *kaivalya*. The *P. Bhāṣya*, suggests its meaning by saying "when the power of intelligence becomes alone, and remains always after in that state it is *kaivalya*," (*chiti-śaktireva kevalā tasyāḥ sadā tathaivāvasthānam kaivalamiti*). It is the same goal which the Sāṅkhya assigns to its votaries, but it uses, instead of *kaivalya*, the word *apavarga* which, though not radically synonymous, conveys the same idea, that of liberation from the trammels of nature. The *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* adopts the term *kaivalya*, and says, "when separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final *kaivalya* accomplished," (v. LXVIII). Gauḍapāda contents himself by saying, "*kaivalya* is the abstract form of *kevala*," (*kevalabdhivāt kaivalyam*). Vāchaspati Miśra and Nārāyaṇa take it to mean "exemption from the three kinds of pain," (*duḥkhatraya-vigamam duḥkha-vināśam*). The lexicographical meaning of *kevala* is 'one,' 'alone,' 'only,' and in the derivative form it means, 'oneness,' 'singleness,' 'solitariness,' 'exclusiveness,' or 'individuality,' i. e., deliverance from the association of nature. Colebrooke translates it into 'deliverance,' and Wilson adds 'liberation.' Mr. Davies, in his translation, prefers 'abstraction.' All these may be resolved into *isolation*, the word used in my version, the idea being that the soul is freed from all association, material, phenomenal, or noumenal.

The epithets 'absolute' (*aikāntika*) and 'final' (*ātyantika*) used in the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, and the word 'always,' (*sadā*) in *P. Bhāshya* show that this isolation is to last for ever, and no future association of any kind is possible. To quote Mr. Davies, "the soul's perfect and final deliverance from the bondage of matter has been gained. No new character can be assumed; no birth into any kind of bodily state, even that of the gods, can follow. The drama of life is ended, and the actors retire from the stage for ever."

This eternal quietude of the soul after isolation amounts, in the opinion of M. Cousin, to "nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme;" but where existence forms the primary condition of the theory, nihilism cannot logically and fairly be predicated. The question is, does the soul exist or not after salvation? and since the *Yoga*, like many other schools of philosophy, both Indian and European, insists that it does, (*cf.* *Sāṅkhya-sūtra* I, 45, 46, 47), there is no room left for a charge of negation against it. Professor Wilson, following the Indian expositors, more correctly explains the case by saying, "it is merely intended as a negation of the soul's having any active participation, any individual interest or property, in human pains, possessions, or feelings." Professor Weber, in his 'History of Indian literature,' (pp. 238-9), has entirely misrepresented the case. He says, "one very peculiar side of the *Yoga* doctrine—and one which was more and more exclusively developed as time went on—is the *Yoga* practice, that is, the outward means, such as penances, mortifications, and the like, whereby this absorption into the supreme Godhead is sought to be attained." To those who have attentively read the preceding pages, it will be obvious, that the idea of absorption into the Godhead forms no part of the *Yoga* theory. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how so well-read a scholar, as the learned professor, could have formed this opinion, unless we believe that he has not read the *Yoga*, and has borrowed his theory from the *Bhagavadgītā*, and *Purānic* and *Tāntric* modifications of *Yoga*.

Patañjali, like Kapila, rests satisfied with this isolation of the soul. He does not pry into the how and the where the soul abides after the separation. This condition of philosophic abstraction, however, not being satisfactory to worldly-minded people longing for a peaceful hereafter, a necessity arose for the elaboration of a more concretely blissful scheme, and the modifications above noticed were offered by the Puráñics to meet the requirement. They devised other forms, but those require no description here.

This completes the work ; but Bhoja takes this opportunity to compare the condition of the soul as described in the *Yoga* with what other systems propose, and thereby to demonstrate its superiority. The first is the Buddhist doctrine of momentary existence.]

Nor is it only in our philosophy that the knower of the field [of action] in its isolated condition is recognised to exist in this form of intelligence ; on reflection it will be seen that in other systems of philosophy also it remains in the same form. Now, in the worldly condition soul appears as full of agency, experientship, and inquisitiveness ; if this one soul, the knower of the field, be not admitted to be so, then in the absence of all antecedent and postcedent enquiry in momentary consciousness, (*i. e.*, believing consciousness to be existent only for the time being, which cannot look into the past or the future,) there would be no constant relation between soul and the fruits of works, and the objection would arise of the destruction of that which has been done, and the coming into existence of that which has not been done, (*i. e.*, no desert would follow works done, and desert would result from undone work). Acknowledge him to be the experiencer (of deserts) by whom an act enjoined by the S'ástras is performed, and there will be an inclination on the part of all to perform works for the acceptance or avoidance of good or evil. Since all actions characterised by the desire of avoidance or acceptance are subject to enquiry ; since there would be an impossibility for enquiry in the case of mutually distinct moments ; (*i. e.*, the

moment when one action is done being distinct from that in which another action is performed); and since in the absence of enquiry there would arise an impossibility for any kind of action to take place, it is established that that which is the agent, experiencer, and enquirer is the soul. In the condition of liberation, there being an absence of all actions characterised by the idea of the acceptable and the acceptor, sentience alone remains behind. That sentience is apparent only as sentience, and not by knowing itself, since the nature of sentience is to perceive objects, and not to perceive itself. Further, when an object is perceived by the thinking power, the idea is "this" (*ayam*), and when the identity of that power is to be implied, the idea is "I" (*aham*). Two such mutually discordant actions, characterised as the profluent and the refluent are, cannot be achieved simultaneously, and since the two actions cannot be performed at the same time, soul remains as sentience only. Hence it is reasonable (to believe) that in the liberated condition, when the qualities are defunct, soul remains solely as sentience. In the mundane condition agency, percipency, inquisitiveness arise in regard to that soul. Besides, there is a relation between *Prakṛiti* and soul, which is that of experience and experiencer; it is natural, and exists from time without a beginning. It is due to the prevalence of want of right notion. And that being the case, in the presence of the two powers for the advancement of the object of soul, (*cf.* IV, xxii), all modifications in the form of *Mahat* and others take place. And since the power of the soul as the supreme agent, and of casting its quality of sentience on the thinking principle, and that of experiencing the result of the conjunction of that reflection, proceed from conjunction (with *Mahat*), and since the consciousness of agency and experiencership of the intellect proceeds from the influence of sentience on the intellect, and consequently of the conduct of all enquirable actions, what use is there in other unprofitable agglomeration of fallacies?

[Bhoja does not say that the theory he combats is due to the

Buddhists, but the dogma of momentary consciousness was prevalent among the Mādhyamikas, and hence I infer that he means the Buddhists. The theory is, that all things are momentary, and their cognition is also momentary, produced by the concatenation of complements of unconscious causes, without a permanent intellectual back-ground, (*cf.* Cowell and Gough's *Sarvadarsana-saṅgraha*, p. 15). It is refuted by the allegation, that such consciousness could not be made subject to moral responsibility. The consciousness that would perform an action now, would have no relation to the one that had acted before, or to that which would act in the future, and the responsibility of the one could not be transferred to another. There could be no such idea as ego, for the ego of one cognition would not be the ego of another, and yet as ego is the basis of cognition and consciousness, no theory can be valid which repudiates that. There could be under such circumstance no incentive to, nor necessity for, moral action. A permanent individual consciousness is unavoidable, and that is found in the thinking principle enlivened by a reflection of soul.]

Again, if, rejecting this course, it be accepted that agency is soul's essential attribute, then arises the admission of its being subject to modifications, and as modifications are non-eternal or temporal, its character as soul is destroyed. Nor can perception of mutually different conditions be effected in one form at the same time; and accordingly, in the condition in which soul is perceived associated with some produced pleasure, can the condition of pain be perceived. Thus the conditions being various, the conditioned must likewise be various, and from variety and modifiability there can be neither spirituality nor eternity, (*i. e.*, that which is modifiable cannot also be eternal or spiritual, and eternity and spirituality are essential attributes of soul). Hence it is that those Sāṅkhyas who believe in a peaceful Brahma, acknowledge soul to remain in the same form both in the mundane and the liberated conditions.

[This is apparently the theory of the Vaisēśikas, who believe

soul to be the real actor. The objection to this theory is that action implies change, and if soul be the real actor, it would be subject to change. The idea of change, however, is, in the opinion of Patanjali, incompatible with the spirituality and eternity of soul ; it would cease to be soul if it were changeable like material objects, and therefore this theory is not tenable.]

The theory of the Vedantists, who believe liberation to be that condition of soul in which it is solely sentience and joy, is not correct. Joy being the identity of pleasure, and pleasure being manifested by perceptables, and perceptibility not being produced without perception, the doctrine of unity is destroyed by the admission of the two, the perceptible and the perception. Again, their saying of cognition itself being the joyous soul would be prejudiced by the incompatibility of two antagonistic qualities abiding together. Perception and perceptable cannot fitly be called one. Again, soul is said by the non-dualists to be of two kinds, the working or conditioned and the unconditioned or supreme. But if you admit that form in which the working soul becomes the experiencer of pleasure and pain, to be also the form in which it exists as the supreme soul, then the supreme soul becomes, like the working soul, subject to modifications, and pertain, the nature of ignorance. If it be said that the experiencership is not direct, but accepted as a present (by the soul) while remaining as a neutral superior, the case would be the same as in our system of philosophy.

The assumption about the joyous form (of soul) has already been refuted. It may be added that if soul be admitted to be of the character of ignorance, there would be no separate existence left for working souls, and which should then be the object of philosophy? Certainly not the unconditioned soul, for it is eternally free ; nor the working soul, for it is (admitted to be) of the character of ignorance, and thus will result the falsification of all systems of philosophy. If the creation be admitted to consist of ignorance, the question would arise, whose ignorance is it? It cannot be that of the supreme soul, for it is

eternally free, and of the form of knowledge. It cannot be of the working soul, for that being without a separate existence, how can it be connected with ignorance? It would be like the admission of horns of a hare (a mere fiction). It might be said that the ignorance of ignorance consists in its not being the subject of demonstration by argument. It may, like the dew on the earth with the rays of the sun (playing on it), melt away under ratiocination, and yet it may be ignorance. This, however, cannot be. Whatever does something must be distinct from, or identical with, something else, and since the agency of ignorance in the development of the universe must be admitted, and admitting it, if ignorance be indeterminate, then nothing whatever will be determinate; even Brahma itself will be liable to be put down as indeterminate, (but if it be described to be determinate, it will cease to be ignorance). It follows then that the form of soul cannot be other than that of a supervisor. This supervisorship is mere sentience only, for there is no evidence of its having any other quality.

[The Vedantic doctrine is refuted on two grounds; 1st, because it involves a duality which the Vedantists themselves repudiate; 2nd, it makes soul liable to be affected by ignorance, thereby destroying its absolute purity, and if we admit that soul may be involved in ignorance then it will become indeterminate, and there would be no certainty about anything.]

It is alleged by the Naiyāyikas and others that soul is sentient, because it becomes so by contact with sentience, and that sentience is produced by the union of soul with its mind. They say that desire, knowledge, exertion and other attributes are produced by the contact of soul during its working condition with mind, and through those qualities, the soul knows itself to be the knower, the agent, and the experiencer. In the state of liberation (*moksha*), when false notions are suppressed on the suppression of the residua (*dosha*) which are produced by them, there results an absolute annihilation of the specific attributes, know-

ledge, &c., and soul is acknowledged to reside in its own essential form. This, however, is not a correct assumption, for what would you accept to be the peculiar soulness of the soul in that condition? (You cannot urge that pervasion, immensity, and eternity are its constituents, for) the qualities of pervasion and the rest pertain to ether and others, and to differentiate it from them, some determinate form must have to be admitted. You may say that the specific character of soul is its own speciality (or kind to which it belongs). But this cannot be urged, for such speciality exists in all things, (*i. e.*, everything has its specific distinction as a particular kind). It is necessary, therefore, to admit some other differentiation of the soul, apart from speciality, and this can be effected by admitting its supervisorship, from its being of the form of sentience, and in no other way.

As to what is believed by the Mīmāñsakas about soul being both worker and work, the position is not tenable. They believe that soul is indicated by the use of the word I, and by the use of I, both the agency and the objectivity of soul are included, (*i. e.*, soul is the ego, and nothing else can be ego, and the soul being the ego, the ego must include both soul and work, for in knowing the soul work must appear to be soul and no other). But this cannot result, because they are of contradictory natures. Agency implies him who measures, while work means that which is to be measured or proved, and the assumption of these two antagonistic qualities cannot be effected in one at the same time. When two antagonistic qualities are assumed, then there can be no unity, as positive and negative, and so are agency and objectivity antagonistic. Should it be said there is no antagonism between agency and objectivity, but there is between agency and instrumentality, we deny it, because the assumption of antagonistic qualities is the same (in either case). Rejecting then the theory of perceptible by the use of I, we hold the soul's supervisorship as proved, and thence its sentienceness.

The theory of those who hold soul to be finite, defined by the body, and mutable, because it is reckoned among matter, tumbles down as soon as it is started. By the admission of mutability, the sentience form of soul is destroyed, and in the absence of its sentience form, how can there be any spirituality in soul? Hence those who desire to uphold the spirituality of soul must admit its sentience form, and that is its supervisorship.

[This is the theory of the Arhatas or Jains. (*Cf.* Cowell and Gough's *Sarvadarsana-saṅgraha*.)]

Some fancy soul to be of the form of the actor. They believe that the action of knowing, which results in the presence of a perceptible object, has for its fruit the cognition of that object; and in that cognition as the fruit, the true form of soul, being of the form of illumination, becomes manifest; and objects being perceptible, the soul becomes the perceptor; for it is produced in some such form as "I know the pot," (in which "I" is the perceptor, "know" is the cognition of the form of illumination, and the "pot" is the perceptible object). The cause of action is for certain the actor, and therefore actorship and experiencership constitute the form of soul. This, however, is inconsistent. (If cognitions be the root),—the question arises, Does the actorship of those cognitions arise simultaneously, or successively? If you say, that the actorship is simultaneous, then its actorship shall cease a moment after. If you say, it happens successively, it cannot be predicated of that which is uniform, (*i. e.*, soul). If you say the actorship of soul is effected always in one or the same form, then that one form being always present, all fruits would become of one form. If the actorship be multiform, then there would be mutability, and there being mutability, there can be no form of sentience. It follows that those who believe in soul's sentience, should not maintain its direct actorship. The way in which the actorship of the uniform, eternal, sentient soul is proved by us, is the most consistent.

Those who by such arguments maintain that the self-manifest soul becomes the perceptor through the cognition of objects, will find their refutation by the same line of argument.

Some hold that the reasoning (*cimarsa*) form of soul is its sentience form, (*i. e.*, its sentience is no other than its reasoning power). They say that the sentience form of soul cannot be ascertained without reasoning; the sentience form is said to be distinct from the inert, and without reasoning it cannot be defined, and without reasoning, there is nothing left behind. This is, however, untenable. Reasoning is the discussion which has the form of "this, thus, and so," (*i. e.*, every process of ratiocination involves the assumption of something like this, this is, this is not, thus it is, thus it is not, it is so, it is not so, and without them there can be no reasoning,) and that cannot arise without egoism (or consciousness), and when reasoning is brought to bear on soul it is brought into cognition in the form "I am of this form," and thus the soul, the subject of discussion, being brought to light by the word I, no advance is made beyond a fancy, and fancy is a form of conviction, which is the function of the intellect, and not of sentience. But as sentience, uniform and eternal, remains always in one shape, there can be no entrance of egotism into it. It follows then, that this assumption of reasoning in the soul is a mistaken assumption of the intellect for soul, and not a knowledge of the identity of the self-manifest soul, the great soul.

Thus in no system of philosophy can the form of soul be ascertained by any means, without admitting its supervisorship. Supervisorship implies sentience form, which is distinct from inertness. Because it exists supervising in the form of sentience, therefore it derives the quality of experience (in objects), and that which is supervised by sentience becomes fit for worldly usage. And such being the case, other systems of philosophy, if they decline to accept what we have said about the isolation of soul as resulting on the cessation of the functions of Prakriti after it has accomplished its duty have no

resource. It has, therefore, rightly been said that isolation is the abidance of the sentient power in its own form after withdrawing its shadow from all functions.

The sources of perfections, (i) ; the manner in which the ~~transmutation~~ of material causes are effected, (ii) ; the mode in which merit cooperates in this process, (iii) ; the origin of created thinking principles, (iv) ; their relation to their original source, (v) ; the superiority of Samádhi-born thinking principle, (vi) ; the nature of various kinds of work, (vii) ; the conformity of works to residua, (viii) ; their invariable relation, (ix) ; the eternity of desires, (x) ; their nature and susceptibility to destruction, (xi) ; the relation of the thinking principle to works, (xii) ; the natures of the qualities and the qualified, (xiii) ; unity of things proceeding from unity of modification, (xiv) ; the relation of cognition to cognizables, (xv) ; the process of cognition, (xvi) ; its permanence, (xvii) ; thinking principle not self-illuminative, (xviii) ; it cannot be directed to two things at the same time, (xix) ; multiplicity of cognitive power not admissible, (xx) ; how it perceives its self, (xxi) ; how it is made fit for all purposes, (xxii) ; its subserviency to another's purpose, (xxiii) ; progress of isolation, (xxiv—xxxii) ; nature of isolation, (xxxiii)—these are the subjects treated of in this chapter on isolation. [Only the substance of the commentary has been given here, for reasons explained before.]

He, who is the asylum of fame and majesty, whose orders are received on the crowns of their diadems, by kings prostrate at his feet in acts of service and salutation, the lotus of whose mouth having been attained by the goddess of speech, she became uncommonly proud, even he, the auspicious Bhoja, lord of the earth, composed these notes on the aphorisms of the lord of serpents.

This is the end of the fourth quarter, or the quarter on isolation, of the commentary entitled Rájamártanda, on Patanjali's Institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.

## APPENDIX.

### A. DESCRIPTIVE LIST OF WORKS EXTANT ON THE YOGA SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

#### Abbreviations.

B. G. C.	Bühler's Gujarat Catalogue.
Bh. D. M. C.	Catalogue of the Bhāū Dājī Memorial.
Bh. R.	Bhandárkar's Report, 1881-2.
H. C.	Hall's Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems.
K. C. P. C.	Kielhorn's Central Provinces Catalogue.
K. P. R.	Kunte's Punjab Report, 1881.
M. N.	Mitra's Notices of Sanskrit MSS.
N. W. P. C.	North Western Provinces Catalogue.
N. W. P. & O. C.	" " " and Oudh Catalogue.
O. C.	Oudh Catalogue.
Op. C.	Oppert's Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. in Southern India.

1. A'chárapaddhati. Duties and exercises of Yogíś. By Basudevendra. B. G. C. IV.
2. Ajapágáyatrí-puráscharana-paddhati. Use of the Gáyatrí in Yoga meditation. By Sáñkara A'chárya. H. C.
3. Amanaska. On steadfastness of the mind. N. W. P. C. V.
4. Ásanádhýáya. On postures appropriate for Yogíś. Op. C. I.
5. Ashtáṅga-hridaya-sañhitá. Meditation on eight particular parts of the body. B. G. C. IV.
6. Ashtáṅga-yoga. Meditation on eight particular parts of the body. By Sáñkara A'chárya. B. G. C. IV.
7. Cháyápurushávabodhana. Knowledge of souls. Op. C. I.
8. Dattatreya sañhitá alias Dattátreya-yoga, or Dattátreya Sástra. A Tantra on the performance of Yoga. By Dattátreya. M. N. I., Op. C. I., B. G. C. IV.

9. *Gheraṇḍa Sañhitá.* A Tantra on the mode of performing the Yoga form of Sákta worship. By *Gheraṇḍa*. M. N. I., N. W. P. C. I., N. W. P. C. IV.
10. *Goraksha-s'ataka alias Jñána-s'ataka.* A century of verses on the performance of Yoga. By *Gorakshanátha*. N. W. P. C. I., M. N. I., H. C., B. G. C. IV., K. C. P. C.
11. *Goraksha-s'ataka-ṭíká.* A commentary on the *Goraksha-s'ataka*. By *Saṅkara*. N. W. P. C. I.
12. *Goraksha-s'ataka-ṭíppana.* Notes on the *Goraksha-s'ataka*. By *Mathuránátha Śukla*. N. W. P. C. I.
13. *Haṭha-dípiká alias Haṭha-pradípiká.* On *Haṭha* and *Rája* Yogas. by *Sátmáráma alias Atmáráma*. M. N. I and II., N. W. P. C. I., H. C., K. C. P. C.
14. *Haṭha-pradípiká.* On *Haṭha-yoga*. By *Chintámaṇi*. B. G. C. IV.
15. *Haṭha-pradípiká-ṭíká.* A commentary on the *Haṭha-pradípiká* which treats on the *Aṣṭáṅga-yoga*. By *Vrajabhúshaṇa*. N. W. P. C. I.
16. *Haṭha-pradípiká-ṭíká.* A commentary on the *Haṭha-pradípiká*. By *Mahádeva*. N. W. P. C. I.
17. *Haṭha-pradípiká-ṭíká.* A commentary on the *Haṭha-pradípiká* No. 13. By *Rámánanda Tírtha*. N. W. P. C. I.
18. *Haṭha-pradípiká-ṭíppana.* Notes on *Haṭha-pradípiká*, describing, *Yama*, *Niyama*, *Dháraṇá*, *Dhyána*, and *Samádhi*. By *Umápati*. N. W. P. C. I.
19. *Haṭha-ratnávalí.* On the suppression of the breath as a Yoga exercise. N. W. P. C. V.
20. *Haṭha-saṅketa-chandriká.* On the performance of the *Haṭha-yoga*. By *Sundaradeva*. N. W. P. C. V., H. C.
21. *Haṭha-yoga.* On the performance of *Haṭha-yoga*. By *Ādinátha*. B. G. C. IV., K. C. P. C.
22. *Haṭha-yoga-dhirája.* On the exercises necessary for *Haṭha-yoga*. By *S'iva*. N. W. P. C. I.
23. *Haṭha-yoga-dhirája-ṭíká.* A commentary on the *Haṭha-yoga-dhirája*. By *Rámánanda Tírtha*. N. W. P. C. I.

24. **Haṭha-yoga-viveka.** On the performance of the Haṭha-yoga. By Vāmadeva. N. W. P. C. I.
25. **Haṭha-yoga-saṅgraha.** The elements of the Haṭha-yoga. By Mathurānātha Śukla. N. W. P. C. I.
26. **Jñānāmrīta.** A poem on the duties of Yogīs. By Gorakshanātha, disciple of Mīnanātha. H. C.
27. **Jñānāmrīta-tippana.** Notes on the Jñānāmrīta. By Sadananda. N. W. P. C. I.
28. **Jñāna-yoga-khaṇḍa.** Knowledge as an element of Yoga existence. Op. C. I.
29. **Jīvanmukti-viveka alias Jīvanmukti-prakaraṇa.** Emancipation during terrestrial existence. By Vidyāraṇya Svāmī. M. N. IV.
30. **Jyotnā alias Haṭha-dīpikā-tīkā.** A commentary on the Haṭha-dīpikā of Svātmārāma. By Brahmānanda. M. N. IV.
31. **Kapila-gītā.** Dissertations on the importance of Yoga meditations and the mode of performing them. by Kapila. M. N. IV.
32. **Kedāra-kalpa.** Yoga practices. K. C. P. C.
33. **Khechari-vidyā.** Yoga exercises for attaining occult powers. By Śiva. B. G. C. IV.
34. **Laya-yoga.** Yoga emancipation. B. G. C. IV.
35. **Mahā-rāmāyaṇa alias Vāśiṣṭha-rāmāyaṇa.** A version of the history of Rāma distinct from that of Vālmīki and designed especially to expound the principles of the Yoga doctrine. M. N. VI.
36. **Mahes'a-saṅhitā.** By Mahes'a. K. P. R. 1881.
37. **Mudrā-prakāśa.** A treatise on Haṭha-yoga, describes Mahāmudrā, Nabhomudrā, Uddiyana, &c. By Kṛipārāma. N. W. P. C. I.
38. **Nādi-jnāna-dīpikā.** On the knowledge of the arteries or nerves bearing on the Yoga. M. N. I.
39. **Nava-ratnākara alias Nava-yoga-kallola.** A treatise explanatory of Yoga-sūtra. By Kshemānanda Dīkṣhita. H. C. Pātanjala-sūtra *vide* Yoga-sūtra.

40. Pátanjala-bháshya *alias* Sáñkhya-pravachana-bháshya. A well-known exegesis on the Yoga-sútra. By Vyása. N. W. P. C. I., H. O.
41. Pátanjala-bháshya-vártika. A commentary on the Pátanjala-bháshya. By Vijnána Bhikshu. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.
42. Pátanjalíyábhinava-bháshya. Commentary on the Pátanjala-sútra. By Bhavadeva Mis'ra. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.
43. Pátanjala-rahashya. Notes on parts of the Pátanjala-sútra-bháshya. By Sridharánanda Yati. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.
44. Pátanjala-rahashya. A commentary on the Yoga-sútra. By Rághavánanda. K. C. P. C.
45. Pátanjala-sútra-bháshya. A commentary on Patanjali's Yoga-sútra. By Bhavadeva Mis'ra, Mahámahopádhyáya. Probably the same with No. 42. M. N. V, and VI.
46. Pátanjala-sútra-bháshya-vyákhyá. A commentary on the Pátanjala-sútra-bháshya. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.
47. Pátanjala-sútra-ṭíká. A short commentary on the Pátanjala-sútra. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.
48. Pátanjala-sútra-vṛitti. A commentary on the Yoga-sútra. By Náráyaṇa Tírtha. K. C. P. C.
49. Pátanjala-sútra-vṛitti *alias* Pátanjala-vṛitti-bháshya-chháyá-vyákhyá. A commentary on the Yoga-sútra. By Nágójí Bhaṭṭa. K. C. P. C., H. C.
50. Pátanjala-vṛitti. A commentary on the Yoga-sútra. By Umápati Tripáṭhi. O. C. XIII.
- Pátanjala-yoga-sútra *vide* Yogánuśásana. Op. C. I.
51. Pavana-vijaya. On the nature of Pránayáma (suppression of breath) and rules how to perform it. By S'iva. N. W. P. C. I., H. C., M. N. I., B. G. C. IV.
52. Rájamártanda *alias* Yoga-sútra-vṛitti. A commentary on the Yoga-sútra. By Bhojadeva. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.
53. Rája-yoga. On the performance of the Rája-yoga. By Rámachandra Paramahási. B. G. C. IV.
54. Rámastavarája. Describes Yoga meditation in the course of a hymn to Ráma. Op. C. I.

55. *Sadáchára-prakaraṇa*. Duties of Yogí. By S'áṅkara Achárya. M. N. II.
56. *Samádhi-prakaraṇa*. On Yoga meditation. Op. C. I.
57. *Samarasára-s'varodaya*. On the regulation of breath and divination from the flow of breath. By Ráma. B. G. C. IV.
- S'áṅkhyá-pravachana, *vide* *Yoga-sútra*.
- S'áṅkhyá-pravachana-bháshya. *Vide* *Pátañjala-bháshya*.
58. *S'áṅkhyá-yoga-dípiká*. On the performance of the Yoga. Op. C. I.
59. *Saptabhúmiká-vichára*. The seven stages of perfection of Yogí. B. G. C. IV.
60. *Saragítá*. On Yoga breathing, probably an extract from a Puráṇa. By Vyása. H. C.
61. *Sárasamúchchaya alias Yoga-sárasañgraha*. The leading tenets of the Yoga. By Harisevaka Mis'ra. M. N. II.
62. *Shaṭchakra*. The six principal parts of the body which should be meditated upon. B. G. C. IV.
63. *Saṭchakra-dhyána-paddhati*. Meditation on six particular parts of the body. By Bráhmachaitanya Yati. K. P. R. 1881.
64. *Siddhanta-paddhati*. Rules for Yoga practices. By Gorakshanátha. Bh. M. C.
65. *Siddha-siddhánta-paddhati*. On metempsychosis according to the Yoga doctrine. By Nityánanda Siddha. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.
66. *Siddha-khaṇḍa*. Occult powers. By Rámachandra Siddha. B. G. C. IV.
67. *Síva-sañhitá*. On the Yama, Niyama and other observances of the Yoga system; alleged to be an extract from the Skanda-puráṇa. By Síva. N. W. P. C. I., N. W. P. and O. C. VI., B. G. C. IV., H. C.
68. *Síva-sañhitá-tíká*. Notes on the Síva-sañhitá. By Sadánanda. N. W. P. C. I.
69. *S'varodaya*. Yoga breathing. (Probably only on divination from the flow of breath). By Vyása. B. G. C. IV.

70. *Tattvávabodhaka*. Commentary on the *Tattvávabodha*.  
By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.
71. *Tattvárnava-ṭíká*. Short commentary on the *Tattvárnava*. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.
72. *Tattva-panchásíka-yoga-chintá*. An epitome of Yoga practices. Bh. R., 1881-82.
73. *Tattvavindu-yoga*. On a peculiar form of Yoga. By Síva. N. W. P. C. I.
74. *Tattva-vindu-yoga*. Defining the various divisions of the Yoga. By Rámchandra Paramahañsa. H. C.
75. *Varna-prabodha*. A treatise on the Yoga. By Dattá-treya. H. C.
76. *Vás'ishṭha-sára*. An abridgment of the *Yoga-vás'ishṭha Rámáyana*, containing only its metaphysical portion. By Tirtha-síva. M. N. III.
77. *Vás'ishṭhiya-gudhártha*. A commentary on the *Vás'ishṭha-sára*. By Ditto. M. N. III.
78. *Videha-muktádi-kathana*. "It handles sundry tenets on the Yoga craze." H. C.
79. *Vivekamártanda*. Eight couplets on the primary doctrine of the Yoga. By Rámesvara Bhaṭṭa. N. W. P. C. N. H. C.
80. *Yájnavalkya-gítá alias Yájnavalkya-yoga*. "A poem in commendation of the Yoga." By Yájnavalkya. H. C.
81. *Yoga-bháshya-krama*. Notes on Vyása's commentary. O. P. C. I.
82. *Yogábhýása-lakshana*. Directions for performing Yoga. Op. C. I.
83. *Yoga-chandra-ṭíká*. A commentary on the *Yoga-chandra*. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I., M. N. I.
84. *Yoga-chandriká*. By Ananta S'armá. M. N. Vol. II.
85. *Yoga-chintámaṇi*. On Rája-yoga. By Bálásástrí Gadge. O. P. C. I., N. W. P. C. I., N. W. P. and O. C. VI.
86. *Yoga-chintámaṇi*. On Rája-yoga. By Sívánanda Sarasvatí. B. G. C. IV., H. C.

87. *Yoga-chintámaṇi*. On *Hāṭha-yoga*. By *Godávara Mis'ra*. N. W. P. C. V., K. P. R., 1881.
88. *Yoga-chintámani-típpana*. Notes on the *Yoga-chintámaṇi*. By *Bhavánī-saháya*. N. W. P. C. I.
89. *Yoga-darpana-tíká*. Notes on the *Yoga-darpana*. By *Bhavadeva*. N. W. P. C. I.
90. *Yoga-darpana-tíká*. A commentary on the *Yoga-darpana*. By *Krishṇanátha*. N. W. P. C. I.
91. *Yoga-dṛiṣṭi-svádhyáya*. (Contents not known). Bh. D. M. C.
92. *Yoga-grantha*. A treatise on *Yoga* with a commentary. By *Vyañkaṭáchárya*. N. W. P. C. V.
93. *Yoga-grantha-tíká*. A treatise on the *Yoga-grantha*, with a commentary. By *Guṇákara Mis'ra*. N. W. P. C. V.
94. *Yoga-kalpadruma*. Instructions for performing *Yoga*. By *Kulamani S'ukla*. N. W. P. C. I.
95. *Yoga-kalpalatá*. Explanations of various *Yoga* tenets. By *Mathuránátha S'ukla*. N. W. P. C. I.
96. *Yogákyána*. A treatise on *Yoga*. By *Yájñavalkya*. P. C. I.
97. *Yoga-mahimá*. Merit of performing *Yoga*. By *Goṇakshanátha*. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.
98. *Yogamáṇi-prabhrá*. A commentary on the *Yogamáṇi*. By *Rámánanda Sarasvatí*. M. N. VI., H. C.
99. *Yoga-manjári*. On the practice of *Yoga*. Op. C. I.
100. *Yogánuśásana-vṛitti* or *Yoganuśásana-sútra-vṛitti*. A commentary on the *Yoga-sútra*. By *Bhává Gaṇes'a Díkshita*. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.
101. *Yoga-nyása*. Dedication of certain parts of the body in course of meditation. Op. C. I.
102. *Yogopades'a*. Principles of the *Yoga*. By *Parás'ara*. B. G. C. IV.
103. *Yoga-pradípa*. On the practice of *Yoga*. By *Devi-siñha Deva*. B. G. C. IV.

104. *Yoga-prákás'a-ṭíká.* A commentary on the *Yoga-prákás'a*. By Kṛiṣṇanátha. N. W. P. C. I.
105. *Yoga-praves'avidhi.* On commencing *Yoga* practices. B. G. C. IV.
106. *Yoga-ratnákara.* By Vires'varánanda. M. N. IV.
107. *Yoga-ratna-samuchchaya.* On the practice of *Yoga*. Op. C. I.
108. *Yoga-ratnávalí.* (Contents not known). By Nágárjuna. Bh. D. C. M. C.
109. *Yogásana-lakṣhaṇa.* On postures. B. G. C. IV.
110. *Yoga-saṅgraha.* On the practice of *Yoga*. Op. C. I.
111. *Yoga-saṅgraha.* On *Hathā-yoga*. By Śrīkṛiṣṇa Śukla. N. W. P. C. I.
112. *Yoga-saṅgraha-ṭíká.* A commentary on the *Yoga-saṅgraha*. By Púrṇánanda. N. W. P. C. I.
113. *Yoga-sára.* The principal elements of *Yoga*. Op. C. I.
114. *Yoga-sára-saṅgraha.* A manual of *Yoga* practice. By Vijnána Bhikshu. N. W. P. C. I., H. C., K. C. P. C.
115. *Yoga-sarávalí.* On the practice of *Yoga*. Op. C. I.
116. *Yoga-sástra.* Notes on the *Yoga-sútra*. M. N. VI.
117. *Yoga-sútra alias Yogánusásana or Sáṅkhya-pravachana.* Original text of the *Yoga* doctrine. By Patanjali. N. W. P. C. I.
118. *Yoga-sástra-sútra-páṭha.* "A set of aphorisms on theocracy." By Śukra. H. C.
119. *Yoga-sástrávachúri.* (In Prákrit). Bh. D. M. C.
120. *Yoga-siddhánta-paddhati.* On the practice of *Yoga*. By Gorakshanátha. B. G. C. IV.
121. *Yoga-s'íkhanishad.* A *Upanishad* on *Yoga*. Op. C. I.
122. *Yoga-s'íkshá.* By Hariebara. B. G. C. IV.
123. *Yoga-sútrártha-dípiká* or *Chandrika*. A commentary on the *Yoga-sútra*. By Ananta. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.
124. *Yoga-sútra-ṭíká.* By Śaṅkara. N. W. P. C. I.
125. *Yoga-sútra-ṭíká.* By Mahádeva. N. W. P. C. I.
126. *Yoga-sútra-ṭippana.* Notes on the *Yoga-sútra*. By Vrindávana Śukla. N. W. P. C. I.

127. *Yoga-sútra-típpana*. Ditto. By Jñánánanda. N. W. P. C. I.
128. *Yoga-sútra-típpana*. Ditto. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.
129. *Yoga-sútra-vṛitti*. By Sadáśiva N. W. P. C. I.
130. *Yoga-sútra-vṛitti-guḍhártha-dyotaka*. By Náráyana Bhikshu. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.
131. *Yoga-sútra-vṛitti-típpana*. Notes on the *Yoga-sútra-vṛitti*. By Bhavadeva. N. W. P. C. I.
132. *Yoga-taraṅga*. Practice of *Yoga* meditation. By Vis'ves'varadatta. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.
133. *Yoga-taraṅga*. Practice of *Yoga* meditation. By Ramásāṅkara. N. W. P. C. I.
134. *Yoga-tárávalí*. On the practice of *Rája-yoga*. By Sáṅkara Achárya. M. N. Vol. IV.
135. *Yoga-tárávalí*. On the practice of *Rája-yoga*. By Súkta. B. G. C. IV.
136. *Yoga-tattva*. The principles of the *Yoga* doctrine. B. G. C. IV.
137. *Yoga-varnana*. On the practice of the *Háṭha-yoga*. By Mathuránátha-Súkla. N. W. P. C. I.
138. *Yoga-vártiká*. A commentary on Vyása's *Yoga-bháshya*. By Vijnána Bhikshu. N. W. P. and O. C. VI.
- Yoga-vásishṭha*. Vide No. 35.
139. *Yoga-vásishṭha-tíká*. A commentary on the *Yoga-vásishṭha*. Op. C. I.
140. *Yoga-vichára*. The nature of the *Yoga* doctrine. An extract from the *Kásíkhanda*. B. G. C. IV.
141. *Yoga-víja*. The essence of *Yoga* practices. By Síva N. W. P. C. I., H. C.
142. *Yoga-vindu-típpana*. Notes on the *Yoga-vindu*. By Bhavadeva. N. W. P. C. I.
143. *Yoga-vishaya*. The object of *Yoga*. By Márkaṇḍeya. B. G. C. IV.
144. *Yoga-vivarana*. A description of *Yoga* practices. By Vásishṭha. M. N. I.

145. *Yoga-viveka*. Knowledge of the *Yoga* system. By *Harisāṅkara*. N. W. P. C. I.
146. *Yoga-viveka*. An account of *Yoga*. By *Vṛindāvana* *Sukla*. N. W. P. C. I.
147. *Yoga-viveka-ṭīkā*. A commentary on the *Yoga-viveka* of *Harisāṅkara*. By *Rāmānanda Tīrtha*. N. W. P. C. I.
148. *Yoga-vṛitti-sāṅgraha*. An abstract of the *Vṛitti* of *Bhojarāja*. By *Udayaśāṅkara*. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.
149. *Yoges'ārṇava*. On the practice of *Yoga*. Op. C. I.
150. *Yoginī-hṛidaya*. Tántric *Yoga*. Op. C. I.

यथम् ॥ २ ॥

५ ।

तो यथा ॥ ३ ॥

। याः

ते ॥ ४ ॥

रे कुर्वता

पा वैयक्ते ।

नोहृत-

॥ ५ ॥

दुर्बोधं अदलीव तदिजाइति स्थृतार्थमयुक्तिभिः  
स्थृतार्थेष्वतिविलूप्तिं विदधति वर्त्तेः समाप्तादिकैः ।  
खस्तानेऽनुपयोगिभित्वा वडभिर्जपैर्वर्त्मनात्पते  
ओदृषामिति वस्तुविश्ववत्तः सर्वेऽपि टीकात्तः ॥ ९ ॥

उत्सृज्य विस्तरसुदरशं विकल्पजालं  
\*फल्गुप्रकाशमवधार्य च सम्बगर्थान् ।

अन्तः पतञ्जलिमुनेर्विद्वितिर्मध्येय-  
मातन्यते बुधजनप्रतिवेधेतुः ॥ १० ॥

अथ योगानुशासनम् ॥ १ ॥

अनेन सूचेष आत्मस्व सम्बन्धाभिधेयप्रयोजनान्याख्यायन्ते ।  
१ 'अथ'शब्दोऽधिकारत्वोत्तो मङ्गलार्थस्य । चुक्तिः 'योगः' समाधानं,  
युजवसमाधौ । अनुशिष्यते याख्यायते सद्वशस्त्रपभेदोपायफलैर्यन् ॥  
तत् 'अनुशासनं' । योगस्थानुशासनं 'योगानुशासनं' । तत् आत्मा-  
स्वपरिसमाप्तेरधिकारं वेदूब्यमित्यर्थः । तत् आत्मस्व व्युत्पादकमया  
योगः समाधनः सफलोऽभिधेयः, तद्वृत्तादनन्त्र फलं, व्युत्पादि-

\* यस्युप्रकाममिति A यस्युप्रकारमिति B चिकित्पुस्तकपाठः ।

† अन्तः पतञ्जलिमते इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ बुधजनप्रतिपत्तिहेतुरिति B चिकित्पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ मूलप्रकारशब्दः वक्तचिकित्प्रयोगाभ्यां क्रोडीकृतः सर्वज्ञ । स च समस्तो-  
प्रवर्त्तताच्च मर्हीतः ।

|| वक्तव्यमेदापायप्रयोगेनेति गानायुस्तकपाठः । जच्छवमेदापायैर्येनेति  
C चिकित्पुस्तकपाठः ।

तस्य योगस्य कैवल्यं फलं । आत्माभिधेयोः प्रतिपाद्यतिपादक-  
भावस्तुतः सम्भवः, अभिधेयस्य योगस्य तत्प्रकाशं च कैवल्यस्य  
साध्याधानभावः । एतदुर्मुखं भवति, व्युत्पाद्यत्य योगस्य साधनानि  
आत्मेष प्रदर्शनम्, तत्प्राप्तविद्वा योगः कैवल्यात्यं प्रलभ्यताद-  
क्षतीति ॥ १ ॥

तत्त्व के योग इत्यत आह ।

## योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः ॥ २ ॥

‘चित्तस्य’ निर्दर्शकस्यपरिणामरूपस्य या: ‘हृतयः’ अङ्गाङ्गि-  
भावपरिणामरूपाक्षासां\* ‘निरोधः’ बहिर्मुखपरिणतिविक्षेपदादन्त-  
मुखतया प्रतिक्षेपमपरिणामेन सखकारणे लक्षः ‘योगः’, इत्या-  
क्षायते । स च निरोधः सर्वासां चित्तस्य भूमीनां† सर्वप्राणिनां  
धर्मः कदाचित् कस्याच्चिद्गुमावाविर्भवति । तत्त्व चित्तं, मूढं,  
विचित्तं, एकार्यं, निरदून् इति चित्तस्य भूमयः चित्तस्यावस्था-  
विवेचाः । तत्त्व चित्तं, रजस उद्देकादस्त्रिं; बहिर्मुखतया सुखदुः-  
खादिविषयेषु कल्पितेषु अवहितेषु चक्षिहितेषु वा रजसा ग्रेरितं ।  
तत्त्व सदैव दैत्यरागवादीनाम् । मूढं, तमस उद्देकात् इत्याक्षय-  
विभागमन्तरेण क्रोधादिभिर्विरुद्धत्येष्व नियमितं । तत्त्व सदैव  
रहपित्रावादीनाम् । विचित्तं, समोद्देकादैविषयेन परिहतदुःख-

\* हृतयो निर्मलस्यपरिणामरूपाक्षासामिति बडपुक्तकसम्मतः पाठः ।

† स्वारब्दे इति ४ चिकित्पुरुक्तपाठः ।

‡ हृतीनामिति ८ चिकित्पुरुक्तपाठः ।

दुर्बीधं वदनीव तदिजहति स्थार्थमयुक्तिः  
 स्थार्थेभतिविकृतिं विधति अर्थः समाप्तादिकैः ।  
 स्वसानेऽनुपयोगिभिः वज्ञभिर्जपैभेभगत्यते  
 ओदृष्णामिति वस्तुविश्ववक्तः सर्वे॒पि टीकाद्यतः ॥ ६ ॥

उत्सृज्ज विस्तरसुदद्य विकल्पजातं  
 \*पश्चुप्रकारमवधार्य च स्वयगर्थाग् ।  
 अतः पतञ्जलिमुग्ने॑र्विद्वितिमध्येय-  
 मातन्यते बुधजनप्रतिबोधहेतुः † ॥ ७ ॥

अथ योगानुशासनम् ॥ १ ॥

अगेन सूचेष शास्त्रस समन्वयमिधेयप्रयोजनान्वास्त्राद्यते ।  
 १ 'अथ' इदोऽधिकारस्योत्तो मङ्गलार्थय । चुक्तिः 'योगः' समाधानं,  
 शुद्धवस्त्राधौ । अनुश्रिते वास्त्रायते लक्षणस्त्रपमेदोपायफलैर्यन् ॥  
 तत् 'अनुशासनं' । योगस्थानुशासनं 'योगानुशासनं' । तत् आशा-  
 व्यपरिच्छमास्त्रेऽधिकारं वेदूच्यमित्यर्थः । तत्र शास्त्रस व्युत्पादकतया  
 योगः समाधानः सफलोऽभिधेयः, तद्वृत्त्यादनस्त्र फलं, व्युत्पादि-

\* पश्चुप्रकारमिति A पश्चुप्रकारमिति B चिकित्पुस्तकपाठः ।

† अतः पतञ्जलिमते इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ बुधजनप्रतिपत्तिहेतुरिति B चिकित्पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ मृदुप्रकारशब्दः वज्ञचिक्षिष्ठेषाभ्यां ओडीद्यतः सर्वज्ञ । स च समस्तो-  
 द्यस्त्रपाठ्य गृहीतः ।

॥ अच्छब्देदोपायपञ्चवैर्येनेति जागापुस्तकपाठः । अच्छब्देदोपायवैर्येनेति  
 C चिकित्पुस्तकपाठः ।

तस्य योगस्य कैवल्यं पापं । नास्त्राभिधेयोः प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादक-  
भावस्तुषः सम्बन्धः, अभिधेयस्य योगस्य तत्प्रसरस्य च कैवल्यस्य  
साध्यासाधनभावः । एतदुर्मुखत्वं भवति, अत्याश्रयस्य योगस्य साधनानि  
आख्येय प्रदर्शनम्, तत्प्राधनविद्वा योगः कैवल्यास्यं परमसुत्पाद-  
स्थानिः ॥ १ ॥

तत्र को योग दृश्यत आह ।

### योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः ॥ २ ॥

‘चित्तस्य’ गिर्मुखस्त्वपरिणामस्त्वप्यस्य याः ‘वृत्तयः’ चक्राङ्गि-  
भावपरिणामस्त्वपादाशारां\* ‘गिरोधः’ वहिमुखपरिणतिविच्छेदादन्त-  
मुखतया ग्रन्तिसोमपरिणामेन चक्रकारणेण स्याः ‘योगः’, दृश्या-  
क्षायते । स च गिरोधः सर्वासां चित्तस्य भूमीनां† सर्वप्राणिनां  
धर्मः कदाचित् कच्चाङ्गिमुमादाविर्भवति । तत्र चित्तं, मूँडं,  
विचित्तं, एकायं, गिरदूम् इति चित्तस्य भूमयः चित्तस्वावस्था-  
विवेषाः । तत्र चित्तं, रजस उद्रेकादस्त्रिरः; वहिमुखतया सुखदुः-  
खादिविषयेषु कस्पितेषु व्यवहितेषु सञ्चिहितेषु वा रजसा प्रेरितं ।  
तत्र सदैव दैत्यदानवादीनाम् । मूँडं, तमस उद्रेकात् छत्राछत्य-  
विभागमनरेष क्रोधादिभिर्विद्वद्यत्येष्व नियमितं । तत्र सदैव  
रुद्रपिण्डादीनाम् । विचित्तं, सत्त्वोद्रेकाङ्गिश्चेन परिहतदुःख-

\* दृतयो गिर्मुखस्त्वपरिणामस्त्वपादाशामिति वज्रपुक्तकवमतः पाठः ।

† चक्रारणे इति A चित्तितयुक्तपाठः ।

‡ दृतोनामिति C चित्तितयुक्तपाठः ।

साधनं\* सुखसाधनेष्वेव भव्यादिषु प्रवृत्तं । तत्त्वं सदैव देवा-  
नाम् । एतदुक्तं भवति, रजसा प्रदृशित्वं, तमसा परापकारनिरतं,  
सत्त्वेन सुखमयं चित्तं भवतीति । एतास्तित्वस्तित्वावस्था च समाधा-  
वुपयोगिन्यः । एकायनिरुद्धरूपो द्वे च सत्त्वोत्कर्षाद्यथोन्नतमव-  
स्थितत्वात् समाधावुपयोगं भवेते । सत्त्वादिक्रमयुतक्रमे तथमभि-  
प्रायः, इयोरपि रजसमयोरत्यन्तेष्वत्वं तदर्थं रजसः प्रथम-  
सुपादानं । यावत्त्र प्रदृशितदर्शिता तावन्निरुद्धर्त्तिर्वाच्यते दर्शयितु-  
मिति इयोर्वर्तत्ययेन प्रदर्शनं । सत्त्वस्थ लेतदर्थं पक्षात् प्रदर्शनं ।  
थंत् तत्त्वोत्कर्षेणात्तरे द्वे भूमी योगोपयोगिन्याविति अनयो-  
द्देयोरेकायनिरुद्धर्योर्भूमिकयोर्यस्तित्वैकायतारूपः परिणामः च  
योगः । किञ्चुकं भवति, एकाये बहिर्षक्तेनिरोधः, निरुद्ध-  
सर्वासां वृत्तीनां संसंखाराणां प्रविलय इति । अनयोरेव भूम्यो-  
र्द्योगस्थ सम्भवः ॥ २ ॥

इदानीं सूचकारस्तित्व-दृश्य-निरोधपदानि व्याख्यातुकामः  
प्रथमं चित्तपदं व्याचष्टे ।

तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपेऽवस्थानम् ॥ ३ ॥

‘द्रष्टुः’ पुरुषस्य, तस्मिन् काले, ‘स्वरूपे’ चिन्माचरूपतायाम्,  
‘अवस्थानं’ स्थितिः भवति । अचर्मर्थः, उत्पन्नविवेकत्वातेस्तित्व-  
दृश्य-

\* परिहृतदुःखसाधनेष्वेव इति E चित्तपुरुषक्षयाठः ।

† एकायनिरुद्धे त्वेवमिति B चित्तपुरुषक्षयाठः ।

माभावात् कर्त्तव्याभिमानगिरुज्जौ प्रोक्षुपरिणामाय, बुद्धावात्मगः  
खरूपेणावस्थानं स्थितिर्भवतीति ॥ ३ ॥  
बुत्यानदग्नायां तस्य किं खरूपमित्याह ।

### दृत्तिसारूप्यमितरच ॥ ४ ॥

‘इतरच’ योगादन्यस्मिन् काले, दृत्यो या वस्थमाणसच्चाणाः,  
ताभिः ‘सारूप्यं’ तद्रूपतः । अयमर्थः, यादृशो दृत्यः सुख-दुःख-  
मोहात्मिकाः प्रादुर्भवन्ति, तादृशूप एव संवेद्यते व्यवहर्वभिः  
पुरुषः । प्रतीयते\* तदेवं, यस्मिन्बेकाग्रतया परिणते वस्तुनि चिक्षकेः†  
खस्मिन् रूपे प्रतिष्ठानं भवति, यस्मिंस्येत्रिवद्वृत्तिद्वारेण विषया-  
कारेण परिणते पुरुषस्तदाकार इव परिभाव्यते, यथा जलतरङ्गेषु  
पलातु सग्दस्युत्तिव्रते प्रतिभासते, तस्मिन्तं ॥ ४ ॥

दृत्तिपदं व्याख्यातुमाह ।

### दृत्यः पञ्चतयः क्लिष्टाऽक्लिष्टाः‡ ॥ ५ ॥

‘दृत्यः’ चित्तस्य परिणामविशेषाः । दृत्तिसमुदायरूपस्थावय-  
विनो या अवयवरूपा दृत्यस्थादपेक्षया तथप्रत्ययः । एतदुक्तं भवति ।  
पञ्च दृत्यः । कीदृशः । ‘क्लिष्टाऽक्लिष्टाः’ । क्लेशैर्वद्यमाणसच्चैराकान्ताः  
‘क्लिष्टाः’, तदिपरीताः ‘अक्लिष्टाः’, ॥ ५ ॥

\* प्रतीयते इतिपाठः B चिक्षितपुरुषके गात्रि ।

† विवित्तचित्ते इति B चिक्षितपुरुषकपाठः ।

‡ क्लिष्टा अक्लिष्टा इति B चिक्षितपुरुषकपाठः । क्लिष्टा अक्लिष्टाच  
इति F चिक्षितपुरुषकपाठः ।

ता एव यस्य दृश्यः समुद्दिश्य व्याख्याद्यन्ते ।

प्रमाण-विपर्यय-विकल्प-निद्रा-स्मृतयः ॥ ६ ॥

आसां क्रमेण स्वत्त्वात्माह ।

प्रत्यक्षानुभानागमाः प्रमाणानि ॥ ७ ॥

अत्रातिप्रसिद्धत्वात् प्रमाणानां ज्ञात्वकारेण भेदनिरूपणेनैवाव-  
गतवास्त्वाणस्त्रुतं न पृथक् तत्त्वार्थं छतम् । प्रमाणत्वाण्जु च विसं-  
बंवादिज्ञानं, तत्करणं प्रमाणमिति । इतिर्थदारेण वाच्चवस्त्रप-  
रागात् चिनस्य तद्विषया सामान्यविज्ञेषात्मनोऽर्थस्य विज्ञेषावधारण-  
प्रधाना दृत्तिः 'प्रत्यक्षं' । वृद्धीतस्मन्व्याख्यानात् चिकित्सः सामा-  
न्यस्तमनाव्यवस्थायः 'अनुभानं' । आप्तवचनम् 'आगमः' ॥ ७ ॥

एवं प्रमाणरूपां दृत्तिं व्याख्याय विपर्ययरूपामाह ।

विपर्ययो मिथ्याज्ञानमतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठम् ॥ ८ ॥

अतथाभूतेऽर्थे तथोत्पत्त्यमानं ज्ञानं 'विपर्ययः', यथा इति-  
कार्यं रज्जनामानं । 'अतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठम्' इति । तत्त्वार्थस्य यद्रूपं न  
तस्मिन् रूपे प्रतिष्ठते, तत्त्वार्थस्य अत् पारमार्थिकं रूपं न तत्  
प्रतिभासयतीति यावत् । संश्योऽप्यतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठत्वात् 'मिथ्याज्ञानं',  
यथा स्वार्णुवा पुरुषो वेति ॥ ८ ॥

विकल्पदृष्टिं व्याख्यातुमाह ।

\* दृश्यः समुपदर्शन्ते इति B चिकित्सपुस्तकपाठः ।

† उपरक्तवस्त्रविषयप्रमाणानामिति F चिकित्सपुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ प्रमाणवक्त्रवस्त्रस्येति F चिकित्सपुस्तकपाठः ।

**शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः ॥ ६ ॥**

शब्दज्ञितं ज्ञानं 'शब्दज्ञानं', तदनुपतितुं शीर्णं यस्तु स 'शब्दज्ञा-  
नानुपाती', 'वस्तुमः', तथात्वमनपेक्षमाणो योऽध्यवसायः सः 'विकल्पः',  
इत्युच्यते । यथा पुरुषस्तु देतन्यं स्वरूपमित्यत्र देवदत्तस्तु कमल  
इतिवत्शब्दज्ञिते ज्ञाने यथा योऽध्यवसितो भेदस्तुमिहाविद्य-  
मानमपि समारोप्य वर्तते ऽध्यवसायः\* । वस्तुतस्तु देतन्यमेव  
पुरुषः ॥ ६ ॥

निद्रां व्याख्यातुमाइ ।

**अभावप्रत्ययात्मना स्ततिनिद्रा ॥ १० ॥**

'अभावप्रत्ययः' 'आत्मनं' यस्ता दृष्टेः सा तथोक्ता । एतदुक्तं  
भवति, या सत्तत्सुक्तित्वात्ममसः† समस्तविषयपरित्यागेन प्रवर्त्तते  
'दृष्टिः' सा 'निद्रा' । अस्यासः‡ सुखमहमखाप्तमिति स्ततिनिदर्शनात्  
स्ततेसानुभवव्यतिरेकेनानुपपत्तेदृष्टिलिं ॥ १० ॥

स्ततिं व्याख्यातुमाइ ।

**अनुभूतविषयात्ममोषः स्मृतिः ॥ ११ ॥**

प्रमाणेन 'अनुभूतस्तु' 'विषयस्तु' योऽप्य 'असम्प्रमोषः' संस्कार-

\* समारोप्याभ्यवसाय इति F चिङ्गितपुरुषपाठः ।

† समस्ततः समुक्तित्वात्ममसः इति G चिङ्गितपुरुषपाठः ।

‡ व्यस्ताचेति G चिङ्गितपुरुषपाठः ।

दारेण बुद्धावुपारोहः, सः 'स्मृतिः' । तच\* प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पा जायदवस्थाः । त एव यदानुभवसात् प्रत्यक्षायमाणास्तदाऽ खप्तः । निद्रा लसंबेदमानविलक्ष्या । स्मृतिष्ठ प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रानिमित्ता ॥ ११ ॥

एवं दृन्तीर्थाख्याय वोपायं निरोधं व्याख्यातुमाह ।

**अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोधः ॥ १२ ॥**

† 'अभ्यासवैराग्ये' वक्ष्यमाणस्तद्देष्ट । ताभ्यां तासां प्रकाशप्रदृष्टनिनियमरूपाणांै चिन्तनीर्नां, यत् प्रतिश्लनं सः 'निरोधः' । किमुक्तं भवति, तासां विनिष्टस्तवाद्याभिनिवेद्वानामन्तर्मुखनया खकारण एव चिन्ते ग्रन्तिरूपतयावस्थानम् । तच विषयदोषदर्शनं बैराग्येण तदैमुख्यमुत्पादयते । अभ्यासेन च सुखजगकमानप्रवाहप्रदर्शनदारेण ॥

दृढं स्थैर्यमुत्पादयते इत्याभ्यां भवति चिन्तन्निनिरोधः ॥ १२ ॥

अभ्यासं व्याख्यातुमाह ।

\* तदचेति A, D चिङ्गितपुस्तकादयपाठः ।

† प्रत्यक्षोपमान इति B चिङ्गितपुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ चित्तनदोग्नेभयतो वाहिनी वहति कल्याख्याय वहति पापाय च । या तु कैवल्यप्राग्भाराविवेकविषयनिष्ठा सा कल्याख्यवहा । संसारप्राग्भाराविवेकविषयनिष्ठा पापावहा । तच वैराग्येष विषयस्तोतस्तिनी चित्तते, विवेकदर्शनाभ्यासेन कल्याख्यस्तोत उत्पादयते, इत्युभयाधीनचित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः । अभ्यासवैराग्ये इत्यादि B चिङ्गितपुस्तकपाठः । एव तु साक्षात्प्रवचनभाष्यपाठः लेखकप्रमादादर्शपुस्तके नीतः ।

§ प्रकाशप्रदृष्टतिष्ठमनरूपाख्यामिति B चिङ्गितपुस्तकपाठः ।

॥ सुखजगकमानप्रत्ययप्रवाहप्रदर्शनदारेणेति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

तथ स्थितौ यत्तोऽभ्यासः ॥ १३ ॥

दृत्तिरस्त्वा चित्तस्य खस्त्रपनिषः परिणामः ‘स्थितिः’ तस्मां  
‘यदः’ उत्ताहः, पुनःपुनस्तथात्वेन चेतसि विनिवेशनम् ‘अभ्यासः’,  
इत्युच्यते ॥ १३ ॥

तस्यैव विशेषमाह ।

त तु दीर्घकालनैरन्तर्यसत्कारसेवितो हृष्टभूमिः ॥  
॥ १४ ॥

मज्जकार्ण ‘नैरन्तर्येणादरातिशयेन च वेद्यमानः ‘हृष्टभूमिः’  
स्थिरै भवति, दार्ढ्याय प्रभवतीत्यर्थः ॥ १४ ॥

वैराग्यस्य लक्षणमाह ।

हृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवित्तुष्णास्य वशीकारसञ्ज्ञा वैरा-  
ग्यम् ॥ १५ ॥

द्विविधो विषयो हृष्ट आनुश्रविकस्य । ‘हृष्टः’ इहैवोपस्थमानः  
प्रश्नादिः । देवलोकादौ\* ‘आनुश्रविकः’ । आनुशूद्यते गुरुसुखादित्यनु-  
भवो वेदः तत आगतः† ‘आनुश्रविकः’ । तयोर्द्वयोरपि ‘विषययोः’  
परिणामविरस्त्वदर्भमान् विगतग्रूहस्य,‡ या ‘वशीकारसञ्ज्ञा’ ममैते

\* देवलोके इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

† ततोऽधिगत इति B, C चिकित्पुस्तकदयपाठः । तत आगतः चात  
इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ विगतरागस्येति B, D चिकित्पुस्तकदयपाठः ।

वशा\* नाहमेषां वश इति योऽयं विमर्शः,† तत् 'वैराग्यम्' उच्चते  
॥ १५ ॥  
तस्मैव विशेषमाह ।

तत् परं पुरुषस्यातेगुणवैतृष्ण्यम् ॥ १६ ॥

'तत्' वैराग्यं, 'परं' उत्तमाणं । प्रथमं वैराग्यं विषयविषयं, द्वितीयम् गुणविषयम् उत्तमगुणवृष्टविवेकस्यातेरेव‡ भवति निरोधसमाधेरत्य-  
नामगुरुकृत्यात् ॥ १६ ॥

एवं योगस्य स्वरूपसुद्गार सम्प्रदातासम्प्रदातरूपभेदमाहै ।

वितर्कविचारानन्दास्मितातुगमात् सम्प्रदातः ॥ १७ ॥

समाधिरिति शेषः । सम्यक् संग्रहविपर्ययरहितबेन प्रश्नायते  
ग्रंकर्षेण ज्ञायते भावस्य स्वरूपं येन स 'सम्प्रदातः' । समाधिर्भाव-  
नाविशेषः । ध्येयातिरिक्तसकलाद्विनिरोधः सम्प्रदातः सवीजसमा-  
धिरिति यावत् । स वितर्कादिभेदात् चतुर्विधः । चवितर्कः, सविचारः,  
सानन्दः, सांस्कृतस्य । सावग्य च भावस्य ॥ विषयान्तरपरिहारेष

\* वशीकारसंश्च नैवे वशा इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

† विभाग इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ उत्पन्नपुरुषस्यातेरेव भवतीति B चिकितपुस्तकपाठः । उत्पन्नगुणवृष्टव-  
विवेकस्यातेत्प्रद्वयतीति D पुस्तकपाठः । उत्पन्नगुणवैवेकस्यातेरेव भवतीति  
E पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ सम्प्रदातभेदरूपमाहेति B चिकितपुस्तकपाठः ।

|| आत्मन इति D पुस्तकपाठः ।

स्तेतसि पुनः पुरुषिवेत्त्वनं । भाव्यस्त्र दिधा । ईश्वरसत्त्वानि च ।  
 तात्पर्यपि च दिधा जडाजडभेदात् । चक्षानि चतुर्विंशतिः । अजडः  
 पुरुषः\* । तत्त्वं यदा महाभूतेत्त्रिव्याचि खूलानि विषयवेनादाय  
 पूर्वापरानुषन्धानेन अव्यार्थास्त्रेषुसम्भेदेन† च भावना प्रवर्तते, तदा  
 सवितर्कः समाधिः । अस्मिन्नेवावस्थान्वने पूर्वापरानुषन्धानव्यार्थास्त्रेषु  
 अन्यत्वेन‡ यदा भावना प्रवर्तते, तदा निर्वितर्कः । तत्त्वाचान्तःकरण-  
 सत्त्वं सूक्ष्मं विषयमालान्वय तस्य देशकालधर्मावच्छेदेन॥ यदा भावना  
 प्रवर्तते, तदा सविचारः । तस्मिन्नेवावस्थान्वने देशकालधर्मावच्छेदं  
 विना धर्मिमालावभास्त्रितत्वेन भावना क्रियमाणा निर्विचार इत्यु-  
 चते । एवं पर्यन्तः समाधिर्थास्त्रमापत्तिरिति यपदिष्टते॥ । यदा तु  
 रजसामोलेशानुविद्वमनःकरणसत्त्वं भाव्यते, तदा गुणभावात् चिक्षकोः  
 सुखप्रकाशमयस्य सत्त्वस्य भाव्यमानस्योद्देकात् सानन्दः समाधिर्भवति ।  
 अस्मिन्नेव समाधौ ये बहुधृतयसत्त्वान्तरं प्रधानपुरुषरूपं न पश्यन्ति,  
 ते विगतदेहाह्वारत्वात् विदेहव्यवाच्याः । इयं यहणसमापत्तिः ।  
 ततः परं रजसामोलेशानभिन्नतं इद्द्वां सत्त्वमालाननीकात्य या प्रवर्तते  
 भावना, तस्यां याद्वास्य सत्त्वस्य न्यग्भावाचिच्छक्षेद्वेकात् सत्त्वमा-

\* अजः पुरुष इति △ पुरुषकपाठः परम्पर्यं न सनीचीनः ।

† यच्चेति F पुरुषकपाठः ।

‡ अव्यार्थास्त्रेषुसम्भेदेनेति C पुरुषकपाठः । अव्यार्थास्त्रेषुसम्भेदेन यदेति

F पुरुषकपाठः ।

§ अव्यार्थोलेशप्रश्नत्वेनेति C पुरुषकपाठः ।

|| सर्वदेशकालधर्मावच्छेदेति F पुरुषकपाठः ।

॥ याद्वासमापत्तिरित्युच्यते इति E चिकित्पुरुषकपाठः ।

चावन्नेवलेन समाधिः साहित इत्युच्चते । न च अहङ्कारालितवो-  
रभेदः इहानीवः, अतो चाचान्तःकरणमहित्युक्तेन विषवान् वेदयते  
चोहङ्कारः, चाचान्तर्बुद्धतया प्रतिखोमपरिणामेन प्रकृतिखीने चेतयि  
चत्तामात्मवभाति याऽस्मिता । अस्मिद्देव समाधौ ये छत्तपरितोषाः  
परमात्मानं पुरुषं न पश्यन्ति तेषां चेतयि इकारणे स्वसुपगते ते  
मकृतिसदा इत्युच्चन्ते । ये परं पुरुषं ज्ञात्वा भावनायां प्रवर्तन्ते  
तेषामियं विवेकस्यातिर्दीतसमापन्निरित्युच्चते । तच सवितर्कसमाधौ  
चत्तोऽप्यवस्थाः इक्षिरूपतयावतिष्ठन्ते, तत एकैकसास्थाने उत्तरो-  
त्तरा इति चतुरवस्थायम् सम्प्रज्ञातः समाधिः ॥ १३ ॥

असम्प्रज्ञातमाह ।

**विरामप्रत्ययाभ्यासपूर्वकः संखारविशेषान्यः\*** ॥ १४ ॥

विरस्यतेऽनेति ‘विरामः’ वितर्कादिचिन्मात्यागः । विरामसाध्यै  
प्रत्ययस्येति ‘विरामप्रत्ययः’, तस्य ‘अभ्यासः’ पौनः पुन्येन चेतयि  
विगिबेन्न, तच या काचित् दृच्छिरूपस्ति तस्यां नेति नेतीति  
मैरन्तर्येण पर्युदसनं तत्पूर्वकोऽसम्प्रज्ञातसमाधिः† ‘संखारविशेषः’,‡  
‘अन्यः’ तदित्यचणः, असम्प्रज्ञात इत्यर्थः । न तच किञ्चिदेदं सम्प्र-  
ज्ञायते इत्यसम्प्रज्ञातो जिर्विजः समाधिः । इहै चतुर्विधसित्तस्य  
परिणामः । व्युत्थानं, समाधिप्रारम्भः, एकायता, निरोधश्च । तच

\* संखारविशेषान्य इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

† तत्पूर्वकः सम्प्रज्ञातसमाधिरिति B पुस्तकपाठः परन्तरं न समीचीनः ।

‡ संखारविशेष इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ समाधिविहेति D पुस्तकपाठः ।

चिन्तमूढे चिन्तभूमी व्युत्यानं । विचिन्तभूमिः सच्चोद्रेकात् समाधिप्रारम्भः । एकाग्रतानिरह्वे तु पर्यन्तभूमी । प्रतिपरिणामस्तु संखाराः । तच व्युत्यानजनिताः संखाराः समाधिप्रारम्भजैः संखारैर्हन्यन्ते । तज्जास्यैकाग्रताजैः । निराधजनितैरेकाग्रताजाः संखाराः स्वरूपस्तु हन्यते । यथा सुवर्णसम्बलितं धायमानं सीसकमात्मानं\* सुवर्णमलस्तु निर्देहन्ति, एवमेकाग्रताजनितान् संखारान् निरोधजाः स्वात्मानस्तु निर्देहन्ति ॥ १८ ॥

तदेवं योगस्य स्वरूपमेदं सङ्क्षेपेणोपायस्त्राभिधाय विक्षरेणोपायं योगाभ्यासप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं वक्तुमुपक्रमते ।

### भवप्रत्ययो विदेहप्रकृतिस्त्रयानाम् ॥ १६ ॥

‘विदेहाः’, ‘प्रकृतिस्त्रयाः’, च वितर्कादिभूमिकासूचे व्याख्याताः । तेषां समाधिः ‘भवप्रत्ययः’, भवः संसारः स एव प्रत्ययः कारणं यस्य स ‘भवप्रत्ययः’ । अथमर्थः । आविर्भूतमाचेऽ एव संसारे ते तथा-विधसमाधिभावो भवन्ति । तेषां परतत्त्वादर्थनात् योगाभ्यासेऽयं । अतः परतत्त्वस्त्राने तत्त्वावगायात्र सुक्रिकामेन यत्रः† विधेय इत्येतदर्थमुपदिष्टम् ॥ १६ ॥

तदन्येषान्तु ।

\* श्रीसर्वं खदमात्मानमिति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

† आविर्भूताधिमात्र इति E, G पुस्तकदयपाठः ।

‡ महान् यत्र इति D, G पुस्तकपाठः ।

अद्वावीर्यसूतिसमाधिप्रज्ञापूर्वक इतरेषाम् ॥ २० ॥

विदेहप्रद्वितिस्यव्यतिरिक्तानां योगिनां, अद्वादिपूर्वकः, अद्वादयः पूर्वे उपाया यस्य स अद्वादिपूर्वकः । ते च अद्वादयः क्रमादुपायोपेयभावेन प्रवर्त्तमानाः सम्प्रज्ञातस्य समाधेदपायतां प्रतिपाद्यन्ते । तत्र 'अद्वा' योगविषये चेतसः प्रसादः । 'वीर्यं' उत्साहः । 'सूतिः' अनुभूतासम्प्रभेषः । 'समाधिः' एकायता । 'प्रज्ञा' प्रज्ञातव्यविवेकः । तत्र अद्वावतो वीर्यं जायते, योगविषये उत्साहवान् भवति । चोत्साहस्य पाद्यात्यासु भूमिषु सूतिरूपजायते । तत्स्मरणात् चेतः समाधीयते । समाधितचित्तस्य भावं सम्प्रविजानाति । त एते सम्प्रज्ञातसमाधेदपायाः । तस्याभ्यासात् पराच वैराग्याद्वयत्यसम्प्रज्ञातः ॥ २० ॥

उक्तोपायवतां योगिनामुपायभेदात् भेदानाह ।

तीव्रसंवेगानामासनः\* ॥ २१ ॥

समाधिलाभ इतिशेषः । 'संवेगः' क्रियाहेतुर्दृढतरः संस्कारः, सः 'तीव्रः', येषामधिमाचोपायानां, तेषां 'आसनः,' समाधिलाभः,† समाधिफलसमाप्तिभवति, ज्ञीवमेव निष्प्रद्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ २१ ॥

के ते तीव्रसंवेग इत्यत आह ।

\* समाधिलाभ इति C, F, G पुस्तकचयेषु पाठः । यत्र सूत्रे समाधिलाभ इति पाठकात्र ठोकायां समाधिलाभ इति शेष इति पाठो गत्वा । तथा च समाधिलाभभग्न्येन अन्यतरस्यस्य यत्र कुचाप्यवग्नमेव भवितव्यमिति निष्क्रोयते ।

† तेषां समाधिर्भवति लाभ इति D पुस्तकपाठः ।

## मृदुमध्याधिमात्रत्वात् ततोपि विशेषः ॥ २२ ॥

तेभ्यः उपायेभ्यो मृद्वादिभेदभिन्नेभ्य उपायवतां ‘विशेषः’, भवति । ‘मृदुर्मध्याधिमात्रः’, इत्युपायभेदाः । ते प्रत्येकं मृदुसंवेग-मध्यसंवेग-तीव्रसंवेगभेदात् चिविधाः । तद्देदेन च नव योगिनो भवन्ति । मृदुपायः, मृदुसंवेगः, मध्यसंवेगः, तीव्रसंवेगस्य । मध्योपायः, मृदु-संवेगः, मध्यसंवेगः, तीव्रसंवेगस्य । अधिमात्रोपायः, मृदुसंवेगः, मध्यसंवेगः, तीव्रसंवेगस्य । अधिमात्रोपाये तीव्रे च संवेगे महान् अन्तः कर्त्तव्य इति भेदोपदेशः ॥ २२ ॥

इदानीमेतदुपायविलक्षणं सुगमसुपायान्तरमाह ।

## ईश्वरप्रणिधानादा ॥ २३ ॥

‘ईश्वरः’ वक्ष्यमाणस्त्रियः, ‘प्रणिधानं’ तच भक्तिविशेषः । विशिष्ट-सुपासनं सर्वक्रियाणामपि तचार्पणं । विषयसुखादिकं फलमनिष्ठन्\* सर्वांः क्रियास्तस्मिन् परमगुरावर्पयति, तत् ‘प्रणिधानं’ । समाधेस्तत्-फलस्ताभस्य च प्रकृष्ट उपायः ॥ २३ ॥

ईश्वरस्य प्रणिधानात् समाधिसाभ इत्युक्तं । तचेश्वरस्य स्वरूपं, प्रमाणं, प्रभावं, वाचकं, उपासनाक्रमं, तत्फलस्य क्रमेण वक्तुमाह ।

क्षेत्रकर्मविपाकाश्यैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः ॥ २४ ॥

क्षिण्यमनीति ‘क्षेत्राः’ अविद्यादयो वक्ष्यमाणाः । विहित-प्रतिषिद्ध-यामिश्वरपाणि ‘कर्माणि’ । विपक्षत्वं इति ‘विपाकाः’ कर्मफलानि

\* फलमनिष्ठृतिः C, F पुरुषकदयपाठः ।

जात्यायुर्भागः । आफलविषयाकात् चित्तभूमौ ग्रेत इति 'आश्रयः'  
वासनास्थाः संखाराः । तैः 'अपरामृष्टः' चित्तपि कालेषु न संसृष्टः ।  
'पुरुषविज्ञेषः' अन्येभ्यः पुरुषेभ्यो विज्ञित इति विज्ञेषः । 'ईश्वरः'  
ईश्वरशीलः\*, इच्छामाचेष सकलाजगदुद्धरणक्षमः । यद्यपि सर्वेषां  
मात्मां क्लेशादित्यर्थां नास्ति तथापि चित्तगतस्तेषामुपदिष्टते ।  
यथा योद्धूगतौ जयपराजयौ खामिनः । अस्य तु चित्तपि कालेषु  
तथाविधेऽपि क्लेशादिपरामर्थां नास्तीत्यतः स विस्त्रित एव भगवा-  
नीश्वरः । तस्य च तथाविधमैश्वर्यमहादेः सन्त्वोत्कर्षात् । सन्त्वोत्कर्ष-  
सात्त्वं प्रकृष्टशानादेव । न चानयेऽपि ज्ञानैश्वर्योरितिरेतराश्रयलं  
परस्यरानपेक्ष्यतात् । ते द्वे ज्ञानैश्वर्ये ईश्वरसन्ते वर्तमाने अनादि-  
भृते । तथाविधेन सन्तेन तस्यानादिरेव समन्व्यः, प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोग-  
वियोगयोरीश्वरेच्छाव्यतिरेकेनानुपपन्नेः । यथेतरेषां प्राणिनां सुख-  
दुःखमोहतया विपरिणतं चिन्तं निर्भले सात्त्विके धर्षात्मप्रस्थे योगि-  
ज्ञरीरे प्रतिसंक्रान्तं चिक्षायासंक्रान्तेः संवेदं भवति, नैवमीश्वरस्य ।  
तस्य केवल एव सात्त्विकः परिणामं उत्कर्षत्रागनादिसम्बन्धेन भोग्य-  
तया व्यवस्थितः । अतः पुरुषान्तरविस्त्रितया स एवेश्वरः । मुक्तात्मनः  
पुनः क्लेशादिसंयोगस्त्वैः आत्मोक्तैरूपायैर्निर्बन्धितः, अस्य पुनः सर्वदैव  
तथाविधत्वात् मुक्तात्मतुल्यत्वं । न सेश्वराणामनेकत्वं, तेषां तु स्वत्वेषि  
भिन्नाभिप्रायत्वात् कार्यस्यैवानुपपन्नेः । उत्कर्षापकर्षयुक्तवे य एव  
उत्कृष्टः स एव ईश्वरः तज्जैव काष्ठाप्राप्तत्वादैश्वर्यस्य ॥ २४ ॥

\* ईश्वरशील इति A पुस्तकपाठः परन्तरयं न समीक्षीयः ।

† न च तयारिति C, F पुस्तकदृश्यपाठः ।

एवमीश्वरस्य खण्डप्रभिधाय प्रमाणमाह ।

तत्र निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञवीजं ॥ २५ ॥

तस्मिन् भगवति, सर्वज्ञत्वस्य यत् 'वीजं' अतीतानागतादिग्रह-  
स्थाणुं\* महत्त्वम्, मूलत्वादीजमिव वीजं, तत् 'तत्र', 'निरतिशयं'  
काष्ठां प्राप्तं । इष्टा हि अणुलमहत्त्वादीनां† धर्मार्णा शान्तिशयानां  
काष्ठाप्राप्तिः । यथा परमाणावणुलस्थाकाष्ठे च परममहत्त्वस्य ।  
एवं ज्ञानादयोऽपि विनाधर्मास्तारतन्त्रेन परिदृश्यमानाः क्षणिकर-  
तिशयतामापादयन्ति‡ यत्र सैते निरतिशयाः स ईश्वरः । यद्यपि  
सामान्यमाचेनुमानस्य पर्यवसितत्वात् विशेषावगतिः सम्भवति,  
तथापि ज्ञात्वादस्य सर्वज्ञत्वादयो विशेषा अवगम्याः । स च  
स्वप्रयोजनाभावे कथं प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः संयोगविद्योगावापादयतीति  
नाप्रहृनीयं । तस्य कारणिकलाद्यतामुग्रह एव प्रयोजनं । कल्प-  
प्रखयमहाप्रखयेषु निःशेषान् संसारिण उद्भूतिर्थामीति तस्याध्यवसायः ।  
यद्यस्येष्ट तस्य प्रयोजनमिति ॥ २५ ॥

एवमीश्वरस्य खण्डं प्रमाणस्ताभिधाय प्रभावमाह ।

स एष पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात् ॥ २६ ॥

आद्यानां स्तृणां ब्रह्मादीनामपि, 'गुरुः' उपदेष्टा, यतः 'सः',

\* अतीतानागतादिग्रहस्थाण्यत्वमिति B, C, D, E पुस्तकानां पाठः ।

† अस्यत्वमहत्त्वादीनामिति A, E पुस्तकपाठः । एवमत्र सर्वत्र अग्र-

ग्रहस्थाने अस्यशब्दव्यवहारः ।

‡ निरतिशयतामासादयन्तीति D पुस्तकपाठः ।

‘कालेन’, नावच्छिद्यते अगाधिलात् । तेषां पुनरादिमत्तादर्शा  
कालेनावच्छेदः ॥ २६ ॥

एवं प्रभावसुक्ता उपासनोपयोगाय वाचकमाह ।

तस्य वाचकः प्रणवः ॥ २७ ॥

इत्यसुप्राप्तस्य ईश्वरस्य, 'वाचकः' अभिधायकः ।\* प्रकर्षण  
गूढते स्थृतेऽनेनेति नैति स्वैतीति वा 'प्रणवः' ओङ्कारः । तथोऽस्य  
वाच्यवाचकभावसङ्घर्षमन्व्यो गित्यः सङ्केतेन प्रकाश्यते, य तु केनचित्  
क्रियते, यथा पितृपुण्ड्रोर्विद्यमानः समन्व्योऽस्थायं पिता अस्तायं  
पुण्ड्र इति केनचित् प्रकाश्यते ॥ २७ ॥

## उपाध्यक्षमात्र ।

तज्जपस्तदर्थभावनम् ॥ २८ ॥

‘तस्य’ सार्वज्ञिमात्रस्य प्रणवस्य, ‘जपः’ यथावदुच्चारणं, तदाच्यते-  
श्वरस्य ‘भावनं’ पुनः पुनस्तेति विनिवेश्यन्, एकायताया उपायः।  
अतः समाधियिद्धये योगिना प्रणवो जप्तः, तदर्थस्य भावनीषः।  
इत्युक्तं भवति ॥ २८ ॥

## उपासनायाः फलमाह ।

ततः प्रत्यक्षेतमाधिगमेऽप्यन्तरायाभावशः ॥ २६ ॥

तस्माजपात् तदर्थभावनात् च योगिनः 'प्रत्यक्षेतत्त्वाधि-

\* वाचकोऽभिधायकः प्रबल ओऽपार इति A, D पुरुषाद्यपाठः।

† तदर्थं ईश्वरस्य भावनीय इति B, D पुस्तकाद्यपाठः ।

‡ चेतनागमोऽन्तराया भाव इति A, C, D, F पुस्तकचतुर्थयाठः ।

नमः,\* भवति । विषयप्रातिकूचेन स्थानःकरणाभिमुखमच्छति, या 'चेतना' दृक्भक्ति,† या 'प्रत्यक्षेतना', तस्मा: 'अधिगमः' ज्ञानं, भवति । 'अन्तरायाः' वस्त्रमाणाः, तेषां 'अभावः' भक्तिप्रतिकूचः, भवति ॥ २६ ॥

अथ के अन्तरायाः‡ इत्याभङ्गायामाद् ।

व्याधि-स्थान-संशय-प्रमादालस्याविरति-धान्तिदर्श-  
नालव्यभूमिकत्वानवस्थितत्वानि चित्तविक्षेपात्तेऽन्तरा-  
याः ॥ ३० ॥

मैत्रे रजसामोक्षात् प्रवर्त्तमानाः 'चित्तविक्षेपाः',<sup>४</sup> भवन्ति,  
तेरेकायाविरोधिभिस्मिन्नं विचित्रते इत्यर्थः । तत्र 'व्याधि' धातु-  
वैषम्यनिमित्तो अवरादिः । 'स्थानं' अकर्मण्टता चित्तस्य । उभयको-  
स्थानमन्वन् ॥ विज्ञानं 'संशयः', योगः साथो या न वेति<sup>५</sup> । 'प्रमादः'  
अननुष्ठानशीलता, समाधिकाव्यने ज्ञादासीन्यं । 'आलस्यं' कायचित्त-  
योगुद्दृश्यं, योगविषये प्रदृश्यमावे उत्तुः । 'अविरतिः' चित्तस्य

\* प्रत्यक्षेतनागम इति C, D पुस्तकदयपाठः ।

† स्थानःकरणाभिमुखमच्छति या दृक्भक्तिरिति B पुस्तकपाठः । स्थानः-  
करणाभिमुखमच्छति या चेतना दृक्भक्तिरिति A, C पुस्तकदयपाठः ।  
स्थानःकरणाभिमुखमच्छति प्रत्यक्षेतना दृक्षेतना तस्माधिगम इति D  
पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ अथ के तेऽन्तराया इति C, E पुस्तकदयपाठः ।

§ चित्तस्य विक्षेपा इति A, C पुस्तकदयपाठः ।

|| उभयकोशालम्बगमिति C पुस्तकपाठः । परन्वयं न समीक्षीनः ।

¶ योगः साथः स्थाना न वेति A, C पुस्तकदयपाठः ।

विषयसम्प्रयोगात्मा गर्दुः\* । ‘भाग्निर्दर्शनं’ इति क्रिकायां रजतल-  
वदितां विषयस्थानं । ‘अस्तव्यमूर्मिकलं’ कुतस्ति निमित्तात्  
समाधिभूमेरसाभोऽस्माप्तिः । ‘अनवस्थितत्वं’ सत्त्वावस्थायामपि  
समाधिभूमौ चित्तस्य तत्त्वप्रतिष्ठा । त-एते समाधेरेकायातावा:  
यथायां प्रतिपक्षतात् ‘अन्तरायाः’, इति उच्चते ॥ ३० ॥

चित्तविक्षेपकारकागच्छान्तरायाम् प्रतिपादयितुमाह ।

दुःख-दैर्मनस्याङ्गमेजयत्व-श्वास-प्रश्वासा विक्षेपसह-  
भुवः ॥ ३१ ॥

कुरुतस्तिनिमित्तादुत्पत्तेषु विक्षेपेष्वेतेऽ दुःखादयः प्रवर्त्तन्ते ।  
तत्र ‘दुःखं’ चित्तस्य रागजः॥ परिणामः वाधनालक्षणः, यदाधात्  
प्राणिनक्षत्रप्रवाताय प्रवर्त्तन्ते । ‘दैर्मनस्यं’ वास्त्राभ्यन्तरैः कारण्म-  
नस्तो दैर्मनस्यं । ‘अङ्गमेजयत्वं’ सर्वाङ्गीनो वेपथुः आसनस्त्रैर्यस्या  
वाधकः । प्राणे यदाश्चां वायुमात्रामति सः ‘श्वासः’\*\* । यत्कौश्चिं  
वायुं निःशारथति† स ‘प्रश्वासः’ । त एते विक्षेपैः‡ सह वर्तमाना

\* विषयसम्प्रयोगार्थो गर्दुः इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

† रजतवदितीति A पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ सत्त्वायामपीति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ विक्षेपेष्वेतेषु इति C, E, F पुस्तकचयपाठः ।

|| चित्तस्य रजस इति A पुस्तकपाठः ।

¶ आसनमनस्त्रैर्ययोरिति A पुस्तकपाठः ।

\*\* प्राणो यदाश्चां वायुमात्रसिति स श्वास इति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

†† निष्पसितीति A, B, D पुस्तकचयपाठः ।

‡‡ ते एतेविक्षेपैरिति A, F पुस्तकचयपाठः । एतैर्विक्षेपैरिति B, E, D  
पुस्तकचयपाठः ।

यथोदिताभ्यामभ्यास-त्रैराग्याभ्यां निरोद्धवा इत्येषामुपदेशः ॥ ३१ ॥

सोपद्वविचेपप्रतिषेधार्थसुपायान्तरमाइ ।

तत्प्रतिषेधार्थमेकतस्वाभ्यासः ॥ ३२ ॥

तेषां विचेपाणां 'प्रतिषेधार्थं' निषेधार्थं, 'एकस्मिन् कस्मिंश्चि-  
दभिमते, 'तत्त्वे', 'अभ्यासः', चेतसः पुनः पुनर्बिंनिषेश्वनं कुर्यात् ।  
यद्यवसात् प्रत्युदितायामेकायतायां प्रश्नमसुपायान्ति विचेपाः ॥ ३२ ॥

इदानीं चित्तसंस्कारापादकपरिकर्मकथनपूर्वकसुपायान्तरमाइ\* ।

मैची-करणा-मुदितोपेक्षाणां सुखदुःखपुण्यापुण्यवि-  
षयाणां भावनातश्चित्प्रसादनम् ॥ ३३ ॥

'मैची' शैद्वार्द्दृ । 'करण' कृपा । 'मुदिता' हर्षः । 'उपेक्षा'  
औदासीन्यं । एता यथाक्रमं सुखितेषु, दुःखितेषु, पुण्यवसु, अपु-  
ण्यवसु च भावयेत् । तथाहि सुखितेषु साध्वेषां सुखित-  
मिति मैचीं कुर्यात् लीर्यां । दुःखितेषु कथं नु नामैषां दुःखि-  
तविमुक्तिः खादिति कृपामेव कुर्यात् न ताटस्यं । पुण्यवसु पुण्या-  
नुमोदनेन हर्षं कुर्यात् न तु किमेते पुण्यवस्तु इति विदेषं ।  
अपुण्यवसु औदासीन्यमेव भावयेत् नानुमोदनं न देषं । सूचे  
सुखदुःखादिग्रन्थैसूदन्तः प्रतिपादिताः । तदेवं मैच्यादिपरिकर्मणा  
चित्तोऽप्रशीदति† सुखेन समाधेराविभावो भवति । परिकर्म चैतदाद्यां

\* चित्तसंस्कारापादकं परिकर्मकथनसुपायान्तरमाहेति C, E पुस्तक-  
इयपाठः ।

† परिकर्मणा प्रसादेपायेन चित्त इति E, D पुस्तकइयपाठः ।

‡ चित्तप्रसादे सतीति D पुस्तकपाठः ॥

कर्म । यदा गहिते मिथ्यादिव्यवहारगहितगिर्व्यप्तये अहस्तितादि-  
कर्म, उपकारक्लेन प्रधानकर्मगिर्व्यप्तये प्रभवति, एवं देवरामादि-  
प्रतिपक्षभूतमैथादिभावगत्या समुत्पादितप्रसादं चित्तं सम्प्रदात-  
समाधियोग्यं सम्पद्यते । रागदेवावेव सुखतया भेदसुत्पादयतः\* ।  
तै चेत् समूलमुकूस्तितौ स्थातां तदा प्रसवत्वात् मनसो भवत्येवै-  
कायता ॥ ३३ ॥

उपायान्तरमाह ।

### प्रच्छर्द्दन-विधारणाभ्यां वा प्राणस्य ॥ ३४ ॥

‘प्रच्छर्द्दनं’ यत् कौठस्य वायोः प्रवलविशेषान्ताचाप्रमाणेन वस्ति-  
निःसारणं । ‘विधारणं’ माचाप्रमाणेनैव प्राणस्यायामः नतिविच्छेदः ।  
स च द्वाभ्यां प्रकाराभ्यां, वाञ्छस्यान्तरापूरणेन, पूरितस्य वायोस्यैव  
निरोधेन । तदेव रेचकपूरककुम्भकभेदेन चिविधः प्राणायामः  
चित्तस्य स्थितिमेकायतायां निवधाति । सर्वासामिश्रितद्वनीनां  
प्राणप्रदृच्छिपूर्वकत्वात् मनःप्राणयोः खल्यापारे परस्यरमेकयोग-  
स्थेमत्वात्मीयमाणः प्राणः समस्येन्द्रियदृच्छिनिरोधद्वारेष चित्तस्यैका-  
यतायां प्रभवति । समस्यदोषज्यकारित्वं चास्थागमे श्रूयते, दोष-  
हतास्य सर्वो विच्छेपदृक्षयः । अतो दोषनिर्वृणदारेणास्यैकायतायां  
सामर्थ्यं ॥ ३४ ॥

इदागीसुपायान्तरदर्शनोपचेपेष चम्प्रदातस्य चमाधेः पूर्वरङ्गं  
करोतीति ।

\* विच्छेपसुत्पादयत इति A, D परस्यकर्दयपाठः ।

† पूर्वाङ्गं करोतीति B पुरुषकपाठः ।

विषयवती वा प्रदृष्टिरूपमा स्थितिनिबन्धनी ॥ ३५ ॥

मनस इति वाक्यशेषः । विषया गन्ध-रस-रूप-सर्प-शब्दाः ते विद्यन्ते फलत्वेन यस्याः सा 'विषयवती', 'प्रदृष्टिः', मनसः स्मैर्यं करोति । तथा हि नाशये चित्तं धारयते दिव्यगन्धसमिदुपजायते । तादृष्टेव जिङ्गाये रससमित् । ताम्बये रूपसमित् । जिङ्गामधे सर्प-समित् । जिङ्गामूले शब्दसमित् । तदेवं तत्तदिन्द्रियद्वारेण तस्मि-स्मिन् दिव्ये विषये जायमाना समित् चित्तस्यैकायतायां देतु-र्भवति, अस्मि योगस्य फलसमिति थोगिनां समाश्वासेत्पादनात् ॥ ३५ ॥

एवंविधमेवोपायान्मरमाइ ।

विशेषिका वा ज्योतिषियती ॥ ३६ ॥

प्रदृष्टिरूपमा चित्तस्य स्थितिनिबन्धनीति वाक्यशेषः । ज्योतिः-शब्देन सात्त्विकः प्रकाश उच्यते, स प्रशस्तो भूयानतिशयवांश विद्यते यस्याः सा 'ज्योतिषियती', प्रदृष्टिः । 'विशेषिका' विगतः सुखमय-सत्त्वाभ्यासवलोक्षणो रजःपरिणामो यस्याः सा, चेतसः स्थिति-निबन्धनी । अथर्वायः इत्यस्यास्युटमध्ये प्रशान्तकलोक्षणीरोदधिप्रस्तं चित्तसत्त्वं सम्भावयतः प्रशालोकात् सर्वदृष्टिपरिज्ञये चेतसः स्मैर्य-सुत्पद्यते ॥ ३६ ॥

उपायान्मरप्रदर्शनद्वारेण सम्प्रज्ञातस्य समाधेर्विषयं दर्शयति ।

वीतरागविषयं वा चित्तं ॥ ३७ ॥

मनसः स्थितिनिबन्धनं भवतीति वाक्यशेषः । 'वीतरागः'

परित्यक्तविषयाभिक्षापः, तस्य यत् 'स्त्रिः' परिहतक्षेत्रं तदास्तमनी-  
क्षतं, चेतसः स्थितिहेतुर्भवति ॥ २७ ॥

एवंविधमेवोपायान्तरमाद् ।

### स्वप्न-निद्रा-ज्ञानावस्थामनं वा ॥ ३८ ॥

प्रथमितवादेश्चित्तमनेमनोमात्रेणैव यज्ञ भोक्तृत्वमात्मनः सः  
'स्त्रीः' । 'निद्रा' पूर्वीक्षास्त्रणा\* । तदास्तमनं स्वप्नास्तमनं, निद्रा-  
मनं वा 'ज्ञानं', आस्तमयमानं, चेतसः स्थितिं करोति ॥ ३८ ॥

नामार्थचिलात् प्राणिनां यस्मिन् कस्तिंचिद्दक्षुनि योगिनः अद्वा  
भवति । तस्य ध्यानेनापि भवतीष्टस्मिद्विरिति प्रतिपादयितुमाद् ।

### यथाभिमतध्यानादा ॥ ३९ ॥

यथाभिमते वस्तुनि वाद्ये चक्रादौ, अभ्यन्तरे नाडीचक्रादौ वा  
भाव्यमाने चेतः स्थिरं भवति ॥ ३९ ॥

एवसुपायाग् प्रदर्श्य फलप्रदर्शनार्थमाद् ।

### परमाणु-परममहस्तान्तो इस्य वशीकारः ॥ ४० ॥

एभिरूपार्थैस्त्रिभृत्य स्त्रैर्ये भावयतो योगिनः स्वस्त्रविषयभावना-  
दारेण परमास्तमः 'वशीकारः' अप्रतिधातरूपः, जायते, क्षणित्  
परमाणुपर्यन्ते स्त्रैर्ये विषयेऽस्य मनो न प्रतिहृन्यत इत्यर्थः । एवं  
स्त्रैर्यमाकाशादिपरममहस्तपर्यन्तं भावयतो न क्षणित् चेतसः प्रतिधात  
उत्पद्यते सर्वत्र स्त्रातस्त्रं भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ ४० ॥

\* पूर्वमेवोक्तक्षक्षेत्रेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† स्थिरीभवतीति E पुस्तकपाठः । चेतःस्थितिभवतीति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

एवमेभिरपायैः संस्कृतस्य चेतसः कीदृशूर्णं भवतीत्याह ।

क्षीणवृत्तेरभिजातस्येव मणेर्ग्रहीतृ-ग्रहण-ग्राह्येषु  
तत्स्थ-तदञ्जनतासमापत्तिः ॥ ४१ ॥

जीण वृत्तयो यस्य सः ‘क्षीणवृत्तिः’, तस्य, ‘यहीतृ-ग्रहण-ग्राह्येषु’  
आत्मेश्चिय-विषयेषु, ‘तत्स्थ-तदञ्जनतासमापत्तिः’, भवति । ‘तत्स्थलं’  
तचैकायता । ‘तदञ्जनलं’ तन्मयलं, व्यग्रहते चित्ते विषयस्य भाव्य-  
मानस्येवोत्कर्षः । तथाविधा ‘समापत्तिः’ तदूपरसिसामो भवतीत्यर्थः ।  
दृष्टान्तमाह । ‘अभिजातस्येव मणेः’, इति अथा ‘अभिजातस्य’ निर्माणस्य,  
खट्टिकमणेः, तपादूपाश्रयवशान्तदूपतापत्तिः । एवं अभिजातस्य  
निर्माणस्य चित्तस्य तत्तद्वावनीयवस्त्रपरागान्तदूपतापत्तिः । यद्यपि  
यहीतृ-ग्रहण-ग्राह्येष्वित्युक्तं, तथापि भूमिकाक्रमवशात् याह्य-ग्रहण-  
यहीतृव्यिति वोद्धृष्टं । अतः प्रथमं याह्यनिष्ठ एव समाधिस्तो  
यहीतृनिष्ठस्तोऽस्मितामात्ररूपे यहीतृनिष्ठः, केवलस्य पुरुषस्य यहीतृ-  
र्भाव्यस्यासम्भवात् । ततस्य स्थूलसूक्ष्मायाह्योपरन्तं चित्तं तत्र समापनं  
भवति । एवं यहीतृ यहीतृरि च समापनं वोद्धृष्टं ॥ ४१ ॥

ददानीमुकाशा एव समापनेश्चतुर्विधभेदमाह\* ।

शब्दार्थ-ज्ञान-विकल्पैः सङ्कीर्णा सवितर्का ॥ ४२ ॥

ओचेश्चिययाह्यः स्फोटरूपे वा ‘शब्दः’ । ‘अर्थः’ जात्यादिः ।  
‘ज्ञानं’ सत्त्वप्रधाना बुद्धिवृत्तिः । ‘विकल्पः’ सक्षात्सूक्ष्मः । तैः ‘सङ्कीर्णा’,

\* चतुर्विधस्यमाहेवि ० पुरुषपाठः ।

यस्यामेते ब्रह्माद्यस्त्वयः परस्यराथासेन विकल्पस्यपेण प्रतिभासने, गौरितिष्ठ्वः, गौरितिष्ठानं, इत्यनेनाकारेण सा ‘सवितर्का’, समापन्निरित्युच्यते\* ॥ ४२ ॥

सुक्षमात्मणविपरीतां गिर्वितर्कामाह ।

स्मृतिपरिशुद्धौ स्वरूपशून्येवार्थमाचनिर्भासा निर्वितर्का ॥ ४३ ॥

ब्रह्मार्थस्तिप्रविलये, प्रत्युदितस्तृष्णाकारप्रतिभासितया न्यग्-भूतज्ञानसन्त्वेनां ‘स्वरूपशून्या इव’, ‘निर्वितर्का’, समापन्निः ॥ ४३ ॥  
भेदान्तरं प्रतिपादयितुमाह ।

एतयैव सविचारा निर्विचारा च सूक्ष्मविषया व्याख्याता ॥ ४४ ॥

‘एतयैव’ सवितर्कया निर्वितर्कया, ‘सविचारा निर्विचारा च व्याख्याता’ । कीदृशी ‘सूक्ष्मविषया’ सूक्ष्मात्मनाचेन्द्रियादिः† विषयो यस्या सा तथोक्ता । एतेन पूर्वस्याः सूक्ष्मविषयत्वं प्रतिपादितं भवति, सा हि महाभूतात्मना ब्रह्मार्थ-ज्ञान-विकल्पसहितत्वेन तद्रहितत्वेन च‡ । देशकालधर्माद्यवच्छिन्नः सूक्ष्मोऽर्थः प्रतिभाति यस्यां सा ‘सविचारा’ । देशकालधर्मादिरहितो धर्मिमाचतया

\* समापन्निरित्यत इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

† ज्ञानांश्चत्वेनेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ तत्त्वाचान्तःकरत्वमिति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ शब्दार्थ-विकल्पविषयत्वेन शब्दार्थ-विकल्पसहितत्वेनेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

सूक्ष्मोऽर्थस्त्वात्तेष्ठियरूपः प्रतिभाति यस्यां सा 'निर्विचारा' ।

अस्या एव सूक्ष्मविषयाः ॥ ४४ ॥

किं पर्यन्तः सूक्ष्मो विषय इत्याह ।

**सूक्ष्मविषयत्वश्चालिङ्गपर्यवसानं ॥ ४५ ॥**

सविचार-निर्विचारयोः समापत्त्योर्यत् 'सूक्ष्मविषयत्वं', उक्तं । जक्तिस्त्रीयते न वा किञ्चिलिङ्गन्यति गमयतीति 'अलिङ्गं' प्रधानं, तत्पर्यन्तं सूक्ष्मविषयत्वं । तथा हि गुणानां परिणामे चलारि पर्वाणि, विशिष्टलिङ्गं, अविशिष्टलिङ्गं, लिङ्गमात्रं, अलिङ्गस्तेति । विशिष्टलिङ्गं भूतानि । अविशिष्टलिङ्गं तत्त्वात्तेष्ठियाणि । लिङ्गमात्रं बुद्धिः । अलिङ्गं प्रधानमिति । नातः परं सूक्ष्ममस्तीत्युक्तं भवति ॥ ४५ ॥

एतासां समापत्तीनां प्रकृते प्रयोजनमाह ।

**ता एव\* सवीजः समाधिः ॥ ४६ ॥**

'ता एव' उक्तलक्षणाः समापत्तयः, सह वीजेन आसमनेन वर्तत इति 'सवीजः' सम्प्रज्ञातः समाधिः, इत्युच्यते, सर्वासां सा-सम्प्रगत्वात् ॥ ४६ ॥

अथेतरासां समापत्तीनां निर्विचारफलकलात् निर्विचारायाः फलमाह ।

**निर्विचारवैशारद्ये अथात्मप्रसादः ॥ ४७ ॥**

'निर्विचारत्वं व्याख्यातं । 'वैशारद्यं' नैर्वास्त्वं । सवितर्कं सूल-

\* सूत्रे टीकायाच्च एताएवेति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

† निर्विचारायाः यज्ञत्वादिति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

विषयामपेत्य निर्वितर्कारायाः प्राधान्वं । ततोऽपि सूक्ष्मविषयायाः सविचारायाः । ततोऽपि निर्विकल्पसूत्रायाः निर्विचारायाः । तस्यासु\* निर्विचारायाः प्रकृष्टाभ्यासवशात् ‘वैश्वारस्ये’ नैर्वक्ते बति, ‘अस्त्वा-प्रसादः’, समुपजायते, चित्तं क्लेशवासवारहितं स्त्रिप्रवाह्योर्गम्य भवति । एतदेव चित्तस्य वैश्वारस्यं, यत्स्थितौ दार्ढं ॥ ४७ ॥

तस्मिन् बति किं भवतीत्याह ।

### चृतम्भरा तत्प्रश्ना ॥ ४८ ॥

“चृतं” सत्यं विभर्ति कहाचिदपि न विपर्ययेणाच्छायते, वा ‘चृतम्भरा’, ‘प्रश्ना’, तस्मिन् बति, भवतीत्यर्थः । तस्माच्च प्रश्नालोकात् सर्वे यथावत् पश्यन् योगी प्रकृष्टं योगं प्राप्नोति ॥ ४८ ॥

अस्थाः प्रश्नाम्भराद् वैस्तव्यस्थमाह ।

### श्रुतानुमानप्रश्नाभ्यामन्यविषयाः विशेषार्थत्वात् ॥ ४९ ॥

‘श्रुतं’ आगमज्ञानं, ‘श्रुतुमानं’ उक्तस्तत्त्वं, ताभ्यां या आयते प्रश्ना वा सामान्यविषया । न हि ब्रह्मसिद्ध्योरिन्द्रियवदित्तेष्वप्रतिपत्तौ सामर्थ्ये । इयं पुनर्निर्विचारवैश्वारस्यसमुपेता॥ प्रश्ना ताभ्यां विस्तव्या

\* तस्या अपीति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

† प्रकृष्टाभ्यासवशादिति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ तस्याच्च प्रश्नायाः इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ श्रौतानुमानप्रश्नाभ्यां सामान्यविषया इति H पुस्तकपाठः । परन्तर्यं न समीचीनः ।

|| निर्विचारवैश्वारस्यसमुद्भवेति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

विशेषविविधत्वात् । अस्यां हि प्रज्ञायां सूक्ष्म-व्यवस्था-विप्रकृष्टानामपि  
विशेषः स्फुटेनैव रूपेण प्रतिभासते । अतस्यां हि प्रज्ञायां योगिना  
यरः प्रवद्धः कर्मण्य इत्युपदिष्टुं भवति ॥ ४८ ॥

अस्याः प्रज्ञायाः फलमाह ।

तज्जः संस्कारोऽन्यसंस्कारप्रतिबन्धी ॥ ५० ॥

तथा प्रज्ञया जनितः च: 'संस्कारः' चोऽन्यान् व्युत्थानजान्  
समाधिजांशु\* संस्कारान् प्रतिबन्धाति, स्वकार्यकरणात्मान् करो-  
नीत्यर्थः । अतस्यत्वरूपतया तथा जनिताः संस्कारा बलवन्नात् अतस्य-  
रूपप्रज्ञाजनितान् संस्कारान् वाधितुं शकुवन्ति । अतस्यानेव प्रज्ञा-  
मन्यस्येदित्युक्तं भवति ॥ ५० ॥

एवं सम्प्रज्ञातसमाधिमभिधायासम्प्रज्ञातं वकुमाह ।

तस्यापि निरोधे सर्वनिरोधान्निर्विजिः समाधिः ॥  
॥ ५१ ॥

'तस्यापि' सम्प्रज्ञातस्यापि, 'निरोधे' प्रविलये, सति, 'सर्वासां'  
चिन्तात्मीयां, स्वकारणे प्रविलयाद्या या संस्कारमात्रा दृप्तिरूदेति,  
तस्यां तस्यां नेति नेति केवलं पर्युद्दशनात्<sup>†</sup> 'निर्विजिः समाधिः',  
आविर्भवति । यस्मिन् सति पुरुषः स्वरूपमात्रनिष्ठः<sup>‡</sup> शुद्धो भवति ॥  
तद्याधिकृतस्य योगस्य सत्त्वां, चिन्तात्मनिरोधपदानाम् व्या-

\* तस्यात्मसमाधिजांश्चेति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

† पर्युद्दशनादिति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ स्वरूपमात्रप्रतिष्ठ इति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

ख्यानं, अभ्यास-वैराग्यसत्त्वं, तत्त्वोपायद्यस्य\*, खस्यं भेदज्ञाभिधाय सम्प्रज्ञातायम्प्रज्ञातभेदेन योगस्य मुख्यामुख्यभेदमुक्ता योगाभ्यास-प्रदर्शनपूर्वकान् विसरेणोपायान् प्रदर्श्य सुगमोपायप्रदर्शनपरतया ईश्वरस्य खस्य-प्रमाण-प्रभाव-वाचकोपायनाक्रम-तत्प्रकाशनि निर्णीय चित्तस्य विचेपांख्यत्वाभ्युवय दुःखादीन् विसरेण च तत्प्रतिषेधोपायानेकतत्त्वाभ्यासमैच्छादीन् प्राणायामादीन् सम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञातपूर्व-रक्षभूतविषयवतीप्रदर्शनित्यादीनाख्यायोपसंहारद्वारेण समापत्तिः सख्याणाः फलसहिताः† खस्यविषयसहितास्त्रोक्ता सम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञातयोत्पसंहारभिधाय सवीजपूर्वको निर्विजः समाधिरभिहित इति व्याख्यतो योगपादः‡ ॥ ५९ ॥

इति श्रीमहाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजदेवविरचितायां राजमार्त्तण्ड-भिधायां पातञ्जलयोगशास्त्रवृत्तौ योगपादः प्रथमः ॥ ० ॥

\* अभ्यास-वैराग्योपायद्यस्येति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

† अच्छायफलसहिता इति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ व्याख्यातो योगपाद इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

### अथ द्वितीयः पादः ।

ते ते दुष्प्रापयोगर्द्धिद्वये थेन दर्शिताः ।

उपायाः स जगन्नाथस्यचोऽस्तु प्रार्थितास्ये ॥ १ ॥

तदेवं प्रथमे पादे समाहितचिन्तस्य सोपायं योगमभिधाय व्युत्प्रितचिन्तस्यापि कथमुपायाभ्यासपूर्वको योगः साधतामुपयातीति तस्माधनानुष्ठानप्रतिपादनाय क्रियायोगमाह ।

तपः-स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि क्रियायोगः ॥ १ ॥

‘तपः’ आख्यान्तरोपदिष्टं क्षच्चं चाक्षायनादि । ‘स्वाध्यायः’ प्रणवपूर्वकाणां मन्त्राणां जपः । ‘ईश्वरप्रणिधानं’ सर्वक्रियाणां तस्मिन् परमगुरौ फलनिरपेक्षतया समर्पणं । एतानि क्रियायोग इत्युच्ते ॥ १ ॥

स किमर्थं इत्यत आह ।

तमाधिभावनार्थः क्षेत्रतनूकरणार्थस्य ॥ २ ॥

‘क्षेत्रः’ वस्थमाणाः । तेषां ‘तनूकरणं’ स्वकार्यकरणप्रतिबन्धः । ‘समाधिः’ उक्तस्तत्त्वः । तस्य ‘भावना’ चेतसि पुनःपुनर्निवेदनं । सः ‘अर्थः’ प्रयोजनं यस्य स तथोक्तः ॥ एतदुक्तं भवति । एते तपः-प्रभृतयोऽभ्यस्थमानाद्वितीयतामविद्यादीन् क्षेत्रान् शिथिलीकुर्वन्तः समाधेदपकारकतां भजन्ते । तस्मात् प्रथमतः क्रियायोगावधानपरेण योगिना भवितव्यमित्युपदिष्टं ॥ २ ॥

क्षेत्रतनूकरणार्थमित्युक्तं तत्र के क्षेत्रा इत्यत आह ।

अविद्याऽस्मिता-राग-द्वेषाभिनिवेशाः पञ्च क्लेशाः ॥  
॥ ३ ॥

‘क्लेशः’ अविद्यादये वद्यमाणसत्त्वाः पञ्च । ते बाधनासत्त्वां परितापसुपञ्चनयनः क्लेशब्दवाच्या भवन्ति । ते हि चेतसि प्रवर्त्तमानाः संसारसत्त्वाणां\* गुणपरिणामं द्रढयन्ति ॥ ३ ॥

सत्यपि सर्वेषां तु त्वे क्लेशत्वे मूलभूतवादविद्यायाः प्राधान्यं प्रतिपादयितुमाह ।

अविद्या क्षेचमुत्तरेषां प्रसुप्त-तनु-विच्छिन्नोदाराणां ॥  
॥ ४ ॥

‘अविद्या’ मोह, अनात्मन्वात्माभिमात्र इति आवत् । या ‘क्लेशं’ प्रस्तवभूमिः, ‘उत्तरेषां’ अस्मितादीनां प्रत्येकं प्रसुप्तादिभेदेन चतुर्विधानां । अतो यत्ताविद्या विपर्ययज्ञानरूपा श्रियसी भवति, तत्र क्लेशानां अस्मितादीनां नोद्भवो दृश्यते, विपर्ययज्ञानरूपावे च तेषामुद्भवदर्शनात् स्थितमेव मूलत्वमविद्यायाः† । ‘प्रसुप्त-तनु-विच्छिन्नोदाराणां’, इति तत्र ये क्लेशाद्विन्नभूमौ स्थिताः प्रबोधकाभावे खकार्यं नारभन्ते, ते ‘प्रसुप्ताः’, इत्युच्यते । यदा वास्त्वावस्थायां । वास्त्व इवासनारूपेण स्थिता अपि क्लेशः प्रबोधकसहकार्यभावेन‡ नाभिव्यक्तयन्ते । ते ‘तनवः’, ये खक्षप्रतिपदभावनया श्रियसीकृतकार्यसम्याद-गम्भयो वासनाविशेषतया चेतस्थवस्थिताः प्रभृतां सामर्थीमन्तरेण

\* संस्कारज्ञानमिति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

† स्थितमेवं मूलमविद्याया इति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ खबोधकसहकार्यभावेनेति B, C पुस्तकपाठः ।

न स्वकार्यमारब्धु चमाः । यथाभ्यासवतो हि योगिनः । ते 'विच्छिन्नाः',  
ये केचिद् बलवता क्लेशेनाभिभूतशक्यस्तिष्ठन्ति । यथा द्वेषावस्थायां  
रागः, रागावस्थायां वा द्वेषः । न द्वानयोः परस्परविद्वद्योर्युगपत्  
सम्भवोऽस्ति । ते 'उदाराः', ये प्राप्तसहकारि�ष्विधयः स्वं स्वं कार्यम-  
भिनिर्वर्त्तयन्ति । यथा सर्वदैव योगपरिपन्थिनो व्युत्थानदशायां\* ।  
एषां प्रथेकं सतुर्विधानामपि मूलभूतत्वेन स्तिताप्यविद्याऽन्वयित्वेन  
प्रतीयते । न हि कचिदपि क्लेशानां विपर्यासान्वयनिरपेक्षारूपाणां  
खरूपसुपलम्भते । तस्याच्च मिथ्याभृतायामविद्यायां† सम्यक्ज्ञानेन  
निवर्जितायां दग्धवीजकल्पनां एषां न कचित् प्ररोहोऽखीति  
अविद्यानिमित्तलमविद्यान्वयस्वैषां निश्चीयते । अतः सर्वेऽप्यविद्याव्यप-  
देशभाजः । सर्वेषाच्च क्लेशानां चित्तविच्छेपकारित्वात् योगिना प्रथमसेव  
तदुच्छेदे यद्वः कर्तव्य इति ॥ ४ ॥

अविद्याया सञ्चणमाह ।

**अनित्याशुचि-दुःखानात्मसु नित्य-शुचि-सुखात्म-  
स्थातिरविद्या ॥ ५ ॥**

अतस्मिंस्तप्रतिभासः‡ 'अविद्या', इति अविद्यायाः सामान्यसञ्चाणां ।  
तस्या एव भेदप्रतिपादनं । 'अनित्येषु' घटादिषु, नित्यत्वाभिमानः

\* चुत्पादनदशायामिति B पुरुषकपाठः ।

† विपर्यासान्वयनिरपेक्षाबामिति B, E । विपर्यासान्वयनिरपेक्षाबामिति  
F पुरुषकपाठः ।

‡ मिथ्याज्ञानरूपायामविद्यायामिति B, C, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

§ अतस्मिंस्तप्रतिभास इति A पुरुषकपाठः ।

अविद्येष्टुच्छते । एवम् ‘अद्विषु’ कायादिषु, इच्छाभिमानः । ‘दुःखेषु’ च विद्येषु, सुखाभिमानः\* । ‘अनात्मनि’ इतीरे, आत्म-  
भाभिमानः† । एतेनापुष्टे पुण्यमोऽन्यते चार्यभूते व्याख्यातः ॥ ५ ॥  
अस्मिता आख्यातुमाह ।

हृग्दर्शनशक्तयोरेकात्मतैवास्मिता ॥ ६ ॥

‘दृक्शक्तिः’ पुरवः । ‘दर्शनशक्तिः’ रजसमोभ्यामनभिभृतः‡  
सात्त्विकः परिष्कामोऽन्यःकरणरूपः । तयोर्भैर्यभोक्तुवेन जडाजडुलेन-  
चात्यन्तं भिन्नयोः ‘एकताभिमानः ‘अस्मिता’, इत्युच्छते । यथा  
प्रकृतिर्वस्तुतः कर्तृत्व-भोक्तुवरहितापि कर्त्तव्यं भोक्त्वाहमित्यभिमन्यते,  
चेऽयमस्मिताख्यो विषयासः क्लेशः ॥ ६ ॥

रागस्य स्वराणमाह ।

सुखानुशयी रागः§ ॥ ७ ॥

सुखमनुष्टेते इति ‘सुखानुशयी’, सुखज्ञस्य सुखानुसृतिपूर्वकः सुख-  
वाधनेषु दृष्ट्यारूपो गर्वः ‘रागसंज्ञः॥ क्लेशः ॥ ७ ॥

देवस्य स्वराणमाह ।

दुःखानुशयी देवः॥ ८ ॥

\* सुखाभिमान इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

† आत्माभिमान इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ रजसमोभ्यामनभिधान इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ सुखानुशयो राग इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

|| गर्वो रागसंज्ञक इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

¶ दुःखानुशयो देव इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

‘दुर्ज’ उक्तस्त्रष्टं ।\* तदभिश्च तदमुक्तिपूर्वकः तत्त्वाधिवेष्यन-  
भिश्चतो योऽन्तं निन्दात्मकां सः ‘देवताकाशः क्षेत्रः ॥ ८ ॥  
अभिनिवेष्य स्वात्माहै ।

स्वरसवाही विदुषोऽपि तम्बनुबन्धोऽभिनिवेशः ॥  
॥ ९ ॥

पूर्वजन्मानुभूतमरणदुःखानुभवासमाप्तात् ॥ भयरूपः समुपजा-  
यमानः भरीरविषयादिभिर्मम विद्योगो माभूदित्यर्थं भरीरानुबन्ध-  
रूपः सर्वस्यैवाक्षरेव्रूपर्थन्ते ॥ निमित्तं विना प्रवर्त्तमानः ‘अभिनि-  
वेशात्मकः क्षेत्रः । तदेवं व्युत्यानस्य क्षेत्रात्मकात् एकायताभ्यासेन\*\*  
प्रथमं क्षेत्राः परिहर्त्वाः ॥ ९ ॥

न चाज्ञातानां तेषां परिहारः अक्षरः कर्तुमिति तज्ज्ञानाय  
तेषां उद्देशं क्षेत्रं विभागं स्वात्मां ॥ चाभिधाय स्मूलस्त्रष्टमेदभिश्चानां  
तेषां प्रश्नोपायविभागमाहै ॥ ।

ते प्रतिप्रसवहेयाः द्वृष्टमाः ॥ १० ॥

- \* प्रतिकूलसक्षमिति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।
- † अभिलक्षतो या निन्दा इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।
- ‡ अभिनिवेष्यमाहेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।
- § तथा रूढोऽभिनिवेश इति C पुस्तकपाठः । अयमेव पाठो भाष्य-  
कारेण दृतः ।
- ॥ पूर्वजन्मानुभूतमरणदुःखानुभवासमाप्तादिति H पुस्तकपाठः ।
- ॥ सर्वस्यैवाक्षरेव्रूपर्थन्तमिति H पुस्तकपाठः ।
- \*\* एकायताभ्यासकामेनेति C, E, पुस्तकपाठः ।
- †† विभागसक्षमिति E पुस्तकपाठः ।
- ‡‡ प्रहरणोपायमाहेति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

ते 'सूक्ष्माः', क्लेशाः, ये वासनारूपेणावस्थिता न दृष्टिरूपः\* परिणाममारभन्ते । 'ते', 'प्रतिप्रसवेन' प्रतिस्तोमपरिणामेन, 'हेयाः' व्यक्तव्याः । स्वकारणास्थितायां छतार्थं सवासनं चिन्त यदा प्रविष्टं भवति, तदा कुतस्तेषां निर्मूकानां सम्भवः ॥ १० ॥

स्थूलानां हानोपायमाह ।

ध्यानहेयास्तद्वृत्तयः ॥ ११ ॥

तेषां क्लेशनामारब्धकार्याणां याः सुखदुःखमेहात्मिकाः 'हृतयः', ताः, 'ध्यानेनैव चित्तैकायतासुषेण, 'हेयाः' इत्यर्थः । चित्तपरिकर्माभ्यासमाचेष्टैव स्थूलतात् तासां निवृत्तिर्भवति, यदा वस्त्रादौ धनः स्थूलो भूतः प्रकाशनमाचेष्टैव निवर्तते । यस्तु तत्र सूक्ष्माः स तैसैदृपायैरस्मापनप्रवृत्तिभिरेव निवर्तयितुं ब्रक्षते ॥ ११ ॥

एवं क्लेशानां तत्त्वमभिधाय कर्माशयस्थाभिधातुमाह ।

क्लेशमूलः कर्माशयो हृष्टादृष्टजन्मवेदनीयः ॥ १२ ॥

'कर्माशयः', इत्यनेन तत्त्वं खरूपमभिहितं, यतो वासनारूपाणेव कर्माणि । 'क्लेशमूलः', इत्यनेन कारणमभिहितं, यतः कर्मणां इत्याभ्यां-इत्यानां क्लेशा एव निमित्तं । 'हृष्टादृष्टजन्मवेदनीयः',‡ इत्यनेन फलमुक्तं । अस्मिन्नेव जन्मनि अनुभवनीयः 'हृष्टजन्मवेदनीयः'?† ।

\* सप्तवृत्तिरूपमिति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

† कर्माशयमभिधातुमाहेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ हृष्टवेदनीय इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः । जन्मवेदनीय इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ हृष्टवेदनीय इति E पुस्तकपाठः । जन्मवेदनीय इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

जन्मान्तरानुभवनीयः 'अदृष्टजन्मवेदनीयः' । तथाहि कानिचित् पुण्यानि  
कर्माणि देवताराधनादीनि तीव्रसंबोगेनैव छतानि दूहैव जन्मनि फलं  
जात्यायुर्भीगलक्षणं प्रयत्क्षम्नि, यथा नन्दीश्वरस्य भगवन्महेश्वराराधन-  
वसादिहैव जन्मनि जात्यादयो विशिष्टाः\* प्रादुर्भूताः । एवमन्वेषा  
विश्वामित्रादीनां तपःप्रभावाङ्गायुषी । केषाम्निकातिरेव, यथा  
तीव्रसंबोगेन दुष्टकर्मक्षतां नङ्गवादीनां जात्यन्नरपरिणामः, उर्वश्वास  
कार्म्मिकेयवने खतारूपतयां । एवं व्यस्तसमस्तरूपत्वेनां यथायोगं  
योज्यं ॥ १२ ॥

इनानीं कर्माङ्गयस्य खमेदभिक्षं फलमाह ।

### सति मूले तद्विपाके जात्यायुर्भीगाः ॥ १३ ॥

'मूलं उक्तसक्षणः क्षेत्राः, तेष्वनभिभृतेषु' सत्यु, कर्मणां कुशला-  
कुशलरूपाणां 'विपाकः' फलं, 'जात्यायुर्भीगाः' भवन्ति । 'जातिः'  
मनुष्यत्वादिः । 'आयुः' चिरकालं भरीरसम्बन्धः । 'भोगाः' विषयाः  
इश्वियाणि सुखदुःखसंविच, कर्मकरणभावसाधनव्युत्पाद्या॑ भोग-  
ब्रह्मस्य । इदमत्त तात्पर्यं चिन्तभूमौ अनादिकालसम्मिताः कर्मवासना  
यथा यथा पाकसुपर्यान्ति, तथा तथा गुणप्रधानभावेन स्थिता  
जात्यायुर्भीगलक्षणं खकार्यमारभन्ते ॥ १३ ॥

\* जात्यायुर्भीगविशिष्टा इति B, C, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

† ज्यतारूपा तथेति B, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

‡ व्यस्तसमस्तलेनेति B, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

§ कर्मकरणभावशुत्पर्येति H पुरुषकपाठः ।

उक्तानां कर्मफलसे जात्यादीनां स्वकारणकर्मानुसारेष कार्य-  
कर्मत्वमाह ।

ते छाद-परितापफलाः पुण्यापुण्यहेतुत्वान्\* ॥ १४ ॥

‘हादः’ सुखं, ‘परितापः’ दुःखं, छाद-परितापौ फले येषां ‘ते’  
तथोक्ताः । ‘पुण्यं’ कुशलं कर्म, तदिपरीतं ‘अपुण्यं’, ते पुण्यापुण्ये  
कारणे येषां तेषां भावस्तुत्वात् । एतदुक्तं भवति, पुण्यकर्मारभा  
जात्यायुर्भेण छादफलाः । अपुण्यकर्मारभाः परितापफलाः ॥ १४ ॥

एतस्य प्राणिमात्रापेक्षया दैविध्यं, योगिनस्तु सर्वं दुःखमित्याह ।

परिणाम-ताप-संख्यारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधात् सर्वं  
दुःखमेव† विवेकिनः ॥ १५ ॥

परिणातक्लेशादिविवेकस्य परिहृश्यमानं सकलमेव भोगसाधनं  
सविष्णादमवतः० ‘दुःखमेव’ प्रतिकूलवेदनीयमेवेत्यर्थः । यस्मादत्यन्ता-  
भिजातः१ योगी दुःखलेज्ञेनाप्युद्दिजते ॥ । यथाऽक्षिपाचमूर्णातमुस्तुर्भ-  
माचेषैव महतों पीडामनुभवति नेतरद्वयः, तथा विवेकी खल्पदुखा-  
मुष्मेज्ञापिणा विरच्यते । कथमित्याह ‘परिणाम-ताप-संख्यार-  
दुःखमेव’ विवेकिनः ।

\* पुण्यापुण्यहेतुपलत्वादिति E पुरुषकपाठः ।

† दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिन इति E पुरुषकपाठः ।

‡ सविष्णाद्विविति H पुरुषकपाठः ।

§ यस्मादत्यन्ताभिज्ञात इति H पुरुषकपाठः ।

|| दुःखक्षेपेनाप्रदिजत इति B, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

¶ खल्पदुःखानुसम्बन्धेनापीति C पुरुषकपाठः । सुखदुःखानुबन्धेनापीति

B, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

दुःखैः । विषयाणामुपभुज्यमानागां थथायथ गद्दाभिद्वेष्टादप्राप्ति-  
छतस्य दुःखस्यापरिहर्यत्वात् दुःखान्तरसाधनलाभास्येव दुःखरूपतेति  
‘परिणामदुःखलं । उपभुज्यमानेषु सुखसाधनेषु तत्प्रतिपन्थिनं\* प्रति  
देषस्य सर्वदैवावस्थितत्वात् सुखानुभवकालेऽपि तापदुःखं दुष्परिहा-  
रमिति ‘तापदुःखता । ‘संखारदुःखलं खाभिमतानभिमतविषयस-  
निधाने सुखसंबिन्दुं दुःखसंविष्टोपजायमाना तथाविधमेव खच्चेचे  
संखारामारभते, संखाराश्च पुनस्थाविधसंविद्वन्भव इत्यपरिमित-  
संखारोत्पत्तिद्वारेण संसारानुच्छेदात् सर्वस्यैव दुःखलं । ‘गुणवृ-  
त्तिविरोधाश्च’ इति, गुणानां सत्त्वरजस्तमसां या द्वन्तयः सुखदुः-  
खसोहरूपाः परस्यरमभिभाव्याभिभावकवेन विद्वद्वा जायन्ते, तासां  
सर्वचैव दुःखानुबन्धाद् दुःखलं । एतदुक्तं भवति । ऐकान्तिकीं आत्य-  
निकीञ्च कुःखगिर्वत्तिभिष्ठतो विवेकिन उक्तरूपकारणचतुष्टयं  
आवत् सर्वे विषया दुःखरूपतया प्रतिभान्ति । तसामात् सर्वकर्मविपाको  
दुःखरूप एवेत्युक्तं भवति ॥ १५ ॥

तदेवमुक्तोऽस्त्र-कर्माशय-विपाकराशेरविद्याप्रभवत्वात् अविद्यायाश्च  
मिथ्याज्ञानरूपतया सम्यग्ज्ञानोच्छेद्यत्वात् सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य च साध-  
नहेयोपादेयावधारणरूपत्वात् भिधानायाह ।

हेयं दुःखमनागतं ॥ १६ ॥

\* तत्प्रतिबन्धनं इति E पुस्तकपाठः । तत्प्रतिपन्थिनमिति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

† तदेवमुक्तस्येति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः । एतदेवमुक्तस्य G पुस्तकपाठः ।

भूतस्यातिकान्तत्वात्\* अनुभूयमानस्य च त्यक्तुमन्त्रकल्पत्वात् अनाग-  
तसेव संसारदुःखं इत्यमित्युक्तं भवति† ॥ १६ ॥  
हेयहेतुमाह ।

द्रष्टृ-हश्ययोः संयोगे हेयहेतुः ॥ १७ ॥

‘इष्टा’ चिद्रूपः पुरुषः । ‘हृष्णं’ बुद्धितत्त्वं । तयोरविवेकस्थातिपूर्व-  
को योजसौ ‘संयोगः’ भोग्यभेक्तुवेन सञ्चिधानं, सः, ‘हेयस्य’ दुःखस्य  
गुणपरिणामरूपस्य संसारस्य, ‘हेतुः’ कारणं, तञ्चित्तस्या संसारगि-  
द्विभिर्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ १७ ॥

द्रष्टृ-हृष्णयोः संयोग इत्युक्तं, तत्र हृष्णस्य खरूपं कार्यं प्रयोज-  
नमाह ।

प्रकाश-क्रिया-स्थितिशीलं भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं भेगा-  
पवर्गार्थं हृश्यं ॥ १८ ॥

‘प्रकाशः’ सत्त्वस्य धर्मः । ‘क्रिया’ प्रवृत्तिरूपा रजसः । ‘स्थितिः’  
नियमरूपा तमसः । ताः प्रकाशक्रियास्थितयः ‘शीलं’ खाभाविकं रूपं,  
यस्य तत् तथाविधं, इति खरूपमस्य निर्दिष्टं । ‘भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं’,  
इति । ‘भूतानि’ स्थूलसूक्ष्मभेदेन पृथिव्यादीनि गन्धतन्माचादीनि च ।  
‘इन्द्रियाणि’ बुद्धीन्द्रिय-कर्मान्तःकरणभेदेन चिविधानि । उभय-  
भेतत्तद्याद्य-यज्ञणरूपं ‘आत्मा’ खरूपाभिन्नः परिणामः, यस्य तत्

\* व्यतिक्रान्तत्वादिति H पुस्तकपाठः । निक्रान्तत्वादिति E, C, श  
पुस्तकपाठः ।

† इत्युक्तमितीति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

तथाविधं, इत्यनेन कार्यमस्योक्तं । ‘भोगः’ कथितसत्त्वाणः । ‘अपवर्गः’ विवेकस्यातिपूर्विका संसारनिवृत्तिः । तौ भोगापवर्गे ‘अर्थः’ प्रयोजनं, यस्य तत् तथाविधं ‘दृश्यं’, इत्यर्थः ॥ १८ ॥

तस्य च दृश्यस्य नानावस्थारूपपरिणामात्मकस्य हेयत्वेन ज्ञात-  
व्यतात् अवस्थाः कथयितुमाह ।

विशेषाविशेष-लिङ्गमाचालिङ्गानि गुणपर्वाणि ॥  
॥ १९ ॥

‘गुणानां’, ‘पर्वाणि’ अवस्थाविशेषाव्यतातः, ज्ञातव्याः, इत्युपदिष्टं भवति । तच ‘विशेषाः’ महाभूतेन्द्रियाणि । ‘अविशेषाः’ तत्त्वाचान्तःकरणे । ‘लिङ्गमाच’ बुद्धिः । ‘अलिङ्गं’ अव्यक्तं, इत्युक्तं\* । सर्वच त्रिगुणरूपस्यावस्थान्वयिलेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानादवश्यं ज्ञातव्यत्वेन योगकाले अस्त्वारि पर्वाणि निर्दिष्टाणि ॥ १९ ॥

एवं हेयत्वेन दृश्यस्य प्रथमं ज्ञातव्यतात् तदवस्थासहितं व्याख्यायोपादेयं द्रष्टारं व्याकर्त्तुमाह† ।

द्रष्टा हश्चिमाचः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः ॥ २० ॥

‘द्रष्टा’ पुरुषः । ‘हश्चिमाचः’ चेतनामाचः‡ । माचयश्च धर्मधर्मनिरासार्थं । केचिद्द्विचेतनामात्मनो धर्ममिच्छन्ति । सः ‘इहुद्वे-

\* इत्यक्तं भवतीति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

† वक्त्वाहेति C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ चेतनमाच इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

अपि परिषामित्वात्त्वात् वोगस्तुते प्रतिष्ठोऽपि, 'प्रत्यवानुपद्धाः'। 'प्रत्यवा' विविधोपरकानि ज्ञानानि, तानि 'ज्ञनु' अव्यवधानेन प्रतिष्ठामात्त्वात् वोगस्तुते, पश्चति । एतदुर्मुख भवति । जातविविधोपरामायामेव वुद्धौ विविधानमात्त्वात् वोगस्तुते पुरुषस्य इष्टृत्वमिति ॥ २० ॥

स एव च भोगस्त्वात् ।

### तदर्थं एव\* हुश्यस्यात्मा ॥ २१ ॥

'हुश्यस्य' प्रागुक्तव्यादेष्य, 'आत्मा' यत् खरूपं, सः 'तदर्थः' तस्य पुरुषस्य भोगस्त्वादनां नाम स्वार्थपरिहारेण प्रयोजनं । न हि प्रधानं प्रवर्त्तमानमात्मनः किञ्चित् प्रयोजनमपेक्ष्य प्रवर्त्तते, किन्तु पुरुषस्य भोगस्त्वादनायेति ॥ २१ ॥

यद्येवं पुरुषस्य भोगस्त्वादनमेव प्रयोजनं, तदात् स्वादिते तस्मिंस्तन्निष्पृयोजनं विरतव्यापारं स्तात्, तस्मिंस्य परिषामशून्ये इद्वलात् सर्वे इष्टारो वन्धरहिताः स्तुः । ततस्य संसारोच्चेर इत्याभस्त्वात् ।

### षष्ठार्थं प्रति नष्टमयनष्टं तदन्यसर्वसाधारणत्वात् ॥ ॥ २२ ॥

यद्यपि विवेकख्यातिपर्यन्तात् भोगस्त्वादनात् कमपि 'क्षतार्थं', पुरुषं, 'प्रति', 'तत्', 'नष्टं' विरतव्यापारं, तथापि 'सर्वपुरुषसाधा-

\* स तदर्थं एवेति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

† भोगं सम्पादयामीति G, H पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ यदिदं पुरुषस्य भोगस्त्वादनं तदेव प्रयोजनमिति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ तदनीमिति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

रक्षत्वात् अस्यान् प्रति 'अगृह्यापारं अवतिष्ठते\* । अतः प्रधानस्य  
सकलभोक्तृप्राधारणत्वात् न कदाचनापि विनाशः, एकमुक्तौ वा  
न सर्वमुक्तिप्रसङ्गं इत्युक्तं भवति ॥ २९ ॥

दृश्य-इष्टारौ व्याख्याय संयोगं व्याख्यातुमाह ।

**स्व-स्वामिशक्तयोः स्वरूपोपलक्षिष्ठेतुः संयोगः ॥२३॥**

कार्यदारेणात्य स्वत्तेण करेति । 'स्वशक्तिः' दृश्यस्य स्वभावः ।  
'स्वामिशक्तिः' इष्टुः स्वरूपं । तयोर्द्वयोरपि संवेद्य-संवेदकत्वेन व्यव-  
स्थितयोर्यां 'स्वरूपोपलक्षिष्ठः', तस्माः कारणं यः 'संयोगः', स च  
वहजभोग्य-भोक्तृभावस्वरूपान्वान्यः । न हि तयोर्निर्त्ययोर्यापकयोर्या-  
स्वस्वरूपादतिरिक्तः कश्चित् संयोगः । यदेव भोग्यस्य भोग्यत्वं,  
भोक्तृस्य भोक्तृत्वं अग्नादिषिद्धूं स एव संयोगः ॥ २३ ॥

तस्मापि कारणमाह ।

**तस्य हेतुरविद्याः ॥ २४ ॥**

या पूर्वं विषयात्मिका नोरूपा 'अविद्या', व्याख्याता, या  
'तस्य' अविवेकस्यातिरूपस्य संयोगस्य, कारणं ॥ २४ ॥

हेयं हानक्रियाकर्त्त्वात्ते किञ्चुमसाहूनमित्याहै ।

\* अगृह्यापारमवतिष्ठत इति A पुस्तकपाठः ।

† न कदाचिदपीति B, E पुस्तकपाठः । न कथचिदपीति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ अस्य हेतुरविद्येति B, E पुस्तकपाठः । तस्य हेतुर्व्यष्टिमविद्येति G  
पुस्तकपाठः । परम्परीष्टपाठस्य सप्तसाहस्रपुस्तकोन्मत्त्वात् भाष्यक-  
स्तुतत्वात् न समीक्ष्यत्वं ।

§ किं पुग्हानमित्याहैति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

तदभावात् संयोगाभावो हानं तद्बृश्चेः कैवल्यं ॥  
॥ २५ ॥

‘तस्माः’ अविद्यायाः स्वरूपविरुद्धेन सम्यग् ज्ञानेनोन्मूलितायाः, योऽयं ‘अभावः’, तस्मिन् सति, तत्कार्यस्य ‘संयोगस्य’, अपि ‘अभावः’, तत् ‘हानं’ इत्युच्चते । अथमर्थः जैतस्य मूर्खद्रव्यवत् परित्यागो युज्यते, किञ्चु जातायां विवेकस्थातावविवेकस्थाति-  
निमित्तः\* संयोगः स्वयमेव निवर्तते इति तस्य हानं । यदेव च संयोगस्य हानं ‘तत्’, एव गित्यकैवल्यस्यापि पुरुषस्य ‘कैवल्यं’, अप-  
दिश्यते । तदेवं संयोगस्य स्वरूपां<sup>†</sup> कारणं कार्यस्थाभिहितं ॥ २५ ॥

अथ हानोपायकथनदारेण उपादेयकारणमाह ।

विवेकस्थातिरविज्ञवा हानोपायः ॥ २६ ॥

अन्ये गुणाः अन्यः पुरुष दृढेवंविधस्य ‘विवेकस्य’, ‘स्थानिः’  
प्रस्था, सा ‘हानस्य’ दृश्यपरित्यागस्य, ‘उपायः’<sup>‡</sup> कारणं । कीदृशी  
‘अविज्ञवा’ न विद्यते विज्ञवो विच्छेदोऽन्तरात्मरा ॥ व्यत्यानन्तरो  
यस्याः सा ‘अविज्ञवा’ ।

दृढमत्र तात्पर्यं । प्रतिपक्षभावगत्यात् अविद्याप्रविज्ञये विनि-

\* अविवेकगिमित्त इति B, G पुरुषकपाठः ।

† गित्यं वेवलस्येति M पुरुषकपाठः ।

‡ तदेवं दृश्यस्य संयोगस्यरूपमिति B, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

§ दृश्यपरित्यागस्योपाय इति B, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

॥ अन्तरात्मनेति E पुरुषकपाठः ।

दृष्टव्यादत्त-कर्द्वत्वाद्यभिमानाद्या रजसोमसानभिभृताद्या बुद्धेरम्भ-  
मुखाद्या या चिष्ठाद्यासंक्रान्तिः सा विवेकख्यातिरित्युच्यते । तस्याच्च  
समातमविच्छेदेन प्रदृष्टायां\* दृश्याधिकारनिवृत्तेभवत्वेव कैवल्यं ॥  
॥ २६ ॥

उत्पन्नविवेकख्यातेः† पुरुषस्य यादृशी प्रज्ञा भवति, तां कथयन्  
विवेकख्यातेरेव स्वरूपमाह ।

तस्य समधा प्रान्तभूमौ प्रज्ञा ॥ २७ ॥

‘तस्य’ उत्पन्नविवेकज्ञानस्य, ज्ञातव्यविवेकरूपा ‘प्रज्ञा’, ‘प्रान्तभूमौ’  
सकलसामान्यसमाधिभूमिपर्यन्तं, सप्तप्रकारा भवति ।

तज्ज कार्यविमुक्तिरूपा चतुःप्रकारा । ज्ञातं मया ज्ञेयं । न  
ज्ञातव्यं किञ्चिदस्ति । जीणा मे क्षेत्रा, न मे किञ्चित् चेत्यमस्ति ।  
अधिगतं मया ज्ञानं, प्राप्ता मया विवेकख्यातिः । इतिप्रत्ययान्तर-  
परिश्वारेण तस्यामवस्थायामीदृश्येव प्रज्ञा जायते । ईदृशी प्रज्ञा  
कार्यविषयं निर्वासं ज्ञानं कार्यविमुक्तिरित्युच्यते ।

चिन्तविमुक्तिस्त्रिविधा । चरितार्था मे बुद्धिः । गुणाद्य ज्ञाता-  
धिकाराः गिरिश्वरगिपतिता इव यावाणे न पुनः स्थिति  
थास्यन्ति, खकारणे प्रस्थायाभिमुखायां सोहमिधानमूलकारणा-  
भावान्निष्पत्योजनताचामीषां कुतः प्रोक्तः । खात्मीभृतस्य मे  
समाधिः । तस्मिन् सति स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठोऽहमिति । ईदृशी चिःप्रकारा  
चिन्तविमुक्तिः ।

\* समातमेन प्रदृष्टायाभिति H, C पुरुषकपाठः ।

† उद्भूतविवेकख्यातेरिति C, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

तदेवमीहृष्णां सप्तविधार्थां प्राप्तमृद्भिप्रश्नायामुपवातार्था पुरवः  
केवल इत्युच्चते ॥ २७ ॥

विवेकस्थातिः संयोगभावे हेतुरित्युक्तं\* । तस्यात्मत्यसौ किं  
निमित्तमित्यत आह ।

योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिराविवेक-  
स्थातेः ॥ २८ ॥

‘योगाङ्गानि वक्ष्यमाणानि । तेषां ‘अनुष्ठानात्’ ज्ञानपूर्वकाद-  
भासात्, ‘आविवेकस्थातेः’, ‘अशुद्धिक्षये’ चित्तसत्त्वस्थ प्रकाशाव-  
रणस्तद्वेष्टपाशुद्धिक्षये,† या ‘ज्ञानदीप्तिं’ तारतम्येन साच्चिकः  
परिणामः, विवेकस्थातिपर्यन्तः‡ स तस्याः स्थातेर्हेतुरित्यर्थः ॥  
॥ २८ ॥

योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षय इत्युक्तं, कानि पुनस्तानि योगाङ्गा-  
नीति तेषां उद्देश्यमाह ।

यम-नियमासन-प्राणायाम-प्रत्याहार-धारणा-ध्यान-  
समाधयोऽष्टावङ्गानि ॥ २९ ॥

इह काग्निचित्तसमाधेः साक्षादुपकारकलेनाम्भराष्टङ्गानि? यथा  
‘धारणादीनि । काग्निचित् प्रतिपक्षभूतहिंशादिवितर्कं अनुसनदारेण

\* इत्युक्तं भवतीति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

† स्तेष्टस्याशुद्धिक्षय इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ विवेकस्थातिपूर्वक इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ अन्तरङ्गानीति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

यमाधेष्वपुरुष्विनि, यथा 'यम-नियमादयः । तत्रासुनादीनामुन्नरो-  
न्नरुपकारकत्वं यथा सत्यासुनजये प्रक्षायामस्यैर्यं । एवमुन्नर-  
न्नापि योऽयं\* ॥ २८ ॥

क्रमेण एषां स्वरूपमाह ।

**अहिंसा-सत्यास्तेय-ब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहा यमाः ॥ ३० ॥**

तत्र प्राणविद्योगप्रयोजनव्यापारो हिंसा । सा च सर्वानर्थहेतुः ।  
तदभावः 'अहिंसा' । हिंसायाः सर्वकालसेवा परिहार्यत्वात् प्रथमं  
तदभावरूपाया अहिंसाया निर्देशः । 'स्वर्ण' वाच्मनसयोर्यथार्थत्वं ।  
स्तेयं परस्पापद्धरणं । तदभावः 'अस्तेयं' । 'ब्रह्मचर्यं' उपस्थित्यमः ।  
'अपरिग्रहः' भोगसाधनानामस्तीकरणं† । त एते॥ अहिंसादयः पञ्च  
'यमशब्दवाच्याः योगाङ्गत्वेन निर्दिष्टाः ॥ ३० ॥

एषां विशेषमाह ।

**एते जाति-देश-काल-समयानवच्छिन्नाः सार्वभौ-  
ममहाव्रतम् ॥ ३१ ॥**

'जातिः' ब्राह्मणत्वादिः । 'देशः' तीर्थादिः । 'कालः' चतुर्दशादिः ।

\* न्यायमिति G पुरुषकपाठः ।

† सर्वप्रकारेष्वेति B, C, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

‡ वाच्मनसेयर्यथाश्यंलमिति B, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

§ अस्तीकार इति C, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

|| तत्र ते अहिंसादय इति B, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

¶ एते त्विति B, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

‘समयः’ ब्राह्मप्रयोजनादिः । एतैषतुभिः ‘अनवच्छिक्षाः’, पूर्वोक्ता अहिंसादयो यमाः सर्वासु चित्तादिषु चित्तभूमिषु भवाः ‘महाग्रतं’ हत्युच्यते । तद् यथा ब्राह्मणं न इनिष्यामि, तीर्थे कंचन न इनिष्यामि, चतुर्दशां न इनिष्यामि, देव-ब्राह्मणाद्यर्थव्यतिरेकेण\* न इनिष्यामी-त्येवं चतुर्विधावच्छेद्यतिरेकेण कस्त्रित् कर्षित् कदाचित् कस्त्रिं चिदपर्यं न इनिष्यामीत्यनवच्छिक्षाः । एवं सत्यादिषु यथायोगं चोऽयं । हत्यमनियतीभूताऽऽ सामान्येनैव प्रष्टस्ताः महाग्रतमित्युच्यते, न पुनः परिच्छिक्षावधारणां† ॥ ३१ ॥

नियमभावृ ।

शौच-सन्तोष-तपः-स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रनिधानानि निय-  
माः ॥ ३२ ॥

‘शौचं’, दिविधं वाच्चमान्तरञ्च । वाच्चं सूक्ष्मादिभिः कायादि-  
प्रकालनं । आन्तरं मैत्र्यादिभिस्त्रित्तमलानां प्रकालनं । ‘सन्तोषः’  
तुष्टिः । शेषाः प्रागेव छत्याख्यानाः ॥ । एते शौचादयः ‘नियमङ्गल-  
वाच्याः ॥ ३२ ॥

कथमेषां योगाङ्गलमित्यत आह ।

\* देवब्राह्मणप्रयोजनव्यतिरेकेण कमपीति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

† हत्यमनियतीभूता इति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ न पुनः परकीयाख्यादिधारणमिति A पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ नियमानाहेति A पुस्तकपाठः ।

॥ प्रागेव व्याख्याता इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः । भूतव्याख्याना इति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

वितर्क्षबाधने प्रतिपक्षभावनं ॥ ३३ ॥

वितर्क्षन्त इति 'वितर्कः' योगपरिपन्थिनो हिंसादयः । तेषां 'प्रतिपक्षभावने सति, यदा बाधा भवति,\* तदा योगः सुकरो भवतीति भवत्येव यमनियमानां योगाङ्गत्वं ॥ ३३ ॥

इदानीं वितर्काणां स्वरूपं भेदं प्रकारं कारणं फलस्त्रै क्रमेणाह ।

वितर्का हिंसादयः छत-कारितानुभेदिता लोभ-क्रोध-मोहपूर्वका मृदु-मध्याधिमात्रा दुःखाशानानन्तफला इति प्रतिपक्षभावनम् ॥ ३४ ॥

एते पूर्वोक्ताः 'हिंसादयः', प्रथमं चिधा भिद्यन्ते 'छत-कारितानुभेदितभेदेन । तत्र स्वयं निष्पादिताः 'छताः' । कुरु कुर्विति प्रयोजकव्यापारेण समुत्पादिताः 'कारिताः' । अन्येन क्रियमाणाः साधु साध्वित्यङ्गीष्ठताः† 'अनुभेदिताः' । एतच चैविद्य परस्परव्यामोहनिवारणायोच्यते‡ । अन्यथा मन्दमतिरेव मन्येत न मया स्वयं हिंसा छतेति नास्ति मे दोष इति । एतेषां कारण-प्रतिपादनायाह, 'लोभ-क्रोध-मोहपूर्वकाः', इति । यद्यपि लोभः क्रोधः प्रथमं निर्दिष्टः‡ तथापि सर्वक्षेत्रानां मोहस्यानात्मन्यात्मा-

\* यदि बाधा भवतीति E, A, D, F पुरुषकपाठः । यथा बाधा भवतीति C पुरुषकपाठः ।

† साध्वित्यङ्गीष्ठता इति A पुरुषकपाठः ।

‡ मोहनिवारणायोच्यत इति B, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

§ लोभः प्रथमं निर्दिष्ट इति G पुरुषकपाठः ।

भिमानसुशणस्य निदानत्वात् तस्मिन् सति ख्यपरविभागपूर्वकलेन  
लोभ-क्रोधादीनामुद्भवात्\* मूलतमवस्थेयं । मोहपूर्विका सर्वा  
दोषजातिरित्यर्थः । ‘लोभः’ दृष्ट्या । ‘क्रोधः’ दृष्ट्यादृष्ट्यविवेको-  
मूलकः प्रज्वलनात्मकस्त्रित्यर्थः । प्रत्येकं कृतादिभेदेन चिप्रकारा  
अपि हिंशादयो मोहादिकारणलेन चिधा भिद्यन्ते । तेषामेव पुन-  
रवस्थाभेदेन चैविद्यमाह ‘मृदु-मध्याधिमाचाः’ । ‘मृदवः’ मन्दा न  
तीव्राः नापि मध्यमाः । ‘मध्याः’ न मन्दा नापि तीव्राः । ‘अधि-  
माचाः’ तीव्राः, न मध्या नापि मन्दाः । इति नव भेदाः† । इत्यं  
चैविद्ये सति सप्तविंशतिर्भवति । मृदादीनामपि प्रत्येकं मृदु-  
मध्याधिमाचभेदात् चैविद्यं सम्भवति । तत् यथायोगं योज्यं । तद्  
यथा मृदुमृदुः मृदुमध्यो मृदुतीव्र इति । एषां फलमाह ‘दुःखा-  
ज्ञानानन्तरफलाः’, इति । ‘दुःखं’ प्रतिकूलतयावभासमानो राजस-  
स्त्रित्यर्थः । ‘अज्ञानं’ मिथ्याज्ञानं संशयविपर्यासस्तप्तं । ते दुःखा-  
ज्ञाने ‘अनन्तं’ अपरिच्छिन्नं, ‘फलं’, येषां ते तथोक्ताः । इत्यं तेषां  
ख्यप-कारणादिभेदेनै॒ ज्ञातानां प्रतिपञ्चभावनया योगिना परि-  
क्षारः कर्त्तव्य इत्युपदिष्टुं भवति ॥ ३४ ॥

एषामध्यासात् प्रकर्षं गच्छतामनु निष्पादिन्वः सिद्धयो यथा  
भवन्ति, तथा क्रमेण प्रतिपादयितुमाह ।

\* समुद्भवादिति B, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

† इत्येवं नव भेदा इति B, C, E पुरुषकपाठः ।

‡ संशयविपर्यासस्तप्तमिति G पुरुषकपाठः ।

§ ख्यपदिभेदेवि H पुरुषकपाठः ।

### अहिंसाप्रतिष्ठायां\* तत्सन्निधौ वैरत्यागः ॥ ३५ ॥

‘तस्याहिंसां भावयतः, ‘सन्निधौ’,† सहजविरोधिनामप्यहिनकु-  
खादीनां ‘वैरत्यागः’ निर्मत्सरतयावस्थानं भवति । हिंसारता हिंस्त्रलं  
परित्यजन्तीत्यर्थः ॥ ३५ ॥

सत्याभ्यासवतः किं भवतीत्याह ।

### सत्यप्रतिष्ठायां क्रियाफलाश्रयत्वम् ॥ ३६ ॥

क्रियमाणा हि ‘क्रियाः’ यागादिकाः, ‘फलं’ स्वर्गादिकं, प्रयच्छन्ति ।  
तस्य तु सत्याभ्यासवतो योगिनः तथा सत्यं प्रशब्दते, यथा अछता-  
यामपि क्रियायां योगी फलमाप्नेति‡ । तद्वचनाद् यस्य कस्यचित्  
क्रियामकुर्वतोऽपि क्रियाफलं भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ ३६ ॥

अस्तेयाभ्यासवतः फलमाह ।

### अस्तेयप्रतिष्ठायां सर्वरत्नोपस्थानम् ॥ ३७ ॥

‘अस्तेयं’, यदाऽभ्यसति योगी तदा तस्य प्रकार्षात् निरभिस्तास-  
स्थापि ‘सर्वतोदिग्भ्यः’§ ‘रत्नान्युपतिष्ठन्ते ॥ ३७ ॥

ब्रह्मचर्याभ्यासस्थापि फलमाह ।

### ब्रह्मचर्यप्रतिष्ठायां वीर्यलाभः ॥ ३८ ॥

\* द्वन्द्वे, अहिंसाप्रतिष्ठायामितिपाठः G पुस्तके नाल्सि ।

† उपनौ, सन्निधावितिपाठः G पुस्तके नाल्सि ।

‡ परमाश्रयतीति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ सर्वतो दिक्षानीति G पुस्तकपाठः ।

यः किं च 'ब्रह्मचर्यं', अभ्यस्ति, तस्य तत्प्रकर्षान्विरतित्रयं 'वीर्यं' सामर्थ्यं आविर्भवति । वीर्यनिरोधो हि ब्रह्मचर्यं तस्य प्राकर्षाच्छरीरेन्द्रियमनःसु वीर्यं प्रकर्षमागच्छति ॥ ३८ ॥

अपरिग्रहाभ्यासस्य फलमाह ।

**अपरिग्रहस्थैर्ये जन्मकथन्तासम्बोधः ॥ ३९ ॥**

कथमित्यस्य भावः 'कथन्ता' । जन्मनः कथन्ता 'जन्मकथन्ता' । तस्याः 'सम्बोधः' सम्बग्ज्ञानं । जन्मान्तरे कोऽहमासु कीदृशः किं कार्यकारीति जिज्ञासायां सर्वमेव सम्बग्ज्ञानातीत्यर्थः ।

न केवलं भोगसाधनपरिग्रह एव परियहः । किन्तु यावदात्मनः भरीरपरियहोऽपि परियहः भोगसाधनलाच्छरीरस्य । तस्मिन् सति रागानुबन्धात्\* वहिर्मुखायामेव प्रवृत्तौ न तात्त्विकज्ञानप्रादुर्भावः । यदा पुनः भरीरादिपरिग्रहनैरपेक्ष्येण माध्यस्थ्यमवलम्बते तदा मध्यस्य रागादित्यागात् सम्बग्ज्ञानहेतुर्भवत्येव पूर्वापरजन्मसम्बोधः ॥ ३९ ॥

उक्ता यमानां सिद्धयः । अथ नियमानाह ।

**शौचात् स्वाङ्गजुगुस्ता परैरसंसर्गः ॥ ४० ॥**

यः 'शौचं भावयति, तस्य 'स्वाङ्गेष्वपि कारणस्वरूपपर्वालोचन-दारेण 'जुगुस्ता' घृणा, समुपजायते । अशुद्धिरियं कायः नाचायश्चर्त्तुं कर्त्तव्य इत्यसुमैव हेतुना 'परैः' अन्यैश्च कायवद्भिः, 'असंसर्गः' सम्पर्क-

\* रागानुबन्धादिति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† मास्य सङ्कुह इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

२ पारे ४२ स्त्रवम् ।

५३

भावः\* संसर्गपरिवर्जनमित्यर्थः । यः किल खमेव कार्यं जुगुणते तत्तद-  
वद्यदर्शनात् स कथं परकीयैस्तथाभृतैः कार्यैः संसर्गमनुभवति ॥ ४० ॥  
शौचस्यैव फलान्तरमाह ।

किञ्चच+ सत्त्वशुद्धि-सौमनस्यैकाग्रतेन्द्रियजयात्मदर्शन-  
योग्यत्वानि च ॥ ४१ ॥

भवन्तीतिः वाक्यशेषः । ‘सत्त्वं’ प्रकाशसुखाद्यात्मकं॑ । तस्मि  
‘शुद्धिः’ रजस्तमोभ्यामनभिभवः । ‘सौमनस्यं’ खेदाननुभवेन मानसी  
प्रीतिः । ‘एकाग्रता’ नियतेन्द्रियविषये॥ चेतसः स्त्रैर्यं । ‘इन्द्रिय-  
जयः’ विषयपरामृखानामिन्द्रियाणां खात्मन्यवस्थानं । ‘आत्मदर्शने’  
विवेकस्थातिरिपे, चिन्तस्य ‘योगश्च’ । शौचाभ्यासवत एते सत्त्वशुद्धा-  
दयः क्रमेण प्रादुर्भवन्ति । तथा हि शौचात् सत्त्वशुद्धिः॥ । सत्त्वशुद्धे:  
सौमनस्यं । सौमनस्यादेकाग्रता\*\* । एकाग्रतावाः†† इन्द्रियजयः ।  
इन्द्रियजयाद्यात्मदर्शनयोग्यतेति ॥ ४१ ॥

सन्तोषादनुत्तमः सुखलाभः ।

सन्तोषादनुत्तमः सुखलाभः ॥ ४२ ॥

\* संसर्गभाव इति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† किञ्चेतिपाठः नवखादर्शपुस्तकपेशु नास्ति, परन्तु भाष्यकारेण दृष्टः ।

‡ सम्भवन्तीतिः H पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ प्रकाशसुखाद्यात्मकात्ममिति B, E, C पुस्तकपाठः ।

|| नियतविषये इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

¶ शौचात् सत्त्वशुद्धिरितिपाठः A, B, C, D, E, H पुस्तकपेशु नास्ति ।

\*\* सौमनस्यादेकाग्रमिति G पुस्तकपाठः ।

†† रेकाग्रादिति G पुस्तकपाठः ।

‘सन्तोषप्रकर्षेण\* योगिनसाथाविधमात्मरं सुखमाविर्भवति यस्ता  
वाचां विषयसुखं अतांशेनापि न समानं भवति† ॥ ४२ ॥

तपसः फलमाह ।

**कायेन्द्रियसिद्धिरशुद्धिक्षयात्पतः ॥ ४३ ॥**

‘तपः समभस्तुमानं चेतसः क्षेत्रादिलक्षणाशुचिक्षयदारेण‡  
‘कायेन्द्रियाणां’, ‘विद्धिं उत्कर्षं आदधाति ॥ ।

अथर्वः । चान्त्रायणादिना चित्तक्षेत्रवयः । तत्क्षयादिन्द्रियाणां  
स्तुत्य-यवहित-विप्रक्षेत्रदर्शनादिसामर्थमाविर्भवति, कायस्तु यथेच्छम-  
पुमहत्वादीनि ॥ ४३ ॥

स्वाध्यायस्तु फलमाह ।

**स्वाध्यायादिष्टदेवतासम्प्रयोगः ॥ ४४ ॥**

अभिप्रेतमन्तर्जपादिलक्षणे ‘स्वाध्याये प्रकृत्यमात्मे, योगिनः  
‘इष्टया अभिप्रेतया, ‘देवतया, ‘सम्प्रयोगः’, भवति । सा देवता  
प्रत्यक्षीभवतीत्यर्थः ॥ ४४ ॥

ईश्वरप्रणिधानस्तु फलमाह ।

**समाधिसिद्धिरीश्वरप्रणिधानात् ॥ ४५ ॥**

\* सन्तोषप्रकर्षे इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

† समस्ति H, G पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ भवतीत्यं पाठः G पुस्तके नात्ति ।

§ क्षेत्रादिलक्षणाशुद्धिक्षयदारेणेति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

|| आपादयतोति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

‘ईश्वरे योऽयं भक्तिविशेषसास्तात् ‘समाधेः’ उक्तलक्षणस्य,  
आविर्भावो भवति । यस्तात् च भगवानीश्वरः प्रसन्नः सन्वन्तरायरूपान्  
क्षेत्रान् परिहृत्य\* समाधिमुद्दोधयति ॥ ४५ ॥

यम-नियमानुक्ता आसनमाह ।

तच्च† स्थिरसुखमासनम् ॥ ४६ ॥

आख्यते अनेनेति ‘आसनं’ पद्मासन-दण्डासन-खस्तिकासनादि ।  
तद् यदा ‘स्थिरं’ निष्क्रम्य, ‘सुखं’ अनुद्देजकं‡ भवति, तदा योग-  
द्वातां भजते ॥ ४६ ॥

तस्यैव स्थिरसुखलापत्त्यर्थमुपायमाह ।

प्रयत्नशैथिल्यानन्त्यसमापत्तिभ्याम् ॥ ४७ ॥

तदासनं ‘प्रयत्नशैथिल्येन’, ‘आनन्त्यसमापत्त्या’, च स्थिरं सुखं  
भवतीति समन्वयः ।

यदा यदासनं बधामीति इच्छां करोति तदा प्रयत्नशैथिल्येण-  
क्षेत्रेनैव तदासनं निष्पद्यते । यदा आकाशादिगते आनन्दे चेतसः  
समापत्तिः क्रियते अवधानेन तादात्मापद्यते, तदा देहाहङ्कारा-  
भावान्वासनं दुःखजनकं भवति । अस्मिंसासनजये चति समाधन-  
रायभृता च प्रभवन्त्यङ्गमेजयत्वादयः ॥ ४७ ॥

तस्यैवानुनिष्पादितस्य फलमाह ।

\* अपहृत्येति G पुस्तकपाठः ।

† तत्रेति शब्दः A, B, C, D, E, F, G पुस्तकेषु नाहिः । परन्तु मात्र-  
कारेण धृतः ।

‡ अनुद्देजनीयमिति G पुस्तकपाठः ।

ततो दन्तानभिघातः ॥ ४८ ॥

तस्मिन्नासनजये सति 'दन्तैः' श्रीतोष्ण-हुन्तृष्णादिभिः, योगी  
नाभिहन्तत दृत्यर्थः ॥ ४८ ॥

आसनजयानन्तरं\* प्राणायाममाह ।

तस्मिन् सति श्वास-प्रश्वासयोर्गतिविच्छेदः प्राणा-  
यामः ॥ ४९ ॥

आसनस्यैर्ये 'सति', तस्मिन्मित्तकः प्राणायामलक्षणे योगाङ्गविशेषः  
अग्रष्टेयो भवति । कोदृशः 'श्वासप्रश्वासयोर्गतिविच्छेदलक्षणः' ।  
श्वास-प्रश्वासौ कृतलक्षणौ । तयोर्देव रेचक-पूरकद्वारेणां वाह्ना-  
भ्यन्तरेषु खानेषु 'गतेः' प्रवाहस्य, 'विच्छेदः' धारणं, 'प्राणायामः',  
उच्यते ॥ ४९ ॥

तस्यैव सुखावगमाय विभूत्य खरूपं कथयति† ।

स तु वाह्नाभ्यन्तरस्तम्भवृत्तिर्देशकालसङ्घाभिः परि-  
हष्टो दीघेस्त्रस्मः ॥ ५० ॥

'वाह्नवृत्तिः' शास्त्रे रेचकः । अन्तरवृत्तिः प्रश्वासः पूरकः । अन्त-  
स्तम्भवृत्तिः कुम्भकः । तस्मिन् जलमिव कुम्भे निश्चलतया प्राणः  
अवस्थायन्ते‡ इति कुम्भकः ।

\* आसनजयादनन्तरमिति G पुस्तकपाठः ।

† तयोर्त्तिर्धा रेचक-पूरककुम्भकद्वारेति A, D, F, G पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ दर्शयतीति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ प्राणोऽवस्थायत इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

चिविधोऽर्थं प्राणायामः ‘देशेन, ‘कालेन, ‘सङ्क्षया चौपलचितः  
‘दीर्घस्थानं द्वयो भवति । देशेनोपलचितो यथा नासादादशान्नादौ  
नासामारभ्य दादशाङुलिपर्यन्तमित्यर्थः । कालेनोपलचितो यथा षट्-  
चिंडनाचादिप्रमाणः\* । सङ्क्षया उपलचितो यथा दयतो वारान्कृतः† ।  
एतावद्धिः शासप्रश्नासैः प्रथम उद्भातः‡ भवति । एतज्ञानाय सङ्क्षायण-  
सुपान्म । उद्भातो नाभिमूलात् प्रेरितस्य वायोः शिरस्यभिहनम् ॥५०॥  
चान् प्रणायामानभिधाय चतुर्थमभिधातुमाह ।

**वाञ्छाभ्यन्तरविषयाक्षेपी चतुर्थः ॥ ५१ ॥**

प्राणस्य ‘वाञ्छो विषयः’ नासादादशान्नादिः । ‘आभ्यन्तरो विषयः’  
तु दयनाभिष्क्रादिः । तौ द्वौ विषयौ ‘आक्षिय’ पर्यालोच्य यः स्त्रम-  
रूपे गतिविच्छेदः स ‘चतुर्थः’, प्राणायामः । दत्तीयस्मात् कुम्भ-  
काल्यादयमस्य विशेषः । स वाञ्छाभ्यन्तरविषयावपर्यालोच्य सहसा-  
तप्तोपलग्निपतितजलजन्यायेन युगपत् स्त्रम्भृत्या निष्पद्यते । अस्य तु  
विषयदयाक्षेपको निरोधः । अयमपि पूर्ववत् देश-काल-सङ्क्षाभि-  
हपलचितो द्रष्टव्यः ॥ ५१ ॥

चतुर्विधस्यास्य फलमाह ।

**ततः क्षीयते प्रकाशवरणम् ॥ ५२ ॥**

‘ततः’ तस्मात् प्रणायामात्, ‘प्रकाशस्तु’ चित्तसत्त्वगतस्य, चत्  
‘आवरणं’ क्षेप्त्ररूपं, तत् ‘क्षीयते’ विनश्चतीत्यर्थः ॥ ५२ ॥  
फलान्तरमाह ।

\* षट्बिंश्तिमाचादिप्रमाण इति B पुरुषपाठः ।

† एतान् वारान् द्वय इति B पुरुषपाठः ।

‡ ७ पुरुषके सर्वत्र उद्भात इत्यत्र उद्भात इति पाठः ।

## धारणासु च योग्यता मनसः ॥ ५३ ॥

‘धारणा’ वश्यमानलक्षणः\* । तासु प्रणायामैः लीणदोषां मनो  
थन् थन् धार्यते, तच तच स्थिरं भवति† न विचेपं भजते ॥ ५३ ॥  
प्रत्याहारस्य स्वरूपमाह ।

स्वस्वविषयसम्बयोगाभावे॑ चित्तस्य स्वरूपानुकार-  
इवेन्द्रियाणां प्रत्याहारः ॥ ५४ ॥

इन्द्रियाणि स्वस्वविषयेभ्यः प्रत्याह्रियन्ते प्रतिकूलतया आह्रियन्ते-  
इस्मिन् इति ‘प्रत्याहारः’ । स च कथं निष्पृशत इत्याह । चकुरा-  
दीर्गां इन्द्रियाणां खः खो विषयः रूपादिः । तेन ‘सम्बयोगः’  
तदाभिमुख्येन प्रवर्तनं । तदभावस्तदाभिमुख्यं परित्यज्य स्वरूप-  
माचेऽवस्थानं । तस्मिन् सति चित्तस्वरूपमाचानुकारीणीन्द्रियाणि  
भवन्ति, अतश्चित्तमनुवर्त्तमानानि मधुकरराजमिव मधुमस्तिकाः॥,  
सर्वाणीश्चियाणि प्रतोचन्ते । अतश्चित्तनिरोधे तानि प्रत्याहतानि  
भवन्ति ॥ ५४ ॥

तेषां तस्मैरूपानुकारः प्रत्याहार उक्तः । फलमाह ।

ततः परमा वश्यतेन्द्रियाणाम् ॥ ५५ ॥

\* वश्यमाना इति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† लीणदोषमिति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ श्विरीभवतीति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ स्वविषयासम्बयोगे इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः । स्वस्वविषयासम्बयोगे इति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

॥ मधुकरराजमिव मस्तिका इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः । मधुकरराजमिव  
मधुमस्तिकांश्चिका इति G पुस्तकपाठः ।

अभ्यस्थमाने हि प्रत्याहारे तथा 'वश्चान्यायमानि 'इन्द्रियाणि सम्बन्धमेत्य, यथा वाञ्छविषयाभिमुखतां नौयमानान्यपि न यान्तीत्यर्थः॥ ५ ५॥

तदेवं प्रथमपादेनालक्षण्य योगस्याङ्गभूतं क्षेत्रतनुकरणफलं किधायोगमभिधाय क्षेत्रानासुदेशं कारणं त्वेत्रं स्वरूपं फलस्त्रोक्ता कर्मणाभिपि भेदं कारणं स्वरूपं फलस्त्राभिधाय विपाकस्य स्वरूपं कारणस्त्राभिहितं । ततस्याज्यत्वात् क्षेत्रादीनां, शान्यतिरेकेन त्यागस्याशक्त्यत्वात्, ज्ञानस्य च ज्ञात्यस्त्वात्, ज्ञात्यस्य च ईयाईयकारणोपादयोपादानकारणभूताया विवेकस्यातेः कारणभूतानामन्तरङ्गविशेषभूतावेन स्थितानां योगाङ्गानां\* अमादीनां स्वरूपं फलस्त्रहितं व्याकृत्य धारणापर्यन्तानां चासनादीनां परस्यरमुपकार्योपकारकभावेनावस्थितानां चहेत्यमभिधाय परस्यरस्त्रकारणपूर्वकं फलमभिहितं ।

तदयं योगो अमनियमादिभिः प्राप्तवीजभावः । आसनप्राणाधानैरकृतिः । प्रत्याहारेण पुण्यितः† । शानधारणासमाधिभिः‡ फलिष्वतीति व्याख्यातः साधनपादः ।

इति महाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजदेवविरचितायां राजमार्त्तण्डाभिधायां पातञ्जलयोगशास्त्रसूचवृत्तौ द्वितीयः साधनपादः ॥२॥

\* योगानाभिति G पुस्तकपाठः ।

† ग्रथेकलद्वयकारणपूर्वमिति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः । परस्यरणक्षणपूर्वकनिति G पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ कुसुमित इति G पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ विस्तधारकासमाधिभिरिति M पुस्तकपाठः ।

## अथ तृतीयः पादः ।

यत्पादपश्चात्तरणादणिमादिविभूतयः ।

भवन्ति भावितामस्तु भूतनाथः स भूतये ॥

तदेवं पूर्वोद्दिष्टं धारणाद्यन्तव्यं निर्णेतुं संयमर्त्ताभिधानपूर्वकं  
वाहाभ्यन्तरादिचिद्विप्रतिपादनाय खलयितुमुपक्रमते ।

तत्र धारणायाः खलूपमात्र ।

## देशवन्धवित्तस्य धारणा\* ॥ १ ॥

‘देशे’ नाभिक्रमावायादौ । चित्तस्य ‘वक्षः’ विषयान्तरपरि-  
हारेण यत् चित्तस्य खिरीकरण । सा ‘चित्तस्य धारणा’, उच्यते ।

अथमर्थः । भेद्यादिचित्तपरिकर्मवाचितान्तःकरणेण यमनियम-  
वता जितासनेन परिहस्तप्राणविक्षेपेण प्रत्याहतेष्टिथयामेण निर्वाधे  
प्रदेशे ऋजुकायेन जितदद्वेन योगिना नासायादौ सम्प्रज्ञातस्य  
समाधेरभ्यासाय चेतयः खिरीकरणं कर्त्तव्यमिति ॥ १ ॥

धारणामभिधाय धारणमभिधातुमात्र ।

## तत्र प्रत्ययैकतानता ध्यानं ॥ २ ॥

‘तत्र’ तस्मिन् देशे† यत्र चित्तं धृतं तत्र । ‘प्रत्ययस्य ज्ञानस्य ।

\* चित्तधारणेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† तस्मिन्नर्थं हति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

या 'एकतानता' विशद्वपरिणामपरिहारद्वारेण यदेव धारणाद्या-  
मासमनीकृतं तदालम्बतयैव निरन्तरमुत्पन्निः, या 'धानं', उत्पत्ते ॥

॥ २ ॥

चरमं योगाङ्गं समाधिमाह ।

तदेवार्थमाचनिर्भासं स्वरूपशून्यमिव समाधिः ॥  
॥ ३ ॥

'तदेव' उक्तलक्षणं धानं । यत्र 'अर्थमाचनिर्भासं' अर्थाकारसमावेश-  
शादुद्भूतार्थरूपं, व्यग्भूतज्ञानरूपत्वेन 'स्वरूपशून्यमिव',\* आपद्यते,  
स 'समाधिः', दत्युच्यते । सम्यगाधीयते एकादीक्रियते विचेपान्-  
परिहत्य यत्र मनः स 'समाधिः' ॥ ३ ॥

उक्तलक्षणस्य योगाङ्गचयस्य व्यवहाराय स्वज्ञाज्ञे तान्त्रिकों संज्ञां  
कर्तुमाह ।

चयमेकच संयमः ॥ ४ ॥

एकस्मिन् विषये धान-धारणा-समाधिलक्षणं चितर्थं प्रवर्त्तमानं  
'संयमसंज्ञयात्' ग्रास्ते व्यवह्रियते ॥ ४ ॥

तस्य फलमाह ।

तज्जयात् प्रश्नास्तेकः ॥ ५ ॥

'तस्य संबन्धस्य । 'जयात्' अभ्यासेन साम्योत्पादनात्† । 'प्रश्नाचायाः'

\* स्वरूपशून्यतामिवेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† संयमसंज्ञ इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ जायोत्पादनादिति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

ज्ञातव्यविवेकखण्डपादाः । 'ज्ञातोकः' प्रसरो भवति\* । ग्रन्था ज्ञातव्यवभासयतीत्यर्थः ॥ ५ ॥

तत्त्वोपयोगमाह ।

**तस्य भूमिषु विनियोगः ॥ ६ ॥**

'तस्य' संयमस्य, 'भूमिषु' स्तूलस्तूलालम्बमेदेन स्थितासु† चित्तदृत्तिषु, 'विनियोगः', कर्त्तव्यः । अधरामधरां चित्तभूमिं जितां जितां ज्ञात्वोन्तरस्यां भूमौ संयमः कार्यः । न ज्ञायमनात्मी-हृताधरभूमिः उत्तरस्यां भूमौ संयमं कुर्वाणः फलभाग् भवति ॥ ६ ॥

साधनपादे योगाङ्गान्यष्टावुद्धिष्ठ पञ्चानां सर्वाणि विधाय चयाणां कर्त्तव्यं न हृतमित्याशङ्काह ।

**चयमन्तरङ्गं पूर्वेभ्यः ॥ ७ ॥**

'पूर्वेभ्यः' चयादिभ्यो योगाङ्गेभ्यः पारम्पर्येण समाधेहृपकार-केभ्यः । धारणादियोगाङ्गचयं सम्प्रज्ञातस्य समाधेः 'चन्तरङ्गं', समाधिस्त्रूपनिष्पादनात् ॥ ७ ॥

तत्त्वापि समाधन्तरापेक्षया वहिरङ्गत्वमाह ।

**तदपि वहिरङ्गं निर्विजित्य ॥ ८ ॥**

'निर्विजित्य' निरासनगस्य गृह्णभावनापरपर्यायस्य समाधेः । एतदपि योगाङ्गचयं, 'वहिरङ्गं', पारम्पर्येणोपकारकत्वात् ॥ ८ ॥

\* प्रसादो भवतीति D पुरुषकथाठः ।

† अवस्थितास्त्विति E पुरुषकथाठः ।

इदानीं योगङ्गसिद्धीरात्मातुकामः\* संयमस्य विषयपरिदृष्टिं  
कर्तुं क्रमेण परिणामन्वयमाह ।

व्युत्थान-निरोधसंस्कारयोरभिभव-प्रादुर्भावौ नि-  
रोधक्षणचित्तान्वयो निरोधपरिणामः ॥ ८ ॥

‘व्युत्थानं’ चित्त-मूढ-विचित्रास्थं भूमित्यं । ‘निरोध’ प्रलङ्घ-  
संस्कारितया चेतसः परिणामः । ताभां व्युत्थान-निरोधाभ्यां यौ  
जगितौ ‘संस्कारौ तयोर्यथाक्रमं ‘अभिभव—प्रादुर्भावौ’, यदा भवतः ।  
‘अभिभवः’ व्यग्भूततया कार्यकरणासामर्थ्यनावस्थानं । ‘प्रादुर्भावः’  
वर्तमानेऽध्वनि अभिव्यक्तरूपतयावस्थानं । तदा ‘निरोधक्षणे’,  
‘चित्तस्योभयदृष्टित्वात् ‘अभ्यवः’, यः यः ‘निरोधपरिणामः’, दद्युच्यते ।

अयमर्थः । यदा व्युत्थानसंस्काररूपो धर्मः स्त्रीभूतो भवति,  
निरोधसंस्काररूपसाविर्भवति, धर्मिरूपतया च चित्तसुभयचाच्चित्त-  
मेनावस्थितं प्रतीयते, तदा च निरोधपरिणामशब्देन व्यवस्थिते ।  
यद्यपि चतुर्वादगुणदृष्टस्य चेतसो निष्पत्तिं नास्ति, तदायेवमूलपरि-  
णामः स्मैर्यमुच्यते ॥ ८ ॥

अखैव फलमाह ।

तस्य प्रशान्तवाहिता संस्कारात् ॥ १० ॥

‘तस्य’ चेतयः, उत्तादिरोधसंस्कारात्, ‘प्रशान्तवाहिता’, भवति ।  
परिहतविहेपतया सहृदप्रवाहपरिणामि चित्तं भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ १० ॥

निरोधपरिणाममभिधाय समाधिपरिणाममाह ।

\* सिद्धीरात्मातुकाम इति ८ पुस्तकपाठः

सर्वार्थतैकाग्रतयोः स्त्रयोदयौ चिन्तस्य समाधिपरिखामः ॥ ११ ॥

‘सर्वार्थता’ चतुर्वाचागाविधार्थगृहणं, चिन्तस्य विचेषो धर्मः । एकमित्रेवावलम्बने सदृशपरिणामिता ‘एकाग्रता’,\* सापि† चिन्तस्य धर्मः । तयोर्यथाक्रमं ‘स्त्रयोदयौ’ । ‘सर्वार्थतासहजस्य धर्मस्य ‘स्त्रयः’ आत्मममिभवः । ‘एकाग्रतासहजस्य धर्मस्य प्रातुर्भावोऽभिव्यक्तिः । ‘चिन्तस्य’ उद्विक्षितस्य, अन्यवित्तवाऽवस्थानं ‘समाधिपरिखामः’, इत्युच्यते ।

पूर्वसात् परिणामादृशं विवेषः । तत्र संख्कारसहजयोर्धर्मयो-रभिभव—प्रातुर्भावौ । पूर्वस्य युत्थानसंख्कारसहजप्रस्थ धर्मस्य न्यग्रभावः । उत्तरस्य निरोधसंख्कारसहजप्रस्थोऽप्यवोऽवभृतव्येवावस्थानं । इति तु स्त्रयोदयाविति । सर्वार्थतासहजप्रविवेषस्यात्यन्तिरस्त्रारादग्रत्यन्तिरतीताध्वनि प्रवेशः स्त्रयः । एकाग्रतासहजस्य धर्मस्योऽप्यवेषवर्तमानेऽध्वनि प्रकटनं ॥ ११ ॥

द्वितीयमेकाग्रतापरिणाममात्र ।

शान्तोदितौ तुल्यप्रत्ययै चिन्तस्यैकाग्रतापरिखामः ॥  
॥ १२ ॥

समाधितस्यैव ‘चिन्तस्य’, एकप्रत्ययो दृग्निविवेषः । ‘शान्तः’

\* एकाग्रत्वमिति इ पुस्तकपाठः ।

† तदपेति इ पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ युत्थानसंख्कारस्येति इ, C पुस्तकपाठः ।

अतीतमध्यानं प्रविष्टः । अपरस्तु उदितः' वर्तमानेऽध्यानि स्फुरितः ।  
द्वावपि समाहितचित्तलेन 'तुल्यौ' एकरूपात्मविनेन सदृशौ,  
'प्रत्ययौ' । उभयचापि समाहितस्यैव चित्तस्यात्मयित्वेनावस्थार्थं  
यत् यः 'एकायतापरिणामः', इत्युच्यते ॥ १२ ॥

चित्तपरिणामेऽकरूपमन्यचातिदिव्याह ।

एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्म-स्तुत्यावस्थापरिणामा व्या-  
ख्याताः\* ॥ १३ ॥

'एतेन' चित्तिधोक्तेन चित्तपरिणामेन । 'भूतेषु' स्तुत-स्तुतेषु ।  
'इन्द्रियेषु' बुद्धिकर्मान्तःकरणभेदेनावस्थितेषु† । 'धर्म-स्तुत्यावस्था-  
भेदेन चित्तिधः परिणामो व्याख्यातोऽवगमनव्यः ।

अवस्थितस्य धर्मिणः पूर्वधर्मगित्वन्नौ धर्मान्तरापक्षिधर्मपरि-  
णामान्तः, यथा स्तुत्यावस्था धर्मिणः पिण्डरूपधर्मपरित्यागेन घटरूप-  
धर्मान्तरस्त्रीकारः‡, 'धर्मपरिणामः' इत्युच्यते । 'स्तुत्यापरिणामः,'  
यथा तस्यैव घटस्त्रानागताध्यपरित्यागेन वर्तमानाध्वस्त्रीकारः,  
तत्परित्यागेन चातीताध्यपरिग्रहः । 'अवस्थापरिणामः,' यथा तस्यैव  
घटस्त्र ग्रथमदितीययोः सदृश्योर्धर्मस्तुत्यायोरम्बयित्वेन । यतस्यैव  
गुणवृत्तं नापरिणममानं चण्डमयासो ॥ १३ ॥

\* धर्मस्तुत्यावस्थापरिणामो व्याख्यात इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

† बुद्धिधर्मभेदेनावस्थितेभ्यति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ परिवाम इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ घटरूपधर्मस्ताराङ्गीकार इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

ननु कोऽयं धर्मोत्यागङ्ग धर्मिणो लक्षणमाह ।  
तत्र\* शान्तोदिताव्यपदेश्यधर्मानुपाती धर्मी† ॥१४॥

‘शान्ताः’ ये छतस्खस्वापारा आतीतेऽध्यन्यऽनुप्रविष्टाः । ‘उदिताः’ ये अनागतमध्यानं परित्यज्य वर्त्मानेऽध्यनि खस्वापारं कुर्वन्ति । ‘श्यपदेश्याः’ ये अक्षिरेष्टे खिता व्यपदेष्टु न अक्षयन्ते । यथा सर्वं सर्वात्मकमित्येवमादयः‡ । नियतकार्यकारणरूपतया योग्यताऽवच्छिन्ना अक्षिरेवेह धर्माङ्गदेनाभिधीयते । तं चिविधमपि धर्मं योऽनुपतत्यनुवर्त्तते अन्यचिलेन खीकरोति, स: ‘शान्तोदिताव्यपदेश्यधर्मानुपाती धर्मी’, इत्युच्चते, यथा सुवर्णं रुचकरूपधर्मपरित्यागेनै खस्तिकधर्मान्तरपरियहे सुवर्णरूपतयाऽनुवर्त्तमानं । तेषु धर्मेषु कथञ्चिद्भिन्नेषु धर्मिरूपतया सामान्यात्मना धर्मरूपतया विशेषात्मनाऽवस्थितमनुपातिलेनावभासते ॥ १४ ॥

एकस्य धर्मिणः कथमनेके परिणामा इत्यागङ्गामपनेतुमाह ।

क्रमान्वयत्वं परिणामान्वयत्वे हेतुः ॥ १५ ॥

\* तत्रेतिपदं अस्माङ्गव्यवहारादर्शपुस्तकेषु नालिति । परन्तु भाष्यकारेण सूचान्तर्गतलेन परिगृहीतत्वात् अस्माभिरपि तथैव व्यवस्थापितं ।

† “योग्यतावच्छिन्ना धर्मिणाः शक्तिरेव धर्मः” इत्यर्थं भाष्यपाठः काश्यां सुद्धितयोगभाष्यपुस्तके सूचान्तर्गत शब्द सुद्धितः । परन्तर्य न समीचीनः वाचिककारेण उक्तपाठस्य भाष्यमध्ये परिगणितत्वात् ।

‡ तेषां यथा स्वं सर्वात्मकमित्येवमादय इति च पुस्तकपाठः । तेषां यथा सर्वं सर्वात्मकमित्येवमादय इति च पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ सुद्धिकारूपधर्मपरित्यागेनेति च पुस्तकपाठः ।

धर्माणामुक्तखचणानां यः 'क्रमः' तस्य यत् प्रतिक्षणं 'अन्यत्वं', परिदृश्यमानं, 'परिणामस्य' उक्तखणस्य, 'अन्यत्वे' नानाविधिवे, 'हेतुः' सिद्धं इत्यपकं भवति । अथमर्थः । योऽयं नियतक्रमः, स्मृच्छूणात् स्मृत्पिण्डस्तः कपालानि तैश्च घट इत्येवं रूपः परिदृश्यमानः परिणामस्यान्यत्वमावेदयति । तस्मिन् एव धर्मिणि यो खचणपरिणामस्यावस्थापरिणामस्य च क्रमः सोऽप्यनेनैव न्यायेन परिणामान्यत्वे गमकोऽवगत्यः । सर्वं एव च\* भावा नियतेनैव क्रमेण प्रतिक्षणं परिणममानाः परिदृश्यन्ते अतः सिद्धं क्रमान्यत्वात् परिणामान्यत्वां । चित्तादीनां सर्वेषां† परिणममानानां केचित् धर्माः प्रत्येकेणैवोपस्थित्यते, यथा सुखादयः संखानादयस्य । केचिदेकान्तेनागुमानगम्याः, यथा धर्म-संखार-शक्तिप्रभृतयः? । धर्मिणश्चाभिन्नरूपतया॥ सर्वचानुगमः ॥ १५ ॥

इदानीमुक्तस्य संयमस्य विषयप्रदर्शणद्वारेण सिद्धौः प्रतिपादयितुमाह॥ ।

परिणामचयसंयमादतीतानागतज्ञानं ॥ १६ ॥

धर्म-खचणावस्थाभेदेन यत् 'परिणामचयं उक्तं । तत्र 'संयमात्'

\* सर्वं एव चेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† अतः सिद्धं क्रमान्यत्वं क्रमान्यत्वात् परिणामान्यत्वमिति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ विषयादीनामिति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ कर्म-संखार-शक्तिप्रभृतय इति B, E पुस्तकद्वयपाठः ।

|| धर्मिणश्च भिन्नभिन्नरूपतयेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

¶ प्रदर्शयितुमाहेति B, C, E पुस्तकेषु पाठः ।

तस्मिन् विषये पूर्वोक्तस्य संयमस्य करणात्, 'असीतागागतज्ञानं', वोगिनः सम्बगाविर्भवति । इहमत्त तात्पर्यं । अस्मिन् धर्मिणि अर्थं धर्माः, इदं सूक्ष्मां, इदमक्षस्यां पाणागतादध्वनः समेत्य वर्तमाने अध्वनि स्वं व्यापारं विधायातीतमध्वानं प्रविश्वतीत्येवं परिहृतविच्छेपतया यदा संयमं करोति, तदा यत् किञ्चिदतिक्रान्तमनुत्पत्तं वा तत्पर्यं वोगी जानाति । यतस्मिन्नस्य इद्युपस्त्वप्रकाप्तरूपतात् सर्वार्थयहसामर्थमविद्यादिभिर्विच्छेपैरजस्यं परिहृयते । यदा तु तैसौरूपायैविच्छेपाः परिहृयन्ते, तदा निष्टप्तमस्येवादर्थस्य सर्वार्थयहसामर्थमेकाप्तावसादाविर्भवति ॥ १६ ॥

सिद्धान्तरमात् ।

शब्दार्थ-प्रत्ययानामितरेतराथ्यासात् सङ्करस्तत्प्रविभागसंयमात् सर्वभूतरूपतज्ञानं ॥ १७ ॥

‘शब्दः’ श्रोतेर्नियथाद्वा नियतक्रमवर्णात्मा नियतैकार्थप्रतिपत्त्ववस्थितः । यदि वा क्रमरूपितः स्फोटात्मा ध्वनिः आत्मसंक्षतवुद्दिश्याद्वाः, उभयथापि पदरूपो वाक्यरूपस्य । तयोरेकार्थप्रतिपत्तौ सामर्थ्यात् । ‘अर्थः’ जाति-गुण-क्रियादिः । ‘प्रत्ययः’ ज्ञानं विषयाकारा बुद्धिवृत्तिः । एवां शब्दार्थज्ञानानां व्यवहारे ‘इतरेतराथ्यासात्’ भिक्षानामपि बुद्धेकरूपतासम्यादगतात् सङ्कीर्णत्वं । तथाहि गामानयेत्युक्तः कस्त्रिह-गोल्खचण्डमर्थं गोलजात्यवच्छिन्नं साक्षादिमत्त्विष्णरूपं, शब्दं तदाशकं, ज्ञानस्त्र तद्याइकमभेदेनैवाध्यवस्थाति । न तस्य गोद्वद्वद्वो वाशकं, अथं गोद्वद्वद्वयं वाशः, तयोरिदं याइकं ज्ञानमिति भेदेन व्यवहरति ।

यथा हि कोऽयमर्थः, कोर्य अब्दः, किमिदं ज्ञानमिति पृष्ठः सर्वं-  
चैकरूपमेवोत्तरं\* ददाति गौरिति । य यदेकरूपतां न प्रतिपद्यते  
कथमेकरूपमुच्चरं प्रथच्छति । एतस्मिन्नवस्थितेऽयोऽयं 'प्रविभागः',  
इदं अब्दस्य तत्त्वं यदाचकलं नाम । इदमर्थस्य यदाचकलं । इदं ज्ञानस्य  
यत् प्रकाशलं । इति प्रविभागं विधाय तस्मिन् प्रविभागे यः 'संब-  
महारोति, तस्य 'सर्वेषां भूतानां भृग-पश्च-पश्च-सरीषुपादीनां यत्  
'हतं' यः अब्दः । तत्र 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते । अनेनाभिप्रायेनैतेन  
प्राणिनाऽयं अब्दः समुच्चारित इति सर्वं जानाति ॥ १७ ॥

सिद्धान्तरमात्र ।

संस्कारसाक्षात्करणात् पूर्वजातिज्ञानं ॥ १८ ॥

द्विविधाद्वित्तस्यै वासनारूपाः 'संस्काराः' । केचित् स्वतिमात्रोत्या-  
दनफलाः । केचिच्चात्यायुर्भागसाक्षणविपाकहेतवः यथा धर्माधर्माख्याः ।  
तेषु संस्कारेषु यदा संयमं करोति, एवं मया सेऽर्थोऽनुभूतः, एवं  
मया सा क्रिया निष्पादितेति पूर्वदृच्छं सर्वमनुसन्दधानो भावनयैव  
प्रवेधकमन्तरेण उद्युद्धसंस्कारः सर्वमतीतं सार्तति । क्रमेण साक्षात्-  
हतेषुद्युद्धेषु संस्कारेषु ॥ 'पूर्वजज्ञानुभूतानपि जात्यादीन् प्रत्यक्षेण  
पश्यति ॥ १८ ॥

\* सर्वचैकमेवोत्तरमिति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

† बदतीति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ अतस्मिन् स्थिते इति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ द्विविधाद्वित्तेति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

|| साक्षात्क्रतेषु संस्कारेभ्यति B, C, E पुस्तकेषु पाठः ।

सिद्धान्तरमाह ।

प्रत्ययस्य\* परचित्तज्ञानं† ॥ १६ ॥

‘प्रत्ययस्य’ परचित्तस्य‡ केनचिन्मुखरागादिगा लिङ्गेन गृहीतस्य । यदा संयमं करोति तदा ‘परकीयस्य चित्तस्य ‘ज्ञानं’, उत्पद्यते । शरणमस्य चित्तं वीतरागं वेति परचित्तगतामपि सर्वानेव धर्मान् जागातीत्यर्थः ॥ १६ ॥

अस्यैव परचित्तज्ञानस्य विशेषमाह ।

न तत् सालम्बनं तस्याविषयीभूतत्वात्§ ॥ २० ॥

‘तस्य’ परस्य, चित्तं ‘तत्’, ‘सालम्बनं’ स्वकीयासम्बनेन बहितं, ‘न’, भक्ष्यते ज्ञातुं । आस्तम्बनस्य केनचिलिङ्गेनाविषयीकृतत्वात् । लिङ्गाचित्तमात्रं परस्यावगतं, न तु नीतिविषयमस्य चित्तं, पीत-विषयमिति वा । यस्य न गृहीतं तत्र संयमस्य कर्तुमभक्ष्यत्वात् । न भवति परचित्तस्य यो विषयस्य ज्ञानं । तस्मात् परकीयचित्तं नास्तम्बनस्तिं गृह्णते । तस्यास्तम्बनस्यागृहीतत्वात् । चित्तधर्माः पुनर्गृह्णन्ते एव । यदा तु किमनेनास्तम्बितमिति प्रणिधानं करोति तदा तत्संयमात् तदिष्यमपि ज्ञानं उत्पद्यते एव ॥ २० ॥

सिद्धान्तरमाह ।

कायरूपसंयमात्तद्ग्राह्यशक्तिस्तम्बे चक्षुःप्रकाशासं-  
योगेऽन्तर्ज्ञानं ॥ २१ ॥

\* प्रथमस्येति C पृस्तकपाठः ।

† एतत्सूत्रं काशामुक्त्रितयोगभाष्यपुस्तके नात्ति ।

‡ प्रथमं यस्य परचित्तस्येति C पृस्तकपाठः ।

§ प्रत्ययस्येतादिसूत्रं, न तस्यास्तम्बनस्तिवादिसूत्रस्य काशामुक्त्रितयोग-भाष्यपुस्तके नात्ति ।

‘कायः’ अरीरं । तस्य ‘रूपं’ चकुर्याद्वौ गुणः । तस्मिन् काये इदं रूपमिति\* ‘संयमात्’, तस्य रूपस्य चकुर्याद्वालरूपा या ‘शक्तिः’, तस्याः ‘स्त्रमे’ भावनावश्वात् प्रतिबन्धे । ‘चकुःप्रकाशसंयोगे’, ‘चकुषः’, ‘प्रकाशः’ सत्त्वधर्माः, तस्य ‘असंयोगे’ तद्यहणस्य व्यापारा-भावे । योगिनः ‘अन्तर्द्वानं’, भवति । न केनचिदसौ दृश्यत इत्यर्थः । एतेन शब्दाद्यन्तर्द्वानमुक्तं वेदितव्यं† । एतेन रूपाद्यन्तर्द्वानोपाय-प्रदर्शनेनैव अद्वादीनां श्रोत्रादिग्राहाणामन्तर्द्वानं उक्तं भवति ॥

॥ २१ ॥

सिद्धान्तरमाह ।

सोपक्रमं निरूपक्रमस्त्र कर्म तत्संयमादपरान्तश्चा-  
नमरिष्टेभ्यो वा ॥ २२ ॥

आयुर्विद्याकं यत् पूर्वकृतं ‘कर्म’, तद्विप्रकारं, ‘सोपक्रमं’ ‘निरूपक्रमस्त्र’ । तत्र ‘सोपक्रमं’ यत् फलजननाय सहेपक्रमेण कार्य-कारणाभिमुख्येन वर्तते । यथा उष्णप्रदेशे प्रसारिताद्वावासः श्रीग्रन्थे शुद्धति । उक्तविपरीतं ‘निरूपक्रमं’ । यथा तदेवाद्वावासः संवर्त्तिं-

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\* तस्मिन्नास्यस्मिन् काये रूपमितीति † चिकित्पुस्तकपाठः । तस्मिन्-  
स्यस्मिन् काये रूपमितीति † पुस्तकपाठः ।

† पुस्तकपाठके ‘एतेन शब्दाद्यन्तर्द्वानमुक्तं’ इत्ययं पाठः शूचाकारेकं व्यवस्थापितः । परक्षयं न समीचीनः, उक्तपाठस्य काश्यामुक्तियोगभाव्य-पुस्तके भाव्यान्तर्गतत्वात् । तत्र वाचस्पतिमित्रेण ‘एतेनेति’ इति भाव्यपाठं विद्यत्वं कायशब्दस्पर्शरसगन्धसंयमात् तद्याद्वाशक्तिस्त्रम्भे श्रोत्रव्ययसनें-  
ग्राहप्रकाशासद्योगे तदन्तर्द्वानमिति दूचमूहनीयं इति भाव्याभिप्रायस्य अद्वितत्वात् । अस्माक्षब्यवठस्त्रु पुस्तकेषु व्यवस्थान्तर्गतत्वात् ।

मनुष्यदेवे चिरेण ग्रोषमेति । अस्मिन् दिविधे कर्त्तव्यिः च: 'संयमं करोति, किं मम कर्म शीघ्रविपाकं किं चिरविपाकमित्येवं ज्ञानदात्मात् 'अपराजत्त्वान्', चक्षोत्पद्धते । 'अपराजा' इतीरवियोगः । तस्मिन् 'ज्ञानं' । असुस्तिन् काले असुस्तिन् देवे मम इतीरवियोगो भविष्यतीति निःसंज्ञयं जानाति । 'अरिष्टेन्द्रो वा' । अरिष्टानि प्रिविधानि आधात्मिकाधिदैविकाधिभौतिकभेदेन । तचाधात्मिकानि पिहितकर्त्तव्यः कौटुम्ब वायोर्धार्वं न इद्योति इत्येवमादीनि । आधिभौतिकानि अकस्मात् विज्ञातपुरुषदर्शनादीनि । आधिदैविकानि अकाल एव\* इष्टमध्यक्षर्णगदिपदार्थदर्शनादीनि । तेभ्यः इतीरवियोगकालं जानाति । यद्यप्ययोगिनामयरिष्टेभ्यः प्रायेण ज्ञानसुत्पद्धते, तथापि तेषां ज्ञानान्वाकारेण तत् संश्यवृणं । योगिनां पुनर्नियतकालदेशतया प्रत्यक्षवदव्यभिचारि ॥ २२ ॥

परिकर्त्तव्यनिष्ठादिताः सिद्धौऽपि प्रतिपादयितुमाह ।

### मैत्यादिषु बलानि ॥ २३ ॥

'मैत्री-करुणा-सुद्धिसोपेक्षासु यो विहितः संयमः तस्य 'बलानि', तासां मैत्रादीनां सम्बन्धीनि प्रादुर्भवन्ति । मैत्री-करुणा-सुद्धिसो-स्थापत्यं प्रकर्षं गच्छन्ति, यथास्य सर्वस्य मिष्टादिकं सम्प्रति-पद्धते ॥ २३ ॥

सिद्धान्तरमाह ।

\* अकाल एवेति ए पुरुषकपाठः ।

† परिकर्त्तव्यनिष्ठन्दभूताः सिद्धीरिति ए, C पुरुषकदयपाठः ।

बलेषु इस्तिबलादीनि ॥ २४ ॥

इत्यादिस्मन्मिषु 'बलेषु', कृतसंयमस्य इत्यादिवद्वलानि आविर्भवन्ति । तद्यमर्थः । यस्मिन् इस्तिबले वायुवेगे मिह्वीर्ये वा तन्मयभावेन\* संयमं करोति, तत्तत्पुर्वसामर्थ्युक्तं सन्तमस्य प्रादुर्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ २४ ॥

सिद्धान्तरमाह ।

प्रदृच्यात्तोकन्यासात् सूक्ष्म-व्यवहित-विप्रकृष्टज्ञानं  
॥ २५ ॥

'प्रदृच्यत्तिर्विषयवती ज्योतिशती च प्रागुक्ता । तस्या योऽसौ 'आत्मोकः' सात्त्विकप्रकाशप्रसरः,† तस्य निखिलेषु विषयेषु 'न्यासात्' तद्वासितानां विषयाणां भावगताः,‡ स्वात्माकरणेभिन्नियेषु च प्रकृष्ट-ज्ञानिमापन्नेषु॥ 'सूक्ष्मस्य' परमात्मादेः, 'व्यवहितस्य' भूम्यमन्तर्गतस्य निष्ठादेः,¶ 'विप्रकृष्टस्य' मेर्वपरपार्श्ववर्त्तिनो रसायनादेः, 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते ॥ २५ ॥

एतस्मानदृशानं सिद्धान्तरमाह ।

भुवनज्ञानं सूर्ये संयमात् ॥ २६ ॥

\* तन्मयीभावेनेति च पुरुषकपाठः ।

† सूक्ष्म-व्यवहित-विप्रकृष्टार्थज्ञानमिति च पुरुषकपाठः ।

‡ सात्त्विकप्रकाश इति च पुरुषकपाठः ।

§ भावगतिः पुरुषकपाठः ।

¶ प्रकृष्टशक्तितामापन्नेभिति पुरुषकपाठः ।

॥ निष्ठानादेविः पुरुषकपाठः ।

‘सूर्यो’ प्रकाशमये, यः संषमं करोति, तस्य उपसु भूर्भुवःस्तुः-  
प्रभूतिषु लोकेषु यानि ‘भुवनानि तत्सम्बिवेषभास्त्रि पुराणि, तेषु  
यथावदस्य ‘ज्ञानं’, उत्पद्यते । पूर्वस्मिन् सूत्रे साम्प्रकाश  
ज्ञानमनतयोक्त इह तु भौतिक इति विशेषः ॥ २६ ॥

भौतिकप्रकाशान्तराज्ञानदारेष्व चिद्गमरमाह ।

### चन्द्रे ताराव्यूहज्ञानं ॥ २७ ॥

‘ताराणां’ ज्योतिषां, यः ‘व्यूहः’ विशिष्टसम्बिवेषः, तस्मिन्  
‘चन्द्रे’, छतसंयमस्य ‘ज्ञानं’, उत्पद्यते । सूर्यप्रकाशेन इततेजस्तत्वात्  
ताराणां, सूर्यसंयमान्तज्ञानं न शक्नोति भवितुमिति पृथगुपाचो-  
डमिहितः ॥ २७ ॥

चिद्गमरमाह ।

### ध्रुवे तद्गतिज्ञानं ॥ २८ ॥

‘ध्रुवे’ निश्चले ज्योतिषां प्रधाने, छतसंयमस्य तासां ताराणां  
या ‘गतिः’, ग्रायेकं नियतकाला नियतदेशा च तस्माः ‘ज्ञानं’,  
उत्पद्यते । इयं तारा अयं यहः दृश्यता कालेन इमं रात्रिमिरं नज्जरं  
श्चाद्यति इति सर्वं जानानीत्यर्थः । इदं कालज्ञानफलमित्युक्तं  
भवति ॥ २८ ॥

वाज्ञाः चिद्गीः प्रतिपाद्यान्तराः चिद्गीः प्रतिपादयितुमुपक्रमते ।

### नाभिचक्रे कायव्यूहज्ञानं ॥ २९ ॥

चरीरमध्यवर्त्ति ‘नाभिसंहकं यत् चोऽज्ञारं ‘चक्रं’, तस्मिन् हस्त-

संयमस्य योगिनः, 'काषगतो योऽसौ 'चूहः' विजिष्टं रस-मणि-धातु-  
नायादीनामवस्थानं, तच 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते । इदमुक्तं भवति ।  
नाभिष्क्रां भरीरस्य मध्यवर्त्ति सर्वतः प्रसूतानां नायादीनां भूलभूतं ।  
अतस्य छतावधानस्य समयः सन्निवेशो यथावदाभाति\* ॥ १८ ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह ।

### कण्ठकृपे श्रुत्पिपासानिहतिः ॥ ३० ॥

कण्ठे गले कूपः 'कण्ठकृपः' जिङ्गा-तन्त्रोरधस्तात् कूपहृव कूपे  
गर्भाकाररप्रदेशः । प्राणादेर्थत्सम्यक्कात् श्रुत्पिपासादयः प्रादुर्भवन्ति ।  
तस्मिन् छतसंयमस्य योगिनः 'कुपिपासादयो निवर्जन्ते । घण्टिकाध-  
स्तात् श्रोतसायायमानेऽ तस्मिन् भाविते भवत्येवंविधा चिद्दिः ॥ ३० ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह ।

### द्वार्घ्नायां स्तैर्य ॥ ३१ ॥

कण्ठकूपस्याधस्तात् या 'कूर्चास्ता नाडी, तस्यां छतसंयमस्य,  
केतसः 'स्तैर्य', उत्पद्यते । तत्स्थानमनुप्रविष्टस्य चपलताऽ न भव-  
तीत्यर्थः । एदि वा कायस्य स्तैर्यसुत्पद्यते, न केनचित् खन्दयितुं  
शक्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ ३१ ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह ।

\* यथावदाविर्भवतीति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः

† जिङ्गाचक्षोरधस्तादिति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ श्रोतसा धार्घ्नायाद इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ चक्षतेति C पुस्तकपाठः । चक्षतेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

## मूर्द्धयोतिषि सिद्धदर्शनं ॥ ३२ ॥

ग्निरकपाले ग्रन्थारभास्यं छिद्रं प्रकाशाधारलात् ‘योतिः ।  
यथा ग्रन्थाभ्यन्तरस्तस्य मणे: प्रसरन्ती प्रभा कुञ्जिकाविवरप्रदेशे  
सहस्राते\*, तथा इदयस्य: शास्त्रिकः प्रकाशः प्रसूतस्तात्र सम्पिण्डितलं  
भजते । तत्र छतसंयमस्य, ये चावा-पृथिव्योरन्तरालवर्त्तिनः ‘सिद्धाः’  
दिव्याः पुरुषाः, तेषामितरप्राप्तस्त्राणां तस्य दर्शनं भवति । तात्  
प्रभाति, तैश्च सम्भास्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ ३२ ॥

सर्वंगले उपायमाह ।

## प्रातिभादा सर्वं ॥ ३३ ॥

निमित्तानपेक्षां मनोमाचजन्मविसंवादकं द्रागुत्यद्यमानां  
ज्ञानं प्रतिभा । तस्मां संयमे क्रियमाणे ‘प्रातिभं’ विवेकस्थातेः  
पूर्वभावि तारकं ज्ञानं, उदेति१ । यथोदेवतः शवितुः॥ पूर्वं प्रभा  
प्रादुर्भवति । तद्विवेकस्थातेः पूर्वं तारकं ‘सर्वविषयं ज्ञानमावि-  
भवति । तस्मिन् सति संयमान्तरानपेक्षः सर्वं ज्ञानातीत्यर्थः ॥ ३३ ॥

सिद्धान्तरमाह ।

## सूदये चित्तसंवित् ॥ ३४ ॥

‘इदयं’ भरीरस्य प्रदेशविशेषः । तस्मिन्धोमुखस्तस्यपूरुषरीकाभ्यन्तरे

\* कुञ्जिताकारेव सर्वप्रदेशे सङ्कृटत इति पा० ।

† सर्वगिमित्तानपेक्षमिति H पुरुषकपाठः ।

‡ भट्टित्यत्पद्यमानमिति D पुरुषकपाठः ।

§ उत्पद्यत इति E पुरुषकपाठः ।

|| उदेत्यति सवितरीति D पुरुषकपाठः ।

अन्तःकरणसत्त्वस्य\* स्थानं । तत्र छतसंयमस्य स्व-परचिन्तज्ञानसुत्प-  
द्यते । स्वचिन्तगताः सर्वा वासनाः परचिन्तगतांस्य रागादीन् जाना-  
तीत्यर्थः ॥ ३४ ॥

मिद्यन्तरमाह ।

सत्त्वपुरुषयोरत्यन्तासङ्कीर्णयोः प्रत्ययाविशेषो भोगः†  
परार्थान्यस्वार्थसंयमात् पुरुषज्ञानं ॥ ३५ ॥

‘सत्त्वं’ प्रकाशसुखात्मकः प्राधानिकः परिणामविशेषः । ‘पुरुषः’  
भोक्ता अधिष्ठात्रहृपः‡ । तयोर्भाग्य-भोक्तृत्वपत्वात् चेतनाचेतनत्वाच  
अत्यन्तासङ्कीर्णवं भिन्नत्वमित्यर्थः । तयोर्थः ‘प्रत्ययस्याविशेषः’ भेदे-  
नाप्रतिभासनं,‡ स भोगः । तस्मात् सत्त्वस्यैव कर्वताप्रत्ययेन या सुख-  
दुःखसंवित् स ‘भोगः’ सत्त्वस्य स्वार्थनैरपेक्ष्येण ‘परार्थः’ पुरुषार्थः ॥ ।  
तस्मादन्यो यः ‘स्वार्थः’ पुरुषस्वरूपमाचालमनः, परित्यकाइद्वारे  
सत्त्वे या चिक्षायासंकान्तिः, तत्र छतसंयमस्य ‘पुरुषविषयं ‘ज्ञानं’,  
उत्पद्यते । तदेवं रूपं स्वात्मनं ज्ञानं सत्त्वनिष्ठं पुरुषो जानाति ।  
न पुनः पुरुषो ज्ञाता ज्ञानस्य विषयभावमापद्यते, इत्यत्यापन्तः ।  
ज्ञात्वाद्वेष्यत्वयोरत्यन्तविरोधात् ॥ ३५ ॥

अस्यैव संयमस्य फलमाह ।

\* अन्तःकरणस्येति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† प्रत्ययाविशेषाद् भोग इति H, B, C चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः । परिण-  
तामकपत्रे सुनितयोगस्त्रिये पुरुषस्वयोः इति पाठो दृश्यते ।

‡ भोक्तृविष्ठात्रहृप इति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ अभेदेन प्रतिभासनमिति D पुस्तकपाठः ।

|| पुरुषार्थगिमित्त इति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

ततः प्रातिभ-आवण-वेदनादर्शस्वादवार्ता जायन्ते  
॥ ३६ ॥

‘ततः’ पुरुषसंयमादभ्यस्यमानात्, व्युत्थितस्यापि ज्ञानानि जायन्ते । तच ‘प्रातिभ’ पूर्वोर्त्तं ज्ञानं, तस्याविर्भवनात्\* सूक्ष्मादिक-मर्थं पश्यति । ‘आवणं’ श्रोत्रेन्द्रियं ज्ञानं, तस्याच प्रकृष्टं दिवं दिवि भवं इव ज्ञानाति । ‘वेदना’ स्वर्गेन्द्रियं ज्ञानं, विद्यतेऽनयेति छत्वा तात्त्विक्या संज्ञया व्यवहृत्यते । तस्यात् दिव्यस्वर्गविषयं ज्ञानं उपजायते । ‘आदर्शः’ चक्षुरेन्द्रियं ज्ञानं, आसमन्तात् दृश्यते उन्मृथते रूपमनेनेति छत्वा, तस्य प्रकर्षाद्विवृप्तज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । ‘आखादः’ रसनेन्द्रियं ज्ञानं, आखाद्यते उनेनेति छत्वा, तस्मिन् प्रकृष्टे दिव्यरससंविदुपजायते । ‘वार्ता’ गन्धसंवित्,† दृक्तिशब्देन तात्त्विक्या परिभाषया ज्ञापेन्द्रियमुच्यते, वर्तते गन्धविषय इति छत्वा दृक्त्वेर्चाणेन्द्रियाज्ञाता वार्ता गन्धसंवित्, तस्यां प्रकृष्टमाणार्थां दिव्यगन्धोऽनुभूयते ॥ ३६ ॥

एतेषां फलविशेषानां विषयविभागमाहः ।

ते समाधावुपसर्गा व्युत्थाने सिद्धयः ॥ ३७ ॥

‘ते’ प्राक्प्रतिपादिताः फलविशेषाः, ‘समाधेः प्रकृष्टं गच्छतःः१

\* तस्याविर्भवादिति H युक्तकापाठः ।

† गन्धसंवितिरिति H युक्तकापाठः ।

‡ विशेषविभागमाहेति D युक्तकापाठः ।

१ समाधौ प्रकृष्टं गच्छतीवि D युक्तकापाठः ।

‘उपसर्गाः’ उपद्रवा विज्ञाः\* । तत्र हर्ष-विस्तारादिकारणेन समाधिः  
शिथिलीभवति । ‘व्युत्थाने’ पुनर्ववहारद्वायां, विशिष्टफलद्वायकलात्  
‘विद्युयः’, भवन्ति ॥ ३७ ॥

सिद्धान्तरमाइ ।

बन्धकारणशैवित्यात् प्रचारसंवेदनात् चित्तस्य  
परश्चरीरावेशः† ॥ ३८ ॥

व्यापकलादात्मचिन्तयोर्नियतकर्मवशादेव इरीरान्तर्गतयोरेव भो-  
क्तृ-भोग्यभावेन यत् संवेदनमुपजायते, स एव इरीरबन्ध इत्युच्यते ।  
तत् यदा समाधिवशात् ‘बन्धकारणं धर्माधर्माद्यं कर्म शिथिली-  
भवति, तानवमापयन्ते । चित्तस्य च योऽसौ ‘प्रचारः’ इद्यप्रदे-  
शादिन्द्रियदारेण विषयाभिमुख्येन प्रसरः, तस्य ‘संवेदनं’ ज्ञानं दृयं  
चित्तवशा नाड़ी, अग्रया चित्तं बहति, इत्यच्च प्राणादिवहाभ्यो  
नाड़ीभ्यो विलक्षणा इति खपरश्चरीरयोर्यदा सञ्चारं जानाति, तदा  
परकीयं इरीरं वृत्तं जीवच्छरीरं वा चित्तं सञ्चारदारेण प्रविशति ।  
चित्तस्य परश्चरीरे प्रविशत् इन्द्रियाण्णनुवर्तते, मधुकरराजमिव मधु-  
मस्तिकाः‡ । अतः परश्चरीरप्रविश्टो योगी खपरश्चरीरेणेव तेनैव व्यवहरति,  
यतो व्यापकयोश्चिन्तपुरुषयोर्भागसङ्कोचकारणं कर्म, तस्येत् समा-  
धिना चित्तं तदा खानक्त्वात् सर्वकैव भोगनिष्पत्तिः ॥ ३८ ॥

\* विज्ञाकारिक इति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† परश्चरीरप्रवेश इति D पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ मस्तिका इति D पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ सप्तरीरवस्त्रेति “परिष्ठ” नामकपञ्चपाठः ।

सिद्धान्तरमाह ।

उदानजयाज्ञान-पञ्च-कण्ठकादिष्वसङ्गं उत्क्रान्तिः ॥ ३८ ॥

समानान्मिश्रिताणां तुष्णात्तावद् या युगपदुत्तिता दृत्तिः सा जीवनसम्भवाच्या । तस्याः क्रियाभेदात् प्राणापानादिसंज्ञाभिर्यपदेष्वः । तत् इद्यान्मुख्यासिकादारेण वायोः प्रणयनात् प्राण दूत्युच्चते । नाभिप्रदेशात् पादाङ्गुष्ठपर्यन्तमपनयनादपानः । नाभिप्रदेशं परिवेष्य समानान्मयनात् समानः । छाकाटिकादेशादाश्चिरोदृत्तेसमयनादुदानः । व्याप्त नयनात् सर्वज्ञरीत्यापी व्यानः । ‘उदानस्य’, संयमदारेण ‘जयात्’, इतरेषां वायूनां निरोधादृद्धगमित्वेन ‘जसे’ महान् शादै, महति वा कर्हमे, तीक्ष्णेषु कण्ठकेषु वा न मञ्जति इति । साधुवाच्चूलपिण्डवज्ञानादौ निमज्जनपि\* उद्गङ्क्तीत्यर्थः† ॥ ३८ ॥

सिद्धान्तरमाह ।

समानजयात् ग्रज्जसनं‡ ॥ ४० ॥

अग्निमावेष्य व्यवस्थितस्य ‘समानात्त्वस्य वायोः ‘जयात्’ संयमेन वशीकारात्, निरावरणस्याग्नेस्त्रृद्वलात्तेजया ज्वलन्निव योगी प्रतिभाति ॥ ४० ॥

सिद्धान्तरमाह ।

\* मञ्जित्वापीति D पुस्तकपाठः ।

† उपरिगच्छतीतीत्यर्थ इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ समानजयाज्ञाननिति याठः C चित्तितपुस्तके काण्डां मुक्तियोगभाष्य-पुस्तके च वर्त्तते ।

ओचाकाशयोः सम्बन्धसंयमाद्विवं ओचं ॥ ४१ ॥

‘ओचं’ शब्दयाइकमाहारिकमित्रियं । ‘आकाश’ वोम शब्द-  
तमाचकार्यं । तयोः ‘सम्बन्धः’ देश-देशभावलक्षणः । तस्मिन् कृतसंय-  
मस्य योगिनः ‘दिवं ओचं’ प्रवर्त्तते, युगपत् सूक्ष्म-व्यवहित-विप्रकृष्ट-  
शब्दयहणसमर्थं भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ ४१ ॥

सिद्धान्तरमाह ॥

कायाकाशयोः सम्बन्धसंयमात्माधुतूलसमापत्तेश्चा-  
काशगमनं ॥ ४२ ॥

‘कायः’ पात्रभौतिकं द्वरीरं । तस्य ‘आकाशेन अवकाशदायकेन’\*  
या ‘सम्बन्धः’, तच संयमं विधाय ‘सूक्ष्मिनि ‘द्वलादौ या ‘समापत्तिः  
तन्मयीभावलक्षणा, तां विधाय प्राप्तात्यन्तलधुभावो योगी प्रथमं  
यथारूपि जलेऽ सप्तरण् क्रमेणोर्णनाभतन्तुजासेन सप्तरमाण आदि-  
त्यरस्मिभिस्य विहरन् यथेष्टुमाकाशे गच्छति ॥ ४२ ॥

सिद्धान्तरमाह ।

वहिरकल्पिता वृत्तिर्महाविदेहा ततः प्रकाशाव-  
रुक्षक्षयः ॥ ४३ ॥

मरीरात् ‘वहिः’, या मगसः मरीरनैरपेष्येण ‘वृत्तिः’, सा ‘महा-  
विदेहा’, नाम विगतमरीराहारादर्द्धदारेणोचते । ‘ततः’ तस्यां

\* अवकाशदायकदिति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† मुक्तीति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

हतात् संयमात्, 'प्रकाशावरणक्षयः' सात्त्विकस्य चित्तस्य यः प्रकाश-  
स्त्रास्य यदावरणं क्षेत्रकर्मादि तत्त्वं चक्षः प्रविलक्षयो भवति । अथमर्थः ।  
ज्ञातीराइहारे सति या मनसा विद्विन्नितिः सा कस्यितेत्युच्यते । यदा  
पुनः ज्ञातीराइहारभावं\* परित्यज्य स्वातन्त्र्ये त्रोदस्त्रे मनसा दृच्छिः सा  
चक्षितात्, तत्त्वां संयमात् योगिनः सर्वे चित्तमस्ताः चीयन्ते ॥४३॥

तदेवं पूर्वान्तविषया अपराज्ञविषया मध्यभावात् सिद्धीः प्रति-  
यात्तावज्ञरं भ्रुवनज्ञानादिरूपा वाच्चाः, कायद्यूहादिरूपा आध-  
मराः, परिकर्मनिष्पन्नभूतात् 'मैत्रादिषु वसानि' इत्येवमाच्चाः  
समाधूपयोगिनीस्तान्तःकरणवहिःकरणस्त्रियेन्द्रियभावाः, प्राणादिवा-  
युभावात् सिद्धीस्त्रियाद्य वसानेः समाच्चादोत्पत्तये प्रतिपाद्य  
रदानीं स्वदर्भनोपयोगिष्वीज-निर्विजयमाधिविद्यये विविधोपाद-  
प्रदर्भनायाह ।

स्थूल-स्वरूप-स्वक्षमात्म्यार्थवत्संयमाद्भूतजयः ॥४४॥

पञ्चानां पृथिव्यादीनां भूतानां ये पञ्चावस्थाविशेषरूपा धर्माः  
स्थूलस्त्रादयः, तत्त्वसंयमस्य 'भूतजयः', भवति, भूतानि वस्त्रा-  
न्यस्य भवन्तीत्यर्थः† । तथाहि भूतानां परिदृश्यमानं विजिष्टाकारवद्गूप्तं  
'स्थूलं' 'स्वरूपं' ऐवां यथाक्रमं कार्यं गन्ध-क्षेत्रैःस्त्राना-प्रेरणावकाश-  
दानस्त्रक्षणं । 'स्वक्षमं' तु यथाक्रमं भूतानां कारणलेनः व्यवस्थितानि  
गन्धादितमाचार्याणि । 'अवस्थिनो गुणः प्रकाश-प्रदृष्टिः-स्थितिरूपतया

\* ज्ञातीराइहंभावमिति C पुस्तकयाठः ।

† भूतात्मवद्यं वस्त्रावीकर्त्त्वं इति H पुस्तकयाठः ।

‡ कारणभेदेनेति C, H, B पुस्तकयाठः ।

सर्वचेदान्वयित्वेन समुपलभ्यते । 'अर्थवत्तं' तेष्वेव गुणेषु भोगापवर्भस-  
न्नादगात्रा अन्तिः । तदेवं भूतेषु पञ्चसु उक्तव्यावस्थापञ्चेषु\*  
मत्यवस्थं संयमं कुर्वन् योगी भूतजयी भवति । तथाया, प्रथमं सूक्ष-  
रूपे संयमं विषय तदनु सूक्ष्मरूपे इत्येवं क्रमेष तत्त्वं हनसंय-  
मस्य सङ्क्षयानुविधायित्वा वस्त्रानुषारिष्य इव नाथो भूतप्रकृतस्ये  
भवन्ति ॥ ४४ ॥

तत्त्वेव भूतजयस्य पत्तमात् ।

ततोऽणिमादिप्रादुर्भावः कायसम्यन्ताङ्गमानभिधा-  
तत्त्वं ॥ ४५ ॥

'अणिमा' परमाणुरूपतापन्तिः । लघिमा द्वूलपिण्डवस्त्रघुत्प्राप्तिः ।  
गरिमा गुरुलप्राप्तिः । महिमा महत्प्राप्तिः अङ्गुल्येण चक्रादि-  
स्यर्जनशक्तिः । प्राकाम्यं दृक्षानभिधातः । व्यरीरात्मःकरणेश्वरतं  
ईश्वितं । सर्वच प्रभविष्णुता वशितं, सर्वादेव भूताणि अनु-  
रागितात् तदुक्तं नातिक्रामन्ति । कामावसायितं सर्वच कामा-  
वसायः, वर्षास्त्रं विषयेऽस्य कामः दृक्षा भवति, तस्मिन् विषये  
योगिनो वसायो भवति, तं विषयं खीकारदारेणाभिलाष-  
समाप्तिपर्यन्तं नयनीत्यर्थः । तत्त्वं ते अणिमाद्याः समाधुपयोगिनो  
भूतजयात् योगिनः प्रादुर्भवन्ति । यथा परमाणुतं प्राप्तो

\* उक्तव्यावस्थावस्थावस्थितिः पुरुषकपाठः । उक्तव्यावस्थावस्थाभि-  
द्धेभितिः पुरुषकपाठः ।

† अनुग्रामित्वादितिः पुरुषकपाठः ।

वज्ञादीनामप्यनः प्रविशति । एवं सर्वत्र थोञ्चं । एतेऽस्मिन्न-  
दयोऽष्टौ गुण महासिद्धय इत्युच्चन्ते । 'कायसम्पत्' वज्ञमाणा, तां  
प्राप्नोति । 'तद्वर्मानभिषातस्त्र' तस्य कायस्य ये धर्मा रूपादयसेषा-  
मभिषातो नान्नो नास्य कुतस्मिदपि भवति । नास्य रूपमग्निरहति  
न च वायुः भ्रोवदति इत्यादि थोञ्चं ॥ ४५ ॥

कायसम्पदमाह ।

रूप-सावण्य-बल-वज्रसंहननत्वानि कायसम्पत्  
॥ ४६ ॥

'रूप-सावण्य-बलानि' प्रसिद्धानि । 'वज्रसंहननं' वज्रवत् कठिना  
संहतिरस्य ग्ररीरे भवतीत्यर्थः । इति कायस्याविर्भूतगुणसम्पत् ॥ ४६ ॥  
एवं भूतजयमभिधाय प्राप्तभूमिकस्येन्द्रियजयमाह ।

ग्रहण-स्वरूपस्मितान्वयार्थं वस्त्रसंयमादिन्द्रियजयः  
॥ ४७ ॥

'ग्रहणं' दक्षियाणां विषयाभिमुखी दृक्षिः । 'स्वरूपं' सामान्येन  
प्रकाशकत्वं । 'अस्मिता' अद्व्यारागुगमः । 'अन्वयार्थवत्त्वे' पूर्ववत् ।  
एतेषामिन्द्रियाणामवस्थापञ्चके पूर्ववत् संयमं छत्वा 'दक्षियजयी  
भवति ॥ ४७ ॥

तस्य फलमाह ।

ततो मनोजवित्वं विकरणभावः प्रधानजयश्च ॥ ४८ ॥  
ग्ररीरस्य मनोवदगुप्तमगतिलाभः\* 'मनोजविलं' । कायनिरपे-

\* मनोवदगुप्तमगतिलाभ इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

काणामिन्द्रियाणां दृत्तिसाभः ‘विकरणभावः’ । सर्ववज्ञिवं ‘प्रधान-  
जयः । एताः सिद्धयो जितेन्द्रियस्य प्रादुर्भवन्ति । तास्य अस्मिन्द्वास्ते  
मधुप्रतीका दृत्युच्यन्ते । यथा मधुन एकदेशोऽपि खदते, एवं प्रत्येक-  
नेताः सिद्धयः खदन्त इति मधुप्रतीकाः ॥ ४८ ॥

इन्द्रियजयमभिधायान्तःकरणजयमाह ।

सर्व-पुरुषान्यताख्यातिमात्रस्य सर्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वं  
सर्वज्ञातृत्वत्वं ॥ ४९ ॥

तस्मिन् शुद्धे सात्त्विके परिणामे द्वातस्यमस्य या सत्त्व-पुरुषयो-  
रत्यद्यते विवेकख्यातिः सा ‘अन्यताख्यातिः’, । गुणानां कर्त्तव्याभि-  
मानग्रिधिलीभावस्यरूपान्तमाहात्म्यात्\* तत्रैव स्थितस्य योगिनः  
‘सर्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वं’, ‘सर्वज्ञातृत्वम्’, समाधेर्भवति । सर्वेषां गुण-  
परिणामानां भावानां खामिवदाक्षमणं ‘सर्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वं’ ।  
तेषामेव ज्ञानोदिताव्यपदेश्वर्धमन्वेत् स्थितानां यथावदिवेकज्ञानं  
‘सर्वज्ञातृत्वं’ । एषा च अस्मिन् ज्ञात्वे परस्तां वशीकारसंज्ञायां  
प्राप्नायां विश्वोका नाम सिद्धिरित्युच्यते ॥ ४९ ॥

क्रमेण भूमिकान्तरमाह ।

तदैराग्यादपि दोषवीजक्षये कौवल्यं ॥ ५० ॥

तस्यामपि विश्वोकायां सिद्धौ यदा वैराग्यमुत्पद्यते योगिनः,  
तदा तस्मात् ‘दोषवीजं’ रागादीनां, चत् ‘वीजं’ अविद्या, ‘तस्माः’

\* कर्त्तव्याभिमानग्रिधिलीभावस्यरूपया तम्यतवेति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

‘स्वे’ निर्मूलने, ‘कैवल्य’ चात्यन्तिकी दुःखजिद्वचिः । पुरुषस गुणा-  
गामधिकारपरिसमाप्तेः\* स्वरूपनिष्ठवां ॥ ५० ॥  
स्थितिवे बमाधो स्थित्यपायमाह ।

स्थान्युपनिमन्त्रणे† सङ्ग-समायकरणं पुनरनिष्टप्रस-  
ज्ञात ॥ ५१ ॥

स्वारो योगिनो भवन्ति । तचाभ्यासवान्प्रदृशमाचज्ञेति  
प्रथमः । चतुर्भारप्रश्नः‡ द्वितीयः । भूतेन्द्रियजयी द्वितीयः । अति-  
कान्तभावगीचयस्तुर्यः । तत्र स्वर्यस बमाधे प्राप्तस्तविधप्राप्त-  
भूमिप्रश्नस ॥ अन्तां मधुमतीसंज्ञां<sup>१</sup> भूमिं साकात्सुर्यसः ‘स्वानिनो  
देवा स्वपनिमन्त्रयितारो भवन्ति, दिव्यस्त्रीरक्षाकारादिक्षुपदौक-  
चन्ति । तस्मिन् ‘स्वपनिमन्त्रणे’, जानेन ‘सङ्गः’, कर्त्तव्यः, नायि  
‘स्वयः’, । सङ्गकरणे पुनर्विषयभोगे निपतति । सावकरणे स्व-  
स्वायमात्राणं भव्यमानो न बमाधायुस्त्वते । अतः सङ्ग-स्वयवोष्टेन  
वर्जनं कर्त्तव्यं ॥ ५१ ॥

अस्मामेव फलभूतमयां विवेकस्त्रातौ पूर्वोक्तसंक्षमव्यतिरिक्त-  
सुपायान्तरमाह ।

\* अधिकारतमात्रेदिति B, C पुरुषमाठः ।

† स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठत्वमिति B, C पुरुषकपाठः ।

‡ स्थान्युपनिमन्त्रणे इति H पुरुषकपाठः ।

१ स्वातन्त्र्यप्रश्न इति H पुरुषकपाठः ।

॥ ग्रामस्तविधभूमिप्रत्ययस्येति H पुरुषकपाठः ।

ग मधुमतीं प्राप्तानिति H पुरुषकपाठः ।

## क्षणतत्क्रमयोः\* संयमादिवेकज्ञं ज्ञानं† ॥ ५२ ॥

‘क्षणः’ सर्वाग्न्यः कालावयवः । यस्य कला प्रविभन्तु न शक्यते । तथाविधानां कालज्ञानानां यः ‘क्रमः’ पौर्वापर्येण परिणामः, तत्र ‘संयमात्’ प्रागुक्तं ‘विवेकज्ञं ज्ञानं’, उत्प्य द्यते । अथमर्थः । अथ काल-क्षणोऽस्मात् कालज्ञानादुत्तरः, अथमसात् पूर्वं दृश्येवंविष्णे क्रमे छतसंयमस्यात्यन्तस्तुल्येऽपि ज्ञानक्रमे यदा भवति साक्षात्कारः, तदा अन्यदपि सूक्ष्मं महदादि साक्षात्करोतीति विवेकज्ञानेत्पन्तिः ॥ ५२ ॥

अस्यैव संयमस्य विषयविशेषोपचेपणायाह ।

## आति-लक्षण-देशैरन्यतानवच्छेदानुल्ययोस्ततः प्रतिपत्तिः ॥ ५३ ॥

पदार्थानां भेदहेततः ‘आति-लक्षण-देशा भवन्ति । क्षिद्भेदहेतुः ‘आतिः’, यथा गौरियं महिषीयमिति । जात्या तुल्ययोः ‘लक्षणं’, भेदहेतुः, यथा दृथं कर्वुरा दृथमरणेति । जात्या लक्षणेन चाभिन्न-योर्भेदहेतुः ‘देशः’, दृष्टः, यथा तुल्यप्रमाणयोरामलकयोर्भिन्नदेश-स्थितयोः । यत्र पुनर्भेदोऽवधारयितुं न शक्यते, यथैकदेशस्थि-तयोः शुक्रयोः वार्षिकयोः परमात्मोः । तथाविधे विषये भेदाय छतसंयमस्य यदा भेदेन ज्ञानानुपज्ञायते, तदा तदभ्यासात् सूक्ष्मा-श्चपि तत्त्वानि भेदेन प्रतिपाद्यन्ते । एतदुक्तं भवति, यत्र केनचिदु-

\* क्षणतत्क्रमयोरिति च पुस्तकपाठः ।

† विवेकज्ञानमिति च पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ विषयविवेकोपयोगमाहेति ८ पुस्तकपाठः ।

पायेव भेदो नावधारवितुं भक्तसूच संवभास्त्रविष्येव भेदप्रतिपत्तिः  
स्वस्माद्वां तस्मानां ॥ ५३ ॥

उक्तस्य विवेकजन्यज्ञानस्य संज्ञां विषयं स्वभावं व्याख्यातुमाह ।

तारकं सर्वविषयं सर्वव्याविषयमकमच्चेति विवेकज्ञं ज्ञानं ॥ ५४ ॥

उक्तसंवयमवलादन्यायां भूमिकायासुत्पक्षं ‘ज्ञानं’, ‘तारकं’,  
इति । तारयत्यगाधात् संसारपयोऽधेः\* योगिनं इत्यात्मर्थिक्या संज्ञया  
‘तारकं’, इत्युच्यते । अस्य विषयमाह, ‘सर्वविषयं’ इति, सर्वाणि  
तस्मानि महदादीनि विषयोऽस्तेति ‘सर्वविषयं’ । स्वभावसारात्  
सर्वव्याविषयत्वं । सर्वाभिरवस्थाभिः स्युष-स्वस्मादिभेदेन तैलैष  
परिणामैः सर्वेणाकारेणावस्थितानि तस्मानि विषयोऽस्तेति ‘सर्वव्याविषयं’ ।  
स्वभावान्तरमाह । ‘अकमच्च’, इति । निःश्वेषनानावस्थापरिषतद्विवेकभावयहणे  
करतसामत्त्वकवद्युगपत् पश्चतीत्यर्थः ॥ ५४ ॥

अस्माच्च विवेकजातात् नारकास्त्रज्ञानात् किं भवतीत्याह ।

सत्त्व-पुरुषयोः शुद्धिसाम्ये कैवल्यं ॥ ५५ ॥

‘सत्त्व-पुरुषौ’ उक्तस्त्वणौ । तयोः ‘शुद्धिसाम्ये कैवल्यं’ ।

\* संसारसागरादिति म् पुरुषकपाठः ।

† निःश्वेषनानावस्थापरिषतन्यात्मकभावयहेत्वे इति म् पुरुषकपाठः ।  
निःश्वेषनानावस्थापरिषतन्यूनाधिकभावयहेत्वे इति C पुरुषकपाठः ।

चित्तसत्त्वस्य सर्वथा कर्त्तव्याभिमाननिवृत्या खकारणेऽनुप्रवेशः  
शुद्धिः । पुरुषस्य शुद्धिरूपपरितभोगाभावः । इति इयोः समा-  
नायां शुद्धौ पुरुषस्य कैवल्यं उत्पद्यते, तोक्षो भवतीत्यर्थः ।

तदेवमन्तरङ्गयोगाङ्गचयमभिधाय तस्य च संयमसञ्ज्ञां छत्वा  
संयमस्य विषयप्रदर्शनार्थं परिणामचयमुपपाद्य संयमबलोत्पद्यमानाः  
पूर्वाभापरान्त-मध्यभावाः सिद्धीरूपदर्श समाधाशासोत्पन्नये वाञ्छा  
भुवनश्चानादिरूपा आभ्यन्तरास्य कायव्युहश्चानादिरूपाः प्रदर्श  
समाधुपयोगायेन्द्रियप्राणादिजयपूर्विकाः प्रदर्शं परमपुरुषार्थसिद्धये  
यथाक्रममवस्थास्तद्वितीयतजयेन्द्रिय-सत्त्वजयोऽन्वास्य व्याख्याय चि-  
वेकज्ञानोत्पन्नये तांस्तान् उपायान् उपन्यस्य तारकस्य सर्व-  
समाधवस्थापर्यन्तभवस्य खरूपमभिधाय तस्मापन्तः छताधि-  
कारस्य चित्तसत्त्वस्य खकारणानुप्रवेशात् कैवल्यमुत्पद्यते इत्यभि-  
हितं इति व्याकृतो विभूतिपादः ॥ ५५ ॥

इति महाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजदेवविरचितायां राजमार्तण्डा-  
भिधायां पातञ्जलयोगशास्त्रसूत्राण्डृष्टिनौ विभूतिपादसूतीयः ॥ ४ ॥

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शब्द चतुर्थः पादः ।

अदाश्यैव कैवल्यं विनोपायैः प्रायते ।

तमेकमज्जीशानं चिदानन्दमयं स्तुमः ॥

रदानों विप्रतिपत्तिसमुत्थान्तिनिराकरणेन युक्त्या कैवल्यस्तु-  
पावस्थापनाय\* कैवल्यपादोऽयमारभ्यते ।

तत्र याः पूर्वसुक्ताः चिद्रुद्यस्तासां जानाविधजन्मादिकारणप्रति-  
पादनद्वारेणैव वोधयति, एताः चिद्रुद्यः सर्वाः पूर्वजन्माभ्वस्तुसमाधि-  
वस्त्राज्जन्मादिनिमित्तमाचलमाश्रित्य प्रवर्त्तन्ते । ततस्मानेकभवसाथस्तु  
समाधेन चतिरस्त्रीत्याश्वासेत्यादनाथ समाधिचिद्रुद्ये प्राधान्यस्थाप-  
नार्थं कैवल्योपयोगार्थं स्नाह ।

जन्मौषधि-मन्त्र-तपः-समाधिजाः सिद्धयः ॥ १ ॥

काश्चन ‘जन्मनिमित्ता एव चिद्रुद्यः । यथा पञ्चादीनस्माकामे  
गमनादयः । यथा वा कपिलमहर्षिप्रस्तौर्णा जन्मसमग्रसरसेव  
उपजायमाना ज्ञानादयः सांसिद्धिका गुणाः । ‘ओषधिचिद्रुद्यो यथा  
पातालादौ रसायनाद्युपभोगात् ब्ररीरदार्ढादयः । ‘मन्त्रसिद्धिर्यथा  
मन्त्रजपात् केवाच्चिदाकाशगमनादि । ‘तपःसिद्धिर्यथा विश्वामित्रा-  
दीर्णां । ‘समाधिचिद्रुद्यथा प्रामेव प्रतिपादिताः । एताः चिद्रुद्यः  
पूर्वजन्मानि चयित्तक्षेत्रानामेवोपजायन्ते, तस्मात् समाधिचिद्रुद्याविव

कैवल्यस्तुपश्चापनायेति ० पुस्तकपाठः ।

अन्वासां सिद्धीनां समाधिरेव जन्मान्तराभ्युक्तः कारणं, मन्मादीनि  
तु निमित्तमात्राणि ॥ ९ ॥

ननु नन्दीश्वरादीनां जात्यादिपरिणामः अस्मिन्नेव जन्मनि  
दृश्यते तत् कथं जन्मान्तराभ्युक्तसमाधेः कारणलमुच्यते\* इत्या-  
गद्याह ।

**जात्यन्तरपरिणामः प्रकृत्यापूरोत् ॥ २ ॥**

योऽयमित्तैव जन्मनि नन्दीश्वरादीनां ‘जात्यादिपरिणामः, सः  
‘प्रकृत्यापूरोत्’ । पाशात्या एव हि प्रकृतयोऽस्मिन् जन्मान्ति विकारा-  
नापूरथनि जात्यन्तराकारेण परिणमनि ॥ २ ॥

ननु धर्माऽधर्मादयसाम त्रियमाणा उपलभ्यन्ते, तत् कथं प्रकृ-  
तीनामापूरणे कारणलमित्याह ।

**निमित्तमप्रयोजकं प्रकृतीनां वरणमेदस्तु ततः  
स्त्रेचिकवत् ॥ ३ ॥**

‘निमित्त’ धर्मादि । तत् ‘प्रकृतीनां’, अर्थान्तरपरिणामे न ‘प्रयो-  
जकं’ । न हि कार्येण कारणं प्रवर्तते । कुच तर्हि तस्य धर्मादर्थीपार  
इत्याह । ‘वरणमेदस्तु ततः स्त्रेचिकवत्’ । ‘ततः’ तस्मादगुष्ठीयमाना-  
द्धर्मादेः, यत् ‘वरणं’ आवरकं अधर्मादिः, तस्यैव विरोधितात्  
‘भेदः’ चयः, क्रियते, तस्मिन् प्रतिबन्धके चीजे प्रकृतयः स्त्रमभि-  
मतकार्यात् प्रभवन्ति । दृष्टान्तमाह । ‘स्त्रेचिकवत्’, यथा स्त्रेचिकः

\* कारणमाव उच्यते इति ० मुख्यकथाः ।

क्षीवसः केदारात् केदारान्नरं जलं निनीषुः जलप्रतिबन्धक-  
वरणभेदमाचं करोति, तस्मिन् भिन्ने जलं खयमेव प्रसरद्धूपं  
परिषामं गृहाति, न तु जलप्रसरणे तस्य कस्ति॒ प्रथमः । एवं  
धर्मादेवाद्युपं ॥ ३ ॥

यदा साक्षात् तततस्य योगिनो युगपत् कर्मफलोपभोगाया-  
त्मीयगिरतिशयविभूत्यनुभावात्\* युगपदनेकमरीरनिर्मितिसा उप-  
जायते तदा कुतस्तानि चित्तानि प्रभवन्तीत्याह ।

### निर्माणचित्तान्यस्मितामाचात् ॥ ४ ॥

योगिनः खयं निर्मितेषु कायेषु यानि 'चित्तानि', तानि मूल-  
कारणात् 'अस्मितामाचात्', एव तदिच्छया प्रसरन्ति, अग्निर्विशुस्तिं  
इव युगपत् परिणमन्ति ॥ ४ ॥

ननु बद्धानां चित्तानां भित्ताभिप्रायत्वावैककार्यकर्त्तव्यं स्थारि-  
त्याह ।

### प्रवृत्तिभेदे प्रयोजकं चित्तमेकमनेकेषां ॥ ५ ॥

तेषां 'अनेकेषां', चेतसां, 'प्रवृत्तिभेदे' व्यापारनामात्रे 'एकं',  
योगिनः 'चित्तं', 'प्रयोजकं' प्रेरकमधिष्ठात्रत्वेन । तेन न भिन्नमतत्वं ।  
अयमर्थः यथा आत्मीये अरीरे मनः चक्रः पात्तादीनि यथेच्छं  
प्रेरयत्यधिष्ठात्रत्वेन, एवं कायान्तरेभ्यपीति† ॥ ५ ॥

\* निरतिशयविभूत्यनुभवायेति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

† कार्यान्तरेभ्यपीतीति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

४ यादे ८ सूत्रम् ।

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अन्नादिप्रभवतात् चिद्गीर्णं चित्तमपि तत्प्रभवं पञ्चविधमेव  
अतो अन्नादिप्रभवत् चित्तात् समाधिप्रभवस्य चित्तस्य वैलक्षण्यमाह ।

तत्र ध्यानजमनाशयं ॥ ६ ॥

‘ध्यानजं’ समाधिं चित्तं, तत् पञ्चसु मध्ये ‘अनाशयं’ कर्म-  
वासनारहितं, इत्यर्थः ॥ ६ ॥

अथेतरचित्तेभ्यो योगिनस्तिर्थं क्लेशादिरहितं विलक्षणं तथा  
कर्मापि विलक्षणमित्याह ।

कर्माशुक्लाकृष्णं योगिनस्तिर्थविधमितरेषां ॥ ७ ॥

शुभफलप्रदं कर्म यागादि शुक्लं । अशुभफलप्रदं ब्रह्महत्यादि  
कृष्णं । उभयसहीर्णं शुक्लकृष्णं । तत्र शुक्लं कर्म विचक्षणानां दान-  
तपः-स्वाध्यायादिमतां पुरुषाणां । कृष्णं कर्म नारकानां । शुक्ल-  
कृष्णं मनुष्याणां । ‘योगिनाम् संन्यासवतां एवंविधकर्मविपरीत-  
स्वाकृष्णं, तत् फलत्यागानुसन्धानेनैवानुष्ठानात् न किञ्चित् फलमार-  
भते ॥ ७ ॥

असैव कर्मणः फलमाह ।

ततस्तदिपाकानुगुणानामेवाभिव्यक्तिर्वासनानां ॥ ८ ॥

इह द्विविधाः कर्मवासनाः स्त्रिमात्रफलाः जात्यायुर्भैर्गफलास्य ।  
तत्र जात्यायुर्भैर्गफला एकानेकजन्मभवाः\* इत्यनेन पूर्वमेव कृत-

\* एकानेकजन्मफला इति ए पुरुषकथाः ।

निर्वद्याः । यासु स्मृतिमाचपक्षालासामभिष्यति सतः कर्मणः । येन कर्मणा यामुक् भरीरमारवं देव-मनुष्य-तिर्यगादिभेदेन\*, तस्मा विपाकस्य याः ‘अनुमुणा अनुरूपा वासनाः, तासामेव तस्मात् ‘अभि-यक्षिः’, ‘वासनामां’, भवति । अयमर्थः येन कर्मणा पूर्वं देवता-दिभरीरमारवं आत्मरस्तव्यवधाने पुनर्स्तथाविधिश्चैव भरीरस्तारमेव तदनुरूपा एव स्मृतिपक्षा वासनाः प्रकटीभवन्ति । लोकान्तरेभ्ये वार्येषु तस्य स्त्रयादयो जायन्ते । इतरास्तु सत्योऽपि न्यग्भूता-स्थिष्ठन्ति । न तस्यां दशायां नारकादिभरीरोपभोगमवा वासना अभिष्यक्षिमायान्ति ॥ ८ ॥

आसामेव वासनागां कार्यकारणभावानुपपत्तिमात्रक्षम्य समर्थ-यितुमाह ।

जाति-देश-काल-व्यवहितानामप्यानन्तर्यां स्मृति-संस्कारयोरेकरूपत्वात् ॥ ९ ॥

इह मानायोगिषु भ्रमतां संसारिणां कात्तिष्ठोगिमनुभूय यदा योन्यन्तरसहस्रव्यवधानेन पुनर्स्तामेव योनिं प्रतिपद्धत्वे, तदा तस्यां पूर्वानुभूतायां योनौ तथाविधिभरीरादिव्यच्छकापेक्षया वासना याः प्रकटीभूता आसंस्तथाविधिव्यच्छकाभावान्तिरोभूताः पुनर्स्तथाविधिव्यच्छकभरीरादिलाभे प्रकटीभवन्ति । ‘जाति-देश-कालव्यवधानेऽपि तासां स्त्रानुरूपस्त्रयादिफलसाधने ‘आनन्तर्यां’ नैरन्तर्यमेव । कुतः ।

\* देवमनुष्यतिर्यगादिभेदभिति इ पुराणपाठः ।

† अथक्षमात्रात्तिर्यग्भूतिं इ पुराणपाठः ।

‘स्मृतिसंख्यारथोरेकरूपत्वात् । तथा हि अनुष्ठीयमानात् कर्वण्डित्त-  
सन्मे वासनारूपः संख्यारः समुत्पद्यते, य च सर्गनरकादीनां फलाना-  
स्त्वाकुरीभावः, कर्षणां वा यागादीनां अक्रिरूपत्वावस्थानं, कर्मुर्वा  
तथाविधमोग्यभोक्तृवृपं सामर्थ्यं, संख्यारात् सूतिः, सूतेष्य सुख-  
दुःखोपभोगः, तदनुभवाच्च पुनरपि संख्यारस्त्वादयः । एवस्य यस्य  
स्मृतिसंख्यारादयो भिन्नाख्यस्थानन्तर्याभावे दुर्लभः कार्यकारण-  
भावः । अस्माकमनु यदानुभव एव संख्यारीभवनि, संख्यारस्य सूति-  
रूपतया परिष्कृते, तदा एकत्रैव चित्तस्थानुसन्धानत्वेन स्थित्यात्  
कार्यकारणभावो न दुर्घटः ॥ ८ ॥

भवत्वानन्तर्यां कार्यकारणभावस्य वासनानां । यदा हु प्रथम-  
मेवानुभवः प्रवर्त्तते तदा किं वासनानिमित्त उत निर्विमित्त इति  
अद्वां व्यपनेतुमाइ ।

### तासामनादित्वमाशिषो नित्यत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

‘तासां’ वासनानां । ‘आदित्व’ न विद्यते आदित्यस्य तस्य  
भावस्त्वं । आसामादिनांस्तीत्यर्थः । कुतः\* ‘आशिषो नित्यत्वात्’ ।  
येवलाङ्गीर्षहास्योऽह्मा रैव सुखसाधनानि से भूयासुः मा कदा-  
चन तैर्मम विद्योगो भूयादिति यः सङ्कल्पविशेषो वासनानां कारणं  
तस्य नित्यत्वादनादिलादित्यर्थः । एतदुक्तं भवति कारणस्य सन्निहित-  
त्वादनुभवसंख्यारादीनां कार्याणां प्रवृत्तिः केन वार्यते, अनुभव-

\* तुल्य इत्यत आहेति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

संख्काराद्यनुविद्धुं संक्षोप्त-विकाशधर्मि चित्तं तप्तदभियज्ञकविपाक-  
साभात् तत्पत्तारूपतया परिणमत् इत्यर्थः ॥ १० ॥

आसामानन्धात् इति कथं सम्भवतीत्याद्यज्ञ इत्योपायमाह ।

**हेतु-फलाश्रयासम्बन्नैः संगृहीतत्वादेषामभावे  
तदभावः ॥ ११ ॥**

वासनानामनुभवो हेतुः, तस्यानुभवस्य रागादयः, तेषामविद्या  
इति साक्षात् पारम्यर्थेण च ‘हेतुः’ । ‘फल’ अरीरादि सृत्यादि च ।  
‘आश्रयः’ बुद्धितत्त्वं । ‘आश्रयम्’ यदेवानुभवस्य तदेव वासनानां ।  
अतसे ‘हेतु-फलाश्रयासम्बन्नैः’, अनन्मानामपि वासनानां ‘संगृहीत-  
तात्’, तेषां हेत्वादीनां ‘अभावे’ इति योगाभ्यां दग्धवीजकल्पयते  
विहिते, निर्मूलत्वात् न वासनाः प्ररोक्षनि\* न कार्यमारभन्त इति  
तासां ‘अभावः’ ॥ ११ ॥

ननु प्रतिक्षणं चित्तस्य नश्वरत्वोपस्थित्वेर्वासनानां तत्पत्तानाम्  
कार्यकारणभावेनायुगपञ्चावित्वात् भेदे कथमेकत्वमित्याद्यज्ञ एकल-  
समर्थनायाह ।

**अतीतानागतं स्वरूपतोऽस्याद्यभेदाद्यर्थाणां ॥ १२ ॥**

इह अत्यन्तमसतां भावानामुत्पत्तिर्ग युक्तिमती तेषां सत्त्वसम्ब-  
न्धायोगात् । नहि अश्विग्नानादीनां क्वचिदपि सत्त्वसम्बन्धो दृष्टः ।  
निरूपाख्ये च कार्ये किमुहिम्स कारणानि प्रवर्त्तेन्द्रन् । नद्यसम्बन्धं विष-

\* प्ररोक्षमुपयात्तीति B, F पुरुषकदयपाठः ।

थमालोच्य कस्ति॒ प्रवर्तते । सतामपि विरोधान्नाभावसम्बोऽस्ति॑ ।  
 यत् स्वरूपेण सञ्चयताकं तत् कथं गिरुपाख्यातामभावस्वरूपतांश्च  
 भजते, न विरह्म रूपं स्वीकरोतीत्यर्थः । तस्मात् सतां नाशासम्भवात्  
 असतांश्चात्पत्त्वभावात् तैस्तेर्धर्वैर्विपरिणममानो धर्मी सदैकरूप एवा-  
 वतिष्ठते । धर्मास्तु ते अध्वक्लेन व्यवस्थिताः\* । स्वस्मिन् स्वस्मिन्नध्वनि॑  
 व्यवस्थिताः स्वरूपं त्यजन्ति,† वर्तमानेऽध्वनि॑ व्यवस्थिताः केवलं  
 भोग्यतां भजन्ते । तस्माद्दुर्धारणानेव अतीतानागताद्यध्वभेदस्तेनैव च  
 रूपेण कार्यकारणभावोऽस्मिन् दर्शने प्रतिपद्यते, तस्मादपर्वगपर्यन्त-  
 नेकमेव चिन्तं धर्मितयानुवर्तमानं न निङ्गोतुं पार्यते ॥ १३ ॥

त एते धर्म-धर्मिणः किंरूपा इत्याह ।

ते व्यक्त-स्वस्था गुणात्मानः ॥ १३ ॥

य एते धर्म-धर्मिणः प्रोक्ताः 'ते', 'व्यक्त-स्वस्थाभेदेन व्यवस्थिताः ।  
 'गुणाः' सत्त्वरजस्त्वमोरूपाः । तदात्मानस्तत्स्वभावासत्परिणामरूपा  
 इत्यर्थः । यतः सत्त्वरजस्त्वमोभिः सुखदुःखमोरूपैः सर्वासां वास्त्वा-  
 भ्यनारभिज्ञानां भावव्यक्तीनामन्वयाऽनुगमो दृश्यते, यत्त यदन्वयि॑  
 तत् तत्परिणामरूपं दृष्टं । यथा घटादयो मृदश्चिता मृत्परिणा-  
 मरूपाः ॥ १३ ॥

यद्येते चयो गुणाः सर्वच मूलकारणं, कथमेको धर्मीति अपदेशः  
 इत्याग्रस्थाह ।

\* अध्वक्लेन चैकालिकत्वेन व्यवस्थिता इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

† न स्वरूपं त्यजन्तीति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

## परिणामैकत्वादस्तुतस्यं ॥ १४ ॥

यदेते चयो गुणास्तथापि तेषामङ्गाङ्गिभावगमनस्त्रिणो यः  
‘परिणामः’ कण्ठित् सत्त्वमङ्गि कण्ठिद्रिजः कण्ठिच तम इत्येवंरूपः,  
तस्य ‘एकत्रात्’, ‘वस्तुनः’, ‘तत्त्वं’ एकत्रसुच्यते । यदेयं वृथिवी अयं  
वायुरित्यादि ॥ १४ ॥

ननु विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्ते सत्यर्थे वस्त्रेकमनेकं वा वर्णं युज्यते यदा  
विज्ञानमेव वासनावश्चात् कार्यकारणभावेनावस्थितं तथा तथा प्रति-  
भाति, तदा कथमेतच्छक्यते वक्तुमित्याभ्यङ्गाह ।

## वस्तुसाम्ये चित्तभेदात्तयोर्विविक्तः पन्थाः ॥ १५ ॥

‘तयोः’ शाब्द-ज्ञेययोः, ‘विविक्तः पन्थाः’ विविक्तो नार्गभेद इति  
यावत् । कथं? ‘वस्तुसाम्ये चित्तभेदात्’, समाने वस्तुनि रूपादावुपल-  
भ्यमाने नानाप्रभावाद्दण्णं चित्तभेदः सुख-दुःख-मोहरूपतया वसुप-  
लभ्यते । तथाहि एकस्यां रूपलावश्चवय्यां योषिति उपलभ्यमानार्थां  
सरागस्य सुखसुतपयते, सप्तम्यास्तु देषः, परिग्राजकादेवं विद्येयकस्मिन्  
वस्तुनि नानाविधिचित्तमोदयात् कथस्मिन् कार्यत्वं वस्तुनः । एकचित्त-  
कार्यत्वे वस्तु एकरूपतयैवावभासेत । किञ्च चित्तकार्यत्वे वस्तुनः  
यस्य चित्तस्य यद् वस्तु कार्यं, तस्मिन् अर्थात्तरव्याप्तिं चित्ते तदस्तु  
न किञ्चित् स्थात् । भवलिति चेत् । तदेव कथमन्वैर्जडभिरूपलभ्यते ।  
उपलभ्यते च तस्मान्न चित्तकार्यं । अथ युगपद्भिः सेवार्थः किञ्चिते  
तदा बङ्गनिर्मितस्य तस्य\* एकनिर्मितादैख्यस्यां स्थात् । यदि

\* कार्यस्येति ० पुस्तकपाठः ।

वैसस्त्वां भेद्यते तदा कारणभेदे सति कार्यभेदस्थाभावे निर्देतुक-  
सेकरूपं वा अगत् स्थात् । एतदुकं भवति सत्यपि भिन्ने कारणे  
यदि कार्यस्थाभेदः तदा समयं जगद्वानाविधकारणजन्यसेकरूपं  
स्थात्, कारणभेदाननुगमात् स्थातव्येण निर्देतुकं वा स्थात् ।  
यदेवं कथं तेज चिगुणात्मनार्थेनैकस्यैव प्रमातुः सुख-दुःख-मोहम-  
यानि ज्ञानानि जन्यन्ते । मैव । यथा अर्थस्त्रिगुणस्थाया चिन्मपि  
चिगुणं, तस्य च अर्थप्रतिभासेन्यसौ धर्मादयः\* सहकारिकारणं ।  
तदुद्भवाभिभववज्ञाविज्ञतस्य तेज तेज रूपेणाभिव्यक्तिः । तथा च  
कामुकस्य चन्द्रिकाद्यां योषिति धर्मसहजतं चिन्म सत्त्वस्थाज्ञितया  
परिणममाणं सुखमयं भवति । तदेवाधर्मसहकारि रजांसेऽज्ञितया  
दुःखरूपं सप्ततीमाचस्य भवति । तीव्राधर्मसहकारितया तमसो-  
ऽज्ञित्वेन कोपनायाः सप्तत्वा मोहमयं भवति । तस्मादिज्ञानव्यति-  
रिक्तोऽस्मि याद्योऽर्थः† । तदेवं विज्ञानार्थयोः‡ तादाव्यविरोधान्न  
कार्यकारणभावः । कारणाभेदे सत्यपि कार्यभेदे अतिप्रसङ्गादिति  
ज्ञानाद्व्यतिरिक्तमर्थस्य व्यवस्थापितं ॥ १५ ॥

यदेकं ज्ञानं प्रकाशकलात् यद्युत्तमभावमर्थस्य प्रकाशलाद्यगाद्य-  
स्तभावः तत् कथं युगपत् सर्वानन्दीच्च व्यक्ताति न सरति येवाशक्त्वा  
परिहारं कर्मसाह ।

\* धर्माधर्मोदय इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

† वाद्यार्थ इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ विज्ञानवस्तुनोरिति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

तदुपरागापेश्चित्वाचित्तस्य वस्तु ज्ञाताज्ञातं ॥ १६ ॥

‘तस्मि’ अर्थस्य, ‘उपरागादाकारसमर्पणात्, चित्ते वाचां ‘वस्तु’, ‘ज्ञातमज्ञातस्तु भवति । अयमर्थः, सर्वः पदार्थः स्वात्मस्वाभे साम-  
ग्रीमपेचते, नीतादिज्ञानस्त्रोपजायमानं इन्द्रियप्रणालिकाया समागत-  
मर्यापरागं सहकारिकारणत्वेनापेचते व्यतिरिक्तस्वार्थस्य समन्वयाभा-  
वादृपद्धीतुमज्जक्षयलात् । ततस्य येनैवार्थेन तस्य ज्ञानस्य स्वरूपेष-  
रागः छतः तमेवार्थं तज्ज्ञानं व्यवहारयोग्यतां नयति । ततस्य  
स्वार्थी ज्ञात इत्युच्यते । येन चाकारो न समर्पितः सेऽज्ञातत्वेन  
व्यवहृत्यते । यस्मिंस्यानुभूतेऽर्थे सादृश्यादिर्थः संखारसुद्भेदधयन्  
सहकारिकारणतां प्रतिपद्यते तस्मिन्नेत्रार्थे स्वतिरूपजायते इति  
सर्वज्ञं न ज्ञानं, नापि सर्वज्ञं स्वतिरिति न कश्चिद्दिरोधः\* ॥ १६ ॥

यद्येवं प्रमातापि पुरुषो यस्मिन् काले नीलं संवेदयते न  
तस्मिन् काले पीतं अतस्मिन्नवचस्यापि कदाचिद्दृपद्धत्वादा-  
कारयण्णे परिणामिलं प्राप्तमित्याग्नज्ञं परिहर्तुमाह ।

सदा ज्ञाताच्चित्तवृत्तयस्तत्प्रभोः पुरुषस्यापरिणा-  
मात्† ॥ १७ ॥

या एताः ‘चित्तस्य’, प्रमाण-विपर्ययादिरूपाः ‘वृत्तयः’, ताः  
‘तत्प्रभोः’ तस्य चित्तस्य ग्रहीतुः, ‘पुरुषस्य’, ‘सदा’ सर्वकालमेव,  
‘ज्ञायाः, तस्य चिद्रूपतया ‘अपरिणामात्’ परिणामिलाभावादित्यर्थः ।

\* क्वचिद्दिरोध इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

† पुरुषस्यापरिणामिलादिति काश्चिमुद्दितभाष्यपुस्तकपाठः ।

यद्यस्तौ परिणामी खातदा परिणामस्य कादाचित्कलाज्ञासां चित्त-  
वृत्तीनां सदा ज्ञातत्वं नोपपद्यते । अयमर्थः, पुरुषस्य चिद्रुपस्य सदै-  
वाधिडाह्यत्वेन अवस्थितस्य अद्वत्तरणं निर्वालं सत्त्वं तत्त्वापि सदैवाव-  
स्थितत्वात् तद्येन येनार्थेनोपरकं भवति तथाविधस्यार्थस्य सदैव  
चिक्षायासंकानिसङ्गावः, तस्यां सद्यां चिद्रुपं सदा ज्ञात्वलमिति न  
कदाचित्परिणामित्वाशङ्का ॥ १७ ॥

ननु चित्तमेव सत्त्वोत्कर्षाद्यदि प्रकाशकं तदा खपरप्रकाशरूप-  
त्वात् आद्वानमर्थस्त्र प्रकाशयतीति तावतैव अवहारसमाप्तिः किं  
यहीचन्नरेण इत्याशङ्कामपनेतुमाह ।

न तत् खाभासं हृश्यत्वात् ॥ १८ ॥

‘तत्’ चित्तं, ‘खाभासं’ खप्रकाशं, न भवति, पुरुषवेद्यं भवतीति  
आवत् । कुतः ‘हृश्यत्वात्’, यत् किल दृश्यं तद्वृद्यवेद्यं, यथा घटादि ।  
हृश्यर्द्वा चित्तं तस्मान्न खाभासं ॥ १८ ॥

ननु चाध्याविश्विष्टोऽयं इतुः दृश्यत्वमेव चित्तस्याचिद्रुपं, किञ्च  
खपुद्धिसंबेदनदारेण पुरुषाणां हिताहितप्राप्निपरिहाररूपा वृत्तयो  
हृश्यन्ते, तथाहि कुद्धोऽहं भीतोऽहं न मे राग इत्येवमाद्या संविदुद्दे-  
रसंबेदनान्वेष्योपपन्नेयाशङ्कां निरसितुमाह ।

एकसमये चोभयानवधारणं ॥ १९ ॥

अर्थस्य संविच्छिन्निरिदन्तया अवहारयोग्यतापादनं अयमर्थः सुख-

\* खपरप्रकाशकात्वादिति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

† वेद्यस्त्रेति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

देहुरुःखेतुर्वेति । दुर्देह च वित् अहमिद्येवमाकारेण सुखदुःख-  
रूपतया व्यवहारक्षमतापादनं । एवंविधस्य व्यापारद्वयमर्थप्रत्यक्षात्ते-  
न युमपत्कर्त्तुः द्वयं विरोधात् । न हि विरद्धयोद्यांपरव्योर्युमपत्कर्त्त-  
वेऽस्मि । अतः ‘एकस्मिन् वाले, ‘सुभवस्तु’ सरूपस्थार्थस्तु च,  
अवधारयितुमश्वलान् चित्तं स्वप्रकाशकमित्युक्तं भवति । किञ्चैव-  
विधव्यापारद्वयं निष्पाद्य फलदृश्यसारंवेदनादिर्मुखतयैवार्थनिष्ठन्ते च  
चित्तस्य स्वयमसंवेदनात्\* अर्थनिष्ठन्ते च फलं न स्वनिष्ठनिष्यन्तः ॥१८॥

ननु भाभद्रुद्धेः स्वयं यहस्य बुद्ध्यारेण हु भविष्यति इत्या-  
प्तक्षात् ।

चित्तान्तरहस्ये बुद्धिकुद्धेरतिप्रसङ्गः स्मृतिसङ्करस्य ॥२०॥

चदि हि बुद्धिकुद्धन्तरेण संवेदते तदा साधि बुद्धिः स्वयमबुद्धा-  
बुद्ध्यन्तरं प्रकाशयितुमयमर्थेति तस्या याह्वां बुद्ध्यन्तरं कल्पनीयं  
तस्या अप्यन्वदित्यवगवस्थानात् पुरुषायुषेणार्थर्थप्रतीतिने स्थान् ।  
नहि प्रतीतावप्रतीतायामर्थः प्रतीतो भवति । स्वतिक्षङ्करस्य प्राप्नोति ।  
रूपे रथे वा समुत्पन्नाद्यां बुद्धौ तद्याहिकाणामनन्तानां बुद्धीना-  
सुत्पत्तेवृद्धिजनितैः संखारैर्वदा वाङ्मासतयः क्रियन्ते, तदार्थबुद्धे-  
रपर्यवसनाद् बुद्धिसृष्टीनां चुगपदुत्पत्तेः कस्मिन्नर्थे स्वनिरिद्यमु-  
त्पन्नेति ज्ञातुमश्वलान् ‘स्वतिक्षङ्करः’,† स्वादित्य रूपस्वतिरित्यं  
रवस्तिरिति न ज्ञायेत ॥ २० ॥

\* स्वरूपसंवेदनाभावादिति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

† स्वतीनां सङ्कर इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

ननु बुद्धेः स्वप्रकाश्वाभावे बुद्ध्यन्तरेण चासंवेदने कथमवं  
विषयसंवेदनरूपो व्यवहार इत्याद्य स्वविद्वान्नामाह ।

चितेरप्रतिसङ्कुमायास्तदाकारापत्तौ स्वबुद्धिसंवेदनं  
॥२१॥

पुरुषशिद्धूपलात् 'चितिः', सा 'अप्रतिसङ्कुमा', न विषयते प्रतिसङ्कु-  
लोऽन्यच गमनं यस्याः सा तथोक्ता अन्येनासङ्कीर्णेति यावत् । यथा गुणा  
अङ्गाङ्गिभावलक्षणे\* परिणामे अङ्गिनं गुणिनमुपसंकामन्ति तद्वृपता-  
मिवापयन्ते, यथा वा सोके परमाणवः प्रसरन्तो विषयमारोपयन्ति  
मैवं चितिशक्तिः, तस्याः सर्वदैकर्ष्ण्यतया स्वप्रतिष्ठितमेन व्यवस्थितलात् ।  
अतस्यान्विधाने यदा बुद्धिस्तदाकारतामापयते चेतनेवोपजायते,  
बुद्धिष्ठितिप्रतिसङ्कुमा च यदा चिक्षक्तिः बुद्धिष्ठितवच्छिक्षतया  
संबोधते तदा बुद्धेः स्वस्यात्मने वेदनं सम्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ २१ ॥

इत्यं सर्वांविदितं चित्तं सर्वार्थपरहणसामर्थ्यं सकलव्यवहारसमं  
भवतीत्याह ।

द्रष्ट-हृश्योपरक्तं चित्तं सर्वार्थं ॥ २२ ॥

'द्रष्टा' पुरुषः, तेज 'हृश्योपरक्तं' तत्सन्निधाने तद्वृपतामिवापन्नं,†  
'हृश्योपरक्तं' गृहीतविषयाकारपरिणामं, यदा भवति तदा तदेव  
सर्वार्थपरहणसमर्थं जायते । यथा निर्मलस्फटिकदर्पणाद्येव प्रतिविम्ब-  
यहणसमर्थं एवं रजस्तमोभ्यामनभिभृतं सत्त्वं इद्युल्लाचिक्षाया-

\* अङ्गाङ्गिभावगमनक्षणे इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

† बुद्धिष्ठितिविद्विषया इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ तद्वृपतामिव प्राप्तमिति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

यहणसमर्थं भवति, न पुगरश्चद्वाद्रजसामसी । तत् व्यग्भूत-  
रजसामोरूपमङ्गितया सत्त्वं निष्पत्तप्रदीपत्रिकाकारं सदैवैकरूपतया  
परिणममाणं चिक्षायाग्यहणसामर्थादामोक्षप्राप्तेवतिष्ठते । यथा  
अथल्कानामनिधाने सौहस्रं चतुर्वर्षाविर्भवति, एवं चिद्रूपयनिधाने  
सत्त्वसामिव्यज्ञमभिव्यज्ञते चैतन्यं । अत एवास्मिन् दर्शने हे चिक्षकी  
नियोदिताऽभिव्यज्ञा ॥ । नियोदिता चिक्षकिः पुरुषः । तत्सन्धि-  
धानादभिव्यज्ञैतन्यं सत्त्वमभिव्यज्ञा चिक्षकिः । तदत्यन्तं सन्धिहित-  
त्वादन्तरङ्गं पुरुषस्य भोग्यतां प्रतिपद्यते । तदेव ज्ञानवृद्धावादिभिः  
साक्षैः पुरुषस्य परमात्मनोऽधिष्ठेयं कर्मानुरूपसुखदुःखभोक्तृतया व्यप-  
दिश्यते । यत्तथनानुद्रिक्तादेकस्यापि गुणस्य, कदाचित्कस्यचिदङ्गि-  
त्वान्निगुणं प्रतिलक्षणं परिणममाणं सुख-दुःख-नोहात्मकं न निर्णयते,  
तत्सन्धिन् कर्मात्मरूपे श्चद्वे सत्त्वे स्वाकारसमर्पणदारेण संवेद्यता-  
मापादथति । तत्कुद्धुमाणं चित्तसत्त्वमेकतः प्रतिसंकान्तचिक्षायमन्यतो  
व्यहीनविषयाकारेण चित्तेनोपठौकितस्वाकारं चित्तंकान्तिवस्ताचेत-  
नायमाणं वास्तवचैतन्याभावेऽपि सुख-दुःखरूपभोगमनुभवति । स एव  
भोगोऽत्यन्तसाम्निषेन विवेकाग्यहणाङ्गोक्तुरपि पुरुषस्य भोग इति व्यप-  
दिश्यते । अनेनाभिप्रायेण विन्द्यवासिनोक्तः । “सत्त्वतयत्वमेव पुरुष-  
तयत्वं” इति । अन्यत्रापि “विन्दे प्रतिविम्बमानच्छायासदृशच्छायाम-  
रोङ्गः प्रतिविम्बव्येनोच्यते । एवं सत्त्वेषि पौरुषेयचिक्षायासदृश-  
चिक्षायान्तराभिव्यक्तिः प्रतिबद्धान्तिबद्धार्थः”\* । ननु प्रतिविम्बं

\* प्रतिविम्बशब्दार्थं इति C पुस्तकपाठः । चिक्षायाशब्दार्थं इति B  
पुस्तकपाठः ।

नामानिर्वेक्षस्य विद्यतपरिणामस्य\* निर्वेक्षे हृष्टं, यथा सुखस्य दर्पणे ।  
आद्यतानिर्वाक्षस्य व्यापकस्य अपरिष्ठामिनः पुरुषस्य तस्मादनिर्वेक्षे सन्ते  
कथं प्रतिविम्बनमुपपश्यते । उच्यते । प्रतिविम्बनस्य खल्पमनवम-  
चक्षता भवते हमभ्यधायि । यैव सत्त्वगतायथा चनिष्ठावाचिक्षके:  
पुरुषस्य व्याख्यादभिष्ठृते । यैव प्रतिविम्बनमुपश्यते । याहृश्च पुरु-  
षगता किञ्चकिसाक्षयः चन्त्रावाचिर्भवति । चद्युक्तमन्वयनिर्वेक्षः  
पुरुषः कथमनिर्वेक्षे सन्ते प्रतिसंक्रामतीति तदप्यनैकान्तिकं । नैर्वेक्षा-  
दप्रकृष्टेऽपि जालादैरां आदित्याद्वः प्रतिसंक्रामताः समुपलाभन्ते ।  
व्यद्युक्तमपरिष्ठिष्ठस्य नास्ति प्रतिसंक्रामितिं तदप्यदुर्लः । व्याप-  
क्षस्याकाङ्क्षस्य दर्पणादौ प्रतिसंक्रामितदर्शनात् । एवं बति न काचि-  
इनुपपत्तिः प्रतिविम्बदर्शनस्य ॥

अनु व्याख्यिकपरिणामस्ये बुद्धिसन्ते पुरुषस्यानादभिष्ठावाचिक्ष-  
क्षकेर्वाच्चाकारक्षकान्तौ पुरुषस्य सुखदुःखरूपो भोग इत्युक्तं  
तदनुपपश्यते, तदेव चित्तसन्ते प्रकृतावपरिणतायां कथं सम्भवति,  
किमर्थस्य तस्याः परिणामः । तचोच्यते† । पुरुषस्यार्थेऽपभोगसम्भादनं  
तथा कर्त्तव्यमतः पुरुषार्थकर्त्तव्यतथा तस्या वुक्त एव परिणामः ॥

अन्यनुपपश्यते पुरुषार्थकर्त्तव्यतथा एवानुपपत्तिः । पुरुषार्थे मया  
कर्त्तव्य इत्येत्वंविधोऽभ्यवसायः पुरुषार्थकर्त्तव्यतोच्यते, जडायास्य  
प्रकृतेः कथमेवंविधोऽभ्यवसायः । अस्ति चेद्भ्यवसायः, कथं जडत्वं ।

\* नियतपरिमाणलेति ० पुरुषपाठः ।

† तस्मादाशविति ० पुरुषपाठः ।

‡ अद्योच्यत इति ० पुरुषपाठः ।

अचोप्तते । अगुलोमप्रतिसोमसत्त्वे परिणामदद्ये सहजं ब्रह्मिद्यमस्ति, तदेव पुरुषार्थकर्त्तव्यतोच्यते । सा च ब्रह्मिरसेतनायाः प्रकृतेः सहजा एव । तत्र यहादिमहाभूतपर्यन्तोऽस्ता वहिर्मुखतयागुलोमः परिणामः । पुनः स्वकारणागुप्रवेशदारेणास्त्रितामः प्रतिसोमः परिणामः । इत्यं पुरुषस्य भोगपरिणामात्मैः सहजब्रह्मिद्यव्यात् छतार्था प्रकृतिर्न पुनः परिणाममारभते । एवं विधायाच्च पुरुषार्थकर्त्तव्यतायां अष्टाया अपि प्रकृतेर्गं काचिदनुपपत्तिः ॥

अनु यदीदृशी ब्रह्मः सहजैव प्रधानस्त्वास्ति तत् किमर्थं मोक्षा-र्थिभिः\* मोक्षाय यत्तः क्रियते, मोक्षस्य चानर्थनीयत्वे तदुपदेशकस्य आत्मस्वानर्थक्षं । उच्यते । योऽत्यं प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरनादिर्भाग्य-भोक्तृभावसत्त्वणः समन्व्यः, तस्मिन् सति व्यक्तेतनायाः प्रकृतेः कर्त्तव्याभिमानात् दुःखानुभवे सति कथमिथं दुःखगिरुत्तिरात्य-निकी मम स्वादिति भवत्येवार्थवसावः । अतो दुःखगिरुत्त्युपाथोपदेशकात्मोपदेशापेक्षास्यैव प्रधानस्य । तथाभूतमेव कर्मानुरूपं बुद्धिसत्त्वं आत्मोपदेशस्य विषयः । दर्शनान्तरेक्षयेवंविध एवाविद्य-स्वभावः आत्मेऽधिक्रियते । स च मोक्षाय प्रथमान् एवंविधमेव आत्मोपदेशं सहकारिणमपेक्ष्य मोक्षात्मं फलमासादयति । सर्वाणेव कार्याणि प्राप्नायां सामग्र्यां† आत्मानं सम्भवते, अत्यु च प्रतिसोम-परिणामदारेष्वौत्पाद्यस्य मोक्षास्यस्य कार्यं तु ईदृशेत्रं सामग्री प्रमाणेन निश्चिता, प्रकारान्तरेणानुपपत्तेः । अतस्मां विना कथं

\* तदर्थिभिरिति <sup>१</sup> पुरुषकपाठः ।

† कर्माकर्मरूपं बुद्धिसत्त्वमिति <sup>०</sup> पुरुषकपाठः ।

‡ समग्रायां सामग्रगमिति <sup>१</sup> पुरुषकपाठः ।

भवितुमईति । अतः स्थितमेतत् । संक्रान्तविषयोपरागमभिव्यक्ति-  
चिक्षायं बुद्धिसत्त्वं विषयनिश्चयदारेण समयां लोकयाचां निर्वा-  
हयतीत्येवंविधमेव चित्तं पश्चात्तो भावाः स्वसंवेदनं चित्तं, चित्त-  
माचक्ष जगदित्येवं ब्रुवाणाः प्रतिबोधिता भवन्ति ॥२३॥

ननु यद्येवंविधादेव चित्तात् सकलस्थवहारनिर्वित्तिः\* कथं  
प्रमाणशृङ्खन्यो इष्टा अभ्युपपद्यते॑ इत्याभ्यङ्क इष्टुः† प्रमाणमाह ।

तदस्त्वायवासनाभिच्छिष्मपिः परार्थं संहत्यकारि-  
त्वात् ॥ २३ ॥

‘तत्’ एतचित्तं, ‘सङ्क्षातुमभ्यक्षाभिः’, ‘वासनाभिः’, ‘चित्तमपि’  
गानारूपमपि, ‘परार्थं’ परस्य खामिनो भोक्तुर्भेदगापवर्गलक्षणमर्थं  
साधयतीति । कुतः, ‘संहत्यकारित्वात्’ संहत्य सम्मूल्य मिलिला अर्थ-  
क्रियाकारित्वात् । यत्त संहत्यार्थक्रियाकारि तत्परार्थं दृष्टं, यथा  
प्रयगावादि । सत्त्व-रजसामांसि च चित्तक्षणपरिणामभास्ति संह-  
त्यकारीणि, अतः परार्थानि । यस्य परः स पुरुषः ॥

ननु च यादृग्नेनप्रयगावासनादिना परेण प्ररीकृता परार्थवसुपलव्यं,॥  
तद्विषयान्वयेन तादृग्न एव परः सिध्यति, यादृग्नस्य भवतां परोऽसंहत-  
रूपोऽभिप्रेतसङ्क्षिपरीतस्य सिद्धेरवसिष्टविधातलद्वेतुः॥ । उच्यते ।

\* सकलस्थवहारनिर्वित्तिरिति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

† अभ्युपगम्येत इति C. अभ्युपगम्य इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ इष्टरीति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ चित्तमपीति C पुस्तकपाठः । परमव्ययं न समीक्षीयः ।

॥ पारार्थसुपर्यव्यमिति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

¶ अथमिद्विषयातको हेतुरिति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

यद्यपि यामार्द्देन परार्द्दमाचे आप्निर्द्दीता तथापि यत्तदि-  
विसर्वधर्मिपर्यालोकनका तदिलक्ष्य एव भोक्ता परः सिद्धति ।  
यज्ञा येवताहृते शिखरिषि विसर्वशास्त्रमाद्विरनुभीष्यमान इतर-  
विद्विसर्वस्येवमप्रभव एव प्रतीष्यते, एवमिहापि विसर्वश्य  
यत्तद्वाक्यम् नोऽप्यते परार्द्दवेऽनुभीष्यमाने तथाविध एव भोक्ताऽधि-  
द्दाता परमित्यात्महेऽसंज्ञः सिद्धति । एवि वा तत्त्वं परत्वं  
सर्वोत्तमस्यमेव प्रतीष्यते, तथापि तामरेभ्यो विषवेद्यं प्रकाश्यते द्वारीं  
प्रकाश्वपेत्रियाभ्यात् । तस्मादपि प्रकाश्यन्ते इत्यिष्यापि । तदेव-  
अपि प्रकाश्यं सत्त्वं प्रकाश्वप्य । तथापि यः प्रकाशकः प्रकाशविद्य-  
क्षमः स चिद्रूप एव भवतीति कूलस्याद्य संहतत्वं ॥ २३ ॥

इदानीं आत्मप्रकाशं कैवल्यं निर्णेतुं दद्विः स्मैषैषपक्षमन्ते ।

**विशेषदर्शिन आत्मभावभावनानिवृत्तिः ॥ २४ ॥**

एवं सत्त्वपुद्वयोरन्यते साधिते\* यस्यार्द्विवेषं पश्यति अथमस्मा-  
दन्य इत्येवंहृष्टं,† तत्त्वं विज्ञातचित्तसत्त्वस्त्रपद्य चित्ते या ‘आत्म-  
भावभावना’, सा निवर्तते । चित्तमेव कर्तृं ज्ञात्वा भोक्तृं इत्यमिमानो  
निवर्तते ॥ २४ ॥

तस्मिन् सति किं भवतीत्याह ।

**तदा विवेकनिष्ठं कौवल्यप्राप्न्मार्तः चित्तं ॥ २५ ॥**

\* प्रतिपादिते इति C पुष्टकपाठः ।

† अहमस्मादन्य इत्येवंहृष्टमिति C पुष्टकपाठः ।

‡ वैवस्यप्रभवमिति F पुष्टकपाठः ।

यदशाश्वाननिष्ठं वहिर्मुखं विषयोपभौगफलं चित्तमासीन्तदि-  
दानों 'विवेकनिष्ठं'\* विवेकमार्गमन्मर्मुखं, 'कैवल्यप्राग्भारं' कैवल्य-  
फलं, कैवल्यप्रारम्भं वा सम्यग्यत इति ॥ २४ ॥

अस्मिंसां विवेकवाहिनि चित्ते येऽन्नरायाः प्रादुर्भवन्ति तेषां  
हेतुप्रतिपादनदारेण स्थागोपायमाह ।

**तच्छिद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्तराणि संस्कारेभ्यः ॥ २५ ॥**

तस्मिन् समाधौ स्थितस्य, 'छिद्रेषु' अन्तरालेषु, यानि 'प्रत्ययान्त-  
राणि' युत्यानरूपाणि ज्ञानानि, तानि प्राग्भवेभ्यः† युत्यानानुभ-  
वजेभ्यः 'संस्कारेभ्यः', अहं ममेत्येवंरूपाणि ज्ञीयमाणेभ्योऽपि प्रभवन्ति ।  
अन्तःकरणोच्छिन्निदारेण तेषां इति कर्तव्यमित्युक्तं भवति ॥ २५ ॥

इत्यापायस्य पूर्वमेवोक्तं इत्याह ।

**हानमेषां स्तोशवदुत्तमे ॥ २६ ॥**

यथा 'ज्ञेयानामविद्यादीनां, हानं पूर्वमुक्तं, तथा संस्कारणा-  
मपि कर्तव्यं । यथा ते ज्ञानाग्निना शुष्टा दग्धवीजकस्या न पुन-  
विनाभ्यमौ ग्ररोहं समन्वे, तथा संस्कारा अपि ॥ २६ ॥

एवं प्रत्ययान्तरानुरूपे स्थिरीभूतेषु समाधौ यादृशस्य दोगिनः  
समाधेः प्रकर्षप्राप्निर्भवति, तथाविधमुपायमाह॥ ।

\* विवेकविवशमिति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

† तस्मिंस्येति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ प्राप्नोत्तमे इति M पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ स्थिरीकृत इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

॥ इतत्पाठः सर्वत्र वर्तते, परन्तु उपायमिति न समीक्षीयं यादृशस्य  
योगिन इति पाठेन सह विवक्षयात् ।

प्रसङ्गानेष्यकुसीदस्य सर्वथा विवेकस्यातेर्धर्ममेघः  
समाधिः ॥ २८ ॥

‘प्रसङ्गान’ आवतां तत्त्वानां यथाक्रमं व्यवस्थितानां परत्यरविल-  
क्षणस्त्रूपविभावनं, तस्मिन् सति ‘अपि’, ‘अकुसीदस्य’ फलमस्तिष्ठोः,  
प्रत्ययान्तराणामनुदद्ये ‘सर्वप्रकारविवेकस्यातेः’ परिशेषात् ‘धर्ममेघः  
समाधिः’ भवति, प्रकृष्टमस्तुक्षणाणं धर्मं परमपुरुषार्थसाधकं मेहति  
सिद्धतीति ‘धर्ममेघः’ । अनेन प्रकृष्टधर्मस्त्रैव ज्ञानहेतुलभित्युपपा-  
दितं भवति ॥ २८ ॥

तस्माद्धर्ममेघात् किं भवतीत्याह\* ।

ततः स्तोशकर्मनिवृत्तिः ॥ २९ ॥

‘ज्ञेनानामविद्यादीनामभिनिवेशान्तानां, ‘कर्मणात् इक्षादिभे-  
देन चिविधानां, ज्ञानोदयात् पूर्वपूर्वकारणनिवृत्या ‘निवृत्तिः’,  
भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ २९ ॥

निवृत्तेषु तेषु किं भवतीत्याह ।

तदा सर्वावरणमसापेतस्य ज्ञानस्यानन्त्याज्ञेय-  
मस्त्र्यं ॥ ३० ॥

आत्रियते चित्तमेभिरिति ‘आवरणानि’ ज्ञेनाः, त एव ‘मस्त्राः’,  
तेभ्यः ‘अपेतस्य’ तद्विरहितस्य, ‘ज्ञानस्य’ गतघगगगननिभस्य, ‘आन-

\* भवतीत्यत आहेति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

न्यात् अगवक्षेदात्, 'ज्ञेयं', 'अत्त्वं' गणनात्सदं भवति, अक्षेत्रेनैव  
सर्वं ज्ञेयं जानातीत्यर्थः ॥ ३० ॥

ततः किमित्याह ।

ततः छतार्थानां परिणामक्रमसमाप्तिर्गुणानां ॥ ३१ ॥

'क्षतः' निष्पादितः, भोगापवर्गलक्षणः पुरुषार्थः प्रयोजनं यैतते  
'छतार्थाः', 'गुणाः' सत्त्व-रजस्तमांसि, तेषां 'परिणामः' आ पुरुषार्थ-  
समाप्तेरानुखोम्येन प्रातिलोम्येन चाङ्गाङ्गिभावावस्थितिलक्षणः, तस्य  
योऽसौ 'क्रमः' वस्त्रमाणः, तस्य परिषमाप्तिः' निष्ठा, न पुनरङ्गव  
इत्यर्थः ॥ ३१ ॥

क्रमस्योक्तस्य लक्षणमाह ।

क्षणप्रतियोगी परिणामापरान्तनिर्गाह्यः क्रमः ॥ ३२ ॥

'क्षणः' अत्तीयान् कालः, तस्य योऽसौ 'प्रतियोगी' एकलक्षणवि-  
स्तज्ज्ञः । 'परिणामापरान्तनिर्गाह्यः' अनुभूतेषु चण्डेषु पश्चात् सद्वृत्त-  
मवृद्धा यो गृह्णते स ज्ञानानां 'क्रमः' उच्यते । न इन्द्रानुभूतेषु चण्डेषु  
क्रमः परिणातुं ब्रक्षयः ॥ ३२ ॥

इदानीं फलभूतस्य कैवल्यस्यासाधारणं स्वरूपमाह ।

पुरुषार्थश्वन्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः कैवल्यं स्वरूप-  
प्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिरिति ॥ ६६ ॥

समाप्तभोगापवर्गलक्षणपुरुषार्थानां 'गुणानां', यः 'प्रतिप्रसवः'

प्रतिलोमपरिषामसमाप्तौ विकारानुद्धवः, अदि वा चिक्षेष्टिनिष्ठा-  
रूप्यनिष्ठानौ खरूपमात्रेषावस्थानं तत् 'कैवल्यं' उच्यते ॥

न केवलमसाहर्षने क्षेच्छाः कैवल्यावस्थायामेवक्षूलचिद्रूपः, चाक्षर्षना-  
मरेष्वपि विष्वव्यवसाय एवंविधरूपोऽवतिष्ठते । तथाहि संसारहराया-  
मात्मा कर्त्तव्य-भोक्तृत्वानुसन्धानव्यवस्थमयः प्रतीयते । अन्यथा अद्युपमेकः  
क्षेच्छास्त्राविधो न स्वाप्तदा ज्ञानक्षणानामेव पूर्वापरानुसन्धानाभावे<sup>\*</sup>  
नियतकर्मफलसम्भवो न स्थान्, छतनाग्राहकताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गस्य । अदि  
येनैव ज्ञान्वोपदिष्टमनुष्ठितं कर्म तस्यैव भोक्तृत्वं भवेत् तदा इता-हित-  
प्राप्तिपरिष्ठारायां सर्वव्य प्रवृत्तिर्धट्टते । सर्वव्यैव व्यवहारस्य हानोपा-  
दानव्यवस्थानुसन्धानेनैव व्याप्तवात् ज्ञानक्षणानां परस्परमेदेनानु-  
सन्धानगृह्यत्वात् तदनुसन्धानाभावेऽ कस्त्रिदिव्यि व्यवहारस्यानुपपत्तेः  
कर्त्ता भोक्तानुसन्धानात् य आद्येति व्यवस्थायते । नोच्छहरायानु-  
सक्षयाद्य-प्राप्तक्षण्यव्यवहाराभावात् चेतन्यमात्रमेव तस्यावश्वित्वते ।  
तच्च चेतन्यं चितिमात्रत्वेनैवेऽपपत्तते न पुणरात्मसंवेदनेन, अस्मा-  
द्विषययहणसमर्थत्वमेव चितेरूपं, नात्मप्राप्तत्वं । तथाहि अर्थस्थित्या  
गृह्यमाणः अब्दिति गृह्णते । सरूपं गृह्णमाणमहिति । न पुच-  
र्युगपद्विसुखताभ्युखतासञ्जणव्यापारद्वयं परस्परं विद्धूं कर्त्तुं  
शक्यं । अत एकस्मिन् समये व्यापारद्वयस्य कर्त्तुमन्वयत्वात् चिद्रूप-  
तयैवावश्वित्वते । अतो मोक्षावस्थायां निष्ठाधिकारेषु गुणेषु

\* ज्ञानक्षणानामेव पूर्वापरानुसन्धानशून्यानं भावे इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

† हितहितप्राप्तपरिष्ठारायेति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ अनुसन्धानाभावे इति C पुस्तकपाठः । तदनुसन्धानभाव इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

चिन्मात्र एवात्मावतिष्ठत इत्येवं युक्तं । संसारदग्धायाम् एवं भूतस्य कर्त्तव्यं भोक्तृत्वमनुसन्धात्वस्य सर्वमुपपद्यते । तथाहि योऽयं प्रकृत्या सह-  
नादिनैसर्विकेऽस्य भोग्य-भोक्तृभावस्तुष्टः सम्बन्धः अविवेकस्त्वाति-  
मूलः, तस्मिन् सति पुरुषार्थकर्त्तव्यतात्पत्रकिदद्यसङ्गावे वा महाद-  
दिभावेग परिणतिस्तुत्वां संघोगे सति यदात्मगोऽधिष्ठात्रत्वं चिन्मात्रा-  
समर्पत्वामर्थं, बुद्धिस्तवस्य च सङ्गात्मविच्छावापहणसामर्थं, चिह-  
वष्टव्यात्मास्य बुद्धेयोऽयं कर्त्तव्य-भोक्तृत्वाध्यवसायसात् एव सर्वस्तानुस-  
न्धानपूर्वकस्य व्यवहारस्य निष्पत्तेः किमन्यैः फल्गुभिः कल्पनाजासैः ।

यदि पुनरेवम्भूतमार्गव्यतिरेकेष पारमार्थिकमात्रगः कर्त्तव्याद्भज्ञी-  
क्रियते, तदात्म परिणामिलप्रसङ्गः, परिणामिलात्मानित्यते तस्यात्मल-  
भेव न ज्ञात् । न श्वेकस्मिन्नेत्रं समये एकेनैव रूपेण परस्परविरहा-  
वस्तानुभवः सम्भवति । तथाहि यस्यामवस्थायां आत्मसमवेते समुत्पद्धे  
सुखे तस्यानुभवित्व्यं, न तस्यामेवावस्थायां दुःखानुभवित्व्यं । अतोऽव-  
स्थानानात्मानदभिन्नस्यावस्थावतोपि नामात्मं, नामात्मेन च परिणा-  
मिलात्मात्मं नापि नित्यत्वं । अत एव आनन्दाद्वादिभिः साक्षैरा-  
त्मगः सदैव संसारदग्धायां मोक्षदग्धायां श्वेकरूपलमङ्गीक्रियते ।

ये हु वेदान्तवादिनस्तिदानन्दमयत्वमात्रगो सेवां मन्यन्ते, तेषां  
न युक्तः पक्षः । तथाहि आनन्दस्य सुखस्तरूपत्वात् सुखस्य च संवेद्य-  
मानतयैव प्रतिभासात् संवेद्यमानत्वस्य संवेदेनव्यतिरेकेषानुपपत्तिमिति  
संवेद्य-संवेदनयोर्द्योरभ्युपगमात् अद्वैतवानिः । अथ सुखात्मकत्वमेव  
तस्योच्यते । तत् विरहदधर्माध्यात्मादग्नुपपत्तं । न हि संवेदनं संवेद्यस्त्रैकं  
भवितुमर्हति । किञ्चाद्वैतवादिभिः कर्मात्म-परमात्मभेदेनात्मा द्विविध

उच्यते\* । तथ येऽपि रूपेष सुख-दुःखभोक्तृवं कर्त्तात्मणः, तेऽपि रूपेष यदि परमात्मणः कात्तदा कर्त्तात्मकपरमात्मणः परिषामित्य-मविद्यात्मावस्था यात् । अथ न याज्ञाङ्गोकृत्यं, किञ्चु तदुपृष्ठौकि-तभुदायीक्षतायित्थात्मनेन सीकरोति, तदासहर्षणानुप्रवेशः । याज्ञ-स्थृपता च पूर्वेव निराकृता । किञ्चाविद्यात्मावस्थे निःखाभाव-  
- „पीतमां कः आत्माधिकारी । न तावच्छिर्गिर्वास्त्वात् चर-  
मात्मा, नायविद्यात्मावस्थात् कर्त्तात्मा । ततस्य यक्षमात्मायैवर्य-  
प्रसङ्गः । अविद्याभवते च अत्तोऽप्यीक्षितमात्मे कर्त्ताविद्येति विद्य-  
र्यते । न तावत्परमात्मणः नित्यगिर्वास्त्वात् विद्यास्थलाच ।  
कर्त्तात्मगोऽपि निःखावस्थाय अविद्यावप्यस्थवे कर्त्ताविद्यावस्थाच ।  
अस्योच्यते एतदेवाविद्याया अविद्यात्म अदविद्यात्मीयत्वं भाव । कैव-  
हि विद्यारेष दिष्करकरस्तृष्णीहरवदिस्तवसुपद्याति, सेवाविद्येष्यु-  
च्यते । अतेव किञ्चित्कार्यं करोति तदवस्थं चुतविद्विभवमनिद्व-  
वा वक्तव्यं, अविद्यावाच्च संसारस्तप्रपञ्चकार्यकर्त्तव्यमवस्थमप्युक्तार्थं, तस्मिन्  
सत्यपि अविद्याच्यत्वसुच्यते, तदा कर्त्ताविद्यिदपि वाच्यं  
न यात् ब्रह्मणोऽप्यवाच्यताप्रयक्षिः । तस्मादित्थात्मस्थृपतार्थतिरेषेष  
गान्वदात्मगो रूपसुपद्यते । अविद्यात्मस्थ चिद्रूपतमेव तद्विशिष्टस्थ  
धर्मस्थ कर्त्ताविद्यित् प्रमात्मानुपपत्तेः ।

येरपि नैवाविकादिभिरात्मा चेत्पादोनाचेत्प इत्युच्यते, चेत-  
नापि तस्य मनःषंघोनेता । तथाहि रक्षा-हान-प्रधावाद्यो गुणात्मक

\* इवत इति ० वस्त्रपाठः ।

अवस्थारहस्यादां भास्त्रमणः संघोगाद्युपश्चन्ते । तैरेव च गुणः स्वर्यं  
आता दद्यन्ते आक्षेति कथपदित्यते । भोवहस्यादाद्यु मित्राद्याद्यनि-  
हृत्यौ तमूलानां दीषाद्याद्यापि चिद्वनेष्वेषां चुक्षादीनां विवेषमूला-  
द्यामत्त्वात्तोच्छित्तिः स्वरूपमात्प्रतिष्ठत्वमात्मनोऽङ्गीकृतां । तेषां च  
सुक्षः पदः । अस्त्वासां द्यादां चिमाद्यग आदत्त्वं । व्यापकत्वाद्यते  
गुणा आकाशादीनामपि संक्षिति । अतासदैक्षेत्रेणत्वातः चिद्विद्वृप-  
भ्रावद्यमङ्गीकर्त्तव्यं । आदमत्त्वाद्याद्यात्प्रतिष्ठेति चेत् । न । सर्व-  
द्यैव इ जातिस्त्रोतः द्यावत्तिः । अत्रोऽन्नात्प्रियो वैक्षत्त्वमात्मगेत्वम-  
भ्रावीकर्त्तव्यं । द्यावधिष्ठात्वं चिद्विद्वृपद्यैव शटते भाव्यता ।

वैदिति भीमांश्कैः कर्त्तव्यद्वृप चात्माङ्गीक्रियते । तेषामपि  
च चुक्षः पदः । तथादि अङ्गस्त्रयसाम्भु आक्षेति तेषां प्रतिष्ठा अङ्ग-  
प्रत्यये च कर्त्तव्ये कर्त्तव्यद्वात्मग एव । न चैतदिवद्वृपादुपपश्यते  
कर्त्तव्ये प्रमादत्त्वं, कर्त्तव्यस्तु चेभेत्वत्त्वं । न चैतदिवद्वृपभ्रावद्यादो चुक्षप-  
द्येष्वाय घटते, यदिवद्वृपभ्रावद्यादां न तद्वेच्छं । सद्य भावतभावै ।  
विद्वृपे च कर्त्तव्य-कर्त्तव्ये । आदोच्चते । न कर्त्तव्य-कर्त्तव्ययोर्वर्त्तरेत्वः,  
किम्पु भर्त्तव्य-कर्त्तव्यत्वातः । नैतद्युक्तं, विद्वृपभ्रावद्यादो दुष्कालात् ।  
कर्त्तव्यद्वृपस्त्रयसाम्भावं चरित्वद्यादगेऽधिष्ठात्वमेवेष्यत्त्वं, तत्र चेत-  
नात्मत्वे ।

वैरिति द्रष्टव्यर्थाक्षेत्रेष्वाक्षत्वोऽस्त्रमवक्षत्वं भर्त्तव्यपरिष्कारद्य यरि-  
त्वाज्ञितविष्टते, तेषात्तुत्वादभरत्वत् एव पदः । यरित्वामिले चिद्वृ-  
पद्याद्यानिः । चिद्वृपद्याभावे चित्तवक्षत्वं आदत्त्वं । तस्याद्याद्यत्त्वं  
कर्त्तव्याद्यानां चिद्वृपद्याभ्रावीकर्त्तव्यं तस्याधिष्ठात्वमेव ।

केचित् कर्तृरूपमेवात्मानमिच्छन्ति । तथाहि विषयवाचिष्ये या ज्ञानसञ्चया क्रिया समुत्पद्यता तस्या विषयवर्तिनिः फलं, तस्याच्च फलतर्हपादां संविन्नौ स्वरूपं प्रकाश्वपतया प्रतिभावते, विषयस्य ग्राह्यतया, आत्मा याइकत्वेन । घटमहं जानामीत्यनेनाकारेण तद्वारा समुत्पन्नः । क्रियाद्याः कारणः कर्त्तैव भवतीत्यतः कर्द्वं भोक्तृत्यज्ञात्मनो रूपमिति । तदनुपपत्तं । यस्मात्तार्था संविन्नीर्णा किं कर्द्वं सुगप्तं प्रतिपद्यते क्रमेण वा । युगपत्कर्द्वत्ये लक्षणात्मरे तस्य कर्द्वं न स्थात् । अथ क्रमेण कर्द्वं, तदैकरूपस्य न घटते । एकेण रूपेण चेत्स्य कर्द्वं तदा एकस्य सदैव समिहितत्वात् सर्वं फलमेकरूपं स्थात् । अथ जानारूपतया तस्य कर्द्वं तदा परिणामित्वं । परिणामित्वाच न चिद्रूपत्वं । अतच्चिद्रूपलमात्मन इच्छ-हि न्न साक्षात्कर्त्तव्यमज्ञीकर्त्तव्यं । याहृश्चमस्याभिः कर्द्वमात्मनः प्रतिपादितं कृतस्यस्य नित्यस्य चिद्रूपस्य तदेवोपपत्तं ।

एतेन स्वप्रकाशस्यात्मनो विषयर्थविच्छिन्नारेण याइकत्वमभिव्यक्त इति ये वदन्ति, तेष्येतेनैव निराश्रयाः ।

केचिद्दिमर्शात्मकलमात्मनस्मिन्नायत्वमिच्छन्ति । ते चाउर्ण विमर्शव्यतिरेकेण चिद्रूपलमात्मनो निरूपयितुं इच्छं । जडात् किञ्च दैत्यवृष्ट्ये चिद्रूपलमुच्यते । तच विमर्शव्यतिरेकेणागिरूपमाणं बान्ध-यावतिष्ठते । तदनुपपत्तं । इदमित्यमेवरूपमिति यो विचारः य विमर्श इत्युच्यते, स चास्मिताव्यतिरेकेणेत्यानमेव न सम्भवते । तथाहि आत्मन्युपजायमानो विमर्शः अहमेवमूल इत्यनेनाकारेण संवेद्यते । ततस्याहं इच्छसमिक्षस्यात्मसञ्चालस्यार्थस्य तच सुरायाच विकल्पस्यारूप-

तातिक्षमः । विकल्पसाधवसायात्मां बुद्धिभ्यौ च चिदूर्ध्वाः । कूटस-  
गित्यत्वेन चितेः बदैकरूपतामाहंकारानुप्रवेशः । तदनेन सविमर्शल-  
मात्मगः प्रतिपाद्यता बुद्धिरेवात्मत्वेन भाग्या प्रतिपादिता, च  
प्रकाशात्मगः परस्य पुरुषस्य स्वरूपमवगतमिति ।

एवं सर्वेषांपि दर्शनेष्वधिष्ठात्रत्वं विश्वाय नान्यदात्मगो रूपसुप-  
पत्यते । अधिष्ठात्रस्य च चिदूपत्वं । तच जडादैस्तत्त्वमेव । चिदूपतया  
यदधितिष्ठति तदेव भोग्यतां जग्यति\* । यत्तु चेतनाधिष्ठितं तदेव  
सकलस्ववहारयोग्यं भवति । एवस्य सति छत्रायत्मात् प्रधानस्य  
श्यापारनिष्ठौ चदात्मगः कैवल्यमस्माभिरुदं तदित्याय दर्शनाकरा-  
णामपि नान्या गतिरक्षित तस्मादिदमेव युक्तमुक्तं दृक्षिणारूप्यप-  
रीहारेण स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा चितिशक्तेः कैवल्यं ।

तदेवं सिद्धान्तरेभ्यो विज्ञाणां सर्वसिद्धिमूलभूतां चमाधिसिद्धि-  
मभिधाय आत्मनरपरिषामलाच्छपस्य च सिद्धिविशेषस्य प्रकृत्यापूरणमेव  
कारणमित्युपपाद्य धर्मादीनां प्रतिबन्धकगिरुक्तिमात्र एव सामर्थ्य-  
मिति प्रदर्श्य निर्बाणचिन्तागामस्मितामाचाकुद्धव इत्युक्ता तेषाम्  
योगिचिन्तमेवाधिष्ठानात्मकमिति प्रदर्श्य योगिचिन्तस्य चिन्तान्तरवैस-  
च्छमभिधाय तत्कर्मणामसौकिकलज्ञोपपाद्य विपाकानुग्रहानां वा-  
सनामामभियक्तिसामर्थ्यं कार्यकारणयोस्मैकलप्रतिपादनेन व्यवहि-  
तानामपि वाचनानामानन्तर्युपपाद्य तासामानन्तरेष्यि रेतुफलादि-  
हारेण शान्तमुपदिश्यातीतादिव्यध्वसु धर्माणां सद्वावसुपपाद्य वि-

\* भोग्यतामेतीति ० युक्तक्षपाठः ।

शान्त्वादं निराकृतं प्रस्तारदर्दं प्रतिष्ठाय पुरुषं शान्त्वादं  
सिद्धाते च सकलवद्वारागिर्यसितुपराय पुरुषिद्वौ प्रमाणसुप्र-  
दर्शं कैवल्यगिर्याय इति: स्मैः उमेशोपदोग्निनोऽर्जान्धिग्राम  
ग्रामान्वरेवेतदेव कैवल्यगितुपराय कैवल्यसर्वं किरीतविवि-  
क्षाहतः कैवल्यादः ।

सर्वे यस च ग्रन्थाप्यवत्तेः पादान्तरे वाचिः-  
ग्रन्थाप्यसुकुटेषु भूर्णेषु दक्षत्वाद्वां धरिषीभुतः ।  
दक्षत्वाद्वायाय गर्वमसर्वं शान्तेवत्तमि विता  
ष श्रीमित्रामार्हापतिः फलिष्ठेः सुखेषु भूर्णं शान्तः ॥

र्तत श्रीमहाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजदेवविरचितायां राजमार्त्त्स्ता-  
भिशायां पातञ्जलयोगशास्त्रद्वयो त्रैवापादस्तुत्यः । शमाप्ना चेयं  
पातञ्जलयोगस्त्रित्यः ॥०॥

## द्वाराणं द्वचो ।

इष्टे, पारे, द्वर्ण ।				इष्टे, पारे, द्वर्ण ।			
अतीतानामतमित्यादि	५९	४	१२	कायेन्दियसिद्धिरित्यादि	५४	२	४६
अब दोगानुभावान्व	१	१	१	किंच सच्चासीत्यादि	५५	२	४१
अग्नित्याश्रौपीत्यादि	५६	२	५	द्वूर्यनाशा चर्णे	७५	२	४१
अनुभूतिप्रयेत्यादि	७	१	११	द्वार्णं प्रतीत्यादि	५१	२	११
अपरिप्रहस्यम् इत्यादि	५१	१	८८	द्वामान्वयं परिवासान्वये			
अभावप्रत्यक्षेत्यादि	०	१	१०	चेतुः	६६	२	१५
अभ्याप्तैराग्नेत्यादि	८	१	१२	ज्ञेयकर्त्तव्यात्येत्यादि	१४	२	१०
अविद्याचेत्यादि	११	२	०	ज्ञेयमूलः कर्मान्वयेत्यादि	१६	२	१२
अविद्याक्षिदेत्यादि	११	२	१	ज्ञेयतत्त्वमयेत्यादिःदि	४०	२	५१
असेवप्रतिष्ठायात्यमित्यादि	५१	२	१०	ज्ञेयप्रविद्यामीत्यादि	१११	३	११
अविद्याप्रविष्टायात्यमित्यादि	५१	२	१५	चीकहसेरविद्यातसेवे-			
अहिंसायत्क्षेत्रेत्यादि	५०	२	१०	त्यादि	१५	२	४१
अैक्यप्रविष्टायादा	१५	१	१२	ज्ञेयस्त्रप्तेत्यादि	४४	२	१०
उदानन्दायात्येत्यादि	५०	१	१५	अन्ते लतारूपूहङ्गान्व	०४	२	१०
उत्तरात्तर प्रक्षा	१८	१	४८	किंविरप्रतिष्ठामात्या			
उद्यममें चेत्यानन्दान्				इत्यादि	१०५	३	१२
रक्षत्	१०२	४	१६	विजायारट्येत्यादि	१०२	३	१०
रत्नैव उविष्टारेत्यादि	१६	१	४४	अज्ञोपविमन्ततप्रद्वादि	८०	१	
रवे अतिदेवेत्यादि	४०	२	११	अतिदेवकमेत्यादि	१४	१	८
रवेन भूतेन्द्रियेत्यित्यादि	४५	१	१२	अतिदेवत्यादि	५०	१	५२
कर्मद्वारै पुत्रियासामित्यिः	७५	१	१०	आत्यनारपरिवास इत्यादि	८१	१	१
कर्मान्वयाद्विष्टित्यादि	१८	१	०	तत्त्वित्येत्यादि	१०८	४	११
काव्यपर्यवेक्षादित्यादि	५०	१	११	वज्रः लंखार इत्यादि	१८	१	५०
काव्याकाशकेतित्यादि	८२	१	४८	वज्रपक्षद्वेषान्व	१८	१	१८

इष्टे, पादे, खर्च ।				इष्टे, पादे, खर्च ।			
तत्त्वायात् प्रश्नालोकः	११	२	५	तदा सर्वोपरस्तमस्तेत्यादि	११०	४	२०
ततः क्षतार्थीनामित्यादि१११	०	११		तदुपरागार्थेचित्यादि-			
ततः क्षेत्रकर्त्तव्यिहारिः	११०	०	१६	त्यादि	१००	०	१५
ततः चीयते प्रकाशावर्त्तं	५०	१	५१	तदेवार्थमावग्निमात्रमि-			
ततः परमा वस्त्रतेप्तिवार्षं ५८	१	५५	त्यादि	११	२	२	
ततः प्रत्यक्षेतत्तेत्यादि १८	१	१६	तदैराग्नादपीत्यादि	४५	१	५०	
ततः प्रतिभ्रात्रावेत्यादि ०८	१	१६	तपः साधावेत्तरेत्यादि	११	१	१	
ततेऽचिमादिप्राकुर्भाव			तस्य प्रश्नान्वादितासं-				
इत्यादि	८८	१	४५	क्षारात्	११	१	१०
ततो इष्टानभिवातः	५९	१	४८	तस्य भूमिषु विलिवाः	११	१	१
ततो भवेत्तरविलभित्यादि८४	१	४८	तस्य वाचकः प्रवक्षः	१८	१	१०	
तत्कृदिपाकेत्यादि	११	४	तस्य चप्तेत्यादि	४५	१	१०	
तस्यर्पुष्टव्यावेत्यादि१०	१	१६	तस्य चेतुरविद्या	४१	१	१४	
तत्प्रतिषेधार्थेतत्त्वा-			तस्यापि लिरीव इत्यादि	११	१	५१	
भासः	११	१	१२	तस्मिन्स्तति ज्ञावेत्यादि	४५	१	५५
तत्प्रथावज्ञानावर्त्तं	४५	४	ता एव उवीकः समाधिः	१०	१	४५	
तत्प्रिरतिष्ठर्य सर्वेषांवीक्षं१०	१	११	तारकं सर्वेविवशसित्यादि८८	१	५४		
तत्प्रथ्येकतान्ता भासः १०	१	१२	तासामन्वादिलभित्यादि	१५	४	१०	
तत्प्राणोदीत्येत्यादि	११	१	तीव्रसंवेदानामासद्वाः	१४	१	११	
तत्प्रियौ यत्तोऽभ्यासः	८	१	ते प्रतिप्रसवस्त्रेष्वाः चरुकाः	१५	१	१०	
तत्प्रियौ यत्तोऽभ्यासः	८	१	ते व्यक्तस्त्रुत्युक्तावाः	१०	४	१६	
तत्प्रियौ यत्तोऽभ्यासः	८	१	ते समाचावुपस्त्री इत्यादि०८	१	१०		
तदभावात् चेत्येवाभाव			ते ज्ञाहपरितापफला				
इत्यादि	४४	१	१५	इत्यादि	४८	१	१४
तदर्थं एव इष्टान्वात्मा	४१	१	चयमन्तरं पूर्वेष्वाः	४१	१	०	
तदचंद्रोयवासनाभिरि-			चक्षेष्व च संवासः	४१	१	४	
त्यादि	१००	४	दुःखदोमेनस्तेत्यादि	१०	१	११	
तदा ब्रह्मित्यादि	४	१	दुःखानुशयी देषाः	४४	१	८	
तदा चिवेकनिमित्यादि१०८	४	१५	दम्भमेत्यादि	४४	१	८	

	श्लोक, पादे, लक्ष्यं ।		श्लोक, पादे, लक्ष्यं ।
प्रदानुचिकेत्यादि	८ १ १५	प्रदेश्यालोकव्यासादित्यादि०१	१ २५
देशव्यव्यित्तिस्य धारणा	१० १ १	प्रसंख्यानेष्यकुसीदस्ये-	
प्रदा द्विभाष्य इत्यादि	४१ १ १०	त्यादि	११० ४ १८
प्रदृढभाष्येत्यादि	४० १ १०	प्रतिभाष्या सर्वं	७१ १ १८
प्रदृढभाष्योपरत्यनित्यादि	१०१ ४ ११	प्रवक्तारस्यैवित्यादि-	
धारणात्तु च वोग्यता भग्नसः ५८	१ १६	त्यादि	१०८ १ १८
धारणेष्यात्तु त्यः	१९ १ ११	वल्लेषु इक्षिवल्लादीनि	११ १ १४
भुवे तद्विभाष्यं	७४ १ १८	प्रत्यक्ष्येप्रतिष्ठायां वौय्ये-	
न तत् चालव्यव्यित्यादि १०	१ १०	लाभः	५१ १ १८
न तत् चालासं द्वज्ञाता॑ १०१	४ १८	भवप्रत्ययो विदेहेत्यादि	१६ १ १८
नामित्त्वे काय्यूद्वज्ञानं ७४	१ १८	भुवनज्ञानं स्त्र॒र्यसंवमात्	०५ १ १९
विभिन्नप्रयोजकेत्यादि ११	४ १	मूर्वंश्चोतिति चिददर्शनं	०३ १ ११
विभाष्यव्यित्तिस्याव्यव्यित्तिः-		द्वदुष्मधेत्यादि	१५ १ ११
मात्रात्	११ ४ ४	मैत्रीकरणेत्यादि	११ १ ११
विभिन्नारवैवारण इत्यादि१०	१ ४०	मैत्रादिषु वक्षानि	०२ १ ११
परमादुपरमभज्ञान		व्याभिन्नस्य धारणा॒	१४ १ १८
इत्यादि	१४ १ ४०	व्यभिन्नप्राप्नेत्यादि	४६ १ ११
परिवामताप्रवच्छारेत्यादि१८	१ १५	योगव्यित्तिहिनिरोधः	६ १ १
परिवामयेत्यादि	१० १ १९	योगाङ्गानुष्ठानेत्यादि	४६ १ १८
परिवामैकत्वाद्विभाष्यं	१८ ४ १४	स्वप्नस्य इत्यादि	८४ १ १९
पुरुषार्थद्वन्द्वानामित्यादि११	४ ११	वसुषास्य इत्यादि	१८ ४ १५
प्रकाशक्रियेत्यादि	४० १ १८	विहरक्रियेत्यादि	८१ १ १६
प्रस्तर्विष्वारत्त्वाभ्यामि-		वाञ्छाभ्यामरविष्वेत्यादि	५० १ ११
त्यादि	११ १ १४	विसर्वापाधम इत्यादि	४६ १ ११
प्रत्यक्षानुभावेत्यादि	६ १ ०	विसर्वापिचारामन्देत्यादि	१० १ १०
प्रत्ययस्य परचित्त्वानं	५० १ १८	विसर्वापिष्वादय इत्यादि	४६ १ १४
प्रवादविष्वेत्यादि	६ १ ६	विष्वेत्वा भिष्वाङ्गानेत्यादि	६ १ ८
प्रवद्वैष्विष्वेत्यादि	४५ १ ४०	विरामप्रत्ययाभ्यासेत्यादि	११ १ १८
प्रदग्निमेष्येप्रयोजकमित्यादि११	४ ५	विवेकव्यातिरविष्वेत्यादि	४४ १ १९

इठे, पाठे, खर्च ।				इठे, पाठे, खर्च ।			
विशेषदर्शित इत्यादि	१०८	०	१०	वहाङ्गातापितृष्टपत्त			
विशेषाविशेषेत्यादि	११	१	१५	इत्यादि	१००	०	१०
विशेषाका या व्योतिष्ठाती	१२	१	१५	वलोपादमुख्यः सुखाकाः ५५	१	४५	
विषवंवती वेत्यादि	१३	१	१५	वदाविभावनार्थ इत्यादि	१५	१	१
वीतरामविषयं या वित्तं	१५	१	२०	वलाविशेषेत्यादि	५५	१	४५
हत्यः पश्यत्य इत्यादि	५	१	५	वलानवादात् प्रवक्ष्यते	५०	१	४०
हणिषारप्यवित्तन्	५	१	५	वलोपत्तेकाशत्वेत्यादि-			
वापिष्टावेत्यादि	१८	१	२०	त्यादि	५०	१	१५
कुत्तामविदेषेत्यादि	१९	१	८	दुषानुदृशी रोता	५४	१	५
वल्लज्ञानाकुपातीत्यादि	२०	१	८	द्वयविषयवेत्यादि	२०	१	४५
वल्लदर्शज्ञामेत्यादि	२५	१	५१	सेपक्षते विद्यप्रदक्षिणे-			
वल्लदर्शप्रवेत्यादि	२८	१	१०	त्यादि	७१	१	११
व्यापोदितवित्यादि	२९	१	११	व्याप्तिगिमन्त्रम् इत्यादि	८५	१	५२
द्वौष-स्वोपेत्यादि	३८	१	११	चूलालक्ष्मीत्यादि	८१	१	४४
द्वौषादाकाङ्क्षुदेष्येत्यादि	५२	१	५०	पृतिपरिमुक्तोपित्यादि	११	१	४२
वदा-वीर्य-कृतीत्यादि	५४	१	१०	सप्तनिदेत्यादि	१४	१	१८
कुत्तामुमामेत्यादि	८८	१	४५	वरसवारी विकुवोऽपि-			
कोत्ताकामवेत्यित्यादि	८९	१	४५	त्यादि	१५	१	८
संक्षारप्राचाक्तरक्तादि-				क-विविदविषयोग्योगा-			
त्यादि	१५	१	१८	माव इत्यादि	५८	१	४४
स इ दूषेष्टमपीत्यादि	१०	१	१५	सासाविद्वत्तोरित्यादि	४५	१	१५
सति मूल इत्यादि	१०	१	१५	सामवेषा लोकेष्वद्वात्	१०८	४	१३
स तु दीर्घक्षेत्यादि	८	१	१४	हहये वित्तसंविद्	५१	१	१३
स तु कामाद्यकरेत्यादि	५५	१	१०	सेषुपक्षामविक्षेपेति-			
सत्यप्रतिष्ठायामित्यादि	५६	१	१५	त्यादि	६९	४	११
सत्यपुरप्यवोरत्यक्षेष्यम्	००	१	१५	सेषु कुम्भवासेत्	२८	१	१५
सत्यपुरप्यवेत्यित्यादि	४८	१	५५				
सत्यपुरप्यवेत्यादि	४९	१	५५				



